THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

SURVIVE

SWEDISH CIVIL DEFENSE 1972

See Page Eight

JULY-AUGUST 1972

C D Calendar

(State, regional, national and international meetings)

July 16-19	Conference, Region III United States CD Council – Greenville, S. C.
July 26-28	Conference, Region VIII United States CD Council – Pocatello, Idaho
July 31 – August 4	International Symposium on Emergency Medical Services (sponsored by American Medical Institute) – Honolulu, Hawaii
October 30 – November 2	Annual Conference, United States CD Council – Boston, Mass.

(Officials of state, regional, national and international civil defense associations are invited to submit dates and places of meetings. Please submit early.)

HEADLINES TO COME . . .

The June 1972 Rapid City, S. D. flood tragedy – caused by the collapse of the earth-built Canyon Lake Dam – puts a queasy focus on the questionable safety of large earthen dams. Last February, West Virginia's Buffaol Creek Dam (earth) gave way and 16 communities were engulfed. The crumbling and bursting of earthen dams dot history back to and beyond the infamous 1889 Johnstown, Pa. flood caused by the failure of the South Fork Dam (earth).

Rapid City is another example of questionable construction methods and questionable habitation patterns. Said one civil preparedness observer: "Two major U. S. dam breaks in the first half of 1972 are two too many. But, based on disaster history one can predict other such catastrophes in the 1970's and further into the future. New and rigid engineering analyses are needed for all large earthen dams, and risks should be assessed for all people living in areas within lethal ranges of possible dam bursts."

SURVIVE

VOL. 5, NO. 4 JULY - AUGUST 1972

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DCPA

Effective May 5, 1972 the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) was "disestablished." In its place the DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY (DCPA) took over. DCPA brings civil defense up a big notch to come directly under Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.

The former OCD team remains intact as the new DCPA organization with John E. Davis at the helm.



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EDITORIAL...

WHAT THE PUBLIC REALLY WANTS

The hot-cold breath of public jitters was felt briefly by local civil defense staffs in early May when President Nixon acted forcefully to cut North Vietnam supply lines – and intemperate reactions by Moscow and Peking were expected;

Where were the shelters? Were we prepared to construct temporary shelters? What was civil defense doing to protect the people? What was GOVERNMENT doing to provide at least some defense for its citizens against nuclear attack?

For several nervous moments people were worried. The obscuring shield of wishful thinking had suddenly vaporized. The missiles were there. The warheads were there. All the terrible possibilities were now visible. And defense was not.

Then the crisis was over as quickly as it had begun. Public concern in the United States dutifully crawled back under its blanket. President Nixon's June 1st assurance that his Moscow agreements represented "the beginning of a process that can lead to lasting peace" put the public thumb back in the public mouth.

For the American political leader there is in this "minor" crisis further clear evidence of a basic truth:

WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT PROTECTION AGAINST THE WEAPONS OF MODERN WAR, WANT A VIRILE CIVIL DEFENSE THAT WILL GIVE THEM PROTECTION, AND EXPECT GOVERNMENT TO HAVE THIS PROTECTION AND THIS CIVIL DEFENSE ALREADY AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF CRISIS.

The people are not going to ask for protection from nuclear weapons during normal times. They do not want to think about nucelar weapons or civil defense. They want to think about less work and more recreation, prosperity, and bite-sized problems that lend themselves to bite-sized solutions.

So far, in the United States, government has failed in this responsibility. The public does not have the protection – the civil defense – which it wants to assume it has. Statistics clearly reveal the shortcomings. But these are statistics which are unpalatable and shocking. It is more comfortable and popular to ignore them.

In a crisis which lasts longer than the initial scare the public will discover belatedly that it has been betrayed, that the safety measures which need to be taken cannot be taken in haste but should have been planned and executed beforehand as a part of government's basic public safety obligation.

What we vitally need – what the public really wants – is inspired, practical and determined leadership. Leadership that will coldly assess facts and take the deliberate and forthright action which is necessary for survival and which the public expects it to take.

Now. Not at the time of crisis.

SURVIVE

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

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Problems of SALT: 1972

by Mark B. Schneider

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were initiated in November of 1969 with a great deal of fanfare. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union solemnly declared their desire to curtail strategic arms competition. Press reports on the first Helsinki session were incredibly optimistic – indeed it is difficult not to conclude that newsmen reported more of their hopes than the news.

After the signing of the first SALT agreement in Moscow

Writer, lecturer, professor Mark B. Schneider hails from the University of Southern California, where he is currently teaching and polishing off his PhD dissertation "Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945 to 1953." Schneider's strategic analyses have appeared in the *National Review, Military Review, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Ordnance* **and** *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra.* **His professional field is History.**

in May 1972 a similar emotional outburst occured. This observer begs to differ with the popular view and to suggest that from the standpoint of history "SALT I" may appear as a classic example of the futility of negotiating from a position of weakness and without public support for one's position.

SOVIET SURGE

Soviet strategic weapons policy since 1969 has all but made a strategically significant outcome of SALT impossible – at least in terms of American strategic problems. SALT I does not do this. SALT II (if it occurs) will probably not either. The main reason for this is the relentless Soviet strategic buildup from 1969 to the present.

In 1969 a rough position of strategic parity had emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was hoped by many that this state of parity could serve as a basis for an equitable SALT agreement. One of our declared SALT objectives in 1969 was to stabilize the strategic balance at the existing level. That was soon to be impossible. As President Nixon has reported "During the first year of the negotiations the Soviets had increased their total arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers by nearly one-fourth, and submarine launchers by nearly one-half." Indeed between mid-1969 and early 1970 the Soviets laid down about 300 new ICBM silos, began the construction of new ABM radars, expedited the construction rates of their new Y-class ballistic missile submarines and flight tested a new ICBM, IRBM and a strategic bomber.

In 1970 there was the much heralded slowdown of Soviet new ICBM starts. Many interpreted this to mean the Soviets had ended their ICBM program. What was ignored was that the Soviets made a massive effort to finish existing silos and begin the construction of a new generation of offensive missiles. In February of 1970 the President projected an increase in the Soviet ICBM force from 1100 to 1290 during 1970. The actual number as he reported in February 1971 was 1,440. Similarly while 350 Soviet SLBMs were projected for late 1970, the Soviets had 400 by the end of the year.

In 1971 the Soviet Union began the construction of new types of ICBM silos all of which are of very large size. Senator Henry M. Jackson pointed out that deployment of

ABBREVIATIONS

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Missile with a range of 5,000 miles or more.

ABM – Antiballistic Missile System. A system designed to intercept and destroy ballistic missile warheads.

SLBM – Sub-launched Ballistic Missile.

MRV – Multiple Re-entry Vehicle. Refers to multiple warhead systems which have limited capabilities to seperate their warheads either during flight or over impact points. These systems may or may not be aimable.

MIRV – Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle. Refers to multiple warhead systems which are aimable and whose warheads can be seperated by considerable distances during flight and at impact.

SS-9 – Largest Russian ICBM and largest and most powerful missile in the world. It has storable liquid fuel, stands about 115 feet tall, is 10 feet in diameter and has a payload of 13,500 to 15,000 lbs. It can carry a single 25 megaton warhead or three 5 or 6 megaton warheads. About 300 exist.

SS-11 – The most numerous of the Russian ICBMs. About 1,000 now exist. While significantly smaller than the SS-9 it is still significantly larger than our Minuteman. Early versions had about a 1,500 lb. payload but this has apparently been increased in the newer versions. It too has storable liquid fuel.

R&D – Research and Development.

SAC – The Strategic Air Command, USAF.

SAM – Surface to Air Missile. These are designed to shoot down bombers but have some ABM capability.

ASW – Anti-Submarine Warfare.

PSI – Pounds per square inch.

MSR – Missile Site Radar.

TRY ADD – A code term used to describe the small tracking radars around Moscow. They are dome covered mechanically steered tracking radars. Four exist around Moscow. They perform final tracking of missile warheads and direct Galosh interceptor missiles at them. Our MSR does the same thing (which it is a lot better at) but the MSR also has to perform the function of the Dog House radar (which it is not!).

CEP – Circle of Equal Probability. The radius of a circle around a target within which – according to the assumed accuracy of the missile being employed – ½ of those missiles aimed at the target will fall. In the case where only one missile is considered that missile will have a 50-50 chance of falling within the circle.

DOD – Department of Defense (United States).

70 such launchers by the Soviet Union that year would add as much payload to their force as is contained in the entire U.S. ICBM force. To this an Administration spokesman replied that 70 would be an exceedingly high rate. In February 1972 the President announced that in 1971 they had started deployment of 100.

By late 1971 the Soviet ICBM force operational or under construction (including training launchers) numbered 1,800. The comparable figure for the United States is 1,068. The Soviets had 43 Y-class missile submarines, comparable to our Polaris class of which we have 41 operational or under construction. In addition about 100 missiles are deployed on older Soviet submarines. Thus if the Soviets were to only complete existing ICBMs and SLBMs they would have 2,550 missiles compared to about 1,700 for the United States. If their buildup continues at current rates their operational force could go over 3,000 by the mid 1970s.

NO. 1 YARDSTICK: PAYLOAD

Numbers of missiles do not tell the entire story. The most important measure of missile capability is throw weight or payload. Throw weight determines the number of warheads and their yields a missile force can carry. The Soviet SS-9 (about 300 currently operational) has ten times the payload of a Minuteman according to President Nixon.* The President's Blue Ribbon Defense Report written in 1970 concluded, "The 300 Soviet SS-9s, expected to be operational by the end of this year, will be capable of delivering 7,500 megatons with a destructive capability several times greater than the total warhead capability of our entire ICBM and SLBM force." Since the U.S. bomber force contains only slightly more megatonnage than our missile force, it seems that the already operational SS-9s carry significantly more megatonnage than the entire U.S. strategic offensive force.

The Defense Department has already reported that the Soviets have begun the deployment of multiple warheads on their SS-9 and SS-11 missiles. The SS-9 can easily carry three warheads of 5 or 6 megatons and the SS-11 three weapons of several hundred kilotons. There is some doubt over whether the multiple warheads are aimable MRV (Mulitple Re-entry Vehicles) or true MIRVs. If they are not MIRV they would not be effective ABM penetrators but they could be used to attack separate Minuteman silos, at least in the SS-9 version. In 1969 Secretary Laird declared that 420 SS-9s (or a smaller number of SS-9s and additonal SS-11s) could destroy 95% of our Minuteman force if they were armed with 3 five megaton warheads with a CEP of ¼ mile. Thus the existing SS-9 force plus the new silos can easily threaten the U.S. ICBM force with the qualitative improvements expected by 1975. They would represent an even more severe threat if they were armed with six 1 or 2 megaton warheads with a somewhat improved accuracy.

Professor Schneider here refers to payload measured in weight. Payload measured in terms of explosive power would show the SS-9 to have twenty-five times the payload of a Minuteman. –Ed.

THE SHIFTING STRATEGIC BALANCE 1966-1972

	U.S.		U.S.S.R.	
	ICSMs	SLBMs	ICBMs	SLBMs
1965	934	464	224	107
1969	1,054	656	1,109	240
1970	1,054	656	1,440	350
1971	1,054	656	1,520	500
Mid. 1972	1,054	656	1,550	580

The Soviet SLBM force represents a great threat to the U.S. bomber force. The U.S. has no adequate coastal radar system against missile launching submarines. The Safeguard system would have given us such a capability if it had been completed, but this is virtually impossible now. Hence the Soviet buildup of the last two years has made two of the three elements of our strategic force potentially very vulnerable by the mid-1970s. In addition, our decision to acquiesce to the Soviet demand to put ABM limitation first eliminates our main effort to preserve the survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces.

ROLE OF THE SUB . . .

If we were to sign an agreement that severely limited or prohibited our deployment of the Safeguard system or a "hard-site" defense system we would be almost completely dependent in the mid-1970s on the capabilities of our Polaris submarines. Some argue that this will remain invulnerable and hence we can rely upon them. They often argue that the addition of several thousand MIRVs through the development of Poseidon will give us an adequate deterrent and even an "over-kill capability." These claims do not stand up to rigorous analysis.

In the first place the Poseidon carries the smallest warhead we have ever considered strategic in almost 20 years – about 40 kilotons. One does not destroy a city with a 40 kiloton warhead. Indeed in 1967 the McNamara administration released information to the effect that it would require three 50 kiloton warheads to destroy a city of only 100,000. Ten such warheads would not completely destroy a city of 1/2 million.

Polaris is not invulnerable. Submarines can be sunk if they are located. At present a Soviet effort might locate only a few Polaris submarines at sea but their effectiveness is bound to decline. The Soviets are making a massive effort in ASW. We must remember that only about 1/2 of our Polaris submarines are at sea at any one time. During the present Polaris conversions to Poseidon the operational force has been reduced to 29 submarines and only about one half of them are at sea at any given time. The next time we have to modify these submarines we may have a situation where as few as 10 Poseidon submarines are at sea. Against

the ASW technology of 1980 this could be a critical weakness.

. . . AND OF CIVIL DEFENSE

The effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces in an "Assured Destruction" role has always been postulated on the basis of normal nighttime distribution of population. If you assume no civil defense, optimal delivery of 400 one-megaton bombs (or say four times that number of 40 kiloton MIRVs) could destroy 1/3 of the Soviet population. But the Soviets have invested vast sums in civil defense. William Kintner* has written that they have probably enough 25 psi shelters for 1/2 of their urban population. Soviet subway systems are designed to serve as bomb shelters. The Soviets have stressed city evacuation.

It is interesting to note that against a population housed in 25 psi shelters a 20 megaton bomb would be necessary to do as much damage as a one megaton bomb against an unsheltered population. We have 40 kilotons in the Poseidon. Eugene P. Wigner has calcualted that if the Soviet Union were to evacuate its urban population, we could inflict only a few million fatalities, and this only if all our strategic forces survived the attack, all were used against population, and none of the weapons were intercepted.

Yet we face a massive and growing Soviet aerospace defense force. The Soviets have several thousand air defense radars. They have over 3,000 interceptors and 10,000 surface to air missile launchers. The Soviets have begun to deploy what seems to be part of a massive ABM. It covers most of the European U.S.S.R. with an area defense. The radars of the Soviets system are simply enormous. The Dog House at Moscow is a large sophisticated phase array radar which has two radiating elements each the size of two football fields. The Dog House is supported by four Try Add tracking radars around Moscow. The Russian Hen House Radar is like nothing else in the world. One version is about 90 feet tall and 1,000 feet long! Another is about a half mile long! This much has been confirmed by the Administration. *Aviation Week* reports that one of them is 6,000 feet long. As Dr. John Foster has commented the 6 Hen House Radars "can in the near term provide the same radar coverage we will have eight years from now if all the Safeguard program is completed." In 1971 the Soviets began to deploy a second generation ABM around Moscow. *Aviation Week* has reported that it may include an advanced interceptor similar to the U.S. Sprint which would mean a tremendous increase in effectiveness. A more advanced supplement for the Try Add is now being built.

The vast Soviet ABM system creates enormous problems for our SALT planners. As Dr. Foster noted the "vast network of Soviet radars and defense sites, whether anti-aircraft or anti-missile, has already complicated the problem of the effective arms control of ABM to where it may not be practical." Many air defense radars have been or could be upgraded to have considerable ABM capability. The more than 1,000 Soviet SA-5 SAMs are ambiguous weapons. There has always been some evidence that they were deployed as dual-capable weapons. Most DoD experts agree that they could be upgraded to have considerable ABM capability especially against existing types of low beta re-entry vehicles when linked with the Hen House. As General B. K. Holloway, commander of SAC, has commented:

> . . . I must treat it as an ABM. It is prudent to do so in our war planning, and the penalty for failure to surpress it as an ABM would be greater than the cost of the effort to negate it, which we now plan to expend. My handling of the SA-5 in this sense is cuncurred in by the intelligence community.

The great problem is that the next generation of SAMs will be even more ambiguous. Few technical people doubt that it is feasable to design a SAM that will be a true dual-capability system – in effect, an aerospace interceptor. Against a very limited number of surviving Poseidon submarines and a handful or surviving ICBMs and bombers, such an advanced SAM system could represent a dramatic damage limitation capability. This combined with the Soviet civil defense effort could give them a war winning capability by most reasonable definitions of the words.

**William Kintner is Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institue at the University of Pennsylvania.*

STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE
MID-1972
Strategic Offensive Forces

	U.S.		U.S.S.R.	
Type	Operational	Under Construction	Operational	Under Construction
ICBMs	1,054	0	1,550*	150
SLBMs	656	0	580	220
IRBMs	0	0	700	**
Heavy Bombers	531***	0	200	****
Medium Bombers	0	0	700	*****

*The Soviets have 100 additional training launchers. We have 14.

**The Soviet IRBM/MRBM force is being modernized. Numbers probably will not change much.

***Includes 66 FB-111s. FB-111 has a range comparable to a medium bomber and a size comparable to a light bomber. It can achieve intercontinental range with two refuelings.

****The Soviets are developing a new strategic bomber, the Backfire, which is between medium and heavy bomber in size. It has intercontinental range with one refueling.

*****The Soviets also have 500 medium bombers in their Naval air forces.

SALT EUPHORIA

The first SALT agreement is not the agreement we would have negotiated if we had been dealing from a position of strength. Our two objectives were to preserve the survivability of our land-based strategic forces and preclude the possibility of either side deploying a heavy ABM. We have achieved neither, nor are we likely to do so in the second SALT agreement.

One ABM site with 100 interceptors in one Minuteman field will not preserve Minuteman or bomber survivability in the late 1970s even against upgrading of current missiles. The first SALT agreement does not prohibit the Soviets from replacing their SS-9s with a new missile with twice the payload. It allows placing of larger missiles in the SS-11 silos. The Soviets will be allowed to deploy any number of mobile ICBMs they desire.

The ABM treaty will allow the Soviets to vastly increase their network of ABM radars. They are limited to two sites, but in those two sites they can deploy as many radars as they would need for a full nationwide system. They have one giant radar at Moscow. The treaty allows them to build 12. At the second site they are allowed to build 2 giant radars and 18 "smaller" radars – or about twice the radar capability we had planned for the 12-site Safeguard system. There is only a minor quantitative limitation on the further construction of long range tracking radars.

The radar capability allowed at these two sites could each support several thousand interceptors. If the Soviets decided to abrogate the agreement, they could have a heavy area shield over much of Russia within a year or two. It would be almost futile to attack any target within about 120 miles of Moscow or in the area protected by the second site. There will be tremendous problems in detecting SAM upgrade or possible clandestine interceptor deployment.

If anyone doubts the value of bargaining power in international negotiations he might do well to remember that the Soviets obtained their 230 SLBM advantage under the agreement mainly because they retained their first and second generation ICBMs and we did not. Now we face negotiations on limitation of strategic bombers after we unilaterally scrapped most of ours. Our uncritical acceptance of the concept of an action-reaction arms race is a major source of our weakness. As William Kintner points out:

> Rarely has disarmament been a symmetrical undertaking. More often than not, arms control measures have been negotiated under some kind of duress or threat of sanction rather than by a mutual desire to disarm.

If we are to avoid a disasterous outcome from SALT we must engage in precautionary research and development and intelligence gathering. We must make it clear to the Soviets that if they exploit loopholes in the agreement we will do the same. Unfortunately, in the current political climate we are more likely to curtail vital existing programs than to undertake a program of safeguards. ■

SALT NO BRAKE ON ARMS RACE – *SIPRI*

SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) was founded in 1969 to mark Sweden's record of 150 years of peace.

On June 13th of this year it released its 1972 yearbook on disarmament and world arms races. It's verdict on the Nixon-Soviet SALT agreement of May, 1972:

"Not comprehensive enough."

Citing the continuation of nuclear arms build-up that the agreement permits, SIPRI observes: "Deployment of new nuclear weapons systems will inevitably move the main nuclear arms race to even higher and more dangerous dimensions."

This, according to SIPRI, will weaken seriously the non-proliferation treaty. "By the end of the 1970's," the institute states in its yearbook, "about one-third of the countries in the world will have significant nuclear programs. This could lead to a totally new situation in military and strategic affairs."



POST-ATTACK NARCOTICS

Medical care in Civil Defense in the United States is still an illusion. No defense against weapons is perfect, and civil defense – protection of civilians against the dangers of war and particularly against the effects of nuclear weapons – is no exception to the rule. On the other hand, the harm that any weapon can cause can be diminished by suitable protective measures.

At present, despite many years of planning and the spending of huge sums of money, the pharmacies of the major hospitals and the wholesale drug companies in the large cities have only enough drugs to meet the normal medical needs of a peacetime population. In the event of a nuclear explosion or an attack by chemical or biological weapons, whatever medicines that are left must of necessity be reserved for those who have a reasonable chance for survival – there will be no medicines for the millions of seriously injured who may linger on for weeks before dying. Hundreds of millions of doses of morphine, the most effective of pain-relieving drugs would be required for burns alone in the event of a nuclear war. Despite top-level Civil Defense pronouncements. . .there are *no* stockpiles of medicine for pain other than, amazingly enough, the ordinary aspirin tablet which is very mild indeed.

The *hypodermic* tablet of morphine is the obvious answer to the difficult problem of relief of severe pain in the expected millions of civilian casualties . . .

Keeping in mind the government's priorities, with many needs demanding a share of the government's income, the secure and safe stockpiling of the morphine hypodermic tablet may be necessary for our very survival. This can be done at about the cost of a single bomber now flying in Vietnam.

Leonard B. Greentree, M. D.
Columbus, Ohio

REPLY TO DR. GREENTREE, by Director of U.S. Division of Emergency Health Services:

While I certainly agree with you that the relief of severe pain in millions of casualties would constitute a major problem in the immediate period following a nuclear attack, I cannot concur with your view that there would be insufficient supplies of pain killers (analgesics) for the seriously injured in an emergency. The following comments are offered in support of this position.

1. Morphine is not the only drug available for use as a narcotic-analgesic resource. The National Research Council has taken the position that, under conditions of emergency, certain synthetic narcotics would be acceptable as replacements for natural substances such as morphine or codeine. These synthetics would include such products as meperidine, methadone, pentazocine, etc . . .
2. Throughout the United States there are more than 60,000 commercial supply sources for narcotics including 57,000 retail pharmacies. Approximately 750 million doses of morphine or equal are located at these commercial distribution levels. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs continues to hold to the policy that surviving commercial sources would provide sufficient quantities of analgesics to cope with the immediate needs of a civil defense emergency.
3. Supplemental narcotic stocks are available in various forms in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs district offices. In addition, the National Stockpile (critical and strategic materials stockpile, managed by the General Services Administration) contains amounts of upgraded morphine sulfate sufficient to cover the remainder of estimated first-year postattack needs.

In summary, supply and requirement studies have confirmed that the major postattack problem with narcotics is more one of logistics than national availability. It is, therefore, most important that State and local officials plan for mutual aid such as interlocality transfer or procurement of narcotics.

Henry C. Huntley, M. D., Director
Division of Emergency Health Services

Your March-April 1972 issue of *SURVIVE* rates President Nixon "weak" on civil defense.

I would like to make one statement in defense of the President: he appointed Governor John E. Davis as National Director of Civil Defense.

Director Davis has been the most outspoken of any Director to date and the President has made no apparent attempt to suppress his activities.

It is my opinion that if we had had Governor Davis for a Director for the past 20 years we would not be in the mess we now find ourselves.

David H. Parmenter, Executive Director
Erie County Civil Defense (Pennsylvania)

On January 14, 1972 Sweden's 6-man "1970 Committee on National Defense" submitted its study of "Total Defense" to the Swedish Minister of Defense in Stockholm. As always the theme was peace – peace through hard-shelled realistic preparedness. With a history of over a century and a half of non-involvement in buffetting European and world conflicts, the committee mapped out recommendations for a course through the next fifteen years that would most likely avoid trouble. Following are excerpts from an official summary of its report:



Press Bulletin
1972-01-11
Civilforsvarsstyrelsen
21 February 1972

As a basis for its consideration of the orientation of Swedish security police and defense policy, the Committee on National Defense examines the present state of world affairs and indicates various conceivable courses of development during a forthcoming fifteen-year period.

The current state of world affairs shows important changes. The Soviet Union's rapid building-up of the systems of strategic weapons and demarcation of the global political interests have brought about a closer approximation to a balance with the capacity and commitments of the United States. On the one hand, this has resulted in a danger of collision between interests in more and more parts of the world, but on the other hand, it has created essential prerequisites for American-Soviet negotiations on a basis of equality concerning limitations of armaments and a solution to local problems. The United States and the Soviet Union seem to have acquired a greater joint interest than formerly in restricting their military commitments so that they will be better able to give their attention to internal social and economic development, for example. China's growing strength and activities in the field of foreign policy are changing the political pattern in Asia. Most of the countries which have originated from the decolonialization of Asia and Africa are still politically weak and exposed to external and internal stresses. New focal points of conflict can thereby arise . . .

Starting with the present situation as it has thus been described, there are many conceivable ways in which world affairs may develop during the next 15 years. The Committee on National Defense – in accordance with the principles of the new planning-system for Swedish national defense – has illustrated various possible courses of development, and on this basis has tried to determine the particular alternatives to which Swedish defense planning should primarily pay attention. It is quite natural that in this respect special attention should be given to those alternatives which may eventually endanger Sweden's security. Progress towards a more multipolar world accordingly leads, in the opinion of the Committee, to the possibility of changes in political groupings in the future . . .

The Committee on National Defense considers that Sweden's chances of continuing to stay out of war and serious conflicts in the future will best be furthered by adherence to the Swedish policy of non-alliance, aiming at neutrality in a future war.

In the view of the Committee, Sweden's security will be promoted if the danger of conflicts is generally reduced and if armaments are controlled and limited in a balanced manner. Sweden should, therefore, within the framework of its restricted resources, seek to assist in changing the international environment in the direction of greater general security . . .

If Sweden's policy of neutrality is to be respected and if the independence of the country is to be maintained in the long run, the support of strong armed forces is required. The primary aim of Swedish defense policy should be to see to it that in the event of a conflict in Europe between the great-power blocs, the defense forces shall be so strong and have such a structure that an attack on Sweden cannot be deemed to be profitable for anyone. In such a case the Swedish defense establishment has the desired capacity for the preservation of peace . . .

In the situations with which Sweden may be confronted, the aggressor, paying attention to his principal opponent, must make sure that a military undertaking can be brought to a conclusion in a short time, that it can be carried out with a limited deployment of force, and that the risks of failure are limited as far as possible. If it is to be able in such circumstances to deter aggressors, military defense must be so strong and of such a kind that an attack on Sweden will require such great sacrifices that the aggressor will probably not find the benefits he may gain worth the sacrifices he will have to make. If Sweden is attacked, the military defense

forces must be able for as long as possible to prevent the aggressor from gaining a foothold on Swedish soil. It must be possible for stubborn resistance to be offered in all parts of the country, if necessary also in the form of irregular warfare. Total defense in general must be adapted to this . . .

The destructive powers of modern weapons and the increased vulnerability of the community make it easier for an aggressor to bring pressure to bear on smaller countries. The Committee on National Defense considers that Sweden should try to prevent the country from being exposed to attacks proceeding from threats, by conducting a firm foreign policy and by taking in peacetime such defense preparations that the government will be capable of resisting a threat . . .

In order to provide the requisite support to Swedish security policy, *total defense* in the opinion of the Committee on National Defense should be built up and organized in such a way that it is the concern of the whole population. Military defense must therefore be based on compulsory military service. Compulsory military service is of the greatest importance for the will to defend ourselves and for the actual effectiveness of defense. Civil defense duty, other forms of compulsory service, and voluntary defense activity – including the National Home Guard – form important complements to compulsory military service . . .

The Committee on National Defense points out that tasks and organization for *civil defense* were laid down in their main outlines during the latter part of the 1950s. In the 1960s there was prolonged and continuous construction of underground shelters, supplemented by extensive evacuation-planning. In addition, an administration and rescue organization has been developed. By this means a civil defense system has been created which is of a high class by international standards.

Civil defense planning has for many years assumed that the population runs the risk of being directly attacked, and that nuclear weapons may be used against major centers of population in a policy of terror. In view of its opinions on the character of a future war and on protection against ABC weapons, the Committee on National Defense suggests that the planning of civil defense in the future should be given another structure. This would assume that centers of population as such should not be regarded as the main targets that aggressors would attack in the event of an invasion of Sweden. Instead, planning should be fundamentally based on the assumption that the population may be affected by the side-effects of attacks on military targets by primarily conventional weapons and in ground combat operations.

However, some attention must also be paid to the possibility that in certain conflict situations the population may be faced with an immediate threat of destruction. The civil defense organization should then be able to use its actions to bring influence to bear on threatening stiuations and to increase the government's freedom of action.

If we can stay out of war, the population should be given protection against the secondary effects in Sweden of ABC weapons used outside the country.

The changed basic view of the tasks of civil defense means in the view of the Committee that the chief aim should be to give protection against conventional weapons. Protection against ABC weapons should be organized only where this can be done at moderate increases in costs. Furthermore, greater importance should be attached to civil defense actions in areas adjoining military tragets and in invasion areas, as well as to the protection of the population during ground fighting.

In the opinion of the Committee on National Defense, this will have the following consequences for the structure of civil defense.

Shelters should be built primarily with a view to the requirements of conventional war, and bearing in mind that the most dangerous areas are those containing or situated near to military targets, and in invasion areas. The principles on which the construction of shelters is based should therefore be reviewed. Areas containing low houses, and the downtown districts of the 14 biggest cities, should accordingly not be exempted, as they generally are at present from the obligation to construct shelters. The currently applicable scheme for the selection of places which are to be considered for the construction of shelters should therefore be reviewed. Shelter planning should be fitted into general community-planning more effectively than it is at present. Planning for the supply of gas masks should follow the system hitherto laid down. This means a limited but continuous acquisition, with facilities for obtaining gas masks at an increased rate.

A planning scheme for the evacuation of densely-populated areas and other areas should be retained. As hitherto, the planning should facilitate freedom of action; not commitment in advance to carry out evacuation.

The continued planning for the management of civil defense and for rescue work should aim at making the present organization more uniform and at adapting it to the changed basic view. When this is done, the requirements for endurance and preparedness should be taken into consideration.

In the view of the Committee, the necessary requirements for taking at short sight steps which make possible a long-term development of civil defense in accordance with the stated guidelines exist in substance at both of the expenditure limits that have been assigned for the program plan work.

Other total defense comprises a series of different functions. The Committee on National Defense gives as an example of these the function of supplying with requisites and services, which includes food supply, industrial production etc., energy and power supply, and transport and communications. Other examples are the public health services, the police force, and psychological defense . . . ■

REVIEWS



Introducing: Your Civil Defense. A Swiss handbook. 20 pages. Published by the Swiss Union for the Protection of Civilians.

This new Swiss booklet is aimed at the 3095 Swiss townships which, according to Swiss doctrine, "constitue the basis of civil defense." Its inside cover carries this message:

LET'S NOT FORGET

All the attempts at peaceful coexistence, all the agreements dealing with disarmament and the utilization of nuclear force are far from being any certain guarantee of a lasting peace. Of course, all humanity wants it. No one, however, knows if and when the threat of war can be averted with any certainty. Abroad preventive measures are taken on all sides, armies are continuously being modernized, new and terifying weapons are being developed and the possibilities of an effective civil defense role are more and more promising.

The value of proper shelter is compared to the German experience in World War II in the following table:

Period of the First Air Attacks	Over 3 Deaths Per Bombed Household
During the Time of Improvised Shelter	1.2 Deaths Per Bombed Household
Toward the War's End After Compulsory Shelter Construction	0.3 Deaths Per Bombed Household

The handbook's 20 pages are generously spotted with illustrations, big type and white space. It's easy to read in 10 minutes. It's an excellent selling job.

La Protection Civile, by Léon Robine. Published by France-Sélection, Paris. 258 pages. (French Language).

For someone who wants an in-depth introduction to the French civil defense organization Léon Robine's book is an admirable vehicle. There is indeed much to be admired in the tight military-like structure of French "civil protection". It is built solidly on the French "Plan ORSEC" (Rescue Organization Plan), which is immediately implemented in every case of disaster – with remarkable success. The book covers this as well as all other civil defense operations.

The last of the books four sections is entitled "Civil Protection in Time of War." It begins by admitting that although the need for civil protection is recognized for peacetime disasters the French public refuses to weigh it seriously as a wartime means of survival. Some believe that nothing is capable of saving those under nuclear attack while others cling to the hope that the horror of such a specter will suffice to keep war at bay. While showing with persuasion how civil protection, now so well adapted to natural disaster situations, could be developed to save the nation in a war situation Robine – a career civil protection man himself – must confess that measured by the standards of wartime requirements French civil protection is pathetically endowed with men, materials and authority.

The conclusion that one must draw is that French civil protection – ORSEC and all – runs the United States a good race for being the most ineffective war survival tool of a world power.

Radioisotopes, Administrator's Guide No. 1, by W. Scott Fellows. Published by Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, Dunwoody Park, Atlanta, Ga. April 1972, 92 pages, $3.00.

With the fast-expanding use of radioactive materials throughout our society the need to provide technical information to administrators and other lay personnel involved with or on the sidelines of radioisotope use has become a real need. The forward to *Radioisotopes* reads in part:

This report. . .presents a fairly detailed discussion of the scientific and technical aspects of radioisotopes. It also includes the regulating, licensing, transporting and other administrative aspects which can serve as a useful reference for the public administrator. SINB (Southern Interstate Nuclear Board) has attempted to present this material assuming no knowledge of physics, chemistry or mathematics while maintaining the rigor of a professional approach.

It is apparent in reading the report that the world is so deeply entrenched in the use of radioactive materials – to its great benefit – that those who deplore its spread to all facets of life today are being something less than realistic. Even our efforts to police our environment will be vastly aided by the use of radioisotopes. 800,000 shipments of radioisotopes take place within the United States each year.

Brief descriptions of developing uses are given in the report, including:

(1) radioisotope-fueled electrical generators
(2) a portable neutron radiography unit – a "neutron" camera which can detect narcotics, boobytraps, and other items that gamma radiation misses.
(3) materials with up to three times the compressive strength of concrete.
(4) life support mechanisms for space travel.
(5) air safety devices, including the "Nuclear Instrument Landing System" (phenominally accurate).

Radioisotopes is a welcome low-key breakthrough in bringing vital scientific information to the serious layman in language that is readily understood. And it's a harbinger of more to come. ■

IRAN DIGS OUT!

سازمان دفاع غیر نظامی کشور

عضو لژیون خدمتگزاران بشر

عضو دائمی سازمان دفاع غیر نظامی بین المللی ـ مرکز ژنو

APRIL 10th EARTHQUAKE QUICKENS SHELTER INTEREST

Casualty counts of the April 10th earthquake in northern Iran are still being adjusted. But estimates run at 5,000 killed, 2,000 injured (hospitalized) and 20,000 homeless. In the forty rural districts involved construction was primitive and no buildings had been designed to withstand seismic shock. Iran's new shelter law, now in the process of being ratified by Iran's bicameral parliament promises some remedial action – how much remains to be seen.

Iran's Imperial Civil Defense Organization – one of the government agencies which responded immediately to the disaster – provided rescuers equipped with special detection instruments to locate buried victims. Major General N. Khalil Nadji, Deputy Chief of Iranian Civil Defense, had this to say for *Survive:*

Civil defense rescue team uses detection instruments to locate quake victims.



"Thanks to the earnest activities run by rescue and assistance units it was possible that within four days the welfare of the disaster-stricken people could be satisfactorily provided. Badly injured victims were transported to different hospitals. Medical and welfare teams got to work in the first hours of the disaster. They were able to care for all wounded and homeless survivors, take necessary health measures and decontaminate the environment.

"Immediately after the earthquake the Prime Minister personally was present at the scene of the disaster surveying through special operational headquarters organized in the disaster area the assistance and rescue activities run by the different competent organizations according to the duties assigned, and issuing the necessary orders and directives in order that the relief process could be accomplished in the minimum time possible.

"Their Imperial Majesties, Shahanshah Aryamehr and Shahbanou Farah Pahlavi (The Queen) visited the disaster-stricken area two days after the disaster and expressed appreciation of the efforts accomplished by the various organizations." ■

"The earth vomited up the bones of the dead and a village with its inhabitants was suspended between heaven and earth . . . then it was swallowed up."

–Jellal As-Soyuti (writing of Medieval Persia)

SPOTLIGHT

DAVIS INTRODUCES "POWER-OFF" PLANNING

National DCPA Director John E. Davis has scotched the 10-year "power-on" policy in shelter surveying. From now on it's "power-off". That is, in a nuclear attack it will be assumed that electric power will *not* be available.

To many local directors, shelter analysts and other observers, who have long pointed to the fallacy of a "power-on" assumption, the Davis action is a welcome step in the direction of realistic shelter evaluation.

Davis has ordered staff studies of the new policy keyed to five recommendations contained in a DCPA "Policy Paper" supporting the changes. Specifically these recommendations cover:

(1) Power-off evaluations of shelter survey data now being processed.

(2) Power-off assumptions in future shelter surveys.

(3) Adjustments of below-ground shelter capacities now in the shelter inventory.

(4) A study of impact of the new policy on other DCPA systems and programs.

(5) A study of possible action "to lesson the impact of a power-off planning assumption on the credibility of the civil defense program."

OAK RIDGE REVIEWS ITS CD RESEARCH

The Civil Defense Research Project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory digs deeply into questions and problems bearing on the impact of nuclear warfare. And each year it reviews its research before a distinguished and highly critical group of officials, scientists and serious students of civil defense. This year the review took place at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory on April 24th. Among the presentations made by members of the 35-man staff were:

EMP Effects on Power Distribution Equipment . J.K. Baird
Power Reactor Vulnerability . . . . . R.O. Chester
Hasty Winter Shelter Studies . . . . . C.H. Kearny
Blast Resistance of Hasty Shelters . . . . . C.V. Chester
Urban Passive/Active Defense Studies, Detroit C.M. Haaland
Problems of Defense Allocation . . . . . E.P. Wigner
Modular-sized Integrated Utility Systems . . . . A.J. Miller

Some of the items of special note in the presentations were the following:

(1) Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Effects. A Study of EMP effects on a typical substation reveals that protection offered by lightning arrestors will protect equipment against a "weak" EMP. Protection against pulses with peak voltages higher than the substation basic insulation level is problematical.

(2) Power Reactor Vulnerability. A nuclear explosion which is not a direct hit but which produces overpressures greater than 20 psi will result in an uncontained core meltdown. Compared with the weapon effects, the meltdown does not produce significant additional casualties.

(3) Hasty Winter Shelter Studies. Based on Russian experiments of shelter construction under freezing conditions, experiments in building both above-ground and below-ground shelters were conducted in February and March of 1972. Above-ground shelters of 30-man log-tepee type with snow cover acting as a shield took 2.6 man-hours per occupant to complete. Other types of above-ground shelters took up to 4.8 man-hours. The range for below-ground shelters (with frozen earth to contend with) was 3.0 man-hours to 7.7 man-hours depending upon type and size.

(4) Blast Resistance of Hasty Shelters. Expedient shelters in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in many cases survived significant blast. Oak Ridge research indicates that hasty shelters – those which are open at two ends and where roof structures are made of green timber (hickory is the best) – can stand up to 22 psi (pounds per square inch) of overpressure.

(5) Urban Passive/Active Defense Studies. Combinations of ABM and blast shelter were studied for the hypothetical case of Detroit provided with both in varied mixes. Shelters with capacities of 200 persons were found to be most economical and permitting a prompt access during an initial period when ABM could deal effectively with first incoming missiles.

Dr. James C. Bresee, Director of the Civil Defense Research Project for the past seven years, stresses that the work at Oak Ridge will focus on uncovering new information and developing new techniques in the civil defense field. "We have learned much that hopefully will be useful for improving U.S. Civil Defense," he says. "But there is much more to be learned. We intend to continue."

As I see it, every community has a choice to make, which, simply stated, is whether in time of emergency it chooses to be an asset to itself and its nation or whether it is willing to be a liability. I seriously doubt if there are many, if any, cities that can honestly say that they have fully developed their potential for the protection of life and property. I'm talking about the full utilization of resources that stand available within our communities but which lie dormant simply awaiting the type of organization and planning that will take full advantage of the existing potential.

Whereas the Federal Government now provides a considerable amount of assistance, it remains for the city to withstand the first massive onslaught of the disaster. The city stands alone during those first frightful hours or per-

haps days, and it is during this initial period of time when the good building codes, the good communications, the good decision making, and the good planning pay off in terms of lives and property saved. What is done or what is not done during this early period more than anything else will determine how well the public trust has been preserved.

Major Edwin W. Wade
Long Beach, California

IN DEFENSE OF DEFENSE

(First six paragraphs of a letter from author, mother, civic and political leader, and critic Phyllis Schlafly to the Most Reverend Carroll T. Dozier, D.D., Bishop of Memphis)

Your Excellency:

Your Pastoral Letter called "Peace" to the Memphis Diocese has just come to my attention and, although I am not a member of your Diocese, I hope you will consider this reply because the issues you raise are important to all of us, regardless of where we may live.

About half your Letter is devoted to beautiful and high-sounding phrases and quotations about how desirable peace is, sentiments with which we must all agree.

When you move into specifics, however, and start to apply such laudable objectives to U.S. defense policy, I respectfully must say that you are talking about a world which not only does not now exist, but never can exist unless God Himself intervenes to change human nature. Please consider:

1. Original sin is not merely an old theory or doctrine of Christianity, but a fact of human nature. There *are* criminals in the world and will always be – criminals who, unfortunately, cannot be reasoned with or appeased. No person who uses the intelligence God gave us can claim that we can eliminate crime in our cities by abolishing the police. It is the responsibility of decent, civilized people to take the necessary means, including force, to protect us from criminals.

2. It takes two sides to make peace, but only one to make war. It is ridiculous and unrealistic for our side to renounce war when the evidence is clear that the Soviet Union has no intention of renouncing it, and Soviet military doctrine specifically espouses the doctrine of a massive genocidal first strike.

As a matter of fact, we *did* officially renounce war as an instrument of national policy in 1928 when we and 62 other nations, including Germany and Japan, signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact. And what was the result? Hilter – because, like all aggressors, when he saw the enemy disarmed and lacking the will to fight, he deduced that he could win quick and easy victories. If you had addressed your Pastoral Letter urging a renunciation of war to the men in the Kremlin, it might have had some logic (though it would be as futile as Henry Ford's "peace ship" of 1915). But it is completely unrealistic to tell the people of Memphis that they can have "peace" by "turning the other cheek" to Soviet 25-megaton missiles . . . .

1100 TEACHERS PUSH CD IN VERMONT

In February 1971 the Vermont Board of Education passed the following resolution:

> **RESOLVED**, that superintendents and school boards should involve their school administrators and teachers in safety instruction seminars conducted by the Emergency Planning and Civil Defense Education Staff, Division of Instructional Services, and be it further
>
> **RESOLVED**, that superintendents and school boards develop, with the assistance of the Department of Education: 1) a comprehensive emergency plan for each school that will be updated annually; 2) a functional emergency organization; and 3) a procedure whereby copies of these plans and organization must be filed with the Department of Education . . .

As a result of this action over 1,100 Vermont school teachers and employees have participated in 25 civil defense workshops. Over 150 of Vermont's 300 public schools have submitted disaster plans to the Department of Education. Private schools are also responding. Local officials and civic organizations are providing major support, while local parent-teacher associations are making evaluations. ■

"Our plunge into the World War in the face of all of our handicaps was extremely courageous, but quite pathetic. One hesitates to contemplate the fate of Europe and ourselves as well, if the grace of the Almighty in His wise providence had not seen fit to confuse our enemies and mercifully watch over our Allies for more than a year while we undertook to train 5 million officers and men and to provide them with munitions, airplanes and transport . . . All we can say is that through the years we, the people and those who make our laws, have gone from bad to worse, learning little, doing less, still prejudiced, lulled into inaction by an unwarranted sense of security and by false ideas of economy."

General John J. Pershing
(as Chief of Staff)

LIBRARIES

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Q AND A CORNER

Q Fatalities of 6% for the Soviets and 60% for America in a nuclear war are ridiculous! Who dreamed them up?

A The figures are certainly disquieting. They are also entirely reasonable – as accurate estimates as one can make, and correct within a rather small factor. Soviet nuclear attack casualties are projected in the 1969 Soviet Civil Defense Handbook to be between 5% and 8% with evacuation of target cities and utilization of shelters. Eugene P. Wigner (see "Myth of 'Assured Destruction'," SURVIVE, July-August 1970 – widely reprinted in other publications) put the figure at less than 5%, and probably less than half of 5%. The 60% figure for the United States is well within "the ball park "of predictions by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), civil defense analyst Arthur A. Broyles (see "How Many Lives Can We Buy", SURVIVE, November-December 1970), AEC Chairman James R. Schlesinger and others. The temptation is strong to reject the figures because they are unpalatable and shocking ("ridiculous") without considering their reliablity.

Q Why not express your pie chart [SURVIVE, May-June 1972] in terms of survivors instead of "fatalities. ' In other words why not be positive in your approach instead of negative?

A O.K. Here they are –

U.S.S.R. – **94% SAVED**   U.S.A. – **40% SAVED**

Q So SURVIVE writers get no pay, alas! What about the SURVIVE staff? Don't tell me they also live on love.

A Alas, yes (except for occasional special part-time help when it is needed at the rates of $1 to $2 per hour).

Q "Why does not the United States take part in the International Civil Defense Organization as a member nation? As host country for the United Nations, as a champion of peace, and with its wide and energetic program of foreign aid, it would appear that such a step would be a natural one to take and beneficial to all concerned." (Brigadier General Abar-Ali of Iran's Civil Defense)

A The ICDO is made up primarily of "developing" nations and those which because of their economy and geography stand to gain security through membership. It is a kind of "disaster insurance." The United States is more or less self-sufficient in this respect. Many other world powers are not members, including Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Germany. They are, however, very interested observers. And there are indications that membership is now being considered by some of them.

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What I would like
My Civil Defense
Director To Be,
by Eugene P. Wigner.