THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

SURVIVE



"One morning in Peking they told us they wanted to show us some tunnels. Now who wants to see tunnels when you are in Peking? We said, 'Well, wouldn't it be nice if we could go out to the countryside and see a commune?' And they said, 'No, no, you really must see these tunnels.' So they took us to the busiest marketing section of Peking and into a large department store. And on one counter they pressed a button: the counter rolled away, and we saw steps leading down. We went down about eight meters, about 28 feet, and found tunnels, all right—well-built, brick and concrete tunnels, miles and miles of them. The entire city of Peking, they told us, has tunnels under it, with an entrance from every department store, every apartment building, every residence.

"Inside the tunnels we saw kitchens, running water, sanitary facilities, food storage, medical facilities, all ready for use. In the event of a nuclear attack, they said, Peking's 7 million people can be safe in the tunnels in seven minutes, and can walk through them to 20 miles outside of the city. And they told us that, since 1968, every major city in China has had similar tunnels built. So whenever we went to another city, we asked to see the tunnels—and they were there . . ."

— from an interview with Political Scientist Dr. Ishwer Ojha published in the April 1972 issue of *Bostonia*, Boston University Alumni magazine.

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Editorial . . .

THE VALUE OF LIFE

This issue of *Survive* may breed a question or two. Dr. Alvin Weinberg and Professor Mark Schneider both provoke some uneasy thinking on SALT and its relationship to civil defense. And the problem of hostage populations comes up again too.

For instance, the United States, where the highest possible value is placed on human life and where we boast of the highest standard of living, has steadfastly affirmed that sheltering its urban population against modern warfare is not practical – too costly. John E. Davis reflects this viewpoint in his *Survive* interview (see page 10).

On the other hand, China is known as a country afflicted with unending economic woes where life has little or no value. Oddly enough, however, China has succeeded in only five years in building extensive well-equipped tunnel shelters for all the people in its larger cities (see cover).

Something is badly out of focus. Are Chinese leaders foolish? (And if they are, so are those of the USSR, Sweden, Norway and other countries. And so are many *Survive* writers.)

Or could it be that the United States has pulled the wool over its own eyes?

SURVIVE

VOL. 5, NO. 6 NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1972

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

Sponsored by
The Civil Defense Forum
The Oak Ridge Civil Defense Society
The Professional Society for Nuclear Defense
The Association for Community-Wide Protection from Nuclear Attack

Survive is published bimonthly by the Association for Community-Wide Protection from Nuclear Attack. Address: *Survive*, Post Office Box 910, Starke, Florida 32091. Subscription: $3.00 per year.

Survive presents authentic information relating to civil defense–to the survival of free government, the United States, and its people in the nuclear age. Its aim is public education in this field and service as a forum.

Authors are encouraged to submit manuscripts for consideration by the advisory board for publication. Articles (preferably illustrated) should be 1,000 to 1,500 words in length, slanted to the non-technical reader, and oriented toward the civil defense field. Views expressed in contributions to *Survive* are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect *Survive* policy.

Survive is printed by D & D Quality Printers of Jacksonville, 1609 San Marco Blvd., Jacksonville, Fla. 32207.

SALT AND CIVIL DEFENSE

by Alvin M. Weinberg
Director, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Five years ago I delivered an address "Let Us Prepare for Peace" on the occasion of the Atoms for Peace Award. The main thrust of my remarks was that real disarmament was possible only from positions of defensive strength. The balance of terror imposed by an escalating offensive armament race was unstable, and could hardly lead to a truly stable world.

The advantages of a defensive strategy, rather than offensive strategy, as I saw them were two fold. First, only in a defensively oriented world would great powers consider themselves sufficiently secure to contemplate disarmament. It was in this sense that I spoke of "preparing for peace" by shifting attention from offense to defense. Second, in a three-power confrontation, offensive armaments can never lead to stability. In a two-power confrontation, where each power must match the weaponry of his opponent, stable solutions are possible with either equal offense or equal defense. In a three-power confrontation, however, it is impossible for one power's *offense* to equal the sum of the offenses of the other two powers. The only solutions are either zero armament or infinite armament. By contrast, if the offensive weaponry is frozen say with each of the three powers having the same weight of weapons, defensive armaments could still give stability: each power builds defense until its total defense is sufficient to blunt, to an acceptable degree, any blow imposed by both of the other antagonists.

Thus I have for some time espoused defensive postures; of these, civil defense is certainly one of the most important. Yet there is, and until now has always been, a fundamental flaw in civil defense. Any civil defense posture could be defeated if the opponent's offense were sufficiently escalated. It was for this reason that, as long as ten years ago, some of us argued that a prerequisite, perhaps the prime prerequisite for a workable civil defense, was an agreement, either tacit or explicit, on the magnitude of the opponent's offense. If there is a ceiling on the offense, one can design the civil defense to withstand that ceiling; if there is no ceiling, there is no rational way of deciding how much civil defense is enough.

At the time we talked about the advantage of offensive freezes, there was little chance that any such freeze would occur. It is on this account that I welcome the SALT agreement so enthusiastically: for the first time there is a definite upper limit to the offense which we confront. We can therefore for the first time, in a sense, consider civil defense, in principle, workable.

I would predict that one consequence of the SALT agreement may well be a reconsideration of civil defense as a serious strategic alternative. Readers of *Survive* might be interested in the line of argument I used in "Let Us Prepare for Peace." I've therefore reprinted appropriate sections from this 1967 talk which appeared in the September 1968 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.*

"The Preconditions for Peace

"This vision of a Pax Atomica, of a world in which tensions have relaxed because scarcities of raw materials are no longer rational bases for conflict, is a golden vision, one to which all of us in the nuclear business are dedicated. And yet it is an incomplete picture of the peaceful world of the future. It neglects those sources of strife that are not rooted in geographic inequities or disparities in natural endowments. There remains the strife that comes from ideological conflict and conflicts of interest, the strife that comes from all but universal human ambition for influence or power. Our atomic powered Utopia needs more than material well-being, important as that may be, to stabilize the Pax Atomica and to prevent war.

"But, even more, this vision ignores the present nuclear confrontation between the superpowers. It has been customary to look to the hydrogen bomb and mutual deterrence as the means to prevent war, to curb the largely emotional drives that impel men in power to seek to maintain their positions or to extend their influence. And, a little surprisingly, the balance of terror has worked – not perfectly but still tolerably well. We have had wars since the atomic bomb was used in Hiroshima; but we have avoided all-out world war and with it the thermonuclear holocaust.

"Yet most of us are acutely uncomfortable with this balance of terror wherein the two superpowers hold as hostages 100 million of each other's citizens. It is unprecedented in world history that the citizens of the strongest powers in the world can no longer be guaranteed by their state some measure of personal security, except to the

extent that the balance of terror dissuades the other side from striking. Somehow, one is appalled by the possible fragility of this metastable balance.

"It is largely on this account, this nervousness about the stability of the balance of terror, that the world has wrestled mightily with arms control and disarmament. Moreover, the nuclear world of plenty is inconsistent with a world in which ever-increasing portions of the gross national product might go into maintaining the deterrent. It seems apparent that we must ultimately disarm; but how can we both disarm and maintain the deterrent? How can we get from here – a world filled with mutual apprehension, with ICBMs, with megaton warheads – to a world based on energy self-sufficiency, mutual respect, and peace? How can we, as Amrom Katz of the Rand Corporation says, make the world safe for disarmament?

"Hope in Failure

"I believe, paradoxically, that a way may have been opened by the failure of the negotiations over deployment of antiballistic missiles. The deployment of ABMs on both sides has been deplored as a new step in an unending arms spiral that eventually will consume everything, including our vision of abundance. But suppose ABMs and other defensive measures turn out to be effective, and at the same time there is no escalation of offense in unending spiral. The knife-edge of delicately balanced terror would then be blunted. Perhaps then, as D. G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute has stressed persuasively (*Bulletin,* June 1967), we should not be so disturbed if the threat of ultimate, absolute, and total mutual destruction is not forever to be the basis for our world order.

"If there is even a remote possibility of achieving effective defense and at the same time limiting offense, should we not examine very much more carefully than we have the possibilities of an essentially defensive posture? Granted that active defense systems today are not perfect, they nevertheless seem to be much more effective than they were thought to be five years ago. And, by virtue of the development of the admittedly imperfect and light antiballistic missile system, we have already achieved a kind of de facto disarmament. Because space and weight in offensive rockets must be allocated to penetration aids, the total number of megatons each side can throw at the other ought to be reduced by the antiballistic missile. In this sense, the ABM has caused a kind of arms limitation, one of the few real arms limitations that we have achieved.

"Moreover, passive defense, a subject about which we hear very little, may be much less impractical than is commonly believed to be the case. We at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been studying the question of civil defense for the past three years under the guidance of Dr. J. C. Bresee and Professor E. P. Wigner. The result of our studies suggests that underground, interconnected tunnels used as shelters could significantly reduce the casualties caused by thermonuclear weapons. In this connection, I remind you that at least one distinguished city planner, Constantinos A. Doxiadis, holds that the megacity of the future can survive only if it puts its transportation, including automobiles, and utilities underground. The megacity will therefore, according to Doxiadis, be honeycombed with tunnels. Such tunnels would be the main elements of a passive defense system: that they might come rather as a matter of course as the city develops should not make them less practical for dual use as shelters.

"But we are told all this is transitory: antiballistic missiles and civil defense will be followed by more ICBMs which will be followed by more ABMs and more civil defense in unending spiral. We shall go from 3,000 megatons to 30,000 megatons to 3,000,000 megatons – where does the crazy spiral stop? It is here that Brennan has injected a new and elegant idea into the discussion: Should not the world, in negotiating the next perilous stage of arms control, focus primarily on limiting offensive weapons, and at the same time encourage defensive systems? All the predictions about deployment of antiballistic missiles and civil defense leading to unending escalation assume that offense will escalate indefinitely. But if the world agreed to, and enforced, a limit on the number of ICBMs we would stop the spiral of escalation. Such limitation on primary instruments of offense are not unprecedented. In the post-World War I era, capital ships of the three great naval powers were limited. Moreover, if defensive systems continue to improve, the capacity of the world to destroy its people and its lands will gradually deteriorate; and the number of hostages held on each side will be reduced, though certainly never to zero, so that nuclear war even in a defensively oriented world could never be regarded as a rational instrument of policy.

"The difficulties of such a posture and such an agreement – to limit offense but leave defense unlimited – are formidable. Can one police a freeze on offense unless secrecy is relaxed? Will such an arrangement withstand pressure for abrogation by those who underestimate their own offense and overestimate the opposition's defense? Will strong defense tend to make each side more aggressive in the conduct of its foreign policy? These are imponderables, but one must remember that the present balance of terror is not a lovely thing to contemplate nor is it a perfect antidote against thermonuclear war. L. B. Sohn of Harvard suggested that an existent posture need be only 50 per cent foolproof, while a newly proposed posture must be 98 per cent effective. If we addressed as much time and energy to developing the details of a defensive posture in arms control as we have devoted either to developing offensive armaments, or even toward present arms control doctrines, is it not at least possible that we would be able to work out credible answers to many of the difficulties we now see in limiting offensive weapons?

"There are two overriding reasons why we must eventually come to some such position. The first is that, much as some deplore it, both of the superpowers have decided to

deploy antiballistic missiles. We are in grave danger of an unending arms spiral unless we enter into agreements to chop off the spiral at the top. This implies some limitation – possibly tacit but preferably explicit – on, say, the total number of offensive missiles or on the total expenditure for offensive missiles.

"There is another reason that seems to me even more compelling. Can we ever hope to achieve real arms control or disarmament from the present position of overwhelming offensive power and almost nonexistent defense? Does anyone really believe, in the kind of hard untrusting world we live in and shall have to live in during the next several decades, that either side will agree to a disarmed world unless it feels secure in its defensive systems? Can we realistically contemplate disarmament, with the possibility of clandestine sequestering of a few missiles, without being reasonably certain that our defenses can handle a sudden attack from such missiles?

"What Posture for Peace?

"In the main, our military technology has emphasized offense rather than defense, and our arms limitation technology has emphasized defense rather than offense, especially in the most recent discussions of the antiballistic missile. I submit that both postures may have been in error, and that the cause of peace will be better served by developing ways to strengthen defense and to limit offense.

"I would therefore urge that the military communities of the world prepare for peace by developing defensive systems, rather than continuing to exert themselves primarily to improving offensive systems. And I would urge that the arms limitation communities of the world prepare for peace by developing doctrines for limiting offense and techniques for enforcing such limitations, rather than continuing to exert themselves primarily to limiting defensive systems."



New Reactor Shield Proves Better and Cheaper

Shielding of direct radiations from a nuclear explosion involves attenuation of neutrons and gamma rays which result from the fission of uranium, thorium or plutonium. These are the same, indeed the energies are the same, as those from the core of a nuclear reactor. Both are chain reactions, the explosion being a rapid uncontrolled event and the reactor, a continuous controlled event. The same materials have the same shielding efficiency for both, thus those concerned with shielding the direct radiations from possible nuclear explosions may find the following of interest.

A newly-tested formula for nuclear reactor shielding materials produces a more effective and safer shield at a substantial savings in cost. The product, called "CHEMTREE 1-20-26," is manufactured as the name indicates by CHEMTREE Corporation of Central Valley, New York. According to tests conducted at Purdue University by Dr. H. E. Hungerford the iron mortar product has both a density and a hydrogen content about 50% greater than standard concrete and will result in an overall savings of about 20% in construction of the shield. The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station reactor, designed by General Electric, is anticipated to be the first reactor site to use the new materials.

In addition to the construction cost savings the reduction of the thickness of the shielding wall from 27.75 inches to 18.5 inches results in a substantial increase in space, or – if preferred – a slightly smaller building with additional savings due to reduce use of building materials. In the latter case reduced operational costs also enter the picture.

Dr. Hungerford's report of his research and findings is expected to appear soon in *Nuclear Engineering and Design.* His conclusions, he says in winding up his report, "amount to an economic breakthrough. Reactor designers and architect engineers who have the responsibility of incorporating into their designs every proven advance in technology owe it to themselves and to their contractors to look into the use of iron mortars for their shields, wherever they may be. Perhaps they will discover large cost savings in their designs by switching to iron mortars. It is possible that in a few years the standard material for reactor sacrificial shields and certain other bulk shields will be iron mortars rather than concrete."

SURVIVE PREPARADNESS AWARDS

Submissions for 1972 *Survive* Preparedness Awards are due at the *Survive* offices not later than January 20, 1973. Any *local* civil defense organization is eligible. (For further information see May-June and September-October 1972 issues.)

The *Survive* Awards Committee offers this guidance:

A practical means for survival in modern war is the most important yardstick used in judging. Local preparations to give the community the best possible survival odds rank as the top consideration. Clarity and brevity are also highly desirable qualities.

Eight regional awards – one per DCPA region – are planned. One national award will be given. Any format is acceptable. Illustrations, if applicable, are of help.

THE NEXT ROUND OF SALT:

TRIUMPH or TRAGEDY?

by Mark B. Schneider

Historian Mark B. Schneider wrote "Problems of SALT: 1972" for the July-August issue of Survive. *Looking to the 1973 sequel to the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement Schneider here paints a frank picture of what can be expected – a picture that, while not at all encouraging, is not devoid of hope if a goodly amount of top-level waking up can be stimulated with short-fuse timing.*

Projecting the course of future strategic arms developments in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is fraught with uncertainty. Elections in the U.S. and political developments in the U.S.S.R. could easily demolish such predictions. Political developments on the international level could have dramatic effects on the internal politics of both nations. We know what the SALT agreement lets both sides do but we do not know if it will be observed by both. Will there be any future SALT accords? Will they be lived up to? In form or also in spirit? Will there be any technical developments that make the SALT agreements obsolete?

Bearing in mind all the limitations in such predictions, it is still reasonable to assume that the strategic weapons programs for both states will follow the lines laid down in the past 6 years. The U.S. froze its strategic weapons force at 1710 missiles of intercontinental capability in 1967 and has phased out about 1/3 of its strategic bomber force since 1966. The Soviets have maintained their strategic bomber force and expanded their ICBM force from 250 in July 1966 to 1550 operational in July 1972 and their SLBM force from 130 in 1966 to 580 in Mid-1972. In 1971, according to President Nixon, the Soviets showed evidence of planning the deployment of two new ICBM systems, began the construction of 100 new ICBM silos – some for large missiles, extensively tested a multiple warhead version of a second missile (the SS-11), perfected an improved sub-launched missile, surged ahead of the U.S. in the number of SLBMs operational or under construction, flight tested a new bomber, resumed construction of an ABM around Moscow and continued testing of advanced ABM radars and missiles.

There has been much debate in the U.S. over the last four years concerning Soviet strategic objectives. The Administration and its supporters have argued that the evidence strongly indicates that the Soviets are aiming at a first strike capability; opponents of U.S. strategic programs have vigorously argued that they are not. With the passage of each year their case has become less viable.

One of the major arguments for U.S. acceptance of an inferior position in numbers of ballistic missiles (2500 launchers of the Soviet Union compared to 1700 for the U.S.) is that the Soviets would have been in a still better position if they had continued their quantitative buildup while we would have continued our unilateral moratorium on missile construction. (Among others, Edward Teller has made this point.) President Nixon announced that the Soviets over the next five years had planned to increase their ABM interceptor force from the present 64 to 1000, increase their ICBM force by 1000, and increase their Y class submarine force to about 90. It is rather difficult to rationalize a force of 4,500 intercontinental range strategic missiles, and a strategic defense force consisting of 1,000 ABM interceptors, 10,000 Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) and 3,300 interceptor aircraft as a force necessary for simple deterrence vis-à-vis "Assured Destruction."

If President Nixon is correct, the Soviets were determined on practically doubling an already oversized strategic capability. It is difficult to assume that their goal was anything but a first strike capability or at least a damage limiting capability of major proportions. If this continues to be their goal they can certainly pursue it under the SALT agreement. There is nothing in any of the pact to prevent

them from force modernization. They can replace their SS-9 missile with a still more gigantic version – with about twice its payload or about 28,000 to 32,000 pounds. Such a missile could easily carry a fifty megaton weapon or perhaps six warheads of more than five megatons yield. If they make dramatic improvements in their warhead designs this figure could be substantially too low. They can improve the hard target kill capability of the SS-11 by deploying an improved single warhead version or an advanced MIRV version. One little known aspect of this agreement is that they can, if they wish, convert their existing 700 IRBM, MRBM silos into ICBM launchers, and construct new silos for these weapons or deploy advanced mobile versions. They can deploy as many mobile ICBMs as they desire. There is no limit to their land or sea based cruise missile capability. They can deploy ICBMs on surface ships, bomber aircraft or large missile carrying aircraft. While their SLBM force is limited to 62 vessels and 950 missiles there is no limit on the number of SLBM under construction at the time the agreement ends. They are supposed to retire 210 older ICBMs to build up to 950 but they probably would not have to destroy any of these until after the interim agreement has expired – in effect after it is no longer in effect. There is no limit on improvements to their air defense system. They can build as many early warning and tracking phase array radars (with ABM potential) as they like provided they are located on the nation's periphery, and do not have 360 degree coverage. They can build radars of any size (up to the three kilometer circle each base is limited to) and power as they like the six allowed sites within 150 kilometers of Moscow. They are allowed two giant radars and 18 radars smaller than our MSR as the second site. A seeming anomaly of the agreement is that they can build a radar as large as our MSR ABM radar anywhere in the Soviet Union provided they do not call it an ABM radar.

While it is unlikely that the Soviets will do all of the things outlined here, they will probably do most of them. If President Nixon was right in his project of planned Soviet activities during the next five years, we must assume they will exploit every strategically significant opportunity they have. It is interesting to note that President Nixon has commented that ". . . Mr. Brezhnev made it very clear that he intended to go forward in those categories that were not limited."

Then there is the possibility of cheating. One can, of course, build an ICBM complex under a factory roof. But the most strategic significant type of cheating is in the ABM field. Since the agreement puts no significant limitations on radar capability, the most important limitation is in interceptor capability. The treaty, of course, limits both sides to two hundred. It does not, however, define just what an ABM interceptor is, except by implication – what is tested against strategic missiles is an ABM. Thus the wording of the treaty creates an incentive for getting around this limitation. It also provides many loopholes through which this can be done. There is no limitation on SAM systems except that they cannot be tested against strategic ballistic missiles; but they can be tested against tactical ballistic missiles. Moreover, there is no onsite inspection to assure that no such testing takes place. The treaty puts no limitation on the construction of ABM components such as interceptors and launchers. There is no control over factories producing these components. Since the Russians can legitimately deploy radars which represent 2/3 of the cost of an ABM, there is a significant incentive toward cheating. Moreover, since the Soviets possess 10,000 SAM launchers and technology is rapidly abolishing the distinction between a SAM and ABM interceptor, they have a significant incentive for SAM upgrading.

In theory, of course, we possess the same options as the Soviets (except of course, we do not possess the option to deploy large payload ICBMs, we cannot significantly increase our SLBM force, we have not the radar base or the air defense system of the Soviet Union). We are certain to do only a small fraction of the things the treaty will permit us to do. We will deploy MIRVs, but there is strong domestic political opposition to even a relatively small-scale U.S. program to improve their effectiveness against hard targets and hence give us some ability to deter less than all-out attacks by the ability to reply in kind. We will build a limited number of Trident missile submarines. The B-1 bomber will be developed and probably about 250 will be built. We may even deploy some type of dual purpose cruise missiles on nuclear submarines. But none of these, except MIRV deployment, will be accomplished during the five year interim agreement on strategic offensive forces. Most of the things outlined as Soviet options can be accomplished within the next five years – there is certain to be a significant increase in their SLBM force, completion of remaining ICBM silos, deployment of MIRV warheads, deployment of new cruise missile submarines, possible conversion of existing IRBM launchers into ICBM launchers, deployment of new ABM radars on a large scale, and probable deployment of their new strategic bomber.

U.S. strategic defensive forces will fare even worse. Over the next five years we will probably complete the Grand Forks Minuteman Field ABM site and possibly build a second small site at Washington. We will deploy only a very tiny fraction of the radar capability we are allowed under the agreement. We probably will further cut back our very limited air defense system and undertake only a limited technical modernization. We will certainly not seek to develop an ABM capabiliby in our SAM systems – more likely we will move in the opposite direction.

Hence, in the second stage of the SALT negotiations it is very difficult to escape the conclusion of Dr. William Van Cleave (of the University of Southern California):

> We will be entering SALT II relatively in a much weaker position than we entered SALT I. This is indisputable. What leverage will we have to encourage the negotiation of a corrective follow-on agreement?

> The only leverage we can possibly have, and the only prospect of a successful outcome for SALT II (however minimal), will be the clear demonstration that we intend to push forward to improve our forces and solve our own strategic problems in the presence of these agreements. If we do not show that we intend to disallow the Soviets meaningful superiority and substantial counterforce capabilities, I do not see that the Soviet Government will have much incentive to reach an agreement limiting those capabilities.

What strategically significant outcome of SALT II can we obtain? What incentive does the Soviet Government have in reducing the threat to the U.S. deterrent force? The main U.S. system they showed much concern over in the first round of SALT was the Safeguard. If they are seeking a counterforce capability against our Minuteman, they now have a much easier task. Some argue they will be willing to make major concessions in exchange for the elimination of the U.S. MIRV capability. Even if we ignore the drastic effects which the elimination of MIRV would have on our penetration capabilities and the political consequences (some appear to be proposing the U.S. scrap MIRV in exchange for some reduction in the Soviet ICBM while the Soviets retain MIRV!), there is simply no evidence that the Soviets are very concerned about our MIRV capability. If they were, why didn't they accept our first SALT proposal, which in the words of President Nixon included "both numerical and qualitative limitations on strategic offensive and defensive systems, including MIRVs." Moreover, if the Soviets really wanted a MIRV ban, they would have to do nothing more than publicly indicate that they were willing to make some slight concession on the inspection issue and any American government would soon be forced by public opinion to sign such an agreement irrespective of any impact it would really have on the strategic balance.

Another alleged reason for Soviet willingness to agree to a more reasonable second SALT accord is the threat of U.S. abrogation. The U.S. SALT delegation has informed the Soviet Union "if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests would be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty."

It is difficult for me to believe that anyone really expects this will happen. I believe any American Government would do almost anything rather than abrogate a treaty of this type. If we really become frightened we might do some more of the things we are allowed to do under the treaty and interim agreement. We might even refuse to extend the interim agreement when it expires; but we are certainly not going to abrogate a treaty, and the Russians know it. They might even assume there is a high probability of the U.S. extending the interim agreement no matter what they do in the intervening period.

Unless there is a major change in the 1964-1972 pattern of U.S. strategic force decisions we will continue to take relatively small steps to maintain a minimum "Assured Destruction" capability. Hence, if we trade away any element of the U.S. strategic weapons program for some Russian concession the chances are we will be gaining little or nothing. The basic fact is that we are doing virtually nothing to threaten the Soviet deterrent while they are doing quite a lot to threaten ours. The Soviets need no further concession from us if they merely want to maintain an "Assured Destruction" deterrent capability. If they are after a damage limiting or first strike capability the only form of concessions they would be interested in are the ones we cannot give – abandonment of measures to retain our "Assured Destruction" capability. Hence, the most likely second round of SALT accords would have little or even negative strategic significance.

If we change our strategic doctrine and give the Soviets something to worry about we may get something more. If we were to develop and deploy hard target MIRVs, a new mobile ICBM system, a really large number of advanced strategic bombers, an improved air defense system and start a meaningful program of civil defense the Russians would have some incentive to negotiate.

Obtaining a strategically signigicant arms control package under the "Assured Destruction" concept is certainly not the best of all possible worlds. Rejection of Donald G. Brennan's "Assured Survival" concept by the arms control community (or really the refusal to even consider it) may eventually be generally perceived as a major blunder. But if the U.S. can deny the Soviets the politically exploitable strategic superiority they have won in SALT I and force them into accepting a more reasonable SALT II pact, an acceptable strategic environment may emerge. If not, the result may well be unmitigated national disaster. ■

C D Calendar

(State, regional, national and international meetings)

Oct. 30-Nov. 3	Annual Conference, United States CD Council – Boston, Mass.
Nov. 3-4	Heavy Rescue Course Part I, Mass. CD Training Academy – Topsfield, Mass.
Nov. 8-10	Fla. CD Assn. Conf. – St. Augustine, Fla.
Nov. 10-11	Heavy Rescue Course Part II, Mass. CD Training Academy – Topsfield, Mass.
Nov. 11	Annual *Survive* Conference – Starke, Fla.
Nov. 27-Dec. 8	Phase III, Career Development Program, DCPA Staff College – Battle Creek, Mich.
Nov. 30-Dec. 2	Third Annual Meeting, National Association of Search or Rescue Coordinators – Sacramento, Calif.

Public Views on the

Strategic Balance and SALT

—A Report to Survive by the American Strategic Defense Association

A national statistical survey in February-March 1972, immediately prior to President Nixon's trip to Moscow, sheds light on the nation's thinking on issues related to the arms control treaty and agreement. The field work was carried out by Marketing Information service of Atlanta, Georgia, for the University of Pittsburgh, where Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa was the principal investigator. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency sponsored the work.

What the public believed about the strategic balance in early 1972 is shown in the following table:

Soviets are:	Strategic Systems	Defense in General	Civil Defense
Much stronger	5.8%	5.2%	6.0%
Stronger	24.1	20.5	20.1
Equal	51.4	45.6	27.4
Weaker	10.7	18.2	15.0
Much Weaker	1.1	1.2	2.6
Don't Know	6.7	9.0	28.5
No Answer	0.2	0.3	0.4
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The public seems to know most about the strategic military balance, with about half convinced that the Soviets have achieved parity with the U.S. Of the remainder, two-thirds believe the Soviets are stronger and one-third consider them weaker than the U.S. Less than 7 percent "don't know." The view for defense in general is somewhat more optimistic but not much so. With regard to civil defense about one-quarter of the population believe the Soviets are stronger and another quarter believe the two nations are equally prepared. The important point is that nearly 30 percent don't know how the two nations compare in civil defense!

The respondents were also asked their views as to the desirability of various arms control agreements. The responses to questions concerning control of offensive weapons are shown in the following table. The category labeled "Neutral" includes not only those considering the proposition neither desirable nor undesirable but also those answering "don't know" or not answering.

POSSIBLE "OFFENSIVE" LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

Proposition	Desirable	Undesirable	Neutral
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to those countries that do not have them now (Non-proliferation Treaty).	69.3%	13.3%	17.4%
Agreement to maintain not more than the number of nuclear bombs and missiles that they now have.	64.3	13.3	22.4
Elimination of all nuclear tests including underground testing.	55.2	27.7	17.1
Agreement of nuclear powers to destroy all of their bombs and missiles; that is, to do away with all bombs and missiles already in existence.	46.9	32.9	20.2

An agreement on a nuclear "freeze" has a higher national consensus than complete nuclear disarmament. Some insight as to why this might be may be gained from the answers to two related aspects of general disarmament:

Proposition	Desirable	Undesirable	Neutral
A safe and secure inspection system operated by the UN or by inspection teams from opposing nations.	59.5%	21.3%	19.2%
A UN Police Force controlling enough nuclear weapons to be the strongest army in the world.	30.7	42.3	27.0

The views of the public on possible defensive arms agreements are as follows:

POSSIBLE "DEFENSIVE" LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

Proposition	Desirable	Undesirable	Neutral
Agreement to limit the number of Anti-missile missiles (ABMs).	63.5%	15.3%	21.2%
Agreement with the Soviets to have no ABMs at all.	39.4	35.6	25.0
Agreement with the Soviets not to have any programs of civil defense; that is, programs to protect civilian populations against nuclear attack.	12.6	65.8	21.6

While some sort of agreement to limit ballistic missile defenses is seen as desirable by a substantial majority, an agreement to eliminate such defenses is highly controversial. Elimination of civil defense is undesirable to about two-thirds of the adult population although the question asked seems too inclusive. Missile and bomber defenses can also protect the civilian population from attack. Clearly, the people do *not* relish being "nuclear hostages" to satisfy some theory of deterrence!

Some clarification of the ambiguities in public attitudes toward ballistic missile defense can be found in the responses to two contrasting *unilateral* policies in the absense of any arms control agreement:

Proposition	Desirable	Undesirable	Neutral
Stopping all plans to put ABMs around some military bases and cities.	23.2%	54.3%	22.5%
Protecting most of our big cities and important military bases with anti-missile missiles.	68.7	12.7	18.6

The above information is drawn from the University of Pittsburgh report by:

Jiri Nehnevajsa, *The Nuclear Arms Control Agreement of Moscow: American Perspectives Before the President's Summit Visit.*



Editor, Survive – Dear Sir:

Just received the July-August 1972 edition of "Survive" and see on the inside cover: "Headlines to Come." You are about to become the victim of sloppy reporting if you publish an article on Rapid City and state the cause of the flood was the collapse of the earth-built Canyon Lake Dam (a WPA project).

Canyon Lake is a "huge" body of water covering nearly 40 acres. At its deepest point it has a depth of less than 20 feet.

Your contributor is making the false assumption, as did many news media at the national level, that a poorly constructed dam broke in a heavy rain and flooded a city. Six days after the tragedy, CBS-TV was still using this erroneous information as lead-in to stories on the flood.

The cause of the flood at Rapid City, South Dakota was seven to ten inches of rain in a two hour period, on the Black Hills. A portion of this water flowed into Rapid Creek (which runs through the center of Rapid City). Rapid Creek was dammed to form Canyon Lake. When the water came out of the hills it flowed into Canyon Lake, over the dam, and flooded the city. The dam held for an appreciable period of time. The damage to Rapid City was done before the dam collapsed.

Suggest your contributor visit Rapid City and speak with authorities before he makes a big issue of dam breaks, because the June '72 Rapid City, South Dakota flood tragedy was not caused by the collapse of the earth-built Canyon Lake Dam. We visited Rapid City and talked with authorities and know the true cause. We have some very fine 35mm color slides to substantiate the above remarks.

Michael A. Dempsey, Assistant Director
Richland County-City of Columbia Civil Defense
Columbia, South Carolina

Following Mr. Dempsey's suggestion in his last paragraph we contacted Mr. Milo J. Hoenscheid, of the South Dakota Civil Defense Office. He forwarded to us a news story from the Rapid City Journal – "Dam Break Here Has Made Others Alert", by City Editor Jack Weaver. It reads in part:

"Our family recently enjoyed a couple of weeks of camping in Wyoming. Campground encounters started with a glance at our license plates, a question about what part of South Dakota we were from, and then the words "Rapid City" inevitable led to a discussion on the flood. . . .

"One point of misinformation kept surfacing with surprising regularity. We were amazed at the number of people who thought the break in Canyon Lake Dam was the only reason for the flood. Not that it wasn't a factor in the damage, but an amazing number of people had no knowledge of up to 14 inches of rain or the fact that water was flowing over the top of the dam before it gave way. Many believe the dam broke and there was a bad flood downstream only . . .

"In another area we were camped downstream from a large federal dam. Next morning a young family from Maryland, not knowing we were from Rapid City told us they almost left in the middle of the night. It was a bright morning and we had forgotten that it had rained a bit during the night. But the Maryland campers said they had just visited Rapid City and when the rain started they started thinking about being below the dam and considered pulling out.

"If there can be any good from a disastrous flood, maybe there is a bit of it here. People from many parts of the country are obviously more keenly aware of flood plain dangers and the importance of sound dams."

Only The Strong – TV Film, 27 Min. Published by Institute for American Strategy. Cost: $265.00. Rental: $42.00 per day.

People want to believe that the United States is militarily stronger than the Soviet Union. Or, failing this, they want to believe that we are about on a par with the Soviet Union. Or, failing both of these viewpoints, they can admit to themselves that the Soviet Union is ahead of us in the arms race – but not so far that it really matters much.

Only The Strong – a dramatic new film which measures comparative USA-USSR military muscle – mirrors these opinions at its beginning through snatches of interviews with "average Americans."

Only The Strong then quickly gets to the facts: the United States, which had a substantial nuclear lead in 1962 and at that time displayed its nuclear power in the Cuban Crisis by forcing the Soviet Union to remove its missiles from Cuba – and in this way maintaining the peace – proceeded to relinquish that lead over the following decade. In 1972 the situation is reversed.

Now the substantial lead belongs to the Soviet Union.

The film freely uses Soviet footage to give its audience a first-hand look at Soviet weapons. It seasons its visual evidence of Soviet might with statistics: the Soviet Union is now far ahead in the nuclear missile department – and lengthening its lead. It is far ahead in bomber aircraft. It has a commanding lead in submarines and in total naval tonnage. It will soon forge ahead in the number of submarine missiles. Its merchant marine has outdistanced ours. A comparison of conventional military forces gives the same picture.

The Soviets, the narrator points out, are particularly strong believers in a heavy defense. Their antiballistic missile (ABM) system has been given a top priority and is developing with great strides. The film shows ABM in test action destroying incoming weapons. The present US capability in ABM: Zero. A watered-down ABM system is due for token dispersal later in the 1970's. Civil defense is portrayed in similar fashion. With shelters, evacuation and an organized total defense the Soviets stand in an all-out attack to suffer less than half its World War II casualties. The figure for the United States – with its flabby "paper tiger" civil preparedness posture – is well over 100,000,000 fatalities.

Ridiculous? This is the point.

Only The Strong makes it clear. Among the convincing authorities who hammer home this theme in the film are Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Retired Air Force General Bruce K. Holloway, retired former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, and nuclear scientist Edward Teller.

Only The Strong sounds the same tocsin of impending decline and defeat for the United States that has been sounded for some years past by *Survive,* by the Institute of Strategic Services, by the American Security Council, and by political leaders like F. Edward Hébert, George Wallace, Henry M. Jackson, John G. Schmitz, and a number of others.

Only The Strong leaves no doubts: Let's repair our fences *now.* Let's give our country and the Free World the chance it deserves to develop and prosper, to dodge the pitfalls of defense anemia, to discourage the aggressor. Let's build for peace.

At the close of the film there is an appeal to viewers to write in opinions on the course of action the United States should take. The address:

Peace Poll
Boston, Va. 22713

One wonders at the "Peace Poll." Certainly the argument of *Only The Strong* for a meaningful national preparedness is compelling. Certainly it appears to be the only logical road to world peace. And certainly time is now very late and is a most crucial factor.

But will these people – these good Americans – who want so earnestly to believe that the United States is not in danger want to believe that it is in the gravest danger ever?

It could ruin their week ends.

Pressure can come from the people and the press to remedy public safety policies when they fail and the public becomes aroused. But reaction requires this *failure.* Then the next step is government action. But when the policy of "strategic sufficiency" and appeasement fails it will be too late for remedies. Impossible. The United States will have already been destroyed.

This point is also clear in *Only The Strong.* The time for government action is now!

Perhaps the "Peace Poll" should be extended to members of Congress. For it will be through their action or inaction that the United States will survive or perish.

QUESTION & ANSWER CORNER

Q What is a cruise missile? Why do we need them?

A A cruise missile is an aerodynamic vehicle, basically a pilotless jet plane that can be given speeds much greater than manned bombers. They are also much cheaper than bombers. The USSR has developed cruise missiles with ranges of 1,500 miles and carries them on submarines, cruisers and patrol boats. The United States has no competing missile. The USSR so poses a great threat to the American population. The development of cruise missiles in the United States was scrapped when Robert S. McNamara was Secretary of Defense.

Survive Interview with

John E. Davis

John E. Davis, Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (right), at a recent meeting with Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.

In his 3-plus years as U.S. Civil Preparedness Director John E. Davis has breathed new life into the faltering program for safeguarding the American public in disaster. With a gift for listening as well as for decisive leadership, he has won a host of friends and supporters among the nation's 5,000 local civil defense directors. This is also true at the state and federal levels.

Without lost motion, Davis has snipped through carloads of red tape and has oriented the civil preparedness program toward more practical goals. New muscle in the form of executive and legislative blessing and support will now put these goals within easier reach.

Looking over his actions, pronouncements and testimony, the conclusion can be drawn that in significant ways his views on providing disaster protection for Americans come very close to paralleling those of Survive.

Here are the Davis replies to Survive *questions –*

SURVIVE: Shortly after you assumed your duties as National Director of Civil Defense in May 1969, you opened a direct dialogue between yourself and local directors. The change of climate has been warmly welcomed by them and appears to permit better overall teamwork. Has this been of significant value to you?

DAVIS: Yes, indeed. The improved exchange of information has been at least as valuable to DCPA* as we hope it has been to the local directors. The response has emphasized to us, more strongly than ever, the importance of local governments being ready to cope with natural and other peacetime disasters, as well as with the effects of nuclear attack. It has brought home to us that local capability to meet peacetime emergencies is uppermost in the minds of local directors, and that most of them justify their total CD activities on this basis.

Our future programs will be based largely on local views that are coming out of the State Seminars for Local Directors, the On-Site Assistance visits† and other activities that call for us to work shoulder-to-shoulder with local directors in all parts of the country.

SURVIVE: Another accomplishment that has been widely applauded in civil preparedness circles was your success in arresting the downward plunge of the national civil preparedness budget. It was hoped this would be followed by increases in succeeding years. You predicted, however, that the budget would remain static for the next five years. Why did you not follow up the first step – the arresting of the budget plunge – with efforts to obtain budget increases?

DAVIS: We are, of course, pleased that the "downward plunge" of the federal civil preparedness budget, as you put it, has been arrested. The hard facts of the matter are

**Defense Civil Preparedness Agency*

†*A new DCPA effort to stimulate productive local CD planning through extended conferences, analyses and programming at selected localities by visiting federal-state advisory teams.*

that for the past several years, the federal civil preparedness effort has been forced – because of heavy demands on the tax dollar for both active defense and domestic programs – to operate at what I have called a "minimum sustaining level." Our low for the period was the $60 million budget for Fiscal Year 1969. Now, we have gotten back up to about $83.5 million, and I am hopeful this will increase in the future, with the winding down of the Southeast Asia conflict.

The effects of an austere budget have not all been bad. For one thing, we were forced to reevaluate our spending and make the best possible use of our funds. This led to improved programs, and tangible progress toward our goal of "all hazards protection" for the American people.

SURVIVE: What is the significance of the new name and position of your agency?

DAVIS: Civil preparedness has long been recognized within the Department of Defense as an essential element of the total defenses. It is also recognized that DoD military resources, manpower, and experience can provide invaluable support to civil government in time of emergency. Our new status within the Department of Defense enhances the effectiveness of civil/military coordinated action in civil emergencies.

The basic objective, of course, is increased safety for the public.

There were a couple of basic reasons for the new name of our agency. For one thing, the nine other Department of Defense agencies all have "Defense" as the first word of their title – such as Defense Nuclear Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Supply Agency. Another reason is that "civil defense" in the public consciousness is related mainly to the nuclear threat. We feel that "civil preparedness' helps acquaint people with the new, broader concept of our program, which includes both peacetime and wartime disaster readiness.

SURVIVE: Do you detect any increased interest in civil preparedness by Congress?

DAVIS: Yes. Increased Congressional interest is reflected in the gradual, though modest, increases in our annual appropriations. Since Congressional interest usually follows public interest, I am encouraged to believe that the American public is gradually becoming more aware of the need for civil preparedness. The enlargement of our program to put more emphasis on readiness for peacetime disasters probably is responsible, in part at least, for this greater public and Congressional interest.

SURVIVE: As you know, *Survive* was founded and is guided by a group of Americans who see a much improved civil defense posture as a strategic requirement. We have been critical of a "minimal" U.S. civil defense effort in the past, and continue to be critical. How do you feel about *Survive's* position in this respect?

DAVIS: I certainly agree with you that our national security, at this point in history, requires a defense posture second to none. Our posture must include effective civilian defense against nucelar attack. It is essential that federal, state, and local governments continue their cooperative efforts to develop a nationwide system that would save millions of American lives in event of attack.

I trust your readers understand that including peacetime disaster preparedness along with civil defense preparedness does *not* indicate any downgrading, on our part, of nuclear attack preparedness. We can have both kinds of protection. Our civil defense systems can and should be used for a dual purpose.

If providing peacetime disaster protection to the public were to mean less nuclear attack protection, we wouldn't urge local governments to get involved more strongly in disaster activities.

Our position in regard to the U.S. civil defense effort is simply this : we want to assure personal survival in any kind of disaster.

SURVIVE: Perhaps what you say can be related to civil preparedness involvement in the disaster caused by Tropical Storm Agnes. Would you comment?

DAVIS: More than a hundred persons lost their lives, and property damage amounted to over $3 billion. The situation would have been much worse if state and local civil defense had not planned so well and responded so valiantly in Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, and West Virginia.

I visited some of the areas soon after the disaster, and came away convinced that the emergency plans, procedures, and facilities worked very well in most places.

This emergency also demonstrated how DCPA and the Office of Emergency Preparedness can work together effectively to bring federal assistance to places where needed. Some 60 DCPA professionals were loaned to OEP during the emergency. Mainly, they established and operated "one-stop Emergency Assistance Centers" in the stricken areas – offices where all needs of the storm victims could be immediately handled.

We also provided to the affected local governments a great deal of our emergency engineering equipment, to keep water supplies available. Generators were loaned also to provide electricity.

Experience is the best teacher. Agnes provided a lot of experience. From that, we have learned a great deal which we will seek to apply effectively in future planning and assistance to state and local governments.

SURVIVE: To return to nuclear attack preparedness – in its March-April issue, *Survive* featured an excerpt from a conversation between you and Representative Donald W. Riegel, Jr., of Michigan, in which he deplored our civil defense unpreparedness and you agreed with him. Assuming you feel Congressman Riegel's position has merit, what can be done to remedy the situation?

DAVIS: I could not in honesty disagree with Congressman Riegel. Our program has not received the attention and

funds it could have used in the past few years, when higher-priority needs had to be met. But as I mentioned earlier, this forced us to do a better job with available funds. For example, our On-Site Assistance program is getting federal technical and financial assistance into the places where it will do the most good – at the local level. We are helping local directors become more professional. Also, we are realigning our total program to a "risk-oriented" approach. And we are adopting procedures that call for aciton programs to be implemented locally in a time of tension or crisis, rather than the more costly procedures of having them fully in-being during peacetime.

SURVIVE: Will you define "risk orientation"? Will this concept lead to improved civil preparedness?

DAVIS: Risk orientation means tailoring a community's emergency preparedness program to cope with the hazards that particular community is likely to be subjected to, in peacetime or wartime. Let me give an example:

If a community is located in a hurricane zone, the primary attention and effort of the emergency planners should be directed to hurricane precautions and preparations.

The same community could also be subject to tornadoes, and possibly floods. If the community is located near a major military installation or is an industrial or transportation center, planning should also consider the effects of nuclear attack. Radioactive fallout would have to be considered by *every* local planner.

If a community is located in a rural area, far removed from what could be considered prime enemy military objectives, the danger of fallout might be the only attack hazard to be considered. Identifying specific risks helps the planners in any town provide maximum protection, because they can concentrate on the more obvious dangers.

Risk orientation is taken into account by the On-Site Assistance teams when they visit towns and cities across the country. These teams help the local planners identify the nature and magnitude of all the risks, peacetime and wartime, to which a particular community is exposed.

I'm fully confident this approach will lead to more effective civil preparedness.

SURVIVE: Blast shelter has been considered too ambitious an undertaking in the past in the United States. But over 10 million underground shelter spaces have been found in urban areas by the national shelter survey which could be used for protection against blast. Is there any new Pentagon attitude toward this question?

DAVIS: Actually, your figure is low. We estimate that about 35 percent of the fallout shelter spaces located so far, or 70 million spaces, are below ground level and therefore offer some degree of blast protection. However, it is likely that not all these spaces could be used to protect people against blast.

There has been no change so far in the Defense Department's attitude that building single-purpose blast shelters is, physically and financially, infeasible. Therefore, we are studying other measures to protect people against blast, such as greater utilization of existing below ground fallout shelters, more use of home basement shelters, and – in some places – strategic movement of people to low-blast-risk areas.

SURVIVE: One of the DCPA programs which appears to have special value is Community Shelter Planning, or CSP. Many communities got a good start through CSP in assessing the huge gaps in their survival planning. But federal funds for this program have been cut. Plans resulting from the studies can no longer be printed and distributed within the communities with federal help, as originally intended. Also, updating of older CSP projects, an important feature of the original concept, has apparently been shelved. The program appears to be "sick" indeed, even though the personnel framework seems to be intact or growing. Can you give us a prognosis?

DAVIS: I can't agree that the program is "sick", or that updating of CSP's has been shelved. CSP projects have been completed or are underway in about 2,500 U.S. counties, with a total population of 165 million.

You are correct, however, in that we have stopped the printing and distribution-to-the-public of CSP guidance. We found that many citizens were not retaining the printed material, and concluded the funds could be better utilized in other ways. Now, most communities are bringing their CSP projects to the point of printing, with plans for printing and distribution to be accomplished quickly in a period of rising international tension or crisis.

Most of the CSP's remaining to be done are in large metropolitan areas. We have recently worked out better, less costly methods of preparing these CSP's, through the use of computers. Computer techniques will also be useful in updating already-prepared CSP's.

SURVIVE: Do you have a general comment concerning civil defense preparedness against the effects of nuclear attack – as part of our total defense readiness?

DAVIS: I believe we have achieved a "meaningful survival capability." That capability is not nearly so strong yet as we would like, but many studies confirm that tens of millions of our citizens would survive a nuclear attack, and that our Nation would survive.

I expect only a gradual rise in the federal civil preparedness budget in the 1970's, with a corresponding gradual improvement in the emergency readiness of local, state, and federal government. Emergency preparedness against nuclear attack is an issue of "low saliency" in the minds of many Americans – including many members of Congress. Unless something happens to change that attitude – such as a major threat of attack – I cannot envision any "great leap forward" in civil preparedness. However, we are all hopeful that the recent gains in international understanding and reduction of international tensions will help make our position more tenable. ■

SO BE IT!

by Kevin Kilpatrick

A theory has been put into practice in the Soviet Union that if you take a city and sort of turn it inside out by placing industries on an outer perimeter area and intersperse it with recreation and small farm regions you create a "non-target" in a nuclear attack sense. People and buildings are spread so thin that a sort of permanent evacuation has been achieved – along with a rural-type environment.

In the United States we have convinced ourselves that such population dispersal techniques are immoral, impossible and unnecessary. Family protection from nuclear attack is considered warlike.



The fact is, however, in the past twenty years or so Americans cities have tended to undergo a mild explosion of this same nature. People have moved to the suburbs for better living. Industry has moved to the suburbs and small detached communities for tax benefits, cheaper land and in some cases lower wages.

As a result population densities in cities have thinned out perceptibly and continue to thin out even though statistics may show that the mushroomed cities have increased in population where new boundaries have been drawn to include outlying industrial areas.

Over 50% of all new industrial construction now occurs outside the big cities. An exodus of business and manufacturing companies from central cities is taking place. In the last five years, for instance, in the Chicago area over 80% of its industrial expansion has taken place in the suburbs.

Even new towns are now being planned along this new line of thinking by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). One far-sighted planner is going beyond this with a concept of complete rural living that embraces a decentralization of industrial functions to satellite shops.

The evacuation of cities, looked upon now in the United States with distrust and suspicion, is taking place in spite of our contempt for it and may be a permanent fact by the year 2,000.

If it really happens we shall have achieved one basic concept of a good civil defense without even meaning to.

Civil Defense Positions of Presidential Nominees

Survive here offers evidence of the positions of Presidential Nominees on home defense issues. That of George McGovern is taken principally from a reply to a questionnaire sent earlier this year to candidates for the Democratic nomination. The John G. Schmitz stand comes mainly from his contact with *Survive* last year (see *Survive*, July-August 1971). The Richard Nixon position has been recently restated for *Survive* in a letter from General G. A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. This letter is reproduced in its entirety.

Democratic Party

McGOVERN George McGovern's frank position on national defense matters remains sharply negative. His expressed opinion of civil defense reveals an indifference to measures for the protection of the American homeland. He would cut a national civil defense budget that is already grossly inadequate. It is obvious that if McGovern were to be elected civil defense -- along with all other areas of defense -- would fare worse than ever before.

American Party

SCHMITZ Californian John G. Schmitz says: "Civil defense procedures limit damage. A well organized civil defense program . . . can substantially lower the level of damage to the population resulting from a nuclear exchange . . . It is absolutely necessary that prevailing trends be reversed and if enough of us keep at it the possibility exists that we may be able to prevent the final Pearl Harbor." Schmitz is a strong supporter of *Survive*. As a third party nominee, however, his views at present are overshadowed by the Nixon-McGovern duel.

Republican Party

NIXON

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SEP 25 1972

Mr. Walter Murphey
Editor
The American Journal
of Civil Defense
Survive
P.O. Box 910
Starke, Florida 32091

Dear Mr. Murphey:

I am responding to your letter to the President of August 28, in my capacity as the President's advisor on civil defense policy. I believe that the following best summarizes the position of this Administration on the civil defense program:

Based on a recent comprehensive analysis of alternative civil defense policies, the President has decided that the U.S. shall maintain the current overall level of effort in its civil defense activities. As provided by the Civil Defense Act of 1950, the primary purpose of civil defense is the protection of life and property in the United States from attack. This can best be achieved through readiness at all levels of government. To help achieve such readiness, the President has directed that there be increased emphasis, within the limitations of existing authority, on plans, procedures and preparedness activities that may also be applicable to peacetime emergencies.

Based on this guidance, we intend to

(1) Continue the shelter system;

(2) Place greater reliance on improved State and local capabilities to meet emergency needs;

(3) Make maximum use of available facilities for protection of the populace;

(4) Put greater stress on use of resources applicable to peacetime as well as wartime emergencies.

(5) Shift some on-going programs to systems that would only be implemented in a crisis to reduce peacetime costs and prevent rapid obsolescence.

Sincerely,

G. A. Lincoln

G. A. Lincoln
Director

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