

SURVIVE





Editorial . . .

THE *SURVIVE* IMAGE (See Cover)

At *Survive*'s annual Florida meeting on November 11th our comely business manager displayed *Survive* materials reprinted in U.S. and overseas publications. It was an impressive exhibit, and the reaction to it caught us off balance. No one had realized we were so widely read. Why hadn't we tooted our horn about it?

Well, fact is we *are* proud of a circulation in all 50 states, and in 40 countries abroad. We are proud also that many publications, including those represented on this issue's cover, honor us by reprinting our materials — as we invite them to do.

We only wish, however, that we could be proud of our impact on stimulating real consideration of practical protective measures for U.S. citizens. Here we sort of stub our toes and doggedly make ready to try again. We need to reach more decision makers — in the U.S.A.

We seem to do all right elsewhere.

So . . . there's a little subdued horn-tooting. We guess its in order. But we feel like an American New Year's Eve celebrant in Moscow or Peking: we've really been tooting for someone else's awakening. It would be wonderful one day to toot for our own.

SURVIVE

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SURVIVE

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Sponsored by

The Civil Defense Forum
The Oak Ridge Civil Defense Society
The Professional Society for Protective Design
The Association for Community-Wide
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Survive presents authentic information relating to civil defense—to the survival of free government, the United States, and its people in the nuclear age. Its aim is public education in this field and service as a forum.

Authors are encouraged to submit manuscripts for consideration by the advisory board for publication. Articles (preferably illustrated) should be 1,000 to 1,500 words in length, slanted to the non-technical reader, and oriented toward the civil defense field. Views expressed in contributions to *Survive* are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect *Survive* policy.

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SURVIVE

**PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY FOR
NUCLEAR DEFENSE REORGANIZED**
---NEWSLETTER SHIFTED

Upon completion of balloting among the more than five hundred members of the Professional Society for Nuclear Defense, one of the sponsors of *Survive*, the name of the organization has been changed and its scope of interest modified. The group is now "THE PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY FOR PROTECTIVE DESIGN" and is an association of architects, engineers, designers, planners, applied scientists, and other professionals in industry, government, education and private practice. The activities of the Society are concerned with the physical protection of the United States population, its resources, systems, and institutions from the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons, natural or man-made disasters, and social disruption.

Professional Society for Protective Design members will continue to receive *Survive*, however their NEWSLETTER, previously distributed concurrently with *Survive*, will be mailed separately in alternate months beginning in February. In addition, a Technical Journal will be published semi-annually, with the first issue scheduled for late spring.

Interested persons may contact: Professional Society for Protective Design, P. O. Box 1485, Madison, Wisconsin 53701.

A *New York Times* report says that China is now deploying liquid-fuel missiles near its border with the Soviet Union capable of reaching Moscow. Within the next 18 months it is expected that 30 to 40 of these 3,500-mile range missiles will be ready in hardened sites. Each missile is said to have a 3-megaton warhead. A total of about 20 other missiles of ranges up to 2,500 miles are also deployed. Washington officials feel that this may present the Soviets with an effective deterrent. (It should be noted that both China and the Soviet Union also possess well-developed civil defense systems.)

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
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EVACUATION TIMING

in the USSR

—Excerpts from *Soviet Civil Defense - Urban Evacuation and Dispersal* (DCPA Document published by the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami)

-by Leon Goure

Evacuation of the USSR is a concept that includes above all continued functioning of the Soviet economy. Timing is crucial to its success. Leon Goure — author of Civil Defense in the Soviet Union and Director of Soviet Studies at University of Miami — analyzes the patchwork information available on the subject and presents a picture of an evolving solution.

Soviet Civil Defense spokesmen frequently warn that evacuation will have to be accomplished in an “extremely compressed time period.” While a “threatening situation” is to be proclaimed prior to an enemy attack, presumably when a significant escalation is taking place in international tensions and the Soviet government believes that an enemy is preparing to launch an attack, the Soviet leadership is unlikely to be able to assure the civil defense command of a specific number of days for completing the evacuation. It is also not clear how confident Soviet leaders are of receiving strategic warning of an attack. In this respect, Soviet spokesmen assert on the one hand that an enemy is likely to attempt to launch a surprise attack and on the other hand that the Soviet Union will detect his plans in advance and will take appropriate countermeasures. Soviet military doctrine indicates that the Soviet leaders expect to launch a preemptive attack of their own. For example, Marshall Grechko Minister of Defense asserts that:

At the present stage the Armed Forces must be capable under any condition to foil an aggressor's surprise attack with the use of nuclear weapons, as well as with conventional weapons, and with swift crushing blows to destroy his main missile-nuclear means and troop concentrations and to assure favorable conditions for the further conduct and the victorious outcome of the war.

Soviet authorities give no indication of how the concept of a preemptive attack fits into the plans for preattack urban evacuation.* Nor are there any indications that Soviet planners perceive the evacuation as being “provocative” and as possibly triggering an attack. Because by Soviet definition the Soviet Union would not initiate a war, the possibility of a Soviet-launched surprise attack is never mentioned in public. However, the concept of a “preemptive” attack is obviously an elastic one and appears to subsume the possi-

*Along with the evacuation and dispersal plans, shelter construction, especially at industrial facilities, has been going on for years and is continuing.

bility of the Soviet Union's achieving surprise in order to destroy enemy strategic forces before they are launched. Therefore, the circumstances that may cause the Soviet leaders to order the evacuation are not clear.

Soviet authorities have never published the planned time span for the implementation of the evacuation. To date, the only indication in open Soviet sources of the possible time frame for the evacuation, at least insofar as industrial




Figure 1
Soviet sketch showing plan of dispersal of typical metropolitan population and industry. Note that key shift workers are located where their travel to and from plants is as short as possible.




Figure 2
A more detailed Soviet sketch showing plan for Assembly Points, loading and unloading stations in a typical section of a city and a typical evacuation district.

workers are concerned, was published in a recent (1970) major Soviet civil defense handbook. This handbook provides, for the first time, a model time schedule for the implementation of specified civil defense measures by an industrial plant in response to various civil defense alert signals:

Warning of the workers and office workers:	30 minutes
Deployment of the public order and safety service at the plant, in the dispersal area and along the routes of movement to the area:	2 hours
Departure of the "operational group" to the assigned area for dispersal and evacuation:	2 hours
Carrying out the preparatory measures for equipping the area for dispersal to receive workers and their families:	12 hours
Dispersal of the workers, office workers and their families:	72 hours
Construction of protective structures* (i.e. shelters) at the plant and in the dispersal area according to the established plan:	72 hours
Protection or removal from the plant to outside the city of materials that may cause secondary damage in the event of an attack:	72 hours
Creation of reserves of food, medical supplies, etc. in the outlying zone and evacuation to the dispersal area of civil defense units and their equipment:	72 hours

The time periods indicated are not cumulative but represent the duration of the implementation of various measures which in most instances are carried out simultaneously. While it is not known whether this model time schedule reflects the actual civil defense plan — at least for industry — it suggests that the Soviet authorities expect to require several days for implementing an evacuation.

DAILY EVACUATION CAPACITY OF GENERAL-USE TRANSPORT (In Millions)

TYPE	1967	1970 (est.)	1975 (est.)
Railroad	23.5	26.5	34.0
Motor Vehicle	14.0	18.0	28.0
River Transport	1.5	1.7	2.1
Sea Transport	0.49	0.87	1.52
Air Transport	0.41	0.72	1.48
TOTAL	39.9	47.9	67.1

It is rare for specific towns to be mentioned in Soviet

**This refers to last-minute construction of shelters in addition to those already built and available.*

publications as areas of relocation for evacuees from larger cities. However, in 1967, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the City Soviet of Mogilev-Podol'sk, a Ukrainian city with a population at that time of 24,000, reported:

We devote a lot of attention to the problem of receiving and placing the population which may be evacuated [here] from other cities. In particular, rooms and apartments where the evacuees will live have been selected, and plans have been made for providing them with food and necessities. The possibility of finding work for those arriving have been established and also medical services for them. . .

A particular feature of the Soviet evacuation program is that it provides for the continued production of essential industries and services by retaining one work shift at the plants on a rotation basis. This procedure and the plans for involving the evacuees in productive work in the rural areas appear to represent attempts to assure that the Soviet Union would not suffer a paralysis of its industrial output in the event of evacuation, and that it can maintain an evacuated posture for some time without suffering intolerable economic and social dislocation.

Present indications are that industry is best prepared to evacuate its workers, office employees and their families. While conditions will vary from city to city, it seems likely that the authorities could succeed in dispersing the bulk of the essential population in a 72-hour period suggested by a recent Soviet publication. It is also conceivable that if the organization functions reasonably smoothly and the population remains disciplined and responsive to orders, it may be possible, by using all means of transportation and also by marching people out on foot, to remove a large part of the urban population within a few days from the probable zones of nuclear destruction. Whether the evacuees could be sheltered against radioactive fallout would depend on how successful they and the villagers were in building the required additional simple shelters in that time period. The civil defense training program for the population includes instructions in the building of such shelters. ■

The U.S.S.R. now has a new national civil defense director. Colonel General Alexander T. Altunin, 51, replaces Marshal Vasily I. Chuikov, 72. The high rank of the new director emphasizes the continuing heavy stress laid upon civil defense by the Soviets in the wake of the recent arms limitation agreement with the U.S.A. Calling for a stepped-up civil defense effort, General Altunin observed that "every Soviet citizen" must realize that there is an effective defense against nuclear weapons and that the reliability of civil defense will depend directly upon the preparedness effort.



SPOTLIGHT

SOUTH CAROLINA PIONEERS STATE CD ANALYSIS

DCPA's ambitious On-Site Assistance program moves up one notch in its one year history as South Carolina becomes the first state government to embark on an On-Site project. Now underway, it is due for completion in April.

Number One objective of the project is to examine "the roles and functions" assigned to state departments and agencies. Presumably the responsibility for slanting shelter into state buildings will come up for examination and action.

In announcing the project in an initial briefing South Carolina's Lieutenant Governor Earle E. Morris observed that the state-federal team would "develop a step-by-step plan to improve that state's ability to respond to all types of disaster."

Morris also said that an end achievement was to coordinate effectively its existing disaster planning "into a formidable bulwark against any type of massive onslaught against lives and property, of whatever kind, and wherever it may take place in the state."

CALIFORNIA PROBES EARTHQUAKE MEASURES

Complete research on San Francisco Bay Area quake history is now being followed up by federal and state plans to cope with future earthquakes. An interim federal plan is due in January, and final plans from both sources are expected by next summer.

Included in the research report were estimates of effects of earthquakes of varied intensities on:

- (1) Casualties
- (2) Damages to construction.
- (3) Damages to transportation systems
- (4) Damages to utilities
- (5) Damages to medical and other public services
- (6) Damages to communications systems

Present research and planning stem from the aftermath of the disastrous San Fernando Earthquake of February 9, 1971.

William Staten, Westinghouse-Tenneco Vice-President for Administration, points to nuclear power plants in outer space "as soon as NASA has its space shuttle ready."



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Seven Myths of CIVIL DEFENSE

by **John E. Bex**
Director, Region II
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Region Two Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Director John E. Bex is a recipient of the Freedoms Foundation George Washington Honor Medal, free-lance writer, lecturer, marketeer, Air Force Colonel, and business executive.

In every field where information is not widely disseminated and the public is not well informed, myths tend to accumulate. Civil Defense has been peculiarly afflicted with such myths since it has been treated as a very minor affair and neglected for so many years. The result is a sort of vicious dwindling spiral, since the effect works both ways and neglect fosters myths which bring about still further neglect.

Any progress in stopping this dangerous downward tendency in Civil Defense requires facing squarely all of these myths and combatting them vigorously. In few fields has the discrepancy between myth and reality grown so great.

We can summarize this unfortunate mythology under the following general points which we will list before proceeding to discuss them in detail:

1: Civil defense is an essentially futile exercise since if war doesn't come, it's unnecessary, while if war does come, it can't help enough to be worthwhile.

2: All efforts toward improving Civil Defense merely further increase the war danger since they are provocative.

3: With our huge defense budgets over the years, so many billions have already been spent on Civil Defense that everything reasonable and practical has already been done.

4: Civil Defense is a military affair of limited interest to civilians.

5: Civil Defense is a Federal Government show and whatever is to be done will be taken care of at the Federal Government level.

6: Civil Defense is concerned only with the effects of nuclear warfare.

7: The general public is uninterested in or opposed to Civil Defense.

Now every one of these myths is false or a twisted half truth at best, yet each one is a major obstacle and acts as a really formidable roadblock against progress. Time and again you will run across these myths or fragments of them in the minds and public statements of not merely ordinary citizens, but high officials and national leaders as well. An adequate treatment would, for some of them, require many

pages or separate essays; but let us dig in and cover the high points.

Myth No. 1

Is Civil Defense futile? War or no war, it is not futile. If war is to be avoided, Civil Defense can play an important role helping to discourage war. A strong Civil Defense system means that any aggressor will not be able to achieve victory in a single knockout blow, but must reckon with the consequences, perhaps long drawn out, of his actions. It adds weight to the counsels of caution and subdues the blitzkrieg fanatics.

Can Civil Defense actually be effective and make a difference? It most definitely can; and difference is in terms of millions of lives. In the American case, the difference between the loss of over 100,000,000 and less than 20,000,000 lives in the initial assault. (Eugene P. Wigner claims that the Soviet Union would lose less than 10,000,000 in these same circumstances due to its organized civil defense.)*

Civil Defense is independent of the issue of pacifism, since it is non-aggressive passive defense upon which both pacifists and non-pacifists can agree. Its essence is simple survival. If anyone were asked to name the principle pacifist nations and international leaders of pacifism, Sweden and Switzerland would certainly appear on anyone's list. It is precisely these two countries which have developed the world's best systems of Civil Defense. Their systems are miles ahead of our own, and include things like deep rock blast shelters.

There is indeed a great hope and a good chance of avoiding nuclear war, but this can best be accomplished by taking appropriate defensive action and not depending on hope, drifting along. Men have complained of the burden and disaster of war since the time of Homer, but war has come. There is no guarantee that it will never strike again. We owe it to ourselves and to our civilization to ensure some sort of survival no matter how bad our luck may be. Mankind survived the attacks of the black plague in the Middle Ages which killed as much as one-third to one-half of the population in many regions. People didn't give up but went on living.

Myth No. 2

The example of the Swedes and the Swiss points up the falsity of the second myth, that Civil Defense increases the war danger by being a provocation. No reasonable person could accuse these nations of meaning to be provocative of war. They just intend to survive and have had the courage to face the unpleasant realities and take sensible, active steps to foster their own survival if worst comes to worst. Both reason and a sense of moral responsibility decree that we do the same.

*"The Myth of Assured Destruction," by Eugene P. Wigner, *Survive*, July-August, 1970.

Let us put the matter finally in these terms. Let us suppose that both Russia and the U.S. maintained the same total defense budget or perhaps reduced it at some constant rate each year. Consider case A where the proportions of that total budget for each nation were shifted away from offensive weapons and toward passive Civil Defense, and case B where the shift was made in the opposite direction. Which would be a better augury for peace?

Myth No. 3

According to myth three, since we've spent so much on defense, a lot of this must have gone for Civil Defense. Nothing could be more mistaken. Ask anyone who holds such a view what he thinks the percentage is which the Civil Defense budget represents of the total defense budget, just approximately. Keeping in mind that this is for the Civil Defense of over 200 million people, should one guess 10% perhaps, or maybe 5%? Such answers are not even in the right ball park, since the actual figure is approximately one-tenth of one percent. The annual Civil Defense budget has ranged around 70 million. The hard and simple facts of life are that we are unprotected today because we have not yet decided to undertake adequate programs, and spend the still fairly modest amount of additional money which is required.

Myth No. 4

Civil Defense is not a military affair at all, but it is run entirely by and for civilians from the National Director of Civil Defense down through the various regional, state, and local officials. It is of concern to civilians, or at least should be, since its whole purpose is to ensure their survival. It is a sad state of affairs for any normal, mentally healthy individual to be uninterested in his own survival, since survival is such an elemental instinct. But an external observer, like a man from Mars, would be almost forced by the available evidence regarding Civil Defense, to conclude that the mass of citizens of the U.S., the land of the free and home of the brave, had reached that strange state.

Myth No. 5

Myth number five, that the Federal Government is or should be taking care of everything in the way of Civil Defense for us, is completely opposed to the facts. The main responsibility and work for Civil Defense lies with the State and local authorities, where Congress has thought best to place it. The Federal Government's role is much more that of a coordinating and planning agency. The Federal agency does research, operates a national warning system, provides training and publications, makes grants of money and equipment, and makes suggestions and recommendations. But the substantive work of providing shelter, etc., to the extent that it gets done at all, must be done at the local level. Citizens must realize that Big Brother, on the whole, is not taking care of you, but will help you to take

care of yourself if you and your local government officials are interested.

Myth No. 6

Civilian defense certainly originated as a response to the threat of nuclear warfare, but it has been considerably broadened since then, so that myth six is now widely at variance with reality. Responsibility for aid in all types of peace-time disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and the like, has long been an intrinsic part of Civil Defense. Active help has accordingly been given in many such disasters occurring in recent years, though the public has generally not been aware of the fact. In this respect, as in many others, one might well agree with one Senator who remarked that the public relations work of Civil Defense seemed to be about one generation behind.

This role of Civil Defense is growing. Logic and psychology both favor further developments in this direction. After all, the role of a general responsibility for disaster aid and prevention at the national level is still unfilled. But then

the same might be said about Civil Defense itself insofar as any really adequate system is concerned.

Myth No. 7

Finally, let us consider myth seven, which asserts that people on the whole are either uninterested or opposed. This is a dangerous sort of half truth. Certainly evidences of apathy, if not actual hostility, are abundant enough. But then the people have never been told about Civil Defense. No serious effort has yet been made to get the message across. As a result, people are better acquainted with the myths than the realities.

As a matter of fact, experience has shown that efforts which are occasionally made to break through this barrier of ignorance, silence, and misinformation are most rewarding. It turns out that people are interested once the facts have been correctly and properly presented to them. This shouldn't be too surprising.

After all, survival is everybody's business. ■

Medical Focus on "Missing Link" in Heart Attack Treatment*

(Excerpts from "Pre-Hospital Emergency Care of The Heart Attack Patient," by J.E. Stolfi, M.D. — *Emergency Medicine Today*, October 1972)

Emergency medical care of patients with a coronary heart attack is divided into pre-hospital and in-hospital phases. In-hospital treatment made excellent progress during the last decade, with the development of coronary care units. Pre-hospital treatment has lagged behind.

Mobile emergency rooms and coronary care vehicles deliver medical care to patients quicker and more efficiently. Equipped with monitors, shock equipment and drugs they allow trained personnel to treat patients on the spot and en route to the hospital.

Nothing has been done to sustain life until a mobile unit arrives. Now an attempt is being made to provide that missing but essential link. The American College of Physicians has embarked on a mass educational program on cardiopulmonary resuscitation. This prestigious society, by using the expertise of 20,000 members, hopes to implement this lifesaving training program on a nationwide basis.

Cardiopulmonary resuscitation combines mouth-to-mouth respiration and closed heart massage. The latter is accomplished by applying downward pressure on the breastbone with the palm of the hand. By squeezing it toward the backbone, the heart is compressed and blood is forced out into

the general circulation. A sudden release of pressure causes the heart to suck blood back into its chambers. If repeated once a second and accompanied by blowing air into the lungs through the mouth (12 times a minute), life can be sustained for periods in excess of thirty minutes.

The knowledge gained in coronary care units, by monitoring patients for long periods, has shown that when the heart stops beating or is rendered inefficient by a rapid or irregular rhythm, it must be restored within four minutes to preserve the brain.

When cardiac arrest occurs in the street, restaurant, theater, sports stadium, golf course, or home, it is difficult to provide professional care within that critical period. . .

Autopsies have revealed that many people who die suddenly have no apparent heart damage. Death may have been caused by a reversible electrical disturbance in rhythm, known as fibrillation. If resuscitated, these individuals could live a normal life.

**Note: In mass casualty situations — particularly those to be expected in nuclear attack — victims are largely dependent upon medical care furnished by themselves and by non-professional personnel. The training of people in medical self-help, emergency medical procedures, rescue operations and allied techniques is therefore of vital importance to civil defense operations. The response of the layman to the need for people skilled in cardiopulmonary resuscitation helps significantly to stimulate interest in the general field of emergency medical aid.*

CIVIL DEFENSE ABROAD

*Photographs courtesy of the
International Civil Defense Organization*

The cover of the November-December 1972 issue of *Survive* presented an eerie scene: tunnel-shelters under a typical Chinese city. Even the distinguished scholar who saw it and described it found it hard to believe. You pushed a button, and a department store counter rolled aside to reveal a stairway leading into a maze of underground passages and rooms. It was like an oriental "whodunit" that had exceeded all bounds of credulity.

Since then more reports have come out of China on urban shelter systems. Not only from adventurous travelers — who might be presumed to be easily fooled — but from trained observers, among them journalists. They report the

Another section of a Peking tunnel used as a conference room.




A Peking tunnel shelter showing everyday use as a vegetable storage area. Sign reads: "Long life to the great leader, Chairman Mao! Long life! Long, long life!"

same phenomenon: networks of underground tunnels extending for miles and miles and connecting with easy accesses throughout the cities.

According to these accounts all tunnels are well equipped and well maintained. Kitchens, toilets, electric power, sewage and drainage and ventilation systems, dormitories, conference rooms, and storage alleys — all in organized complexes of shelter for millions. And dual use is being actively encouraged.

If some claimed in China — as many have done in the United States — that blast tunnel shelters were too costly, provocative, ridiculous, useless and the distorted dream of queasy crackpots there was certainly no sign of it. Leadership was provided unequivocally by the top political level. Civil Defense contributed the know-how. The people themselves volunteered their labor and technical skills. Local businesses and government came up with financial support. A few professionals were hired. Work began in late 1969, and three years later tunnel systems were accomplished facts. Improvements and extensions are now under way, and more are planned.

The Chinese shelters are somewhat similar in concept to those which have for years been proposed by the Oak Ridge Civil Defense Project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. The September-October 1968 issue of *Survive* features a story by Morris W. Self on "The Tucson Tunnel-Grid Plan" with illustrations of a planned interconnecting shelter system of tunnels underneath Tucson, Arizona conceived in 1964. They were scrapped as too costly (\$122,804,790). They look as though they might double for a Chinese tunnel plan. ■



OUR CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTOR — What We Would Like Him To Be

— by EUGENE P. WIGNER and WALTER MURPHEY

It is easy for someone in a different walk of life to make exaggerated demands for the performance of members of another occupation and to overlook the difficulties they are facing. This is particularly true if he considers the performance of the members of that occupation of vital importance for himself and his nation. On the other hand, those of the occupation in question, well aware of the difficulties they are facing, may not fully realize the community's expectations toward their activities.

It is to balance these two types of points of view that we decided to write this article jointly. We are glad to report that, right from the start, our views differed very little.

As to the problems which our civil defense directors face, they are plentiful. In our country an official is not automatically respected, and the fact that he enjoys the confidence of the government may mean little to most citizens. The professional activities of the civil defense director have, most of the time, little significance for the average citizen — natural disasters are rare and the danger of a nuclear war seems distant — it never happened before. In addition, the citizen, while wanting to be protected, also wants to turn his back on something as frightening as a nuclear war. He wants to forget it, to ignore it. He is much helped in this endeavor by many of our intellectuals who tell him that it is just as well to forget it — nothing can be done about it — there is no defense against nuclear weapons.

These intellectuals — we must admit — have been very successful in propagating this falsehood, but we have to postpone discussing their motives — not altogether base — for another occasion.

* * *

It is with this unfortunate background in mind that we have to approach the question of the title — “Our Civil Defense Director — What We Would Like Him To Be.” What qualities of mind and what kind of knowledge would we like him to have?

Naturally, we want the civil defense director to be patriotic, to be well informed, to be helpful. But what beyond these generalities? And, first of all, on what questions should he be particularly well informed? Here we begin to put forward our hopes and suggestions:

Our civil defense director should certainly be well informed on the effects of nuclear weapons, the ranges of the blast and heat waves, the radiation, both initial and delayed, resulting from the fallout. He should keep abreast of published intelligence reports and estimate on the basis of these as far as possible the number and size of the explosions any enemy can produce. Second, he should be familiar with the physical methods and possibilities of defense against these weapons effects. Lastly, still on the same subject, he should be able to advise on the methods of defense and the possi-

bilities of evacuation. He should also be able to advise on sources of procuring the equipment which protects against the weapons effects. Yes, antiquated as this may appear to many, he should know about the cost and effectiveness of shelters, both permanent and improvised.

In sum, he should know and he should continually keep abreast of the methods and the developments in the broad field of civil defense. This is his first and most vital function.

Familiarity with local conditions and possibilities would assume increased value if it were coupled with familiarity with the national situation and also with the status of civil defense arrangements in traditionally neutral countries such as Switzerland and Sweden — as well as in Communist countries, particularly the USSR and China.

On a larger scale, the civil defense director should be able to advise not only individual citizens but also local and state officials. He should be able to coordinate the emergency functions of the officials in question, advise the decision makers, and make decisions if the government leaders are unable to do so.

As it becomes increasingly apparent, the function of the civil defense director is not restricted to emergencies caused by a nuclear attack. The highest praise that any civil defense organization has received from a high government official was offered by Alaska's governor after the 1964 earthquake. And, in fact, it is natural for an organization which should cope with a disaster as severe as a nuclear attack, to be able to help in smaller disasters such as tornadoes and earthquakes. He should foresee the calamity as much as possible, issue warnings and last minute advice. His help in such situations would be effective not only in minimizing the harm done by the disaster — it will also increase the confidence of the public in his effectiveness, in his ability to be of assistance, and in his reliability.

Up to this point, we could state with reasonable concreteness what the civil defense director should know and be able to do. We spoke about those of his activities which are truly in his line of duty. We cannot be equally concrete and precise when we try to project the image which he should try to create of himself and his organization by activities which might be called extracurricular. But we do hope that he will participate in public affairs outside his narrower responsibilities, that he will attend public meetings and offer wise and well-considered advice — will offer it

unostentatiously, showing a low profile, but manifesting his keen interest in the welfare of his community.

There is one further function which we hope the civil defense director will undertake, also outside his line of duty, but a function in which he should *not* show a low profile —

A great deal is being said and written, often in strident tones, against the pollution of our environment by our factories, power plants, and other physical equipment. But little is being said by the present leaders of the antipollution campaign against pollution of the mind caused by misinformation spread by placards and, in many cases, by the news media. In the much-maligned field of civil defense each of us certainly remembers news items which have been grossly incorrect. And each of us knows of cases in which misinformation was, in fact, publicly exposed. The organization Accuracy In Media (AIM) was founded to counteract misinformation, and it has a hard time doing it.

We hope and wish that civil defense directors will help to decrease this "spiritual pollution," that they will make a deliberate point of correcting errors of fact. One way of doing this is through "letters to the editor." There are many more.

Naturally, this will require familiarity with a wide variety of subjects of public interest, and perhaps an increasing need to consult with colleagues familiar with the subjects on which questionable information is promulgated. To be sure, an incorrect correction does more harm than the original misinformation. However, efforts in this direction — to decrease spiritual pollution — would have two important side effects. It would improve the image of the civil defense director, foster the collaboration between directors and strengthen the contacts between them. It would also make the office of the civil defense director a full-time occupation, and would mean that the function we here propose can become of decisive importance.

* * *

We realize that the image of the civil defense director which we have tried to project is a very ambitious one. We hope that this will not be interpreted only as a sign of our demanding nature but also as a sign of the very high importance we attach to his office. We wish the civil defense director to be both an expert on a number of technical problems and also an "elder statesman" — with a deep interest in public relations. ■

SO BE IT!

by Kevin Kilpatrick

On November 18th the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) televised another national showing of the mid-60's film, "On The Beach" (from the book by the same name).

"On The Beach" is a tensely dramatic account of how fallout in a nuclear war wipes out humanity. It is also far-out fantasy — a fact eclipsed by its finesse. As Bernard Spinard observed in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (September 1971): "Very few literati are aware that Neville Shute's 'On The Beach' is scientific nonsense."

Its CBS showing followed an exhaustive attempt by the Institute for American Strategy to buy television time from CBS for its documentary 27-minute film "Only The Strong" — a factual comparison of USA-USSR military strengths.

CBS refused to sell the time. So did the National Broadcasting Company. So did the American Broadcasting Company.*

In the United States Senate there were echoes of support for the blackout. Said one Senator: "The film may disturb many who are not well versed in arms affairs."

"Only The Strong" rips the cover off the camouflage that hides American defense slippages. (See review in *Survive*, November-December 1972.) It deals in fact. And it is certainly most disturbing: It could awaken America to its predicament. It could stimulate a demand for timely action.

TASS, the Soviet news agency, also approved the blackout.

Propaganda (and censorship) aimed at destroying a nation's will to prepare against war — to preserve peace — can be deadly and is nothing new. It was a favorite Nazi technique. It paid off.

And today in the United States we have been neatly persuaded that defense — active and passive — is for us immoral, unnecessary, unattainable and ridiculous — but reasonable and just for our potential adversaries.

Which presumably may also be all right with TASS.

Citizens of China and the Soviet Union and many other countries are assured of effective measures by their governments to protect their nations and peoples in the event of the outbreak of modern war.

Protection of the United States and its citizens is hardly their concern. It is ours. "Only The Strong" puts this point in sharp focus. "On The Beach" evades it, deceives its viewers, breeds hysteria. It achieves a propaganda mission, intended or not.

The question in America now seems to be: Do we actually want to protect Americans — to make them

REVIEW: *Americans and Civil Defense: Some Highlights of the 1972 National Survey*. A report summary by Jiri Nehnevajsa for DCPA. 1972

In spite of Nehnevajsa's evidence to the contrary for the past several years, official sources continue to point fingers at the American public and deplore "public apathy" in the field of civil defense. According to them the public does not understand the problem and has little or no interest in protective measures against the weapons of modern warfare.

With his latest research into the matter of public attitudes toward a civilian defense Nehnevajsa again gives the lie to this sophistry. In this latest study (1972) 85.4% of those he queried, for instance, favored public fallout shelters. And 62.9% supported building of shelter into new buildings or incorporating it in modifications to existing structures.

Over 50% of those questioned expressed their willingness to volunteer for civil defense duty, thereby demonstrating the practicality of a shelter effort based on contributed public labor — perhaps something similar to what the Chinese have accomplished in the past four years. A heavy majority indicated that they would permit use of their basements for public shelter. Needed: the proper political leadership.

With the national civil defense budget now up to a little over 80 million dollars, the opinion of the sample group was that the civil defense budget was somewhere around 700 million — and furthermore that it ought to be over 1.2 billion dollars, or over twelve times what it actually is!

Nehnevajsa makes this observation:

"In 1972, civil defense remains viable. Its exact missions may not be altogether clear to the public; its low level of Federal financial support is clearly *not* perceived by the public. But whatever else may be said, it holds without equivocation that the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, as major carrier of the burden of protecting the nation's population against nuclear attack, has a public *mandate* stronger than any legislative mandate would seem to imply, and much stronger than the level of funding makes possible."

It is not then that the public doesn't *know* what it wants. What it doesn't know is that it doesn't *have* what it wants.

unrewarding targets?

And the answer appears to be: "No. Not really."

Maybe TASS would not approve.

**Note: The Institute for American Strategy (Boston, Va. 22713) is taking legal action to contest this refusal. And through its efforts 300 of the 643 TV stations in the USA have individually shown "Only the Strong."*

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