

SURVIVE

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CIVIL DEFENSE



DEFENSE...

FOR THE PEOPLE

An Open Letter To The President

(See Pages 5-7)

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NOVEMBER -

DECEMBER,

1974

Commentary

Editor, SURVIVE:

Just read the article, "Three Decades And a Mountain" by Wm. Cornelius Hall, and I would like to comment that the article perhaps tells a lot more than was intended by the author.

Quoting from the article, "Well, I'm glad I have my mountain that 29 years ago I elected to hide behind," I am afraid this pretty well expresses the general feeling of the American public with regard to Civil Defense. We're all "hiding behind a mountain" of that well-known cliché, "it can't happen to us," the equally well-known apathy of Americans and our well-known ability to casually disregard the cold, unpleasant truth of any matter.

And in certain respects, I am afraid that quotation sort of symbolizes the efforts of Civil Defense itself, which still tends to operate in the "horse and buggy days" of the sky-watch era — but without much of the public support and cooperation as was given then. In other words, perhaps too many of us directly involved in Civil Defense are "hiding behind a mountain" of assuming we are doing a job of educating and informing the public, when such is not necessarily the case.

But the article was good, as was the entire publication.

— Kenneth A. Bouton
Deputy Director of CD
for the City of Las Vegas

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Oil, gas and coal prices have little impact on the electric power industry in Quebec. Over 99% of its electricity is generated by its No. 1 natural resource: water.

SURVIVE

The American Journal of Civil Defense

VOL. 7 NO. 6

NOVEMBER - DECEMBER, 1974

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
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Authors are encouraged to submit manuscripts for consideration by the advisory board for publication. Articles (preferably illustrated) should be 1,000 to 1,500 words in length, slanted to the non-technical reader, and oriented toward the civil defense field. Views expressed in contributions to SURVIVE are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect SURVIVE policy.

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SPOTLIGHT

1975 Congressional Review Slated For Civil Defense

Congressman F. Edward Hébert, Chairman of the powerful House Armed Services Committee, told three U.S. Civil Defense Council spokesmen on September 20th that the U.S. Civil Defense Act, Public Law 91-820, would come up for an overview hearing during the next Congress. Hébert informed the trio that civil defense must be an integral part of the nation's overall defense and that the need for examining its responsibilities in providing meaningful protection for Americans was past due. Such a review, he indicated, would be "total," would include the whole spectrum of home defense problems, and would look carefully into allegations that the civil defense mission had become "fragmented" through division among different federal agencies.

The three USCDC officials (President J. Howard Proctor, President-Elect Walter D. Hyle, Jr., and Legislative Committee Chairman Bob McGukin) also called at the office of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. There they talked at length with Special Assistant Thomas Latimer and Deputy Assistant for Administration David O. Cook. The principal points covered were (1) the need for much-improved local warning systems, (2) rescue equipment that would better serve the rescue mission, (3) funding for replacement of certain categories of survival supplies, (4) a remedy for the totally inadequate civil defense budget, and (5) the 1975 Congressional overview hearing for civil defense.

Latimer and Cook indicated that a good bit of in-house preparation had to be accomplished by the Department of Defense and DCPA for the overview hearing. They frankly expressed their concern for the present condition of civil defense in America and said they intended to brief Secretary Schlesinger fully on the discussion.

"We were received warmly by everyone," said Proctor in a telephone interview with SURVIVE. "We had ample time to cover everything we felt we needed to cover. We were all highly pleased with the success of both conferences. We are not stopping here, however. In our approach to this problem we have got to have a 'togetherness' with the National Association of State Civil Defense Directors and with DCPA. I am suggesting that we have one or more planning meetings so that we can come to grips with definitions of problems and agreement on recommended remedial measures. In this way we will best serve the

interests of the country in anticipated appearances before Congressional committees conducting hearings on the 'overview' matter. I think it is also very important that we make it clear we are not trying to preempt the roles of DCPA or the Department of Defense. We are working in support of their goals."

Preparations for a team effort for giving testimony in the 1975 overview hearings were begun in earnest at the USCDC meeting in San Juan October 6-12. ■

Fourteen Nations At San Juan CD Conference

Over 400 participants from 14 nations took part in the United States Civil Defense Council's Fall Conference in San Juan, P. R. October 6-12. Included were representatives from Mexico, Ecuador, Chili, Venezuela, Canada and Switzerland.

For the first time in USCDC history the flavor of its conference was heavily international. National and international relief organizations were in attendance and groundwork was laid for better coordination in South, Central and North America during times of natural disaster. Deputy Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Director Georgiana Sheldon pointed to the exchange of ideas among countries as the most valuable outcome of the conference and stated that in major catastrophes there were no boundaries that would hamper assistance.

Miss Sheldon also told of a recent encounter in China at which Chinese Premier Chou En-lai asked a visiting U. S. Congressman why America chose to ignore the cheapest line of defense (civil defense).

Past USCDC President Gilbert Leonard indicated that a tentative arrangement has now been made for National Association of State Civil Defense Directors chief Thomas S. Pryor and USCDC head J. Howard Proctor (or his successor Walter D. Hyle, Jr.) to discuss preparedness problems with President Gerald R. Ford at the White House.

Of particular note and value to United States delegates was the information contained in several Latin American presentations. These "broke the ice" in creating the necessary liaison base for meeting the demands of hemisphere-wide disaster assistance. ■

Embryonic American "counterevacuation" planning as it relates to Soviet strategy comes in for close scrutiny with this anchor article of a 3-part series by Eugene Wigner and Joanne Gailar. They also examine the long-neglected and often muted question of accessible blast shelter.

Civil Defense In The USSR

— Our Own Defenses

Eugene P. Wigner and Joanne S. Gailar
Health Physics Division
Oak Ridge National Laboratory*
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

WHAT WE SAID BEFORE

In our first article on Russian civil defense in the May-June issue of *Foresight*, we described the Soviets' detailed plans for evacuating their cities and dispersing their population. We also cited some of their own evaluations of the effectiveness of their plans to reduce the casualties in a nuclear war. We concurred with their estimates.

In the second article (July-August issue of *Survive*), we expressed our fears on two counts — (1) that their evacuation option in case of a crisis would severely degrade our bargaining position and (2) that the motives behind their evacuation plans could be offensive (cf. Representative Aspin's** statement opposing our own "crisis relocation" plans). It is apparent that the Soviet leaders do not believe the U.S. would strike even if they evacuated their cities in a crisis — after all, we have no right to oppose their moving their people. However, once their evacuation has been completed, they would be in a position to make quite far reaching demands on us, hinting at the possibility of a nuclear attack if we did not comply. This would leave us in a most precarious situation. We did not, perhaps, emphasize enough that evacuation, if it can be carried out successfully, is both a more effective and a less costly mode of civil defense than the building of blast shelters. We did not recommend it previously because of its potentially destabilizing effect in a crisis similar to that of mobilization before World War I.

WHAT CAN WE DO? WHAT SHOULD WE DO?

Evidently, the realization of the USSR evacuation option would create a most precarious situation for our country. What can we do to mitigate the magnitude of this danger?

*Operated by Union Carbide Corporation for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

**U.S. Representative Les Aspin (D), Wisconsin.

Clearly we do not want to adopt the strategy which Rep. Aspin believes that the USSR may adopt if we evacuated our cities; we would not mount an attack. But there is another way, not aggressive, to restore the strategic balance: to evacuate our own cities. This procedure of Crisis Relocation is, in fact, being studied and planned by the DCPA at present. Our only reservation about the planning is that it is not as vigorous as we would like to see it — but its low budget, not the DCPA itself, is responsible for this. We also would like to call it "counterevacuation" to indicate that we contemplate it only as a countermeasure in case of a Russian evacuation.

What might be the result of such planning? Evidently, the U.S. is physically better equipped than the USSR to carry out an evacuation. Our problems would consist (1) in organizing the reception areas for receiving, housing, feeding, informing, and providing protection from fallout for the evacuated people and (2) in distributing the outgoing traffic in such a way that no bottlenecks would develop. Since we would have enough vehicles for everyone, we need not consider evacuation by trucks, trains, and even walking as the USSR does.

Because automobiles are almost universally available, we could probably evacuate the population of our cities somewhat more quickly than the USSR. They seem to believe that it would take about two days, we might be able to do a reasonable job in 24 to 36 hours. Our faster evacuation capability gives us the advantage of starting the counterevacuation only after we are sure that their evacuation is nationwide rather than meant to be exercises and restricted to a few locations. Also, our own evacuation would have to cover a wider area than the USSR's because our cities are larger than theirs and most of them are so situated that at least one direction — the southeast in New York, the northeast in Chicago — is unavailable. Thus, our evacuation would have to extend, in some instances, a distance of up to 200 miles in contrast to the



50-mile circle planned by the USSR. It would appear offhand — but this will have to be verified by the more extensive studies now in progress or contemplated — that the evacuation would be about equally effective in the two countries.

How effective our evacuation is, hinges, of course, on our solving the two problems mentioned before: the organization of the reception areas and the proper instruction of the prospective evacuees. However, even if we should make a serious effort in these directions, we should be aware that the USSR is extending its efforts to protect its people not only by evacuation but also by providing some in-place blast protection, by "slanted" construction of new houses, by building dual-use underground facilities, notably subway stations and underground parking facilities. A generous U.S. shelter program does not seem feasible now — it could perhaps follow a counter evacuation during a serious confrontation with the USSR.

Unfortunately, the U.S. could be in a most serious situation if the USSR were to employ another strategy to counter the effectiveness of our counterevacuation. They could start with an evacuation of their cities, to which we would respond with a counterevacuation.

They could then peacefully return their people to their apartments and represent the original evacuation as an exercise. We would, naturally, also ask our people to return to their homes. However, if they repeated their evacuation a few months later, it is questionable whether our people would again accept the direction for counterevacuation. While conversations with refugees strongly indicate that evacuation planning is unpopular with the people of the USSR, these same conversations leave no doubt that the command to evacuate would be obeyed. The peaceful return, representing the first evacuation as an exercise could, in fact, make the enterprise less unpopular in the USSR — it did not lead to war. The reaction in the U.S., on the other hand, would be just the opposite: since the first evacuation was unnecessary, why undertake a second one? People may not believe that the first one was useful, that it may have averted a serious confrontation.

We would doubtless try to explain the actual situation, the genuine possibility that, had we not ordered a counterevacuation, we might well have been subject to outrageous demands. The extent to which such an explanation would be accepted would

depend on the credibility and authority of the one who gave it. It is reassuring in this connection that a recent public opinion poll (conducted by the Michigan Institute of Social Research) gave the military the highest rating of confidence (5.5 on a scale of 9) of all organizations considered, including colleges, churches, and many others.

The extent to which a second order for evacuation would be obeyed would depend also on the smoothness of the first, whether it succeeded in avoiding friction among the evacuees, unpleasantnesses of both emotional and physical nature. It would be very important, therefore, to plan the evacuation carefully not only from the physical point of view of assuring food, communication, and a modicum of physical comfort, but also from the standpoint of anticipating and avoiding possible conflicts between individuals, between the evacuees and the host population; of keeping alive the interest of the evacuees in their activities; and probably of foreseeing other factors which we have not yet thought of.

PERMANENT SHELTERS WITH RAPID ACCESSIBILITY

We hope the planning of counterevacuation will not obscure the need for civil defense as it is more traditionally understood — for well built, easily accessible shelters. Counterevacuation, or even the planning of it, may protect our people if undertaken during the evacuation by a possible opponent; it cannot be swift enough to counter a more sudden threat, one not preceded by the evacuation of an opponent's cities. The flight time of intercontinental missiles is about 20 minutes, and the warning that submarines have launched missiles would precede the missiles by an even shorter period. If the opponent evacuated his cities, his people would be just as vulnerable to our weapons as our counterevacuating people would be to his. However, and this is Representative Aspin's point, a sudden threat cannot be countered effectively by evacuation, and there still

is no better way to avert the danger of such threat than by reducing its effectiveness. And, even if we had the ability to counterevacuate, there is no guarantee that we would be given a warning in the form of the evacuation of the cities of the opponent.

Some of our friends believe that the mere planning of the counterevacuation, together with a candid explanation of the need for such planning, would make the necessity of more traditional civil defense measures clear to an increasing number of our citizens. We share this hope. Even more widespread is the expectation that the actual carrying out of a counterevacuation would have this effect. We hope that there will be no need for this. It is, at any rate, a comment on relative morale that the People's Republic of China, with a gross national product amounting to less than one-sixth of ours, distributed over a population more than three times ours, can afford to build blast shelters for the people of its cities while we cannot do so for ours. Perhaps we should counter the view so often expressed in our country that nuclear war would destroy all mankind, with the words of V. Chuykov: "Although the means of destruction are called mass means . . . they will not destroy people, but only those who neglect the study, mastery, and use of the defense measures." It is not enough to quote these words; we must provide evidence for them in word and deed. It does seem to be increasingly realized (cf. for instance, a recent article by Martin J. Bailey in *Orbis**) that a world in which no nation can destroy the others is much preferable to a world in which the "mutual assured destruction" keeps all in fear and apprehension — particularly if such destruction is no longer mutual. We may also cite numerous statements by Soviet leaders which can assure us that they do not consider civil defense aggressive. As Brezhnev questioned, "Which weapons should be regarded [as] tension-causing — offensive or defensive weapons?" ■

* "Deterrence, Assured Destruction, and Defense" — Vol. XVI, page 682 of *Orbis*. Mr. Bailey is now Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Treasury.

A little boy wanted one hundred dollars very badly and decided to pray for it. After getting no answer, he wrote the Lord a letter. The Post Office, not knowing what to do with it, sent it to Washington. A Congressman got hold of it and sent the boy five dollars. The boy then wrote the Lord a letter of complaint, saying "You routed my letter through Washington, and they deducted 95 percent."

The prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies reports from London that China's inventory of nuclear weapons is probably over 200 and possibly close to 300. The Institute's annual survey also reveals that a Chinese missile capable of reaching the United States appears to be under development.

Defense ... For The People!

An Open Letter To The President

Excerpt of a *U.S. News and World Report* (February 14, 1972) interview with James R. Schlesinger, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission:

Q. Could the U.S. survive an all-out nuclear war if it developed a civil defense program?

A. I think that the U.S. would survive, but not in the form that we know it today. The estimates are that something on the order of 100 or 110 million of our people would die in an all-out nuclear war, and it might go even higher than that. That is assuming the most fragmentary kind of civil-defense program.

Civil defense, even so simple a scheme as evacuation of the public from major metropolitan centers, would save on the order of 40 or 50 million lives if there were strategic warning.

The Soviets have had a more ambitious civil-defense program than has the United States.


The point is that we are not going to have all-out war. All-out nuclear war would be a catastrophe for the nations involved. But the end of life on the planet — or even the end of life in the countries targeted — represents a vast overstatement.

Q. Does the U.S. have a plan for evacuation of major urban areas?

A. No.

Q. Should there be such a plan?

A. In my personal judgement, yes.



One argument against providing America with a meaningful civil defense is that there is no public demand for it. The fact that this is true is used as proof that the need does not exist. However, there is also no public demand for ICBMs, for battleships, for traffic laws, for elevator safety regulations. The public assumes that government takes care of public safety — its primary function. Because there is a civil defense hierarchy it assumes that civil defense will offer it adequate means of protection in the event of war. In this case the public has been deceived.

SURVIVE

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October 1, 1974

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford .
President, The United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

DEFENSE . . . FOR THE PEOPLE
An Open Letter to the President

Dear Mr. President:

In your inaugural address you pledged that you would be "the President of all the people," and you stated that the only way to go forward is by "serving the people's urgent needs." We believe that.

In your message to Congress on August 12th you said:

"A strong defense is the surest way to peace. Strength makes detente attainable. Weakness invites war, as my generation knows from four bitter experiences.

"Just as America's will for peace is second to none, so will America's strength be second to none.

"We cannot rely on the forbearance of others to protect this nation . . . "

We believe that too.

We believe that a "strong defense" must include protection of those who may be exposed to enemy attack. This is certainly not new or revolutionary thinking. It is long established military doctrine. One example is NORAD -- the North American Air Defense Command. Here under millions of tons of granite, burrowed 1,400 feet into the entrails of Cheyenne Mountain sits a 4 1/2-acre sealed, shock-mounted steel city designed to protect key military personnel and its fighting capability from nuclear attack.

Good. The people -- the taxpayers -- have willingly paid for it and for other fortresses.

Federal and most state governments also look to protected sites built with taxpayers' money. Local governments -- almost 4,000 of them -- boast hardened emergency operations centers for the refuge of government officials and government workers in time of war. All paid for by the people.

Industry at the top -- looking toward survival and recovery in the event of attack -- provides management teams and vital records with sophisticated remote shelter. Some companies go further. For instance, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company's underground blast-protected cables today criss-cross America. Buried shock-immunized communications control centers service the network. These lines avoid cities and other probable target areas.

This thanks to the buying power and the sweat of the people.

The tie-in of a virile defense program with enhanced chances for peace is not always clear. It is something like a locked, barred, alarm-wired window not being an invitation to an intruder. He will choose instead the window where these investments have been neglected. Sweden and Switzerland -- both which have renounced war as an instrument of national policy -- are prime examples of the value of strong defenses. In the midst of the turmoil of European wars -- and hungrily coveted by aggressors -- they have remained at peace for over 150 years because of their dedication to well-planned and well-executed home defense. Even Hitler backed away from them. Today they possess the best civil defense programs in the world. Their motive as always: peace.

Apologists have labelled plans to provide American citizens with means of survival "provocative." They recommend that Americans remain exposed to annihilation and cringe at the idea of effective home defense for the people. They are, we believe, inadvertently or advertently inviting humiliation and defeat for our country.

Those duped by them into dreaming that by cultivating people vulnerability we avoid being provocative surely serve only the interests of our adversaries. They shy from the conviction that "a strong defense is the surest way to peace."

But the people themselves? What about them?

Mr. President -- although the Military, Government, and Industry have been able to visualize correctly the need for these defenses for their own operations within our homeland and to do something about it they have chosen not to look upon the defense of the people themselves as very important.

We the American people -- the women, the children, the families, the communities -- ourselves have no place to go.

Our Civil Defense, which is supposed to provide this, is a placebo.

And when this U. S. Civil Defense (the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency) -- cleverly ridiculed and discredited and relegated to a beggar's role -- makes so bold as to suggest that people should at least be given the opportunity to leave expected target areas, the idea is denounced as "provocative."

Provocative -- yes. Like an umbrella, a seat belt, padding for a football player, a soldier's helmet, or his foxhole.

Provocative, even though possible opponents have themselves long been doing it.

The result is that the United States stands to lose over 60% of its people in a nuclear exchange, while the Soviet Union -- because of its insistence on protection for its people -- would lose under the worst possible attack conditions less than 6%!

Do we not need, Mr. President, in the United States also a home defense that will protect the people as well as Government, the Military, and Industry? A home defense that will be a close and vitally necessary partner in total national defense? A home defense that will drastically reduce civilian fatalities in the event of war? And, much more important, a home defense that will in this way help to make aggression against us unattractive -- that will give us, to apply your wording, "the surest way to peace?"

We think so.

It can be done. Less prosperous countries than ours have done it -- China for instance. It must be done if democracy is to remain viable, if the United States itself is to survive.

We trust Mr. President, we have made our point that protection for the people has to be a part of our defense.

For the first time in many years we hopefully have leadership that appreciates the meaning of and need for home defense.

Respectfully,

SURVIVE, The American Journal
of Civil Defense


Walter Murphy
Editor

On September 13th in his Washington office Congressman George A. Goodling questioned Region Two-DCPA Director John E. Bex on the status of civil defense in the United States. Here SURVIVE publishes the unabridged transcript of that interview.

Why Civil Defense?

Goodling: John Bex, you are a constituent of mine from Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania and you are also a part of the Executive Department as Regional Director of Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. Would you tell me why you came into Government and your impression of the Federal service as you view it from the inside?

Bex: *I welcomed the opportunity to serve my government in Civil Preparedness because our Nation is twenty years behind in its preparedness effort and this became a very personal thing to me.*

Goodling: Have you found your experience trying to get things done in this environment frustrating? Or, perhaps I should ask whether it has been more or less frustrating than you expected?

Bex: *At times I have experienced frustration. To me, time and results are extremely important when working with taxpayers' dollars, and it does become frustrating when delays and little action are taken, based on antiquated regulations.*

Goodling: What's the story with Civil Defense or Civil Preparedness, as you now call it? Do we really need it or not?

Bex: *I feel the Civil Defense story is defensive strategy, and we need it now more than ever before. Only in a defensively oriented world would great powers consider themselves sufficiently secure to contemplate disarmament. Our current civil defense posture is far from what it should be. Of course, as you are aware, Civil Preparedness is concerned with natural disasters such as floods, fires, etc., as well as military ones.*

Goodling: If you agree that the cause of peace will be better served by developing ways to strengthen defense and limit offense, and that we need some Civil Preparedness, then is our present effort satisfactory?

Bex: *There is no easy way of deciding exactly how much civil defense is enough, but it is clear we have far from enough. Presently our Civil Preparedness effort can best be described as austere. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency has less than one Federal employee per 300,000 people. From a financial point of view, the picture is just as bleak. Our budget for the year is about \$83.6 million. Spread across the population, this amounts to spending about 40 cents per capita for Civil Preparedness. This is less than the cost of a gallon of gasoline.*

Goodling: If we don't have a program commensurate with our needs — why?

Bex: *The American people can be very complacent and we have a tendency to pick ourselves up by the boot straps only when disaster strikes. This is not good enough for me, for we have the resources, we have the dollars to have the best civil defense program in the world. Every Soviet citizen must become infused with a feeling of personal responsibility for the fulfillment of civil defense measures and participate in them actively, and until we in America do likewise, we will never realize a program commensurate with our position as the richest country in the world.*

Goodling: Don't Americans believe in security or want security?

Bex: *Yes, Americans want security — but they believe that the Federal government is there to give it to them — Civil Defense is not a give-away program. It is a program for survival and security for all of us, but all of us have to understand and want it before the cry will be heard by our legislatures.*

Goodling: It seems that Civil Preparedness has been for a long time pushed pretty far down on the list of national priorities. How can we get it pushed back to where it should be?

Bex: Only through extensive public information programs and training and educating all citizens. Then and only then will the people speak, and our Congress will act.

Goodling: If the real message of Civil Preparedness has never yet been conveyed to the American people, do you think it can and should be now?

Bex: Yes, the time is long overdue. The message should include not only what people need to do for themselves, but also those things that people should insist their government do because it cannot be accomplished by individuals alone.

Goodling: What do you think our next steps should be? In the short-term and in the long-term?

Bex: Short-term — we must continue with full speed ahead. Long-term calls for a complete reassessment of Civil Preparedness. Too many agencies are involved in the Civil Preparedness mission. How can we expect the public to accept and understand when so many agencies have bits and pieces of the overall mission? What we need is a unified agency which will act as a sort of safety-engineer for every man. Any such agency with adequate power and funds would mean a huge step forward in raising the level of security for all of us. And raising the level of security is close to the fundamental progress of civilization — in a sense, it is civilization itself.

Goodling: In other words, you still haven't given up hope of getting the right things done?

Bex: Never — The mission of Civil Preparedness is too important. To give up hope on this program would be giving up hope on thousands of lives should a disaster strike.

Goodling: How can I help your effort? How can Congress help most?

Bex: I'm awfully glad you asked that question. In response to what you and other members of Congress can do individually, I would say, first of all, stress to your constituents the importance of Civil Preparedness and their obligation to their community to prepare for survival.

Second, there is the need for you and your colleagues to support legislative and funding requests which will permit the Federal government to lead the way, to do its part, and to set the example for States and local governments to emulate.

Third, your enabling legislation is of 1950 vintage — old and perhaps antiquated. I think it would be appropriate

and desirable for Congress to conduct in-depth, substantive hearings of your activities with the view of bringing about needed legislative changes. It might be appropriate to expand such a Congressional overview to include a review of disaster responsibilities of other Federal Agencies as well as DCPA. It is my opinion that there might be a better way for the Federal Government to organize to meet its responsibility for all types of disasters than the present division of responsibilities for disaster among so many different agencies.

Goodling: You have now given us in the Congress our charge and I would like to explore with you the actions that might help on the Executive side. I do not recall that, since the days of President Kennedy, has there been a positive statement from the White House as to the need and importance of Civil Preparedness. Now that we have a new Administration and the probability of Mr. Rockefeller, who was a Civil Preparedness leader among governors, being our Vice President, wouldn't this be an ideal time for some such pronouncement?

Bex: Across this Nation, we have over 6,000 full-time, part-time, paid, and volunteer Civil Defense Directors and Coordinators, serving Mayors, County Commissioners, and other elected local officials at the grass roots level. Collectively, they are waging an uphill battle to be prepared to serve 210 million people in an emergency. A statement from our President concerning the importance of the great work that has been done and that remains to be done would be greatly appreciated. If such a Presidential message were complemented by a letter to the Governors of all States, emphasizing that Civil Preparedness is part of our strategic deterrence and that preparedness actions must be taken at the local level, this would give the whole national mission a positive lift. Also, the Secretary of Defense should on every possible occasion emphasize the importance of Civil Preparedness to our deterrent posture.

Mr. Congressman, you can help, Congress can help, the President can help, the Secretary of Defense can help, and, all your efforts, in this man's opinion, would be in the best interest of 210 million Americans. Remember — people count!

We appreciate your sincere interest and concern in the Civil Preparedness mission for our nation!

WHERE DO WE STAND ON CRISIS RELOCATION PLANNING

By JOHN E. DAVIS

Director

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency is engaged in pilot project work and research on Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP) to determine whether it would be feasible, during a period of intense international crisis, to relocate people temporarily from high-risk U.S. cities to lower risk host areas.

Such relocation plans would provide an additional option for U.S. authorities, in case of a crisis so severe that it might be highly desirable to thin out or disperse much of the urban population. The Department of Defense believes that an attack on this country would quite probably be preceded by a period of intense crisis. In fact, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger reported to Congress in March 1974 that he regarded the probability of a massive surprise attack on our military forces as "... close to zero under existing conditions," with crisis escalation thus being much the more likely way in which a nuclear war could occur.

Should such a period of severe crisis occur, it is likely that a considerable number of people would leave cities on their own initiative. Such "spontaneous evacuations" have occurred in many countries before, during, and since World War II, with millions of people leaving their homes because they believed they would be in great danger if they stayed at home.

Just how many people might leave U.S. cities in a severe crisis is not predictable. The total would depend on factors such as how rapidly the crisis had arisen, and how threatening it appeared to the people.

Contingency plans for crisis relocation would help State and local authorities deal with spontaneous evacuation. In addition, it would be desirable to have the capability throughout the United States for organized crisis relocation of a major percentage of urban populations. About 65 percent of the total U.S. population lives in high-risk areas.

The reasons why such a capability would be desirable are highlighted by a 1973 study sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which shows that if a heavy attack should occur, with the U.S. population essentially in place (except for an assumed 10 percent of spontaneous evacuees), use of existing civil defense capability, based on extensive use of fallout shelters, could result in about 109 million survivors.

On the other hand, if even 70 percent of the population of U.S. cities were relocated to low-risk host

areas, to fallout protection of at least PF-20,¹ survivors could rise to about 174 million. If PF-100 shelter could be developed in host areas, survivors could total about 181 million.

Thus, relocation has the potential to add some 65 to 72 million survivors, should an attack occur after a crisis long enough to conduct relocation operations. Also, relocating the bulk of the U.S. urban population could well result in additional time for negotiations to resolve the crisis. The hope, of course, would be that attack would not occur; and people could return home.

The need for a crisis relocation capability is clear. It is clear also, however, that developing such a capability requires finding answers to a number of difficult problems. These include:

- How can evacuees be fed?
- Can they be housed for a period of several days or more?
- How can fallout radiation protection be provided for large numbers of people in host areas? (In some cases, these areas lack sufficient protection for their own residents.)
- What essential services and industries would have to keep operating in the high-risk cities — and how?
- What about the special problems of the Northeast and other highly urbanized areas?

To find the answers to these and related questions, DCPA has taken a two-phase approach: "Mark I" — Allocations for relocation; and "Mark II" — Operational planning, including reception area activities.

To determine feasibility of the "Mark I" phase, pilot projects were conducted in nine selected areas, starting in March 1974.

In this first phase, determinations are made of which people from a specific high-risk area should go where (unless they have their own place to go, such as a vacation cabin, or relatives or friends in a low-risk area).

Although some of the pilot projects still are underway, allocation planning already appears feasible. This includes production of standby emergency in-

¹Radiation rate inside shelters 1/20th that outside.

formation materials to be published during a severe crisis. The materials would specify "where to go and what to do."

The prototype planning efforts have demonstrated clearly that information and instructions can be prepared and distributed to facilitate orderly movement of populations from high-risk areas to low-risk reception areas within reasonable time periods, such as two or three days.

Local and State civil defense personnel involved in the pilot projects feel that relocating people would not be an insurmountable problem; and a number of host-area directors say they believe that local government officials and the general public would accept urban evacuees. Very few adverse reactions were reported by the news media, and none from State and local public officials.

Many State and local directors have pointed out that relocation plans are useful also in peacetime emergencies such as created by hurricanes, floods, or accidental release of toxic substances in the air. At the same time, though, local and State directors point out that the really hard problems mostly remain to be solved in the area of developing realistic operations plans that could be executed by local and State capability.

To find answers to "Mark II" operational planning problems, DCPA is conducting a number of research and development projects. One project aims at developing procedures for local operational planning in both risk and host jurisdictions. Handbooks will be developed. This project is underway in Texas, with strong support and assistance from the Texas Division of Disaster Emergency Services. It involves San Antonio and Comal County (a host jurisdiction for San Antonio); Waco and its two host counties, Hill and Falls; Beaumont-Orange-Port Arthur, and one host jurisdiction, Jasper County.

During the summer of 1974, DCPA also conducted pilot surveys of fallout radiation protection in the host areas around the nine "Mark I" pilot cities. In these surveys, all facilities offering fallout protection are being identified, including all those upgradable to PF-20 or better. Also included are public and commercial

buildings suitable for "congregate care" of evacuees — that is, places where evacuees could live, similar to the schools and other areas opened up for hurricane or flood evacuees in peacetime.

Additional research projects are being conducted in Colorado, in cooperation with the State Division of Disaster Emergency Services. One project aims at developing a first-generation handbook for State-level planning.

Other projects now underway are looking in detail at such areas as providing food during a relocation period, communications planning, police operations and planning, and medical operations.

Because these projects began in May-June, 1974, it is still too early to assess the feasibility of operational planning for crisis relocation. DCPA also has undertaken a project to develop special solutions for highly urbanized parts of the country such as the Northeast.

Thus, DCPA is well into an intensive effort to determine the feasibility of crisis relocation planning. Final determinations cannot be made until the projects on operational planning are further along.

But these things, at least, are clear:

- A crisis relocation capability is desirable; it would represent an *option* to be exercised during a severe crisis.

- CRP's would complement — *not replace* — plans to protect the population in-place, in cities and elsewhere.

- Community Shelter Planning (CSP) for in-place protection remains essential, for use in case of sudden attack, or a rapidly-escalating crisis which would not provide the two or three days needed for crisis relocation.

- If crisis relocation planning proves feasible, it will be conducted only where State and local governments agree to participate.

Also, if planning is undertaken, DCPA would hope to be able to provide support; and State and local participation would be essential, especially for operational planning. This would not be expected to become an undue burden on already hard-pressed State and local CD staffs. ■

HEAVY ATTACK SURVIVABILITY - USA

URBAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

SURVIVORS

(1) 90% of city population "in place," 10% spontaneous evacuation	109,000,000
(2) 70% of city population relocated	174,000,000
(3) 70% of city population relocated, with PF-100 shelters available	181,000,000

EDITORIAL . . .

Translation [EPW] of editorial appearing in the Swiss CD Magazine ZIVILSCHUTZ for June 1974:

Security Through Civil Defense

The well-known expansion of the armaments of the Eastern block of nations which, in spite of all claims of peaceful intentions and in spite of all peace conferences, still goes on . . . does not contribute to the prospects of peace of the world, to fulfilling the desire of all men of good will for peace and security. Unfortunately, even the United Nations Organization seems powerless to alter this situation . . .

The desire for peace and the condemnations of machinations do not suffice to counteract the activities which threaten also the smaller nations. The only safe alternative is a maximal development of our total defenses, using all means at our disposal, even if this involves both personal and material sacrifices. Our 1971 Civil Defense Concept, and the Federal Councilors' Parliamentary Report spell this out most convincingly. By means of these, Switzerland acknowledges the principle that no force should be used for settling either national or international conflicts. The Parliamentary Report is summarized in the form of 19 principles of security. One of these principles clearly states that the aim of Switzerland is not "peace at any price." It is "peace with independence" which enables us to abide by the principles of democracy and creates the best conditions for the preservation of the freedom of the individual. The aforementioned report also declares that, if necessary, weapons must be used to guard these objectives.

Viewed in this context, civil defense appears to be one of the supporting pillars of our national security and of our all-around defense. It offers all of us — population and government — more security, a way to be prepared against all threats, means to survive and to live on. Along with a well-equipped army and a well-coordinated war economy, a well-prepared civil defense posture is a condition for our government's ability for independent political action and for protection against nuclear blackmail. The implementation of the 1971 Civil Defense Concept gives all of us the assurance, the confidence, and the security which we need to weather tragic periods of threat and terror. It also arms us against all other types of catastrophes.

— Herbert Alboth
Editor

NOTE: Omitted portions represented by dots in the first paragraph refer specifically to the Arab terrorist activities in Israel.

A nuclear-fueled 400,000-ton tanker can sail at a speed of 19 knots versus 15.5 knots for an oil-burning ship.


It could make 6½ round trips to the oil-exporting Persian Gulf annually, against five round trips for the conventional ship.

It would consume 1.3 million dollars' worth of nuclear fuel a year, compared with a fuel cost of 4.3 million for the conventional ship with oil at \$6 a barrel.

In total . . . there is a 30 percent increase in productivity on the nuclear ship — enough to offset the 22 percent higher construction cost.

In the 25-year life expectancy of a nuclear supertanker, it is estimated that it would earn 110 million dollars more and deliver 188 million more barrels of oil than a conventional vessel, while saving the 26 million barrels of oil the conventional ship would burn.

— U.S. News & World Report



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Survive Pays Off



This is one magazine we wish could be made required reading for every elected and appointed government official throughout the United States of America. If this could only be accomplished awareness of the need for a strong national, state and local civil defense posture throughout the country would become a reality."

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
Soviet Schools Accent CD

Soviet Civil Defense Director Colonel-General Alexander T. Altunin zeroed in on educators recently in an article published in the *Soviet Teachers' Gazette*. Pessimistic descriptions of the effects of weapons of mass destruction were out of line with reality he pointed out. He called upon teachers to stress the value of good shelter and the importance of improving shelter so that it would afford protection against all kinds of enemy attack, including chemical and bacteriological. Along with proper class orientation on shelter use should be stressed, according to Altunin, the importance of knowing how to construct and take full advantage of improvised shelters. The effectiveness of civil defense in attack situations, he said, should be a prominent part of school instruction and understood by all.

Israel Looks To Civil Defense

Like the Arab nations which border her, Israel puts a strong accent on civil defense preparations. Following is an excerpt from *The Jerusalem Post* of August 4, 1974 which quotes Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres:


"We have resolved to set in motion our civil defense machinery in case the Arabs launch another pointless war. We have to prepare the nation for the maximum readiness. For if the Arabs realize we are ready to defend ourselves and fight back then their lust for battle will diminish."



Entrance to underground Israeli shelter — typical of construction found in rural communities (August 1974).

COUNTDOWN...

by Herb Johnson



Americans:

Important To Americans?

Let's just suppose that the protection of people in our country was about 5% as important as guns, planes, missiles, bombs, military aid to other countries, and all the things that go into making us the second most powerful nation in the world. Tie that 5% to the military budget; i.e., if the military budget went up or down because of world tensions or the lack thereof, then the dollars that 5% represents would do likewise. That doesn't sound unreasonable, does it? When the military threat is greater, the threat to our people is greater. Let's see, 5% of \$82.5 billion (Defense Budget for FY 1974), that comes to \$4.13 billion. Gee, that's over 40 times as much as DCPA even asked for this year.

Since we're dreaming, we could further suppose that local and state governments had a strong say in how that money was spent. That doesn't seem unreasonable either since most locals and some states are spending in excess of the 50/50 matching funds formula, and their preparedness needs differ widely. Imagine the preparedness on the home front that could result from this 5% investment. The people might start thinking that we're serious about their protection. They may even start thinking they are important to this country. I think they are.

Survive

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Next In *SURVIVE*:

- What really makes Soviet Civil Defense tick? What guarantees the USSR over 94% survival in a nuclear attack? *SURVIVE* for January - February will expose the 1975 ingredients for Soviet success in "people protection."