
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COMMENTARY

"THE FRANKENSTEIN MONSTER"

Editor, The American Journal of Civil Defense:

Robert McNamara, when he was Secretary of Defense, instituted a system of budgeting called "Planning Programming Budgeting System" (PPBS) for the Department of Defense. Other federal agencies quickly followed suit. Then the states. Then local governments. This one system has contributed more to our lack of understanding of governmental functions than any other of our long string of bureaucratic bunglings.

With this, financial "experts" have developed a whole new jargon to go along with PPBS. They break down program elements into parts labelled with odd-ball names that even they are hard put to explain.

Most politicians have been successful business men, doctors, lawyers, etc. before entering politics, so they are not dummies. But most of those involved with budgeting spend major portions of budget hearings getting explanations of what the budget documents they are considering really mean.

Is it any wonder that the President and Congress create new agencies every time they have a problem? They don't know they already have an agency handling what looks like a new problem to them.

Two recent cases in point were the creation of the Federal Energy Office and Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency has been studying and planning for twenty years to respond to an energy crunch. Apparently no one knew that! DCPA has been assisting state and local governments over twenty years to prepare for and respond to disaster situations. Apparently no one knew that!

What we have created now are three different agencies all directed by law to do the same kind of things with not even a clear mandate that they will even cooperate with each other. The most senior of these three agencies is DCPA with many practiced experts in all kinds of emergencies and disasters and enough research and studies to fill the Houston Astrodome.

If we could afford this multiplicity, and it was a desirable thing to have, that would be one thing. However, it is not desirable, nor can we afford it.

Many states and local governments automatically looked to their disaster preparedness agencies to handle their fuel problems. In all cases at state and local levels the same agencies handle man-made and natural disasters.

The reason all states and local governments didn't turn to their civil defense agencies during the energy crunch was that the feds had already led the way with the creation of a new agency. Suppose they (states and locals) now followed suit and created separate agencies for fuel, natural disasters, man-made disasters, flood insurance programs (another new federal agency), ad infinitum? Talk about the soaring cost of government!

Survive's May-June 73 issue quoted Senator Brock: "Over the years we've patched together a self-regenerating Frankenstein monster that blunders along, devouring tax dollars and spitting out programs that compete with other programs. With its present size and complexity, the Federal Government is no longer responsive or relevant."

A voice crying in the wilderness.

Quentin Everson, Chicago, III.

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OUR WEAKEST LINK

- Evar Peterson

(Response to ABC TV Program "Missiles of October")

On the evening of December 18, 1974, millions of Americans watched an ABC television program called "Missiles of October." Most observers would agree that it was a fascinating story with good casting and acting. It also can be reasonably assumed that the majority of the viewers learned for the first time just how close this country came to the brink of nuclear holocaust.

Historians of this "near miss" will record that in spite of the fast-moving buildup of U.S. military forces very few of the nearly 200 million U.S. citizens would have been prepared to survive the potential devastation if the missiles had started to fly. Nearly all would have stood virtually helpless to the onslaught. Without doubt, untold millions of men, women and children would have died within hours of the launching of the first missile.

It should be of concern to all thinking Americans who paid the taxes making the buildup of this tremendous military armada possible that in the 17 intervening years between the development of the A-Bomb and the Crisis of October 1962 neither Republican nor Democratic administrations, nor Congress were willing to support a meaningful civil defense program to protect the taxpayer. If diplomacy and/or the show of military force had failed there would have been nothing left to prevent or significantly reduce the carnage that could have occurred.

One would think that having had such a close call would have taught us a lesson. The lesson being that in this age of nuclear-tipped missiles an adequate national defense requires a balance between military and civil defense. Neither by itself is sufficient now that nuclear-tipped missiles can simply overfly military defenses and destroy whatever communities they are aimed at. It is obvious that a proper balance cannot be achieved when the poor taxpayer receives only a dollar's worth of civil defense for approximately every one thousand dollars that comes out of his pocket for military purposes.

We can all thank God that the strength of our military forces was able to prevail during those frightful days in October. Can we safely assume that a show of military force by itself will always prevail should an adversary become more adventuresome in the future?

This question takes on more meaning when one considers that the comparative strength between the United States and Russia has dramatically changed during the last twelve years. In this comparison it is particularly significant to note that the Kremlin hierarchy in addition to vastly increasing its military strength has kept the Russian Civil Defense program in particularly strong balance.

As for this country, even though our experience in October 1962 should have made the message abundantly clear, our weakest link, beyond any question, is still our lack of a credible Civil Defense program. We are almost as unprepared to protect our citizens today as we were in October 1962.

What a tragic lack of leadership!!!

PREPAREDNESS:

VIENNA VIEWPOINT

-- Josef Hans, Secretary General Austrian Civil Defense Union

No one would deny that our atomic age has brought about numerous achievements, that science and techniques have facilitated our struggle for life, and that we are enjoying to a greater extent the benefits of civilization. But on the other hand there is no doubt either that in spite of all this, humanity today does not live without fear.

Indeed, a large part of the world's economic capability is wasted in producing destructive weapons. Both in the East and the West arms acquisition is swallowing up enormous funds.

PEACE THROUGH FEAR

Three decades after the end of the Second World War the two great powers have become, through a large-scale arms race, militarily stronger than ever, and only a balance of fear maintains a very uncertain peace — a peace of fear.

Moreover, demarcation lines — materialized by walls and barbed wires — prevent persisting tensions and contradictions from being reduced and solutions for a durable peace from being reached. Undoubtedly, opinions also differ on demarcation lines.


On both sides fundamentally different systems of society have shaped political, economic, social and cultural patterns. Personal liberty and democracy determine the Western forms of community life; repression of the individual in collectivity and dictatorship characterize the state-citizen relationship in the East.

This situation is clearly confirmed by efforts made toward efficient national defenses. The East is in this respect militarily more powerful—no one would deny that. Therefore, the Warsaw Pact powers prevail in personnel and equipment in the European theater over the Western defense community.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE

One must admit that not only contradictions exist between East and West. There are also points of agreement, especially in one particular field: basic civil defense. In fact, there is a general concurrence in the concept that a total national defense not only needs appropriate military measures, but also far-reaching

*Condensed from the Bulletin of the International Civil Defense Or ganization, Geneva.



economic provisions and preparatory actions for the protection of the civilian populations.

More and more strongly, people come to recognize the idea that civil defense today implies much more than the mere air protection of the past. Man's life, health and property, as well as the community's spiritual, cultural and material values, are actually threatened not only by war and its consequences but also by numerous peacetime dangers.

Nowadays civil defense's humanitarian peaceful tasks are no longer contested. Protection of the civilian population in various situations of distress is a highly ethical aim.

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Even though surreptitious attempts have been repeatedly made from the East to undermine the

development of civil defense on the Western side of the iron curtain, the USSR and its allies attach for themselves great importance to civil defense. In that part of the world, therefore, civil defense is on an equal footing with other measures within the program of total defense.

Soviet Civil Defense essentially consists of two main parts: the Anti-Air Defense (MPWO) and the paramilitary organization DOSAAF. Their closely-knit network covers the whole territory of the Soviet Union from Moscow to the smallest kholkozes on the outer limits of the Soviet Republic of Turkestan, to the Arctic Sea, to Vladivostok, and to the Turkish frontier. And as civil defense also comes within the fields of activity of the Warsaw Pact's Unified High Command, the network also spreads to the Baltic Sea, the Elbe, the Bavarian-Czech frontier. The USSR's Eastern allies all have their own national civil defense programs.

THE WESTERN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

The Western Defense Community is not only militarily inferior. Even its national civil defense programs have serious handicaps. Western Europe, on this side of the demarcation lines, does not form a homogeneous entity. Its objectives often differ, and the weaknesses of its democratic governments are only too obvious. People here are not always conscious that liberty and democracy have to be paid for and demand sacrifices.

The situation in the NATO countries is alarming. Without exception, funds allocated to civil defense can in no way be compared to military expenses. The disproportion is particularly glaring in England, where civil defense measures in general have been repressed for years now. In most of the Western Defense Community namely Great Britain, the Federal Republic of

Germany, and France the building of shelters is shockingly neglected.

The neutrals are in a better position. These countries — Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and Austria — are conscious of the fact that it is up to them to defend their neutrality and independence with the means they have at their disposal. They adhere to the principle of "armed neutrality." But defense of neutrality can only be effective through total defense. Neutral countries — as well as a few block-connected countries, particularly the smallest ones — shape their civil defense measures on the model of the 1971 Swiss concept of civil defense. This new concept breaks with many traditions and places common efforts dedicated to the protection of civilian populations on a new basis.

Clearly-defined capabilities and regulations — which include obligations to serve in civil defense and to build shelters — lay the foundation of the activities of official groups, operational units and civil defense associations in Switzerland, Sweden and Finland. In Austria the decision to insert in the Federal Constitution the adoption of "a total civil defense" is now being formulated in the National Council (Federal Parliament). The question of mandatory shelter construction, after the Länder (provincial) governments' unanimous approval of it, is either in the process of being settled on the level of the Länder legislatures or is being examined by technical experts.

The conditions for a fruitful international collaboration already exist, and it is hoped that in the future those responsible for civil defense in the neutral countries will get even closer together in order to better harmonize their efforts on problems of common interest and to work in a spirit of solidarity for the benefit of the populations.

IF PEACE SHOULD FAIL

In late 1974 Herbert H. Hardin prepared a survival analysis for the Hawiian Telephone company. He outlined, in addition to operational continuity plans, the far-reaching public service that would result. We present here excerpts from his study.

The subject of nuclear war is both abhorrant and psychologically depressing to most people. It is one of the things which we would prefer not to think about even though, intellectually, we recognize the unfortunate necessity for doing so. Meaningful planning for such an occurrence is not only technically complex, it is emotionally objectionable to many people. Perhaps that is why there exists a great deal of emergency preparedness "compliance planning" that which barely complies with a directive to write "a plan." Comprehensive emergency planning, along with effective supporting programs, could make the difference between national recovery and national stagnation and entropy following a nuclear war. It certainly can make a significant difference between corporate health or sickness, life or death following war or major natural or man-caused disaster. Such a comprehensive disaster plan for Hawiian Telephone Company is both feasible and desirable.

A comparison between the civil defense plans and actions of foreign nations and the present status of the

U.S.'s civil defense posture, reflects poorly on our nation. It raises serious questions about both the quality of planning and the resolve to provide meaningful protection to the civilian populace of this country. It is a fact that our potential enemies and some of our European friends take civil defense more seriously, spend proportionately more money on it and have or are preparing more effective protection for their civilians. They recognize and plan for the fact that, while millions would probably die in a nuclear war, so would millions survive. Much of the nuclear war claptrap which has been disseminated in this country has convinced large numbers of our population that survival is not possible — a fallacious belief which does indeed diminish the potential for survival. While many would survive whether or not they wanted to or expected to, the greatest survival rate would be among those who were best prepared. The Soviets define the "winner" of a nuclear war as that nation which recovers first. Their planning demonstrates that they not only believe it but expect to accomplish it in case of nuclear war.

TORNADOES:

IN RETROSPECT - IN ANTICIPATION

- A Survive Report


One good reason to look at past disaster is to be able to plan a better defense against future disaster. Last year's April 4 tornadoes provide us with such an opportunity. Lessons are there for those who want to accept them.



Photograph by DCPA-Region IV showing tornado path in East Louisville, Ky

Stuistic, are often used to make one paint or another. And sometimes at the expense of objectivity. This Service table has a point to make and that point is that toteone County. Ohio — especially the town of Xenia — wer much harder hit in the April 4 fornadoes than other counties. It's killed and injured totals were high. The number of deaths and hospitalized injured per 100 destroyed homes, however, was not abnormally high in Greene County in comparison with other counties shown

AREA.	Homes destroyed		Killed	injured (hospitalized)	Killed & injured (hosp.)	Killed and injured (hospitalized) per 100 homes destroyed
Jefferson Co., Ky.	360	(O)×	2	16	18	5.0
Hamilton Co., O.	457	(O)	5	43	48	10.5
Madison Co., Ala.	366	(147)	22	94	116	31.7
Bradley Co., Tenn.	89	(31)	2	22	24	27.0
Greene Co., O.	1,905	(31)	28	100	128	6.6



Photograph by Courier Journal and Louisville Times.

One lesson is very clear: mobile homes are highly vulnerable. If possible, they should be avoided in tornado situations.

Warning is also important — even though it gives only a few minutes time.

Knowing where to go and what to do is certainly vital.

Weather bureaus, civil defense offices and other public service agencies have good free information on tornadoes and what to do about them.


Perhaps the best precaution is a readily applicable sale shelter—a cellar, preferency with everhead protection, or a seasone portion of its built to withstand seasone, such a

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- Photograph by Courier-Journal and Louisville Times.



- by John A. Samuel

EXPEDIENT SHELTER HANDBOOK, Christy, C. A. and Kearny, C. H., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Final Report, August, 1974. (Available from National Technical Information Service, U. S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Printed copy \$10.60; Microfiche \$1.45.)

(See also reviews of: EXPEDIENT SHELTERS SURVEY, SURVIVE, Vol. 7, No. 2, March-April 1974, and BLAST TESTS OF EXPEDIENT SHELTERS, SURVIVE, Vol. 7, No. 4, July-August 1974.)

In the review of Expedient Shelters Survey it was stated: "The survey does help define the present state of the art in expedient shelter design and points out some positive things which need to be done before an adequate handbook on shelter planning and construction can be produced. If this leads to positive action to develop the necessary information, the effort which went into the survey will not have been wasted."

It is pleasant to be able to report that the necessary work has been done and that the handbook has been produced.

The Expedient Shelter Handbook includes designs for 15 types of expedient shelters. Included for each design are drawings, step-by-step instructions for building the shelter, a list of materials required and a list of tools necessary to build it. Seven of these designs have been proof-tested by having the shelter built by inexperienced labor following designs and instructions in the Handbook. The instructions in the Handbook reflect the changes which were necessary as a result of this testing.

The remaining designs have either never been built or have been built only by experienced labor. Thus, further testing should be done to verify the instructions included in the Handbook. One design, the Trailer Van Shelter, is considered too complicated for unskilled workmen to complete without some assistance or direction by skilled construction workers or carpenters.

All of the designs have a radiation protection factor of at least 100 (as compared to a minimum of 40 required for public fallout shelters) and several have protection factors of 1000. All but two of the designs offer some degree of blast protection. This may be as little as 2 psi* overpressure for several of the designs

but can be as high as 30 psi for two of the designs with modifications to improve blast protection.

In fact, that these expedient shelters afford some blast protection may mean that it would not be necessary to move people as far under conditions of crisis relocation. This could simplify the relocation planning by reducing the transportation time, increasing the feasibility of moving materials and supplies from the high-risk area to the relocation area, and by improving the possibility of people commuting from the relocation area to perform necessary functions in the high-risk area.

In addition to the designs for expedient shelters, the Handbook presents a Guide for Community Planners. This is a check list for community planners to use in developing or modifying the "all-hazards, all-contingencies" approach to civil preparedness.

Also included are suggestions and guidelines for upgrading the fallout shelter capabilities of existing structures. This could not be considered as an expedient method since it could not be done, in most cases, in the 24 to 48 hour time frame assumed for expedient shelter construction. As stated in the Handbook, "Each individual structure will require an independent investigation and analysis to determine what modification is indicated and where it is to be made." It is obvious that this could not be done in the expedient time frame without massive application of manpower skilled in fallout shelter analysis and design.

It is unfortunate that this requirement for skilled manpower should emerge just when DCPA is in the process of phasing out the last vestiges of the architectural and engineering program which produced some 25,000 qualified fallout shelter analysts. These analysts are now fading away, their time and effort applied in other fields and their shelter analysis skills grown rusty and useless from lack of use. There are, of course, no plans or money to retrain and reactivate these people.

Even so, the Expedient Shelter Handbook is an essential reference for any crisis relocation planning which is to be done. A copy should be on the desk of every civil defense director and community planner in the United States.

"By courting false ideas of peace today we frequently render the efforts made to bring about active and passive protection for our population more difficult — sometimes even ridiculous.

"However, it is a fact that here in the heart of our old Europe — and in nearby and distant lands as well — we live in a world of tension, of brutality and of blackmail that is everything but peaceful and reassuring. The best proofs of this are: (1) disarmament conferences, (2) non-aggression pacts, and (3) non-proliferation treaties. . .

"To misunderstand this menace, to want to minimize it or even steadfastly to deny it while knowing that it exists amounts to evidence of laxity, naivety, foolishness or depravity."

-Hans Mumenthaler, Swiss CD Director

^{*}psi - pounds per square inch

Christmas Crime — South Bend Solution

by Kevin Kilpatrick

In South Bend, Indiana police personnel and an opportunist civil defense director hatched an idea. The idea revolved around these two facts:

Fact one — Crime at Christmas time zoomed, especially in Christmas shopping areas. There weren't enough policemen to go around. Merchants complained. Purse snatchers, shop lifters and parking area muggings were impossible to control. When a crime was spotted it took time to get to a phone, to call the police, to explain circumstances and locations, to get police to the scene, to explain again. In the confusion the criminal was long gone.

Fact two — Civil defense radio operators didn't have enough to do. Routine training became artificial — it was a poor prod for communicator enthusiasm. They itched for action. They had their own citizen band (CB) radio equipment. They were sharp. They were public spirited. They were available.

Sergeant Joel Wolvos and Corporal Jimmy Emmons of the South Bend Police put the idea in motion when they were detailed to work it up with Civil Defense Coordinator Donald Germann. Plans materialized, volunteers were checked and trained, and the idea blossomed.

On November 1, 1974 the first CB radio patrols were placed in shopping areas. Members of it were officially part of the police department, but armed only with radios and not vested with police arrest authority. Like police they were assigned areas, they were briefed on police bulletins which might help them spot trouble, and they covered their "beats" on regular shifts. With instant radio contact to nearby police patrol cars they were able to report trouble immediately so that alerted police—already apprised of details in the situation

could close in on the crime scene in a matter of seconds.



Result: Christmas crime in South Bend took a nosedive. Merchants were happy. The public was happy. News media played up the success. CB radio operators were inspired by the drama of using their hobby to run down crime. To the police it was a miracle.

The only people who lost out were the criminals. They were stymied. Wherever radio patrols operated their activities dropped off.

When the holiday season ended the patrols remained active. Carefully screened volunteers were added to what is now known as the "Community Radio Watch." It's a permanent part of police protection in South Bend — a surprisingly effective one. With the experience of several months the growing expertise of the "Watch" is being applied to other types of crime with equally encouraging results.

"We are expanding the watch both in numbers and in scope," says Civil Defense Coordinator Germann. "I can't say enough for the dedication of these CB specialists and their unselfish service to the community. It's a shot-in-the-arm to the whole city. It's the most exciting thing that has happened around our office in years. And the real pay-off to civil defense is that in major disasters we will have trained, coordinated, experienced communicators that will fit into an emergency situation at a moment's notice already geared to function with full effectiveness. You can't buy that anywhere."

If we interpret the present availability of gasoline and other energy fuels as a signal to return to our former spendthrift ways in energy consumption, we shall be disillusioned very quickly. We do not now, nor will we ever again, have the luxury of a boundless supply of energy — cheap or otherwise.

Looking at the problem over the long term, it is evident that the lifting of the Arab embargo last spring changed nothing. It bought us a little time, that is all. The case for Project Independence remains as strong as ever.

Hon. Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, writing in National Defense for January-February 1975 ["The Energy Challenge — A New Fight for Independence"].

How Vulnerable is Humanity?

- Charley Meyer

Optimists for peace may obtain some bolstering from the recent Vladivostok pact concerning SALT II. But only the grossly uninformed can agree with Kissinger's reply when he was asked why the Russians agreed to it.

"I would suppose," he said, "that the General Secretary (Brezhnev) has come to the conclusion that we have: that whatever level you put at the ceiling, it is enough to destroy humanity several times over, so that the actual level of the ceiling is not as decisive as the fact that a ceiling has been put on it."

"Whatever" level? Just how vulnerable is humanity? Suppose — if I am permitted to indulge in fantasy — the three-odd billion people of the world were assembled on a plain and passively submitted to slaughter by 30,000 men armed with machetes. At a macabre pace of five killings per man per minute, it would take about 40 eight-hour working days to "destroy humanity," and in a year humanity could be destroyed nine times over.

There are over a half million machetes in Cuba alone. Should we not engage in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with Cuba to put a ceiling on the number of these terrible weapons which they now possess in numbers sufficient to destroy humanity several times over?


Another example: Suppose all the three-odd billion people of the world were assembled within a circle on a plain, and let's allow five square feet of elbow room for each person, more space than occupied per person

at a typical open-air music festival. All the world's people could in this way be assembled within a circle of about 26 miles in diameter, and all these people could be killed in a few seconds by the thermal radiation from a single 10-megaton H-bomb airburst above the center.

Nuclear weapons are indeed terrifying, but the assessment of their killing power and the vulnerability of mankind to their effects must be made with regard to the real world and not to impossibly contrived and artificial situations. It is now widely accepted among serious analysts of the strategic situation that all the U.S. nuclear weapons could destroy less than 6% of the Soviet population, assuming the implementation of the Soviet prepared and tested plan for civil defense. In the United States even without a valid civil defense program all the USSR nuclear weapons could not destroy much more than 60% of the American population (a terrible and unacceptable price — but not destruction of life several times over).

The tragedy of Kissinger's statement is that it conveys a sense of helplessness, a complete lack of hope of the effectiveness of any kind of civil defense. Is it meant to? Most likely Brezhnev has not told him about the ambitious Soviet civil defense program. Apparently the Soviets aim to keep under wraps the high quality of their program so they can save it for a surprise. How can serious negotiations on arms limitation be made with such disregard of the real situation?

Kissinger's statement is simply incorrect. Untrue. False. If it did not arise from ignorance, then it exhibits a profound deviousness of his advisors — which is even more disturbing.



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SPOTLIGHT



On January 12th the Federal Government announced a new national warning policy to the press: existing special frequencies of the National Weather Service are to be used to help disseminate disaster warnings quickly. Special low-cost radio receivers have already been on the market for several years.


On January 15th the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency explained the action in a clarifying TWX to regional and state civil defense directors. Most counties and cities got copies of the TWX from state disaster offices before the week was out.

There were 4 or 5 days when grass roots directors were in limbo trying to answer official and unofficial questions on what the press release actually meant. It appeared that coordination in releasing the information was lacking.

One important point is that the new system is a *supplement* to other warning systems now in use (NAWAS, radio, TV, sirens, etc.). It is aimed to serve the "most populated areas." Its present 70 stations cover 9,000 of the USA's 3,615,211 square miles. By the end of 1977 350 Stations will cover 45,000 square miles.

* * * * * * * * * *

On January 8th the 'project states' for the Crisis Relocation Planning Mark I project reported on progress at the DCPA Washington meeting. In a January 17 memorandum Tom Pryor, President of The National Association of State Directors of Disaster Preparedness stated that "Without exception these reports indicated feasibility of this project with varying additional input requested." The consensus appeared to be that CRP should be accomplished within the framework of Community Shelter Planning.



Opinion . . .

Near the end of the Jan. 18th CBS news broadcast commentator Dan Rather indulged in the popular past-time of ridiculing civil defense measures and dubbed shelters "relics of the past." A month and a half before that the media were busy reporting that TWA Flight 514 had crashed in the Virginia mountains on December 1st killing all on board. Particularly newsworthy was the fact that the plane had come uncomfortably close to hitting the site of a secret underground government installation 1½ miles along a ridge at Mt. Weather. There reportedly were nervous moments when it was feared that people conducting rescue operations might get too close to Mt. Weather.

The truth is that not only the Blue Ridge Mountains area but the entire country is now pockmarked with installations that shelter government-industrial-military brass, records, electronic gear, etc. from the effects of nuclear attack. Nothing really wrong with this idea — it needs to be improved upon — but it is noteworthy that these shelters are not looked upon as "relics of the past." They are considered vital basic requirements now and indefinitely into the future.

However, the taxpayer, who pays the bill, gets only a smug chuckle when the question of protective measures for himself and his family are mentioned. Why? The authors of Rather's script might ask themselves (and tell us) why shelters for bigwigs are not also targets for commentator carping — are not also "relics of the past."

Or better: why the man-in-the-street doesn't himself get in on a little of the "protection" he is buying for bigwigs. He sure does in Russia. —Ed.

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COUNTDOWN...

Coordinated Effort On "Overview"



by Herb Johnson

Guess anyone can be subject to the "Pavlov's dog" syndrome (conditioned reflex). We in Civil Defense may be particularly vulnerable. We have had so many false starts and stops in programs. So much splintering of efforts. Too many people that get particularly turned on to one segment of preparedness and devote all their efforts in that direction. It is no wonder that we always come up on the short end of the stick.

Again we are presented with an unusual opportunity to tell our story. Through the efforts of USCDC and in the persons of Howard Proctor, Walter Hyle, Evar Peterson and supported by John Bex and many others we have been promised a Civil Defense "Overview." That is, the new Congress has promised a new look at Civil Preparedness. Where we are, where we are going, and what kind of support is needed for a viable program.

We must now speak with one voice. And speak we must. You will all remember that the "Lincoln Report" was supposed to be the salvation of Civil Defense. We sat back waiting for wonderful things to start happening to us. Well, things happened all right — a continued downgrading of our programs.

Let's now get behind USCDC. Don't wait for them to get in touch with you. They are at least as busy as you are. Call, write, let them know how you feel. Find out what is already proposed, add to that, support it. Get in touch with your Congressman. Act! Kick Pavlov's dog out! Who needs it?

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