JOURNAL OF

CIVIL DEFENSE



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NOTICE:

POSTPONEMENT OF "REACTOR ANATOMY — PART III"

Due to the sensitive nature of materials contained in "Reactor Anatomy — Part III" and the need for special review and clearance the publication of this installment has been postponed until the September-October issue.

Part II of "Reactor Anatomy," which appeared in the May-June issue, regrettably did not include some last-minute corrections made by the author. In that article it was implied that loss of control of the rods which regulate the neutron flux could result in a "meltdown." Actually, all reactors are designed so that if control of the neutron flux regulators is accidentally lost, the reactors will shut down automatically.

Meltdown could possibly occur in large water-cooled power reactors as a result of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Because of this possibility, these reactors are designed with multiple redundant systems of supplying the coolant.

Another correction pertains to the location of storage of nuclear wastes. At the present time, these are stored only at the reprocessing plants, and not alternatively at the reactor sites as stated in Part II.

UPCOMING

Jul 11-14 - Region III-USCDC Conf., Chattanooga

Sep 9-12 — 8th Annual Conf., National Assn. of Search and Rescue Coordinators, Chevenne

Sept 13-17 - RDOA Annual Conf. - Workshop, Fresno, Ca.

Nov 2-5 - USCDC National Conference, New Orleans

Nov 13 - Annual Conf., Journal of Civil Defense, Starke, Fl.

Apr 10-13 (1977) - Transfer of Nuclear Technology Conf., Shiraz, Iran

(Note: Due to fluid CD budget situation the NASDPD will schedule annual conf. as circumstances may require.)

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JULY-AUGUST, 1976

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The Professional Society for Profective Design
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The JOURNAL OF CIVIL DEFENSE presents authentic information relating to civil defense — to the survival of free government, the United States and peace in the nuclear age. Its aim is public education in this field and service as a forum.

Authors are encouraged to submit manuscripts for consideration by the editorial committee for publication (the JOURNAL, as a non-profit organization, pays no fees). Articles, preferably illustrated, should be 500 to 1,200 words in length, slanted to the non-technical reader, and oriented toward the civil defense field. Views expressed in contributions to the JOURNAL are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect JOURNAL policy.


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SPECIAL NOTE FROM JERRY STROPE:

After the Journal went to press, Rep. Bill Chappell carried to the House floor the same amendment that was defeated in Committee. It passed the whole House in a voice vote!

Part of the reason for success was a "Dear Colleague" letter sent by Chappell to all members of the House. But there was active and timely help from CD supporters across the nation.

Shortly after the House voted \$85,000,000 for DCPA, Senator Montoya's subcommittee reported out the \$71,000,000 asked by the President. So Bill Chappell has won a battle, but civil defense has not yet won the war.



Disaster Revisited

Four months ago, in discussing the DCPA budget disaster in this column, we said, ". . the House Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction neither over natural disaster matters nor appropriations, so the legislative actions that are needed are just too complex to bring about quickly." Events have justified at least part of this pessimism.

Despite the recommendation of the Armed Services Committee for an appropriation of \$110 million, both by letters from Chairman Mel Price and subcommittee Chairman Eddie Hébert and an appearance before the Steed appropriations subcommittee by panel chairman Bob Leggett, the Steed subcommittee proceeded to report out \$71 million, an effective cut of 25 percent in the program level and just what the Ford Administration had asked for. For those concerned about civil defense, the potential disaster is worse than it appeared initially. The DCPA appropriation is now at the level that caused Kennedy's SecDef. Robert McNamara, to tell a congressional committee in 1961. "It buys an organization but not a program." The Steed subcommittee structured the cuts to make this stick. Said the committee report, "The Committee believes that the Civil Defense structure must remain, even if funds for research, shelter survey and marking are reduced."

The scene before the full Appropriations Committee was almost surrealistic. The DCPA disaster was a minor part of the legislation and it was almost at the last moment that Rep. Bill Chappell of Florida, rose to protest the cut and move to add the \$14 million necessary to keep the DCPA appropriation at this year's level. Several other members of the Committee endorsed the amendment but then the subcommittee chairman, Tom Steed, urged that more money could always be added "later" and the ranking minority member, Clarence Miller of Ohio, vehemently opposed the increase. Whereupon, the amendment was defeated, 17 to 15. The civil defense disaster was confirmed.

Was opposition of Chairman Mahon of the House Appropriations Committee the result of discussions with the Office of Management and Budget? If so, the dual use issue is also in doubt. Legislation introduced by the Armed Services Committee does not change the definition of civil defense; it merely authorizes the use of CD resources in natural disasters. And OMB is the author and defender of the Administration's prohibition on such use.

The What Race?

On April 28th of this year, Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin, acting chairman of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, opened hearings on Civil Preparedness and Limited Nuclear War, advertised to be "the first top-to-bottom Congressional review of the nation's civil and industrial preparedness effort since the end of World War II." The first and only session of these hearings to this writing featured a "panel of experts" consisting of two pro-civil defenders and two anti-civil defenders. Herman Kahn and Paul Nitze argued for civil preparedness; Richard Garwin and Wolfgang Panofsky opposed.

More interesting were the chairman's opening and closing statements, which had obviously been written before the session started. They outlined the false framework that was intended to govern the discussion. It was all exhibited in one longish sentence: "But if the doctrine of limited nuclear war truly requires a Civil Defense Program to be credible. if we feel we must catch up to the Soviet Civil Defense Program and close the so-called Civil Defense Gap. then there seem to be only two choices, either we can embark on a massive Civil Defense Program that will encompass the entire country in order to be equitable, or we can explore the possibility of negotiating a halt to the arms race before it adds a new heat in the form of a Civil Defense Race to the already costly strategic arms competition.'

The current anti-CD strategy seems to be to tie civil defense to the limited nuclear war controversy. That way, Dr. Panofsky can assert, as he did, that any nuclear attack was bound to escalate to all-out war, as if that ended the need for civil defense.

The next ploy is the "two choices" routine. Either a "modest" program (meaning the current nonexistent effort) is the choice or else a "massive" program (meaning billions and billions of dollars) is inevitable. The program that the country desperately needs (perhaps \$300 million annually) is never discussed.

But the best part of the framework is the potential Civil Defense Race. The What Race? Let's face it. The Soviets have civil defense and we don't. That is not the basis for a race. If Senator Proxmire must play games, he had better not play poker with the Russians.

Apologies are due Representative Donald Mitchell of New York for erroneously labelling him a Democrat in my last column. In doing so, I also gave a false impression of partisanship to the civil defense hearings that did not exist. In drawing my attention to this egregious error, Representative Bob Carr (D-Mich.), the missing third panel member, writes that he "would have liked to attend," had conflicting commitments, "did, however, read the prepared testimony which was passed on to me and I did review and sign the panel's report, with which I am in general concurrence."

Let the record so show.

Jerry Strope

PERMISSIVENESS:

Road To Panic

- by Frank Williams

Behind the glitter of our American Bicentennial there looms an ominous moral crisis — clearly the greatest in our history. We have begun, loosely, to call it "permissiveness." Not a very adequate word, but the best we have at the moment.


As a politician I am awed by its magnitude and its implications.

Bluntly, it all boils down to a serious doubt that our country, while celebrating its 200th birthday today, will last out the remaining two decades of the 20th Century. A fast-growing number of my colleagues in local, state and national politics are accepting this same disturbing vision.

Permissiveness — you might define it as a consuming desire to sympathize with, to help the forces that work against society and to whitewash their threat to our existence — now pervades our entire national life. It has both its domestic and international aspects. From a vigorous, responsible people that characterized the first 175 years of the "American Experiment" we have become a self-indulgent, guilt-ridden, sycophantic bunch of apologists.

As one example, take crime. We have coddled the criminal until today he enjoys the status of a privileged citizen. We have tied the hands of our law-enforcement people with restrictions that make justice a mockery. We blindly try to rehabilitate those who will not be and can not be rehabilitated. We are making country clubs of our prisons. We are being laughed at. We deserve to be laughed at. And, as a result in the past fifteen years the crime of murder has increased over 100 percent; rape has increased over 200 percent; and armed robbery has increased over 300 percent.

Crime pays. It's a good business. The risk of getting caught is minimized. Only 5 out of every 100 criminals are convicted where major crimes are involved. And even these look to being soon free. That element of



Frank Williams — State Representative 25th District, Florida

society which is attracted by "easy money" no longer has effective restraints.

In the early 1960's I was a prison guard. Then the prisoner could be controlled because justice was fair and tough, and the penalty for revolt was severe. But not today. "Permissiveness" has taken over. We seem to feel that prisoners have a right to riot. The prisoner knows that he has a good press and that there is a great deal of "understanding" for his misfortunes. Even if he should kill a guard his penalty is apt to be of wrist-slapping dimensions. Today the life of a guard is in real jeopardy. The trained, experienced, competent career guard wants out, wants another job.

Crime is only one field where permissiveness has gained the upper hand. Education, welfare, national economy, the family unit and the professional world are other examples. Decadence is indeed pronounced.

Politics itself is infested with abuses and laxity. We have come to expect them. Local, state and national governments have in both manpower and cost exploded beyond all reason. Where do they stop?

All this is only the tip of the iceberg.

In politics this attitude of indulgence and permitted contempt for values spills over into the international scene. Here too, it is less disturbing not to make waves, to be permissive. President Ford, for instance, is busy assuring and insisting that the United States still holds position No. 1 in the lineup of military powers. But others, including Ronald Reagan, Elmo Zumwalt, Henry Jackson, James Buckley, James Schlesinger and Edward Teller, shoot holes through the claim. The Journal of Civil Defense has for several years pointed to the United States as "Number 2" in military strength.

What are we really?

We are No. 2 in offensive capability. That's for sure. And in defensive capability? Well, we are No. 22!

JOURNAL OF CIVIL DEFENSE: JULY-AUGUST, 1976

I think it is appropriate here in the Journal of Civil Defense to examine the question of home defense as it relates to our permissiveness hangup.

Few people want to talk about this, and our national leaders — Republican and Democrat alike — have successfully brushed it under the rug these past twenty-odd years. The defense of Americans (except of the chosen few in government and in the military who must be protected to carry on official functions) has become a standing joke. Arguments for it are ignored and obscured.

The story — the real story — of the need for a home defense is written in vital statistics emanating from the same source that ridicules the lessons they give. One example is PONAST II, a recent government nuclear attack study. It shows that 53.8% of our population would have survived an assumed attack with our present undeveloped home defense setup, but that well over 90% would have survived had we taken the trouble to protect our people. But we won't do it.

The idea turns us off.

The remedy for our soaring crime rates is obvious: make a U-turn on the road to permissiveness and come back to a policy of toughness. Executing hardened criminals may be repulsive to the cake and cookie advocates (and to others as well, including myself), but if it will result in dramatic decreases in

the number of murders and rapes of innocent victims

what is the real moral decision?

Over 30 states have now submitted new laws "with mandatory aspects" to the U.S. Supreme Court in order to make capital punishment acceptable. Penologists agree that permissiveness in the field of crime has been a total failure. It has been responsible for the needless deaths of thousands of crime victims. Its continuation would take an even greater toll.

Fortunately, as these facts indicate, there is a move now to become more realistic in dealing with the problem of crime. My estimate is that within the next five years or so we will again — through a policy of toughness — regain our composure in this respect.

There are indications that education, politics and other areas may also benefit by this same overall awakening. They have to. The alternatives are unacceptable.

The situation we face in protecting our American population from modern weapons is somewhat different. We quickly forget international crises. We want to forget them. The nightmare we woke up to when we found out that Cuba had Soviet missiles (1962) sent us frantically off on a fallout shelter binge. But when the crisis subsided we lampooned what we had done. And national leadership was so weak it failed to react.

Looking at what had happened 5 months later an article in the March 23, 1963 issue of *The Saturday Evening Post* ("The shocking truth about our civil defense") said:

"The lion's share of blame for the CD crisis must be borne by the top officials of our national Government — the President, the Secretary of Defense and their advisers. The hard fact is that the American people have not been given the kind of leadership they have a right to expect."

That leadership is still lacking. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Foy D. Kohler, says this today:

"Soviet civil defense measures, indeed civil defense measures on either side, have consistently been treated in U.S. estimates as an essentially insignificant consideration. Now we are finding that they may be decisive, and that the whole foundation of the U.S. deterrence posture is crumbling."

Like the ever-mounting oil crisis (we will soon be over 50% dependent on oil imports) civil defense problems are not immediately visible, and we view them with yawning and boredom. Until they strike and overwhelm us. Our one big accomplishment here has been self-deception. A real emergency will precipitate panic. Panic is the price of permissiveness.

Is there really hope? Could it be that, like the apparent awakening to the need for crime control, it is possible that once we are provided facts instead of myths (the preposterous "overkill" story is one) we could seriously lay the groundwork for an effective program of homeland defense — and along with it greatly improve our capability to respond to all types of natural disaster and major accidents?

After all, home defense is the first duty of a conscientious politician. Nothing is more important than the defense of our country and its people. At least, nothing should be. Upon the successful accomplishment of an effective home defense our very survival depends.

Our Founding Fathers said it. And today at our Bicentennial I borrow this message and repeat it. If America is to be around come the 21st Century we need to fight for that concept.

I for one intend to.

"People in Britain find it hard to believe that living among them today are quislings, fifth-columnists and traitors who are dedicated to the destruction of everything they believe in. Furthermore, they are getting results by wrecking free trade unionism, sabotaging the economy of the country, subverting youth, universities and the media, inciting racial, class and religious divisions and eroding the country's will and capability to defend itself.

"All this is certainly not coincidence, It is planned, systematic, professional and well financed."

— Gen. Sir Walter Walker in International Summary (May, 1976).

"The Netherlands — as history has proved — is highly vulnerable to invasion."

Civil Defense And The Dutch

(with comment by Eugene P. Wigner)

- Karel Muth



Karel Ch. M. Muth, Philips' Eindhoven executive and Dutch CD official.

In the Netherlands industry works hand-in-glove with civil defense. It has to. That's Dutch law.

Take for example the 60 Philips' electronic factories with more than 90,000 employees. The largest is located in Eindhoven on the Dommel River. It employs 37,000 people. In contemplating emergencies Philips' must subscribe to the realism of the country itself. With no natural defense barriers and astride logical approaches to other nations, the Netherlands defense job is at the same time rough and delicate. Dutch industrial civil defense is primarily involved in:



Dutch fire-rescue team treats a simulated casualty.

- a. The protection of personnel
- b. The protection of buildings, machines, equipment and stocks
- c. The protection of the population living in the immediate vicinity
- d. The continuation of the production process

That takes extra-special efforts in organization, detailed planning, intensive training, indoctrination and disaster exercises.

EINDHOVEN ACTIVITIES

At Philips' Eindhoven plants the responsibility is answered in a number of ways. All-purpose shelter is provided for the 150 workers who will conduct emergency operations. Fallout shelter with a protection factor over 100 is provided for over 37,500 people. This is space that is used on a day-to-day basis. Then there is shelter with a protection factor of over 30 for more than 82,000 people who would be expected to come from Eindhoven city. This is also space that is normally utilized for factory operations.

To make this concept practical and workable there is a core of about 400 trained men and women (approximately 100 professionals and 300 volunteers) who keep their talents sharpened with not less than two hours per week of active civil defense training in their spare time. All these specialists must have undergone a basic 100-hour fire-rescue and first-aid rescue course, and most of them take an additional 100hour advanced fire-rescue course. These key "pros" would make the plan work. Backing them is another force of 85 professional firemen (3 brigades) who provide plant fire protection on a 24-hour basis and 275 security guards who give police protection to the 160building complex. Security guards have their own command. So do the firemen and the industrial civil defense voluntary forces (BZB).

ALL-NETHERLANDS TRAINING

Each year the entire plant—and much of Eindhoven itself — goes through a full-scale industrial civil de-


fense exercise. Equipment and supplies to support such an operation are brought into play. These rescue-emergency ambulance vehicles, radio nets, special-purpose units and other vital accessories are also kept limber throughout the year by Philips' volunteer and regular safety crews. As a further encouragement to readiness national Philips' rescue competitions are held annually at the training grounds of the Dutch Ministry of Defense. These competitions attract about 200 entries from the Philips' Eindhoven plant—and another thousand from other Philips' factories in other parts of the Netherlands.

Every four years (1977 will be the next one) there is a national civil defense exercise supervised by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Once again an opportunity for Philips' to cope with the Government and other industries in testing its preparedness posture with a comprehensive three-day civil defense shakedown. In many other countries, of course, a quite different view is required.

Comment by American observer, Eugene P. Wigner:

As a result of the courtesy and hospitality of the author of the preceding article, and that of his friends and associates, including that of the Dutch Director of the Civil Defense effort, Baron C.E. van Asbeck, this writer became acquainted with the civil defense institution of the Netherlands. He also saw an impressive night exercise of the rescue operation from a Philips' factory which would save many lives in the case of a catastrophic fire or explosion. Mr. Muth also asked me to add a few paragraphs to his article, outlining my impressions and in particular also any suggestions for improvement of their plans.

Casualties await transportation at Dutch disaster exercise assembly point.



The annual out-of-pocket cost to Philips' for the Eindhoven civil defense program is about \$2,500,000. The total strength of Philips' volunteers throughout the Netherlands is about 2,600.

"The investment is sound and most rewarding," observes Philips' Industrial Civil Defense Board Director, P.J.A. de Groot. "Our people realize that in an emergency we will do everything possible to safeguard our work force and their families — and to keep our Philips' factories in operation. This is a strong, positive morale factor, and we will continue to improve our capabilities to respond to disaster."

The Netherlands — as history has proved — is highly vulnerable to invasion. For this reason it would be very doubtful that nuclear weapons would be used directly on its territory. The argument would apply even more to Eindhoven than to Amsterdam. Fallout from strikes elsewhere, however, would certainly be expected, and for this reason the concept of defense from nuclear weapons is centered not so much on protection from blast as on protection from fallout and accompanying difficulties.

This last suggestion will be difficult to carry out because most of my impressions were favorable. In particular, all those engaged in civil defense work appeared to be convinced of the importance of their efforts and of its usefulness both to discourage efforts at intimidating the nation and to decrease the effect on the civilian population of a military attack or of a natural disaster. The importance of civil defense is recognized also by the government: the annual budget, though smaller than that of Switzerland, amounts to about \$4 per person in contrast to our 40¢ per person. As a result, they are quite well provided with shelter — in particular in Eindhoven — and these appear to be well planned and constructed. This applies, however, principally to the civil defense stations, not to the shelters for the general population.

The reasons for this, and for the very moderate participation of the general public in civil defense, are threefold. The first reason — rarely mentioned — is that because of the small size of the country (16,000 square miles) an attack of the size which can be launched by one of the possible enemies would cover

the whole territory with a severity so large that it would be difficult to provide good protection for its people. Of course, this is true only if the attack, or the threat of the attack, is directed only against the Netherlands — a situation which we consider as very unlikely. However, it appears to be difficult for the Dutch — as also for the members of most other nations — to identify themselves with a larger community, such as Western Europe or the NATO.

The second reason, given already in the preceding article, is that the purpose of an enemy would be more likely the occupation and exploitation of the country, not its destruction. This may be true but an effective civil defense protects not only against an attack but also against the threat of it, demanding surrender. However, this is a point difficult to accept — and we are, in this regard, hardly better than the Dutch.

The last reason that I am aware of is technical. The water table is very high over most of Holland — one has to dig very little in order to find water. As a result,

a blast shock would propagate in the ground very effectively, much more effectively than in our country or in the air. It would affect most everyone in a shelter, except if he were to lie flat. It is for this reason that even the leadership has serious reservations about the effectiveness of blast shelters. Yet, this writer at least, can not believe that this difficulty can not be overcome by suitable arrangements — some of our buildings which are in danger of being attacked by explosions creating heavy ground shocks are elastically suspended and this would protect them. Some research would be necessary to devise arrangements with similar effects for shelters but it is not at all clear that this would be impossible. Perhaps they should sponsor a research effort in our country!

The last three paragraphs were devoted to the problems of the Dutch civil defense effort. They should not divert us from realizing that it is a serious effort which has earned the devotion of many outstanding people and a strong support of the government.

ABM — "KEY TO PEACE"

— From the Phyllis Schlafly Report

Shortly before Congress' adjournment for Christmas 1975, the anti-defense lobby pushed through passage of the Kennedy Amendment to force the closing of our only anti-ballistic missile site, at Grand Forks, North Dakota. This is the wrong move at the wrong time at the wrong place.

The anti-ballistic missile system, or ABM as it is called, is one of the greatest achievements of American technology. It is a device for shooting down enemy missiles when they are coming at us at speeds up to 18,000 miles per hour. The technical feat involved is as difficult as hitting a bullet with a bullet — and this fantastically difficult intercept was developed and perfected by American scientists.

The ABM is not a weapon of war but the key to peace. It is no good at all for killing people. Its sole purpose is to defend American lives and property against enemy attack. It is the only means we have to protect ourselves against the possibility that some Dr. Strangelove in the Kremlin might push the button to launch the 1,618 Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles at the United States.

The anti-defense lobby argues that the ABM is "provocative." This is like saying that it is provocative of a jewelry store to install a burglar alarm system. A burglar alarm is totally benign toward everyone in the world except the burglar; it doesn't even harm him, but serves only to hamper his illegal work. The ABM cannot kill a single Russian or Red Chinese. It doesn't interfere with anything except missiles that have already been launched to kill millions of Americans.

The anti-defense lobby argues that the ABM is "destabilizing to the nuclear balance." Over the last seven years, the Soviets have built a thousand intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying fire and death to millions of Americans. During the same period of time, the United States built no additional offensive missiles, and only that one ABM in North Dakota, with which we can shoot down a handful of incoming Soviet missiles. The record speaks out loud and clear as to which side is destabilizing.

The anti-defense clique argues that we have never used the ABM so, therefore, the money we spend on it is wasted. That is about like saying that your fire insurance premiums on your house are wasted if your house never burns down and you never collect. I will not feel cheated if I pay fire insurance premiums all my life and never collect. Military weapons, and especially the ABM, are our insurance of peace. The most successful weapons of all are the ones we never have to use because we convince the enemy in advance that we have more than enough means to come out on top of any fight he starts.

The anti-defense lobby argues that the Soviets now have so many MIRVs that they can overwhelm our ABM and still hit U.S. targets. The answer to this is not to give up and let the Soviets destroy us more easily, but to revive the great American "can-do" attitude. If the Soviets have enough missiles to overwhelm one ABM, then we should build the twenty ABM sites ordered by President Lyndon Johnson before his wise plan was killed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The lives we save may be our own.

JOURNAL OF CIVIL DEFENSE: JULY-AUGUST, 1976

SPOTLIGHT

The American Security Council's "1976 National Security Voting Index" matches public opinion polls with congressional voting records on defense issues. One question asked in a poll recently taken was this: "In the First Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the United States and Russia agreed not to protect their citizens against nuclear missiles. Instead of that, would you prefer that the United States develop the capability to destroy most missiles before they can strike our cities?" The American Security Council poll showed 93% of opinion leaders voting "Yes," 2% voting "no," and 5% undecided. A poll of the general public by the Opinion Research Corporation showed 86% voting "yes," 10% voting "no," and 4% undecided. In spite of this massive American endorsement of a system to destroy incoming missiles (ABM) Congress has voted to scrap the only ABM system (Safeguard ABM) now under construction.

Two new publications in the CD-disaster field are now out:

Mass Emergencies, "An International Journal of Theory, Planning and Practice," appears quarterly, has a clear international stamp, is printed in Amsterdam, and is edited by Americans Jiri Nehnevajsa and Enrico Quarantelli. For information write MASS EMERGENCIES, c/o Elsevier, 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017. (One year subscription: \$19 for individuals, \$36.25 for institutions.)

International Summary comes "from the desk of" General Sir Walter Walker, former NATO Commander-in-Chief, Northern Europe. General Walker pulls no punches in presenting incisive and chilling analyses of the ills that afflict the Western Democracies today. Highly informative. For information write INTERNATIONAL SUMMARY, P.O. Box 4, Hungerford, Berkshire, England. (One year — 24 issues: \$125.)

The Association of the United States Army has issued a 26-page study on "Diminishing Deterrence, A Look At The Fiscal Year 1977 Defense Budget." Its statistics show dramatically that defense spending has given way to societal expenditures. Total US armed forces, including reserve-type units, now total 3.9 million while those of the USSR total 11.2 million and those of the Peoples' Republic of China climb to 12.4 million. It quotes Fortune Magazine as saying that "A mind armored with ideological convictions is almost impenetrable to unwelcome facts." And it ends with a warning from James L. Schlesinger that "the continued deterioration of the military balance would ultimately leave the Western World in a position in which its only serious foreign policy course would be retreat or appeasement."

— Noma Shinrock*

There is no other federal program in being today which gives the taxpayer more for his money.

None.

Every federal dollar spent on a local civil defense program is more than matched by local money. Because federal dollars are so limited, many cities and counties have volunteer civil defense directors and deputy directors. For every local government paid employee in Nebraska, for instance, there are 5 unpaid volunteer directors and deputies trying to do the job, and that's not the full story either. Many, many other people are volunteers in the program, giving thousands of hours of their time to civil defense.


So what does this mean? What do all these people do in the program?

Is it true that detente and the SALT agreements have given the USSR the balance of nuclear and military power in the world today? Is it also true that many people would be killed if the United States were to be attacked with nuclear weapons today? Could perhaps as many as fifty per cent of the population die in such a holocaust?

How can any thinking American politician, economist or writer possibly advocate that because these facts are true the American public should simply give up, bare their necks to the sword, and prepare to die?

This is America, and Americans are fighters to the last ditch. We cannot abandon them.

^{*} Mrs. Shinrock, Civil Defense Director of Norfolk-Madison County, Nebraska from 1960 to 1976, died on February 14th of this year.



Book Review

William B. Marty

WAR SURVIVAL IN SOVIET STRATEGY — USSR CIVIL DEFENSE. 1976 Monograph by Professor Leon Gouré, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 215 pp. \$6.95 from Director of Publications, Suite 1213, 1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Whether or not an advocate of civil defense, any American who wants to speak out on civil defense should read this new book on war-survival in Soviet strategy.

In this scholarly book a longtime student and analyst of Soviet civil defense precisely defines and describes the interlocking elements that collectively constitute "the largest and most comprehensive warsurvival program in the world today."

Authenticated by extensive documentation and discussions with Soviet officials, author Gouré explains exactly why and how the Soviets are so resolute in their concerns for a national war-survival capability.


The accumulative effect of this monograph tends to rivet the reader's focus on the political and strategic implications for the U.S. in the Soviet's leadership policy to fight a nuclear war if necessary, ensure national survival and fight through to eventual victory over the "imperialist" powers.

Because this monographic book is so thorough and written by a genuine authority of scrupulous integrity a reader should have no doubts that civil defense (war-survival) in the Soviet Union —

- is a major element in military preparedness
- has a growing momentum and emphasis since 1972
- permeates the social, economic and political mainstream of the socialist republics

In the informative and interpretive forward, former Ambassador to Moscow Foy D. Kohler includes conclusions that the USSR rejects a US contention mutual assured destruction is a durable foundation for deterrence, questions US capabilities to destroy the USSR, and because of an inadequate American civil defense effort sees that "the whole foundation of the US deterrence posture is crumbling."

Readers of this book who are informed on American civil defense will be impressed by the several similarities in the designs of US and USSR national programs — probably because the essence of warsurvival measures are as international as the hard sciences. There are, however, two crucial differences: the Soviet acceptance of civil defense as an unavoidable national obligation, and the way the two superpowers manage and implement their respective programs.



There has to be some invisible force field surrounding Washington, D.C. Some force that wipes out of the minds of politicians and bureaucrats any thought about the protection of the lives and properties of our civilian population.

Or, that force so muddles their thinking they imagine that this vast nation and her territories can be prepared for a nuclear holocaust on a \$71 million annual budget.

The following quote is from the Secretary of Defense's annual Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1977, (Posture Statement):

"Rather than continue defense department funding in support of the common total peacetime State and local level preparedness base, through funding provided in the civil defense program, the FY 77 budget request reduces those elements of the program which should be supported by State and local governments."

He goes on to say those program elements to be eliminated were the ones designed to respond to natural disasters. His reasoning is that civil defense was designed for nuclear war preparedness and should not concern itself with any other hazards our people face daily.

Mr. Secretary, why don't you apply the same yardstick to the military? Do they do natural disaster planning and response activities? Of course, they do. In fact, they present extra problems for the communities they are based in.

Should the local governments exclude military families from their disaster protection measures and refuse to assist them during recovery periods? Should they not furnish storm shelters for military families? Come on Mr. Secretary, what gives?!

If you are successful in this "to-the-rear-march" approach to preparedness you will be presiding over the demise of the civil nuclear preparedness program. What little nuclear preparedness accomplished thus far has been piggybacked on our communities' need for natural disaster preparedness.

Do you honestly believe that State and local governments are going to match federal dollars for people, systems and equipment for nuclear preparedness only? What folly!

If you did go strictly nuclear, how can any one in his right mind even imagine that nuclear civil preparedness could be accomplished with \$71 million? Even your Pentagon payroll dwarfs this amount!

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A.E. Marchetti, M.D.,
 Chief of the Medical Staff, NAFEC

"I have circulated your correspondence through various offices at Kennedy Airport, and the general reaction has been good. Surely a standardized form appears to have considerable merit, and I believe the proposed form will be very helpful during the triage portion of aircraft incidents."

> Donald T. Foley, Manager, Aeronautical Services Division, Kennedy International Airport

[Sample quotes from a flood of comments endorsing METTAG across the nation.]

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
"I regard our present trials and the possibility of nuclear holocaust as resulting from, (1) the increasing, worldwide, disrespect for human life, largely attributable to the increasing mechanization of society; (2) the West's loss of the ideals which initially inspired its great economic progress; and (3) the world-wide gradual erosion of the ethical basis of civilization, also a product of society's mechanization. These developments, I feel, have blinded the West to communism's threat, not only to the West's basic ideals, but to its very existence; and in this blindness to have built up its enemy to its present awesome power—now capable of plunging the world into nuclear war and coming out the victor.

"I feel, therefore, that we should view present trials and the possibility of nuclear holocaust, not as 'inevitable,' but as the result of our own folly; hence as amenable to mitigation by the exercise of our God-given intelligence."

— DeWitt S. Snell in the Manchester Union Leader

NOTE: Due to an influx of METTAG orders for even hundreds the following expanded price list has been placed in effect and is retroactive to cover past orders (previous prices for quantities of 50, 500, 1,000 and 5,000 remain unchanged):

QUANTITY	PRICE PER TAG	NET PRICE	SHIPPING COSTS	TOTAL COST
50	35c	\$ 17.50	\$ 1.25	\$ 18.75
100	29c	29.00	1.95	30.95
200	26c	52.00	2.55	54.55
300	23c	69.00	3.10	72.10
400	21c	84.00	3.60	87.60
500	19c	95.00	3.90	98.90
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5,000	17c	850.00	27.50	877.50



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CIVIL DEFENSE ABROAD



WHAT PRICE PROTECTION?

(Peter Laurie, writer for the British New Scientist, visited Switzerland in January to look at Swiss civil defense, came back "less ignorant but certainly more nervous." Here is in part what he had to say.)

Briefly, the Swiss think that war in Europe — and that means a very nasty nuclear war — is a sporting chance any time from 1980 on. Already they have dug most of a second, underground Switzerland. Every home is obliged to build, stock and maintain a shelter where it can lurk for two months. Each community has a communal shelter, equipment store and command bunker which will resist three atmospheres' overpressure (1 megaton at 1 mile). There are a vast number of underground hospitals. The Army has burrowed itself into the Alps, and is reputed to have stores there for three years, where it can menace the flank of any invader of the homeland.

Sweden is much the same, with an elaborate program of shelter building, putting power stations and factories underground, surrealist opening cliffs for warships. It seems likely that after the holocaust Europe will be run by Swedes and Swiss, trundling round in immaculate ABC suits, wearing that pained, "I told you so" expression on their faces. A most unpleasant prospect. . . .

Come the 80's, a few holes in the ground might be judicious. Switzerland spends 0.4 per cent of GNP on civil defense. For that modest amount, in 15 years, they have assured themselves almost complete protection for people and important resources. Is £5 (\$9) a head a year too much to spend on preserving the British way of life?

Now you mention it, maybe it is.

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• Reactor Anatomy — Part III