


JANUARY—FEBRUARY 1978

VOL. XI NO. 1

# Journal of Civil Defense


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# Journal of Civil Defense

JANUARY—FEBRUARY 1978 — Volume XI — Number 1

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Authors are encouraged to submit manuscripts for consideration by the editorial committee for publication (the "Journal", as a non-profit organization, pays no fees). Articles, preferably illustrated, should be 500 to 1,200 words in length, slanted to the non-technical reader, and oriented toward the civil defense field. Views expressed in contributions to the "Journal" are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect "Journal" policy. Material may be reproduced if context is preserved, credit given, and copy sent to the "Journal of Civil Defense."



# CAPITAL COMMENTARY

by Jerry Strobe

## *...and in this corner!*

As everyone knows, the question of whether the primary emergency planning agencies — Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Federal Preparedness Agency, and Federal Disaster Assistance Agency — should be combined for purposes of increased efficiency has been under study at the President's direction. The study, led by White House staffer Greg Schneiders, is supposed to be on the President's desk by the end of February. That being the situation, no one has been surprised that only the head job in DCPA has been filled by a Carter appointee, Bardyl Tirana. Indeed, most knowledgeable observers have presumed that no further appointments would be forthcoming until the reorganization question was settled.

At the Federal Preparedness Agency, which is a division of the General Services Administration, the estimable deputy for research, Dalimil Kybal, has been acting Director. Over at FDAA, which is in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Tom Dunn remained as a holdover from the Republican administration. These temporary arrangements have now been overturned by new appointments.

The new head of FPA is Joseph A. Mitchell, 35, who has been deputy assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison. His appointment was announced by Jay Solomon, Administrator of GSA, at the end of October. Mitchell is a card-carrying member of what the media have dubbed the "Georgia Mafia," a mainly flattering reference to the earlier close-knit group around President John F. Kennedy. He was an official of the State of Georgia under Carter, beginning as federal-state coordinator in the Office of Planning and Budget in 1970 and becoming executive secretary to the governor some three years later. In the Carter-Mondale campaign and in the Presidential Transition, he dealt mainly with congressional relations.

Mitchell was born in Georgia and had time before he joined the State government to gain a bachelors degree in economics and political science from Auburn, a masters in management from the University of North Dakota, a J. D. from Woodrow Wilson Law School, serve in the Strategic Air Command, and engage in management consulting practice in Atlanta. "Joe Mitchell has a strong background

in high-level management and policy-making positions," said Jay Solomon in the GSA news release. "It is the kind of experience we are seeking and getting as we round out our management team here at GSA." But FPA, which is charged with continued operation of the federal government and industrial recovery in the event of a national emergency, may be only a temporary stop for this young man on the way to other things.


William Willcox, who is replacing Tom Dunn at FDAA, comes from Pennsylvania where he was Secretary of Community Affairs in the governor's cabinet. He is 58, a generation older than Mitchell, but also with flying experience. He received the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal in World War II. Born in Philadelphia and educated at the University of Connecticut, he spent most of his career as Executive Director of the Greater Philadelphia Movement, an urban development organization, before joining Governor Shapp's administration in 1971.

Willcox is not particularly known as a Carter man. The position of head of FDAA is not a presidential appointment as are the other two and he most probably came to the attention of HUD Secretary Patricia Harris through the urban development route. Thus, the two appointments are most likely coincidental and not symbols of a decision with respect to the emergency preparedness agencies. That decision is not expected for at least another three months. An indication that the decision is still wide open will be found in a recent Carter executive order that changed all DCPA Regional Directorships to political positions. The career incumbents have rights so long as they occupy the jobs but, should a reorganization change the job structure, the Administration has a free hand.

### **Crockett Retires —**

Quite independent of all of the above, William E. Crockett, the able Deputy Director of FDAA, opted for retirement in mid-January, 1978. Bill, who finishes a 31-year career in the Federal Government, gave most of it to the cause of civil defense and is widely known among State and local civil defenders. □

# EDITORIAL



## CHANGING GEARS

With its September-October 1977 issue the *Journal of Civil Defense* expanded into a full-blown magazine — one that carried its message of civil preparedness with more flair, more color, more impact. It was like shifting from first to second.

The "new look" was due to the efforts of public relations specialists who took us under their wings. They were a particularly effective team in this respect, and the November-December issue also bore their brand of public relations expertise. And reader reaction was again enthusiastic. Everyone liked it.

This issue, the January-February 1978 number, continues the trend. It sort of completes the shifting from 2nd to 3rd.

Not, however, without some grinding of gears, some readjustments triggered by PR man Jack Conway's heart attack on December 10th. For one thing, radical personnel changes followed within the Conway organization. The wake of these changes helped to bring about the dissolution of the working agreement between the *Journal* publisher (the American Civil Defense Association — ACDA) and the Conway organization — and a realignment and tightening up of forces working for *Journal* progress and achievement.

Not only are all ACDA-*Journal* systems "go" and forging ahead — but there is new functional planning and a sharpened focus on objectives related to the widened ACDA and *Journal* activities.

For instance, the benefits offered with the ACDA annual sponsoring membership of \$56 (see back cover ad) are now more tightly defined and, where schedules are appropriate, programmed for production. These are:

ACDA membership and voting privileges.

*Journal of Civil Defense* subscriptions (automatically implemented)

ACDA Newsletter — to begin with February 15 issue and continue bimonthly

Annual reports.

Technical bulletins — issued as required.

Membership cards — to be forwarded on a return-mail basis.

Conference and seminar invitations (these are mainly the annual *Journal of Civil Defense* conferences — to be combined with seminars)

Consulting services on individual negotiable bases

Survival Handbook options: (1) Contract where practical for professionals to conduct the project; (2) Purchase at a nominal price of a Community Survival Handbook "kit" whereby communities with available qualified people can conduct the project locally (to be ready by March 15).

The decision to provide survival handbook kits where desired is based on the knowledge that many communities possess promotional expertise, and also the realization that in this way the benefits of the projects can reach across the country without the delay that the slower (but often preferred) technique of professional public relations work would entail.

In addition to the \$56 Sponsoring Membership the ACDA Board of Directors decided — due to requests for it — to create a \$25 streamlined Regular Membership for those who wish to participate on a more limited scale. The \$25 membership includes the ACDA membership and voting privileges, a *Journal of Civil Defense* subscription and conference and seminar invitations. There also remains the straight \$12 subscription rate for the *Journal* (\$22 for two years).

Behind the overall plan and its accomplishment, of course, is still one very clear idea: the buildup of civil defense interest and action that will bring about protection for the American people — at least an 80% reduction in vulnerability to weapons attack, and the practicability of peace in our time.

The road lies before us. We're on our way. *Journal* articles in these pages attest to it in explicit terms.□



# Letters TO THE EDITOR

Editor, *Journal of Civil Defense*:

As Deputy Director of the Office of Civil Preparedness in New York City, I would appreciate a clarification of any background material on writer Jack Conway ("Blackout," September/October 1977) which qualifies him as an expert on either the New York City blackout or on Civil Defense.

Mr. Conway is quite remiss in documenting any source of information other than himself, and yet, according to the biographical sketch presented within the article, he could hardly be described as an expert in anything but public relations. I question the credibility of any author who fails to substantiate facts in a publication dedicated to presenting "... authentic information relating to civil defense ...," and with a stated aim of "... public education and service as a public forum ...". Readers of Mr. Conway's story might be led to believe that the aims of this journal are mutually exclusive - that presenting a paper in a public forum relieves the writer of his responsibility to confirm the validity of his data. His statistical information is misleading, if not inaccurate; for example, he states that 32% of 25,000 Police Officers had reported for duty by 4 A.M. when in fact, 54% of the 18,858 officers considered available were working by 4 A.M.

Mr. Conway consulted neither the staff of the Office of Civil Preparedness nor with the Public Inquiry Section of the New York City Police Department, although he stated in his article that "... support activities were coordinated by the New York City Office of Civil Preparedness ...". Although he is in no way obligated to confer either with this office or with any other representative of the New York City Police Department, the value of his statistical data in particular might be improved if he considered the possibility of dealing with the agency that generated said statistics.

The Office of Civil Preparedness would be most willing to assist Mr. Conway in preparing any future article regarding our activities; we would endeavor to provide information sufficiently accurate to befit publication in the official publication of the American Civil Defense Association.

ROBERT A. HOGAN  
Deputy Director  
Office of Civil Preparedness  
New York City Police Dept.

RESPONSE: A check of author Jack Conway's "back-up" file on the New York blackout story has been made. (Conway is at the present writing confined to a hospital bed with a heart attack.) As Police Officer Robert A. Hogan points out, we try our best to be authoritative and to serve as a forum. In the one set of statistics Mr. Hogan presents it appears that he corroborates Conway's calculations inasmuch as the Conway figure of 8,000 police reporting for duty by 4 AM on the morning after the blackout is actually 32% of the 25,000 manpower figure cited in Mr. Hogan's letter. Conway specified in his article that his 32% figure was of the "total force." Mr. Hogan's figure of 54% is based on "18,858 officers considered available." (This means that for one reason or another about 1 out of 4 officers were not considered available.) The real discrepancy between Mr. Hogan and Conway may be in the total amount of officers who reported for duty, although this is not brought up in the letter. If in not bringing up Conway's figure of 8,000 Mr. Hogan does not question it then this 8,000 figure is 42% of the "available" officers and not Mr. Hogan's 54%. If we use the 54% figure then 10,183 officers (instead of 8,000) had reported for duty by 4 AM, over 6 hours after the blackout began. With the figures at hand Conway's 32% is right in the ballpark.

Perhaps a narrative description of the situation does better. *The New York Times* reported police reluctance in this way: "Thousands ignored an order to report for emergency duty. Many undoubtedly did not hear the order, but others did and chose to ignore it out of unhappiness with their working conditions."

We thank Mr. Hogan for his letter, and we invite further comment should he desire to make it. We thank him also for offering us a "horse's mouth" source of information in New York City should we need it. - Editor

\* \* \*

Editor, *Journal of Civil Defense*:


Our National civil defense situation is not improving any with Harold Brown as Secretary of Defense and Bardyl Tirana as Director of DCPA.

In my opinion, it is worsening with Secretary Brown's hangup on his Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) philosophy.

Director Bardyl Tirana's elimination of DCPA "*Foresight*" magazine also does not indicate that we are moving in the right direction.

Any effort you can give to improving this situation will be appreciated.

Respectfully yours,  
George T. Glacken  
Director, Las Cruces NM  
Office of Civil Defense



## *new man - new hope?*

AN OFF-THE-CUFF INTERVIEW WITH BILL SMITH, 1978 USCDC PRESIDENT

— Walter Murphey

William E. "Bill" Smith, Lt. Colonel U. S. Army (retired), Atlanta-Fulton County Civil Defense Director since 1973, recipient of a long string of awards in recognition of his incessant public service, and 1978 President of the United States Civil Defense Council (USCDC) is hardly one to be timid about saying what he likes and dislikes. When he disagrees, for instance, with new Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) Director Bardyl Tirana he lets him know about it. However, he believes also in "giving the man a chance." For this reason he disapproves of printed criticism of Tirana which has appeared in the *Journal of Civil Defense*.

Perhaps the following "interview" of Bill Smith is more of a discussion between him and Walter Murphey. Whatever it is, here it is.

MURPHEY: Bill, to kick this thing off what have you in mind as general priorities for your 1978 term as USCDC president?

SMITH: My priorities will be first of all getting the Brinkley Bill out of Congress and getting it enacted. This bill is an update of Public Law 920. It puts us into a total disaster preparedness program — a dual-purpose, all-risk, all-hazards disaster program. If we cannot take care of and respond to a natural disaster situation or a man-made or man-caused

disaster other than nuclear attack, we certainly cannot handle a nuclear situation.

MURPHEY: I see what you mean, but there is also this view, which I recently noted in Jerry Strobe's American Strategic Defense Association newsletter: If we prepare for the natural disaster hazard we may not be going far enough to prepare for the nuclear, whereas if we prepare for the nuclear then we would be in shape to take care of natural disasters. Do you go along with that?

SMITH: No. I can't exactly agree with that. I go on the theory that we must crawl before we can walk and walk before we run, and I think that we must do this first with natural disaster planning and continue on into the nuclear eventuality should it ever occur.

MURPHEY: The exercise of our expertise as a training vehicle in natural disaster situations is what we embrace too.

SMITH: I don't think our thinking is that far apart.

MURPHEY: From what you say you appear to be 100% behind what we are trying to do, although you don't always approve of the way we are doing it.

SMITH. Let me go one step further. I do not feel that we can devote our attention *in toto* to natural disaster and man-made accidents. I think that we *must* continue to plan for the eventuality of nuclear attack, because I'm certain that our adversaries are not letting up one bit, and I don't think that we can either. I think that we must continue to

plan for that. And I'm the first one to scream from the rafters that anyone who disregards that primary responsibility is really and truly kidding himself, the Federal Government and the American people.

MURPHEY: How do you see the development of NCP (Nuclear Civil Protection) with its two parts, CSP (Community Shelter Planning) and CRP (Crisis Relocation Planning) along the lines of the prototype cities — I think Macon is one of them.

"I AM A STRONG ADVOCATE OF SHELTER"

SMITH: I am *not* a strong advocate of the evacuation part of the planning. I *am* a strong advocate of the shelter side of the planning. Maybe I'd better explain what I mean. If we are to be realistic in planning evacuation, crisis location or whatever then we must go out to the perimeters or to the areas we plan to evacuate to and prepare suitable shelters and areas to receive these people when they are moved out of the metropolitan areas. And if we are serious about that then we'd better go back and do some homework, build some shelters and do whatever is required in those areas where we plan to move people in, and make sure that the food and other requirements are worked in from the very beginning. I don't think it's been addressed in that depth yet in any area I've been to where they've been doing that type of planning.

MURPHEY: I don't see any divergence of opinion there, with us at least, and I think we feel too that evacuation as simply a population explosion is incomplete — a bad thing.

SMITH: You've made a statement, Walter, a couple of times that bothers me. The only thing that I have disagreed on with the *Journal* in any form or fashion is the habitual criticism of Tirana when the man is trying to get his feet on the ground and trying to find out. He has made some mistakes, and God knows we all chastised him, but I didn't continue to harp on it. And if there's any divergence of opinion at all between the *Journal* and me in any category whatsoever, then it's in that area — not in what you are trying to do.


MURPHY: We have been, as you say, critical of him. We — Eugene Wigner and I — had a friendly hour's visit with him. And we told him that we hoped that our criticism furnished him with a weapon or a lever in presenting evidence to the effect that here are people who are not satisfied with things as they are.

SMITH: His hands are tied by the Administration and by the Secretary of Defense, and he's got to adhere to what their mandate might be. And God knows I've jumped him also in meetings where he was called everything from a big-footed son-of-a-gun on down. And you can see that some of our exchanges have been rather heated. But, again, I feel like the guy is trying, and I'm willing to pitch in and try with him.

MURPHEY: We see your point, and we accept the principle that in a paramilitary situation you've got to be a good subordinate and do what the boss says.

SMITH: Right.

MURPHEY: But there's another side to that: As a staff officer you are also obliged, in addition to following orders



and before the decisions are made, to present evidence as to what the score is.

SMITH: And he has done this I can assure you.

MURPHEY: Well, he told us that he didn't feel that this was his duty at all.

SMITH: He has presented papers, I can assure you, and these are classified, which have given his position, and he has made it abundantly clear.

MURPHEY: And we were upset, like you I assume were upset, and like many other people were upset, by some of his initial actions.

SMITH: Like not needing money and not knowing what he'd do with it.

MURPHEY: Yes. On the other hand, he's also done some good things, and these should be recognized. He came out for the dual-purpose concept.

SMITH: In direct opposition to the Secretary of Defense. And the Secretary of Defense has conceded and goes along because of Tirana's presentation.

MURPHEY: Something else that confuses us, and maybe you can enlighten us on it. He is in what he calls a "holding pattern," and I assume that this means he's waiting until these various studies now in progress on civil defense are finished.

SMITH: Let me define that "holding pattern" a little better. What he is saying is that the President and the Secretary of Defense have not made a pronouncement, as of this date, as to the direction that they want civil defense to follow.

"SOMETIMES I FEEL LIKE I'M  
HIS ONLY DEFENDER"

And based upon that and the moneys that were requested by the previous Administration and concurred in by the present Administration there was the clear indication that it



was what they wanted him to do — stay in a “holding pattern” until such time as the President’s Reorganization Project Committee could complete its study and put the report on his desk so that the President and the Secretary could make a pronouncement as to the future role of civil defense. And here again, I think it is a matter of semantics with all of us as to what the guy is saying as opposed to the position he finds himself in. Sometimes I feel like I’m his only defender, but again on the other hand I feel like the guy is trying. And I’m willing to pitch in with anyone as long as he’s trying. Because I was getting a bit tired of sitting on our dead end not doing anything.

MURPHEY: You know, Bill, we’ve been in a holding pattern for a long time, and I hope that you are right, that we are going to come out of it. And I notice that in the Congressional appearances that Tirana has made he mentions the holding pattern too, and the House subcommittee was sort of impatient with him and said that we’ll wait until March and if something is not done we’re going to do it.

SMITH: On that particular point, when the hearings that we had on the Brinkley Bill are finalized you should be able to get a copy.

MURPHEY: Fine, Bill. Anything else that you can think of that ought to go in our interview? Any special aims of yours?

SMITH: My primary aims are: one, to work as closely with the Administration as I possibly can until it completes its study, but I think it is absolutely imperative that we get the Brinkley Bill enacted, which is a simple change in mission.


Also, I will tell you that on the S-1209, which is Senator Proxmire’s Bill — I was assured that they would be holding hearings some time in January or February on that bill, but that they would take no action until such time as the President had had an opportunity to complete his study and made the determination on the direction he wanted to follow.

MURPHEY: I hope that we are looking forward to something of substance in March or April.

SMITH: The White House Schneiders study is due to be completed according to persons in that study group and to be placed on the President’s desk for decision by the 28th of February. Then he should have the time to consult with the Cabinet and other people on the matter. And I would hope he would be able to give us a decision some time in mid-March or certainly by the 1st of April;

MURPHEY: That’s good news.

SMITH: There were three questions that the Schneiders group was especially interested in getting input from the field. These were featured on the first page of the USCDC Bulletin for November. They also plan to have four area type meetings with local elected officials and civil defense staff people. They are trying to get everyone’s input that they possibly can.



### Questions listed on the front page of the USCDC Bulletin for November:

1. At the State and Local level are there similarities between Natural Disaster Preparedness and Attack Preparedness? What are they? Do they justify an all-risk Preparedness Program?
2. Should the Federal Government be involved in an all-risk Disaster Preparedness Program?
3. What steps should be taken to improve coordination between Federal, State and Local Governments before, during and after an emergency?

It’s not too late. Send your comments to:

Sandra Bricker  
Federal Emergency Preparedness & Response Project  
Room 3050  
1111 20th St., N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

MURPHEY: Let me get back for a minute to this question of shelter and evacuation. With reference to DCPA Circular 77-9 dated October 21, 1977 on SHELTER MARKING AND DEMARKING, do you recall this?

SMITH: Yes, I do.

MURPHEY: I notice in it some emphasis on evacuation tied in with reception areas — which you are more-or-less adamant on bringing up and which I also think is necessary. And this is somewhat encouraging to me. Now, I also notice in here an implied criticism of current fallout shelters in urban areas which we’ve been harping on for a long time. As a matter of fact it says that downtown shelters in above-ground space are “obsolete.” Which sort of tips up our old apple cart — and again I think that’s good. And it marries this thing up in somewhat the same way you did earlier. That is, if you are going to have evacuation you’d better have shelter wherever the people are going to evacuate to. Anyway, the circular gave priorities on planning, and the first priority is “risk areas,” so I assume that in reading this that we are going to have to make shelters that qualify against the *direct* effects of nuclear weapons.

“HE’S SAYING THAT REALLY AND TRULY WHAT  
WE NEED ARE BLAST SHELTERS”

SMITH: Yes. Now this is brought about again by an in-depth study by Mr. Tirana on this subject and he's saying that really and truly what we need are blast shelters. I think he's going back, in his own mind at least, to the Dr. Teller theory.

MURPHEY: Good for him!

SMITH: He's going back more in that direction.

MURPHEY: Now, this second priority is the "host areas," which would take in evacuation. I think that you can essentially say that most of us, and that includes Wigner and so on, dislike evacuation and accept evacuation only because it has turned out to be a more practical—under the present budget constraints—alternative to putting blast shelters in urban locations.

SMITH: Well, if you don't put them in urban locations you're going to have to put them in the suburban areas, and you're going to have to put a certain amount of blast protection in them. Because you see I can't help, Walter, but go back and fuss and fume when we talk about building shelters or we talk about evacuation. I look at this 64-mile ring of concrete around the city of Atlanta (Atlanta's peripheral expressway) and I look at all of the valleys and so forth that were filled in or bridged over, when if they had put in shelter when they were building it they could have done it for a 3 or 4 percent increase in cost, and we would have had our evacuation area set out.

MURPHEY: Yeh. Well, they wouldn't listen to anyone then, and of course not many are listening now. So this new Circular 77-9 is a little fresh water. We've got something that's a first step. Now, of course, we think it is *only* a first step—or I think it's only a first step—because it criticizes the current urban shelters which God knows are terrible—they're traps in my estimation—and this circular is fine. But I hope we proceed from this to something more definitive. That is, what really comes out of it? You don't have enough blast shelters in Atlanta. What would you find in the way of blast shelter? Certainly shelter for only a very small percentage of those who need it. So, what's the solution?



**Clifford E. McLain**

SMITH: I think the solution is going to come with Cliff McClain, who was brought aboard DCPA as Deputy Director recently. He is one of those people who worked for Werner Von Braun for a number of years at Huntsville. He was on the other side of the missile industry—the delivery side. And

now he is looking at the other side,—how would you go about building a protection program that is acceptable to the citizenry, which is acceptable to the political sector, and that cost-wise is practical. And again, Walter, I have to say when I see the scientific community becoming involved, when I see the professional planners becoming involved it gives me hope, and Cliff McClain, I can tell you that he will not—he told me himself—that he would be there no longer than it was required for him to come up with some type of a prototype program that would be acceptable and could be sold. He can go over and talk to Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, and communicate with him. I can't. I don't have the think-tank background that's required for people like him, and like Dr. Wigner and Dr. Teller and so on. They're out there in an intellectual stratosphere somewhere while I'm still struggling along at the pick and shovel level.

MURPHEY: Like me.

SMITH: McLain worked out at Boeing with T. K. Jones for a while too. I'm sure many of his colleagues look at him and say "My God, what are you doing in this business." He is in there and looking at it, and saying "Hey, how can we come up with something that is believable, that is salable, and something that we can sink our teeth into and move out on." And he made the statement to me that "as soon as I'm able to do that I'm going to have to get out and let some of the operating personnel come in and make whatever slight modifications are required to make it operational."

MURPHEY: What would be something in your opinion that would be practical and salable and effective?

SMITH: I think it's going to be a long-range plan of blast shelters being built in conjunction with other construction where you'll be able to hold the cost down. And as I said a while ago in talking about the perimeter expressway around Atlanta, that 64 miles of concrete, if we had put our shelters in in it we could have done it for 3 or 4 percent additional cost. And there are similar types of construction where the same thing can be done, can be worked in. But, it's not going to be something that's going to happen overnight. If we really went in to it heavily we would accomplish it in the next ten years. That would be excellent. But if we accomplished it in the next twenty years I think that would be about what we might expect as a schedule.

MURPHEY: This is what most countries which take it seriously have to plan in the way of a time frame, isn't it?

SMITH: That would be my estimation. Again I have to say I'm not a professional planner. I'm a pick and shovel man.

MURPHEY: Thank you. One last question: What can the *Journal* do to help you, to support you, to ease your way?

SMITH: I think the *Journal* could best help us by encouraging those local elected and appointed officials to become involved in and recognize the need for a true disaster preparedness program.

MURPHEY: Bill, I sure appreciate the interview.

SMITH: Well, I'd just like to say in closing, Walter, that with a live interview like this you know that what I've said is coming from the heart and is not coming from a prepared text. □

# PDH-

## *a national disgrace*

— MAX KLINGHOFFER, M.D.

It is almost as though there were a deliberate conspiracy to destroy the defenses of the United States. For certainly we know that, in order for a nation to survive modern warfare and to be able to return to a semblance of normality, there must be provision for comprehensive disaster medical care for its citizens.

In 1975 I addressed a letter to President Ford, deploring the abandonment of our medical defense programs: the Packaged Disaster Hospitals (PDH'S); the Hospital Reserve Disaster Inventory (HRDI); and Medical Self-Help. Until the destruction of these programs, the United States had a comprehensive disaster medical network. While these combined programs needed constant updating and further training, they did provide medical "back-up" for millions of casualties. The equipment and methods were quasi-military and austere, but effective. Many of us who were associated with these systems felt that, in the event of any national catastrophe, we had the means to cope with the medical problems. Thousands gave their time and efforts to further this system, because we felt this work might be vital to the survival of the United States.


We had at least the beginning of a unified mass casualty program: the Packaged Disaster Hospitals, stored at strategic points throughout the country, provided more beds than do the fixed hospitals. They were of even greater value because they were dispersed throughout the United States, and thus not in key target areas.

The Hospital Reserve Disaster Inventory not only provided fixed hospitals with a standby of essential medications and supplies, but also served as depots of supply for the Packaged Disaster Hospitals.

*"Given a segment of a perimeter to guard, the soldier who fails in that duty is subject to severe punishment. Should those who weaken our medical perimeters of defense be held any less culpable?"*

Medical Self Help had gone a long way toward teaching the average citizen how to care for himself, his family and his fellow citizens in time of emergency. This self-help concept would have taken a great burden from the existing hospitals, whether permanent or PDH. Medical Self Help gave us a base of triage within our general population.

Yet, about four years ago, the Federal Government suddenly dropped its role in all these programs. Without Federal support, interest waned. And this is not surprising. If National Defense is the obligation of the Federal Govern-



ment, and if that Federal Government shows little interest in the matter, it seems likely that the average citizen will also take these matters less seriously. Worse yet: today, even the vestiges of the Packaged Disaster Hospitals are being offered as gifts to the "Pan American Development Agency". (See Civil Preparedness Circular no. 77-8, dated October 14, 1977). What a bitter paradox! Our Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) advocates disposing of the remaining disaster hospitals left in the United States! But there is a reward for following these suggestions. The circular further states: — "the Pan American Development Foundation will pick up the PDH's at no cost to you."

No cost? Except, perhaps, the loss of millions of our people in case of war. Whether we consider nuclear war, or the possibility of large-scale civil disorders, or nuclear terrorism, we simply are not prepared to cope with the medical problems inherent in these situations. In spite of the often excellent performance of our medical personnel following catastrophes it has become obvious we are not prepared for a really large-scale disaster, or for the follow-up care over a long period of time.

Bulletin no. 77-8 states further that Dr. Peter G. Bourne, Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues, asked DCPA to approach State and local authorities and request donation of PDH's excess to their needs. Where are our DCPA Directors? Why have they not raised an indignant voice to tell Bourne: "We need ALL the PDH's we have, and much more if we are to protect our citizenry in case of disaster."

There are about 1,500,000 hospital beds in the United States today in fixed hospitals. Most of these are in key target areas. The PDH, the HRDI, and Medical Self Help assured us of a vastly increased number of beds, and the personnel to staff them. In addition, they offered the advantage of dispersal. As things stand today, we are extremely vulnerable.

It does not seem possible that all our national leaders can be blind to these facts. Apparently they choose to bury their heads in the sand. This leaves much of the anatomy vulnerable.

Excerpt from Dr. Klinghoffer's 1975 letter to President Ford: (*Journal of Civil Defense*, May-June 1976:)

"The Packaged Disaster Hospital evolved from the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) of the Korean War. The MASH unit evolved from the Field Hospital of World War II, but was much more mobile than the Field Hospital. With the successful use of the MASH unit, it was recognized by personnel in the Department of Defense and the United States Public Health Service that modification of the MASH unit might provide a means of survival for casualties in case of any disaster striking the mainland of the United States or any

regional area emergency. On this basis, the first Civil Defense Emergency Hospital (CDEH) was developed. This unit was further modified and improved, and finally became the Packaged Disaster Hospital."

The real responsibility for the debacle at Pearl Harbor has never been fully revealed. Only a few scapegoats suffered as a result; and it seems the real culpability will remain hidden.

But there are many responsible individuals in the field of disaster medical care who are aware of the wanton destruction of our emergency medical facilities, and who are aware that countless lives may be lost because of this. Given a segment of a perimeter to guard, the soldier who fails in that duty is subject to severe punishment. Should those who weaken our medical perimeters of defense be held any less culpable?

It is sometimes rationalized that we are prepared for such catastrophes by virtue of the training of increasing numbers of individuals in advanced emergency care. There is no doubt great value in such training. But it is a most dangerous fallacy to assume that preparation for every-day emergencies will automatically mean preparation for mass casualty care. It is far more logical, and far safer, to assume that preparation for large scale disaster will make us better able to cope with everyday emergencies.□

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## Two Jack Andersons ?

No one would accuse good Mormon Jack Anderson of smoking "grass" or worse, but his enthusiasm to alarm the nation about the Shippingport, Pennsylvania nuclear reactor has all the earmarks of an opium "trip." His article ("White Clouds over Pennsylvania") achieves a new record in misinformation per column inch. *Access to Energy* for Dec. 1, 1977 points out that "since the 852 MW plant at Shippingport is nuclear, it not only produces no air pollution, but eliminates the following pollutants that would be produced by a coal-fired plant of equal capacity: 511 lbs of CO<sub>2</sub> per second, 8.5

lbs of SO<sub>2</sub> per second, 26 lbs of bottom and fly ash per second, as much nitrous oxide as 170,000 automobiles, countless tons of lime sludge generated in scrubbing the stack gasses, and toxic metals — the three mentioned in Anderson's concoction, plus 16 others . . .

"The 'pall' above Shippingport is one of the few things in town that is not radioactive. One that *is* radioactive is Jack Anderson when he comes to visit. Two Jack Andersons (perish the thought) would emit more radioactivity than the NRC allows for the Beaver Valley Plant."

## AW HECK !

The *Journal of Civil Defense* almost made it — that is, into the pages of the *USCDC Bulletin*. On page 6 of the November issue Gregg Schneiders and Bardyl Tirana are shown looking at a copy of the *Journal*. But the *Journal's* cover appears to have been defaced by an alert *Bulletin* censor, and the caption calls the *Journal* a "program."

Well, maybe next year.

# TOO GOOD TO FILE ...

Journal of Civil Defense research and far-flung correspondents gather materials which give the Journal direction, furnish it with back-up expertise and help it formulate policy guideposts. Sometimes quotes are taken from such materials to use for Journal "fill". We think Journal readers would like to see selections of these materials in a special column. Here they are. (Ed.)

The basis for all governmental civil defense efforts in the United States is the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Public Law 920, 81st Congress, as amended. In the Declaration of Policy under this act, it is stated that:

It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a system of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack. It is further declared to be the policy and intent of the Congress that the responsibility for civil defense shall be vested jointly in the Federal Government and the several states and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall provide necessary direction, coordination, and guidance; shall be responsible for the operation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration as set forth in this act; and shall provide necessary assistance as herein authorized.

It is ironical that we, of this generation, living in the United States with so much to lose, and who possess a superior technology and economy, have been unable to develop the necessary will as a nation to provide protection for those things which we have proclaimed throughout our history as our sacred trust . . .

That concept which was once termed Civil Defense in the Soviet Union has expanded, developed, and been so completely integrated with other phases of Russian war preparation programs that today it is difficult to compare it with the Civil Defense program in the United States. Whereas the United States program has stagnated upon the concepts developed during and prior to World War II, the Soviet approach has been highly innovative and dynamic.

- from a thesis by Van E. Hallman,  
Colton, CA

\* \* \*

I agree with the position advocated by Herman Kahn in *Thinking About the Unthinkable*, which is simply that avoiding unpleasant thoughts is a sensible thing to do unless it makes unpleasant realities more likely to occur.

The present unwillingness of the public and of politicians to discuss the threat of nuclear warfare seems to me to be the single largest factor favoring the conclusion that war is inevitable. If the public would talk about it, and if politicians would make a political issue of it, the outlook for prevention might be much brighter.

- from "Planning for the Day After  
Doomsday," by Bruce Douglas Clayton  
(*Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*,  
September 1977)

\* \* \*

It is not practical for a local government, or a State government, to establish one agency to plan for response to a natural disaster, another to plan for train wrecks, another for major industrial accidents, still another for civil disturbances, and yet another for nuclear attack. It would be wasteful, inefficient, duplicative, and expensive.

We do not have a separate Police Department for every different type of crime. True, we may have separate divisions within the Police Department, such as narcotics squad, vice squad, homicide squad, patrol division, etc. But they *all* have *one* Chief. And they are *all* fighting the same thing — crime.

The same is true of natural disaster, technological disaster, and nuclear attack. They are *all* disasters; they simply vary in degree and the method of response.

It is no more logical for the Federal Government to have separate agencies dealing with different types of disasters than it is for local or State Government. It is costly, inefficient, and unwieldy, and it detracts from the primary goal — *helping the people*.

-Sam B. Sloane II, CD Director  
Tuscaloosa County, Alabama  
in a letter to the "Schneiders Committee."

\* \* \*

If one were asked to set aside any concern about the budgetary and political obstacles to a strengthened civil defense and recommend a course of action, it might be along these lines: (1) In keeping with its constitutional mandate and its superior command of funds and resources, the Federal Government must be given by statute the basic or primary responsibility for civil defense, with the States and local units of Government having an important supporting role; (2) Civil defense objectives must be clearly defined, including, preeminently, a comprehensive nationwide shelter system providing blast, fire, and fallout protection related to target risk; (3) These national civil defense objectives must be authorized by law and funded on a basis which permits the buildup of protection in a steady and systematic way rather than by fits and starts during recurring crises; (4) Shelter construction and other necessary civil defense measures must be time-phased to yield maximum protection with every given shelter increment; and (5) Command and control authorities in emergencies must be more clearly delineated, with a firmer statutory basis and full consideration for maintaining continuity of civilian Government leadership and unity of central direction.

- Herbert Roback in the ASDA  
*Newsletter* (Oct. 28, 1977)

# CIVIL DEFENSE ABROAD

Reports and repercussions of the 1977 American "Civil Defense Debate" are appearing in foreign publications. In Great Britain *The Journal of the Institute of Civil Defense* digs into Congressional hearings and says:

One Republican, Congressman William Whitehurst, also argued that it would be criminal to give up hope of defending against a nuclear attack when civil shelters could reduce casualties "down to 20 million."

But the new director of the Pentagon's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Mr. Bardyl Tirana, said there was no question of building blast shelters for the civil population, which would cost far more than the sums being voted.

"Frankly, we do not seek an increase," he said. "All we would do with the funds is accelerate our program. We're not going to build shelters or do any industrial hardening, as some people have suggested."

\* \* \*


Russians carefully monitored the hearings, and General of the Army A. I. Radziyevskiy in an interview with V. Aleksandrov printed in the Canadian *Emergency Planning Digest* for September-October 1977 has praise for "sober-minded" Americans who play down civil defense. In answer to a question about claims of a stepped-up Russian civil defense made by the American press, American generals and Boeing Aerospace Company Radziyevskiy says:

"They are totally baseless. Soviet civil defense has never threatened anyone and has always pursued humane aims.

"As in the past, the main tasks of civil defense are: to protect the population during war; to increase the stability of the functioning of the national economy in wartime and to eliminate the consequences of an aggressor's attack on peaceful cities and villages . . .

"Naturally, the civil defense organization and its methods of protecting the population and national economy from an aggressor's air attacks and natural catastrophes are constantly being improved. However this fact, which was recognized during the conclusion of the ABM Treaty, was no obstacle to its signing and alarmed no one until 1976, when the struggle over the US military budget for the next few years broke out.

"Seeking an increase in the military budget, American 'hawks' are now trying to belittle US civil defense potential as much as possible. Yet in the past, when the military-industrial complex had to convince American public opinion that the vast sums being spent at the taxpayer's expense to implement extensive civil defense programs were being used most effectively, they enthusiastically praised the achievements of US civil defense . . .



"While knowing of the United States' extensive civil defense programs, the Soviet Union has never called these measures a threat to the peace and security of other peoples, and has never tried to depict them as an obstacle to ending the arms race or to general disarmament. Indeed, it is not hard to understand that with the ending of the arms race and the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the need for civil defense measures will also recede of its own accord. Therefore, the attempt to present civil defense measures as an insurmountable obstacle to further progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is just as ridiculous as an attempt to lead a jackass backwards along a road . . ."

\* \* \*

Closer to home, Soviet Scientist M. A. Markov writes a persuasive article for the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (November 1977) which is meant to refute Richard Pipes' statement in the July 1977 *Commentary*. Pipes said:

"Since the mid-1960s, the proposition that thermo-nuclear war would be suicidal for both parties has been used by the Russians largely as a commodity for export. Its chief proponents include staff members of the Moscow Institute of the USA and Canada, and Soviet participants at Pugwash, Dartmouth and similar international conferences, who are assigned the task of strengthening the hand of anti-military intellectual circles in the West."

Markov tackles his mission pretty well and he tries to reemphasize the title of his article, which is "Have We Learned to Think in a New Way?" He quotes the Pugwash Manifesto in saying that "There can be no winners in a third world war." A familiar goblin, and he points out:

"With the appearance of the nuclear weapon, and with the threat of global destruction of life on earth, arose the realization that the use of this weapon was tantamount to self-destruction . . .

"The duty of scientists is to warn the world about this god of war donning the mask of a pacifist, and to warn about the military strategists' temptation to unleash a preventive war for 'humanistic' ends. . .

"The genie has been released from the bottle, and it only remains for us to search for different forms of limiting its spread and preventing its aggressiveness. The danger is that an accumulation of plutonium can take place in reactors designed for generating nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

" . . . The disappearance of an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and fear in favor of an atmosphere of security will lead to a new economic order and to the peaceful cooperation among people in solving tasks common to all mankind."

\* \* \*

Prominent among those whom the Soviets would like to discredit is Major General George Keegan, who retired a year ago as Chief of Air Force Intelligence. Following are excerpts of an interview published in *Human Events* of September 24, 1977:

" . . . The Soviets have taken extraordinary steps to harden, protect and shelter their military, leadership, industrial and population resources from nuclear attack. While Soviet cities would be destroyed, they would probably suffer no more than four or five million fatalities to our 160 million.

" . . . Future catastrophe can be averted — just as World War II could have been prevented.

"All the United States has to do is continue making a prudent, objective assessment of what the Soviet Union is doing and assuring that we don't let it happen. Prudent and adequate investment in security and defense is basically what is required. In my opinion, we are not doing that today . . .

"Altunin [Soviet Chief of Civil Defense] has over 200 general officers on active duty from the several services, serving directly on his staff, or in command of civil defense in all the major cities of the Soviet Union. He is known to have many dozens of regiments of civil defense troops that are assigned principally to supervising city defense throughout the Soviet Union. His organization includes several large military academies like the Air Force Academy or West Point exclusively devoted to training civil defense officers.

"After four years of the most intensive training in civil defense, they graduate with the equivalent of a college degree, are commissioned second lieutenants, and spend their entire 35- to 50-year career in civil defense.

Ultimately, these young officers become the commanders of civil defense detachments throughout the cities of the Soviet Union.

" . . . There is no longer any mystery about the matter of Soviet civil defense. The difficulty is that you cannot get senior officials of the U. S. government to believe, because to believe would simply be to put detente, SALT and the ABM treaty of 1972 in an extremely adverse light." □

## Question and Answer Corner

- Q - You persistently advocate writing Congressmen to stimulate more interest in civil defense. Aren't we naive in thinking that letters to Congressmen are going to do any good? Or are even going to be read?
- A - With the awesome workloads of most Congressmen this might appear to be a logical assumption. But experience indicates strongly that letters are taken seriously. On October 21, 1977 Congressman Robert H. Michel of Illinois had the following to say for the Congressional Record:

" . . . one of the most important parts of the legislative process is constituent letters to Congressmen. These letters do more than keep legislators informed — they also serve as a kind of "care package" of commonsense from back home to Congressmen living and working in this isolated and often insulated city on the Potomac. Letters to Congressmen are essential if we are to keep our legislative process responsive to the voice of the individual citizen.

"Letter-writing is the best way to let your Congressman know what is on your mind. The telephone is a wonderful invention and it does save time — but very often it is a permanent written record in the form of a letter that is going to enable you and your Congressman to work together for your interests.

"The question arises, then: How can a citizen be certain that his letter will get the care and attention it deserves? Allow me to offer a few suggestions in the form of advice to anyone who might be thinking of writing.

"There are three basic steps to remember when writing to your Congressman: Keep it clear, keep it accurate and, if at all possible, keep it brief . . .

"Writing letters to your Congressman is part of the democratic process. You do not have to be a graduate student of English literature to tell your Congressman what is on your mind. All he asks is that you tell him clearly, accurately, briefly — if possible — and that when he is finished reading your letter, he knows he has some work to do for you. That, after all, is what Congressmen are in Washington to do."



*Government, the military and industry have sunk billions into special protective measures for leadership, staff and critical systems in case of nuclear war. But for John Doe, the taxpayer who foots the bill — and his family? . . . Read on.*

# Let There Be Truth...

- FRANK WILLIAMS

Silent steel doors — like a scene from science fiction — lead into an outsize buried complex. They shut behind you. Deeper silence. The sleek subdivided space spread before you is encased in a heavy jacket of reinforced concrete. Utilities, clocks, furnishings are shock-mounted. Systems are redundant. Special valves protect ventilation shafts and pipes. Supplied with its own food, its own water, its own power, its own accommodations, its own fuel — completely independent of outside help — it can be a sealed-off “home” to a select group for two to four weeks. This in a brutal, close-in nuclear attack environment.

Is this protective shelter that government has built for people?

No. It is shelter that government has built for *government*. One of many.

Well, you might ask, where are the shelters government has built for people?

And the answer is simply that government does not build shelter like this for people. Not in the United States. Government builds them for government. For emergency operations. Some are highly sophisticated. Some are less so. Over 4,000 such shelters exist for officialdom, for the military.

But not for the people. Why? What's to happen to the people?

Authorities in Washington have for years — with dignity, conviction and persuasion — pointed out compelling reasons for a “low-key” civil defense: It would be useless, because protection is not possible. It would be provocative, because the security afforded would cause the Soviets to take offense. “Overkill” proves that everyone would be killed many times over. It would cost billions to protect the public. We must maintain our people in a “hostage” status and exposed to annihilation to show good faith. Destruction is more effective than protection. It is pessimistic to think of nuclear attack. The whole thing is “unthinkable.” Therefore un-American. And unimportant. It might interfere with week ends.

You might also ask — If protection is such a *low* priority for people then why is it such a *high* priority for government?

And this would be a good question. Perhaps an embarrassing one.



Frank Williams

President Carter might well ponder it. He might ask why in a nuclear crisis carefully laid plans exist to spirit him and his advisors quickly out of Washington and airborne where they will be out of reach of incoming nuclear weapons, why key military and government crews will fan out to buried bunkers that circle Washington? Any why most of his neighbors — the children, the women, the people of Washington, D. C. — will be left to fry, sizzle and pop under the attack?

Is this the “American way”? A part of Potomac dogma?

Perhaps the most dramatic of the government's shelters — one which illustrates best the attention given to protecting “the vital few” — is the military North American Air Defense Command in Colorado. Buried under millions of tons of granite, tunneled over 1,000 feet into Cheyenne Mountain, it consists of windowless multi-story stainless steel buildings mounted on mammoth coil springs. It boasts many other special features.

It is superb protection — built obviously by those *who believe that such protection is necessary and effective and well worth the cost.*

But outside Cheyenne Mountain churches, schools, homes and commercial buildings — eggshell structures — stretch across Colorado, across the United States. Those in target areas would crumble under the direct effects of nuclear explosions. Those in locations remote from explosions



would for the most part offer pitifully inadequate protection against fallout. No more than "nuclear traps." This deplorable pattern of neglect is why serious scenarios have for years predicted 100,000,000 initial deaths for the United States in an all-out nuclear attack.

What is the rationale that permits government to take taxpayer money to protect itself and to ignore the taxpayer? What moral code allows leadership to condone this protection for itself and exposure to death for those whom it serves?

Industry also gives us examples of survival preparedness. AT&T, for instance, has during the past twelve years constructed vast underground communications lines with buried, reinforced two-story control centers to serve them. These lines crisscross America, carefully avoiding cities and military installations (except for spur lines), and are built to withstand the shock of nearby nuclear detonations. Well over \$1 billion has so far been spent on these lines — *a good deal more on this one project alone (for cables) than the United States Government has spent during this same period to provide a civil defense agency for its 217,000,000 human charges.*

Do Americans really want protection?

A recent American Security Council nationwide poll report shows that 91% of the people queried (of a total of 135,841) wanted ABM protection against nuclear attack. 1% said "No." The rest were undecided. An accompanying poll report showed that 89% of the respondents thought an agreement between Russia and the United States *not* to protect their peoples (which reportedly took place in 1972) was objectionable. Such responses are not really new. They show that a great majority of Americans think that government has provided for their protection. In the light of proud American heritage this is a logical assumption.

The Russian, too, assumes such protection and *has* it. The Chinaman assumes it and has it. The Swiss. The Swede. The Finn. The American is fooled, deceived. He is a deliberate "hostage."

In this way, in a land where leaders preach human rights without letup, the citizen himself is deprived of his most basic and most precious human right — the right to survive. While our leadership worries and frets about the rights of people in other nations around the world, and at home rights for Blacks, Indians, women, the poor, the handicapped, the aged, the young, the sick, gays, old soldiers, prisoners and whatever, has it forgotten the right of the working citizen to have his tax money applied to making *his* life safer?

Apparently.

A goodly number of Washington studies are now in progress to respond to the recent surge of interest in civil defense. One of them, the White House civil defense review by Greg Schneiders' "Reorganization Project," is scheduled to wind up by the end of February. It is in all probability the pivotal study. As an "in-house" effort its conclusions may well be influenced by Administration policy, which appears *not* to favor any meaningful upgrading of civil defense. It should be recalled that other White House civil defense studies such as the Gaither and the Lincoln reports (both of which strongly recommended a greatly improved

civil defense posture) were in effect ignored. Pentagon studies which showed the tremendous life-saving potential of a proper civil defense have also been ignored. Today's Secretary of Defense Harold Brown feels that American opinion would not support an upgraded civil defense program and discounts the Russian effort. His answer to the pleas for planning protection for the people (similar to that which he enjoys as the Pentagon chief) is to say that we must not be led to "replicate" Russian civil defense.

So, can we count on current studies being taken seriously in Washington?

Congress has indicated that if by March no Administration action has been taken to correct the tragic civil defense imbalance then Congress will act on its own.

In reviewing the Schneiders report when it goes to him on February 28th President Carter would do well to keep a few salient points in mind, among them:

- (1) That protection for government, the military and industry is taken very seriously and that a tremendous investment has been made in it.
- (2) That protection for himself and his advisors is taken even more seriously and that his move to an airborne command post is ready to be implemented on a moment's notice at any time.
- (3) That the American taxpayer pays handsomely to buy this protection.
- (4) That the American taxpayer has no such protection, is himself — with his family — left exposed, at the mercy of an attack.
- (5) That the myths and excuses for maintaining his exposure are effete platitudes, credits only to aggressor propagandists.
- (6) That Pentagon studies (as well as others) show that good civil defense measures would bring survival expectancy up from less than 50% to around 95% — near that of the Soviet Union.
- (7) That human rights — in addition to faith, food and freedom — include the No. 1 right of *the people* to be considered for survival in nuclear warfare.
- (8) That a tough home defense would make aggression against the United States unwise, unrewarding, a long-shot gamble, and much less likely. With such a development we would truly be opting for the highest possible peace odds.

President Carter has said to the country: "I'll never lie to you." He is certainly very serious about living up to his promise. He rules out the lie. But neglect to face an issue squarely, neglect to cover a question fully and failure to speak out frankly and accurately can be tantamount to the lie. Silence can be a lie. Mark Twain called the "silent lie" the worst kind. That it is. And it is a highly developed art in our national capital.

We hope Mr. Carter remembers his Georgia roots. On civil defense we need a lot of common sense, a lot of candor, a lot of courage. Mr. Carter needs to give the taxpayer back some of what the taxpayer has given him: protection. It's that simple.

Let there be truth. □

# AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE RUSSIAN THREAT

*Is the downgrading of American civil defense related to Soviet military strategy? Do we now have an offensive-defensive imbalance? According to this military study the answer is "Yes" to both questions.*

— MARLIN H. BERRY - Major, USAF

In reviewing the strategic balance between the U. S. and Russia, one becomes dismayed over the massive increase in military hardware the Soviet Union has produced over the past six years. Russia's strategic or near-strategic superiority is now a fact of life! Her weapons inventories either lead the U. S. now, or production objectives are such to eventually outweigh American military capability. Supplementing Russia's rapid increase in international weaponry, new concepts and weapons systems have been developed.


With this increase in Russian military power, do we Americans have an adequate civil defense system? This article will attempt to explain why the U. S. needs a good civil defense organization, and how our defensive system might be strengthened. If a specific concept is to be developed from this paper, it is hoped to make the reader aware that civil defense must be an integral part of U. S. military strategy.

In order to have a strong military, America's political, social and economic base must also be strong. Both factions — military and civilian — are interrelated. *Military Strategy*, edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union, V. D. Sokolovsky, states that "... one of the cardinal tasks for Soviet Military strategy is the reliable protection of the country from nuclear strikes, anti-missile and air defense." The Soviets have always devoted great attention to an active defense as a major aspect of their military policy.

If Russia places so much effort in a civil defense system, should the U.S. do likewise? Before we answer that question, let us look at some basic facts:

Within the Soviet Union, the total population is trained in defensive measures. For instance, the elementary school system stresses civil defense activities for about fifteen hours a year in grades 5, 6 and 7, and this continues up through the years of higher education. Both farmers and factory workers are trained to participate in defensive activities. In fact, civilians are taught to use bulldozers, cranes and shovels from stockpiled equipment which is reserved primarily for this purpose.

*"Russians have increased their capability by an astonishing 392%!"*



In the past, U. S. strategy discounted Russia's civil defense capability. This was based on former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's statement that we could kill 20-25% of the Soviet's urban population to include destruction of at least half of the country's industrial capacity. As long as Kremlin leaders faced that degree of devastation it was assumed that they would not attempt to initiate a nuclear war.

Today, however, the picture has drastically changed. Offensively, Russia has 2,450 strategic nuclear weapons compared to 2,208 held by the U. S. In 1966 the balance was 625 and 2,216 respectively. In other words, the U. S. has seen a slight decrease in total nuclear weapons while the Russians have increased their capability by an astonishing 392%! Coupled with the massive increase in Soviet civil defense expenditures, is there any question as to what Russia is attempting to do?

Over the past several years neither SALT nor detente has slowed Moscow's drive for decisive strategic superiority over the United States. In fact, U. S. Government experts are realizing that the Russian buildup will soon confront America's Minuteman missile force with a very real knockout threat — something the U. S. has striven to avoid through arms negotiations. The situation might be summed up in what a prominent British defense expert, Lord Chalfont, said:

"I am deeply sorry if I tread on anyone's dreams, but I feel bound to draw attention to the fact that the nuclear balance, always a fragile and uncertain edifice, is being demolished before our very eyes."

The Soviets are currently spending about one billion

dollars a year on civil defense and even more on methods of dispersing their industries into different geographical locations. Russia calculates that only 7-12 million casualties would result — a figure that would be far below that needed in the eyes of an antagonist.

Where then does the United States defensive posture fit into the total world picture? Let us first examine what the former chairman of the United States Committee on Armed Services, Senator Richard B. Russell, said at an official hearing in 1967:

"I think the people of this country have been badly spoiled. We have become too fat and soft. We think we are entitled, just as a gift from heaven, to the greatest way of life ever known in the history of man, and without having to make any sacrifice to preserve it."

Because we are a free nation with tremendously diverse political and social backgrounds, it can be easily understood that civil defense does not loom as a major concern within the American mind. As a matter of fact, the problem of defending civilians as a part of military strategy has been made a matter of debate by small but vocal minorities while the public at large remains indifferent.

As Americans, we realize that the U. S. has no reason to attack Russia. In fact we have never shown any interest in attack. However, the Soviet Union has a definite goal to overthrow America since our capitalistic system is the great stumbling block toward its sworn objective of world domination. Since the Soviet aim is to impose its system on all of the world, is it any wonder why it stresses civil defense?

Are the Soviets gearing up to fight and win a nuclear war? From what we have learned so far they are. With a good shelter system, ample food and a national education and training program there is no question they are more prepared than their American counterparts. They have never adopted the U. S. strategy of "mutual assured destruction." Based on Soviet nuclear striking power and a realistic civil defense program, they may very easily be preparing a serious confrontation within the next five years.

*"Are the Soviets gearing up to fight and win a nuclear war?"*

It is no wonder, therefore, that civil defense plays an important part of the total strategic system in Russia — on par with rocket troops, air defense, ground, air and navy forces. Their philosophy rests upon the belief that a healthy, educated and well-organized population will not only survive, but will be able to function during and after a nuclear attack.

On the other hand, the U. S. believes that the combined arsenals of Russia and America could destroy humanity ("Overkill"). Directly or indirectly, this rationale ultimately leads legislators and other government officials to postpone viable civil defense plans.



Nuclear war is not unthinkable according to the philosophy of Russian rules. What is the Kremlin attempting to do about so-called "unthinkable" nuclear war?

- obtain positive nuclear superiority over the U. S. in strategic weapons, and over NATO in tactical nuclear arms in Central Europe.
- survive a large U. S. retaliatory strike by maintaining a well-balanced, realistic civil defense system.
- expound throughout Western civilization that nuclear war is unthinkable and unacceptable by promoting detente, peace petitions and disarmament.

In Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev there are unusually deep subways designed to shelter hundreds of thousands of people. Subways continue to expand throughout populated areas in Russia which are providing more and more dual-purpose underground shelters.

Emphasis is also placed on dispersing people in large metropolitan centers into smaller communities (decentralization). Factories are being placed outside of present industrial centers as well as spreading out other

likely nuclear targets into extended areas which cannot be seriously affected by one nuclear blast.

To further enhance the seriousness of civil defense planning, Russia gave preparedness new emphasis shortly after the first SALT agreement was signed in 1972. Since then observers have seen increased spending in construction and larger administrative staffs. Additional posters, booklets, instructional materials and films are now very common.

The development and realistic practice of evacuation plans are probably the most convincing part of the entire Russian civil defense program. Such plans and exercises include entire cities!

*"... 2.5 billion bushels of grain ... will supply 250 million mouths for 300 days."*

The dispersal, evacuation and shelter plans developed by Russian military strategists suggest that approximately 240 million Soviets would survive the short-term effects of a full-powered U. S. nuclear attack. In order to maintain a living population during this "age of threat," there are now facilities being constructed to store 2.5 billion bushels of grain in rural areas of Russia which will supply 250 million mouths for 300 days! This is long enough for the nuclear sequence of events to go from initial radiation to radiation decay back to livable levels, whereby crop planting and harvesting may again be performed.

Russia's uppermost aim is to remove any doubt about its ability to deter the U. S. Certainly wealth, geographical position and population densities bring much to bear on

civil defense policy. However, in each and every case it is the willingness or reluctance of responsible political leaders to face facts, assess the situation and accept the responsibility of this totally disagreeable and complicated problem of national preparedness.

Many problems and challenges exist if America is to take its defensive posture seriously. According to a report by the Civil Defense Panel of the House Armed Services investigating subcommittee:

*"U. S. Civil Defense efforts, in the face of growing Soviet activities in this area, are underfunded, fragmented and lack a national policy base."*

From an attitudinal point of view, civil defense has been an orphan in the Department of Defense. Billions of dollars have been appropriated each year for sophisticated weapons systems; civil defense can only count its funds in the tens of millions.

Not only have costs been a primary roadblock in obtaining realistic civil defense goals; there has been no national effort in shelter systems and training programs. In fact, the investigating subcommittee found that the level of training and education in civil defense is too low and erratic to warrant strong confidence in a national civil defense operation. It feels that "research, planning and training do not appear to be getting the attention and resources that they deserve."

On the other hand, civil defense acts to reduce the enemy's offensive force by reducing the effectiveness of its warheads. This is equivalent to an important form of arms reduction. One of the greatest potentials of civil defense is to change the outcome of a nuclear war and establish arms control.

### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET FINANCIAL SUMMARY BY APPROPRIATION CATEGORY (BILLIONS OF \$)

APPROPRIATION TITLE	FY 1974	CURRENT DOLLARS		
		TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY		
		FY 1975	FY 1976	FY 1977
Military Personnel . . . . .	\$24.1	\$24.9	\$25.6	\$26.5
Retired Pay . . . . .	5.1	6.2	7.3	8.4
Operation and Maintenance . . . . .	23.9	26.2	28.9	32.4
Procurement . . . . .	17.5	17.4	21.4	29.3
RDT & E . . . . .	8.2	8.6	9.5	11.0
Military Construction . . . . .	1.8	1.8	2.4	2.3
Family Housing . . . . .	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2
Civil Defense . . . . .	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Revolving and Management Funds . . . . .	—	—	0.1	0.4
Military Assistance . . . . .	3.3	1.6	1.5	1.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$85.1</b>	<b>\$87.9</b>	<b>\$98.3</b>	<b>\$112.7</b>

Source: Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report — FY 1977*.  
Washington, D.C., GPO, 1976, p. 256.


*"U. S. Civil Defense efforts . . . are underfunded, fragmented and lack a national policy base."*

Historically, the U. S. has leaned toward the development of offensive systems rather than defensive efforts. The public and Congress must realize that because of Russia's offensive and defensive (civil defense) strategy the American population could be held hostage to a nuclear threat simply because of America being unable to protect its population.

Recent Congressional hearings on civil defense in the U. S. are part of the first thorough review of our national civil preparedness posture in 13 years! Future plans are to fully examine the proficiency of federal, state and local preparedness programs.

How long can this country of ours exist without serious attention to the nuclear threat? In terms of the younger generation security seems to be our rightful inheritance instead of earning it through constant work and effort. Can America reap the benefits of international stability without paying the costs?

Certainly military strategists — as well as many thinking Americans — can understand what the increase in Soviet defense activities means. It would be naive to believe that such an effort is for the passive defense of the Russian homeland and nothing else! ☐



## CD on TV

On January 4th the Public Broadcasting System televised a one-hour documentary on civil defense. Called "In the Event of Catastrophe" it succeeded to a refreshing degree in presenting both sides of the civil defense debate.

Although Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Paul Warnke noted near the beginning of the film that civil defense talk was guilty of "indulging optimism to the point of total folly" and DCPA Director Bardyl Tirana observed that after the Cuban Crisis "the nation began to disregard civil defense because it was not necessary" others made a remarkably strong case for it. Leon Goure, Harriet Scott, T. K. Jones, DCPA's William K. Chipman and Region I Director Alan Zenowitz are among those who produced convincing evidence that civil defense must be considered as a basic national policy and developed accordingly. It was generally agreed that the present state of the art in the United States remains embryonic.

Clearly delineated at one point was the message Frank Williams delivers in his article "Let There Be Truth" (see page 16): that protection for political and military leadership is obviously a requirement in the minds of our planners and is generously provided — and that protection for the public is curiously looked upon as not needed and is *not* provided.

Zenowitz does a commendable job of helping to sum up the situation from his Maynard, Massachusetts bunker-type headquarters. There is, he says, no "instant civil defense" and the public is simply "not prepared."

The program appeared to leave this question in the minds of viewers: "Is it worth the trouble it takes to give the average American protection — or isn't it?"

# SPOTLIGHT

The American Security Council's film "The price of Peace and Freedom" received the 1977 American Society of TV Cameramen National Service Award. The film, which dramatizes the need for American preparedness, has now had over 475 television showings. Over 1,500 copies of the film are being circulated throughout the United States, and showings to schools, civic clubs, business and professional groups, veterans organizations, etc. are still being made. Reconditioned films may now be purchased for the bargain price of \$100 each. (Orders may be placed, with payment, to the American Security Council Education Foundation, Boston, VA 22713.)

\* \* \*

Articles and reports in the American press pointing up the disparity between American and Soviet civil defense programs continue to grow. A particularly pungent analysis by Thomas H. Etzold appears in the October 1977 issue of *Air Force Magazine*. Etzold writes:

"Recently, Soviet civil defense and war survival programs have seemed fundamentally to threaten the strategies intended to ensure the security of the United States. Mutual assured destruction and associated ideas about the "sufficiency" of strategic nuclear forces in an era of parity have depended on the idea that, without terminal defenses against ballistic trajectory weapons, the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union would be hostages, a situation that would enhance mutual deterrence. Yet, Russian developments in civil defense, as outlined in the February '77 issue of *Air Force Magazine*, have raised the disturbing possibility that soon only Western populations may be sufficiently vulnerable to deter their governments from effective political-military pursuit of national interests.

"... Analysts cited in this magazine in February concluded that, as a result of civil defense measures, only about four percent of the Soviet population would perish from blast, fire, and initial radiation, vs. forty percent or more in the West. Similarly, these analysts estimated that the Soviet Union might be able to recover from nuclear war in two to four years, or three to six times faster than the U. S. They have reasoned that the United States is losing the ability to destroy the percentages of Soviet population and industry long thought necessary to deter Soviet leaders from initiating nuclear war or other major aggression. Coupled with the

widespread misgivings about detente and trends in the overall strategic arms relationship, Soviet war survival measures have seemed palpably to menace American security."

\* \* \*

A 1977 report by the International Civil Defense Organization in Geneva, Switzerland looks at the political emphasis placed on civil defense by the Soviets:

"... Apparently, the Party organs constantly keep in mind the problems of Civil Defense, as there are specific examples of active support of Civil Defense on the part of provincial, urban, rural and factory Party committees and the executive committees of the local councils.

"Thus, the Civil Defense Program has been expanded and accelerated and appears to be receiving still larger allocations of resources. This further upsurge of the Civil Defense Organization has been the result of a thorough review of the program undertaken in 1973, which has led to significant changes aimed at further improving the program and increasing the combat readiness of the Civil Defense Organization to a much higher level, in line with the general effort being made to improve the combat readiness of the armed forces as a whole.

"Following instructions from the Party and Government, in 1973 an entire complex of organizational measures were implemented for restructuring and improving all areas of Civil Defense, and investigating and introducing new forms of training of the population for defense from modern weapons. Measures were taken for further improvement in administrative agencies, for organizing communications, for supplying the population, military Civil Defense units and civilian Civil Defense units with modern means of protection and for equipping them with authorized property and technical equipment."

\* \* \*

It has long been known to certain industrialists, but not to the public-at-large, that discharges from coal-burning plants are to a significant degree radioactive. "Radiation Risks From Plutonium Recycle," by a group of six well-pedigreed experts in the December 1977 issue of *Environmental Science & Technology* has this to say:

"Radionuclides, especially elements of the uranium and thorium series, occur naturally in coal. When coal is burned in large power plants many of the trace elements,

become concentrated in the effluents. The more volatile elements can vaporize and pass through particle-collecting devices in high-temperature streams. These elements can then recondense at lower temperatures further down the effluent streams to be released to the atmosphere."

\* \* \*

*The Christian Science Monitor* reports that the nuclear power industry's fate is tied to the availability of energy. In a November article it observes:

"Regulatory delays will continue, opposition to nuclear plants probably will grow, and the cost of constructing a plant will increase an average 10 percent a year, making financing difficult until at least 1979, possibly 1981. So says William C. Hayes, editor-in-chief of *Electrical World*, one of the power industry's most respected trade magazines.

"After 1981, however, prospects will change considerably, as energy shortages and prices turn nuclear power from an option to an absolute necessity, says Mr. Hayes, contrary to some forecasts . . .

"Mr. Hayes describes himself as 'unabashedly in favor of nuclear power,' seeing it as 'the only viable alternative to our power needs.' "

\* \* \*

Wisconsin Congressman Les Aspin's ridicule of civil defense is legend. So is his unconcern about Soviet preparedness. In an interview with *Navy Times* (December 19, 1977), however, his statements appear to betray a crack

or two in his armor:

"The evidence doesn't show the Russians are friendly fellows. But it doesn't show they are hell-bent for a confrontation either. In fact, the evidence pulls the rug out from under those who see a parallel with Nazi Germany . . .


"In simple terms, the Russians are producing only a little more than is required to keep their forces from declining in size and to keep the average age of their force stable. Germany's modernization pace, by contrast, was phenomenal . . .

"No one is suggesting that the Soviet leadership is benign, docile or unthreatening. The Politburo clearly does not have the best interest of our political or economic systems at heart. But to reach the conclusion that Moscow is preparing for a confrontation is to leap beyond the evidence. Clearly, so far as Soviet intentions can be deduced from their military program, they are not as hostile as some have portrayed them to be."

\* \* \*

Power shortages and blackouts are not limited to the United States. Turkey, for instance, is plagued with them on a daily basis. In Ankara, with a population of 2 million, two-hour blackouts are a daily affair — mid-morning or mid-afternoon. Businesses, homes, hospitals, schools, etc. must work around the blackouts. Sometimes, as in the case of computers, electrical machinery, elevators, ventilators, etc. it's not easy. Turkey's largest city, Istanbul, and other industrial areas also have frequent power interruptions.





has been previously informed and educated in broadcast warning capabilities that effectiveness doubles and redoubles.

This idea has led Twenty-First Century Systems of Decatur, Alabama to utilize the network control pattern of Cable Television communities. With a system called "Cable-Lert II" the company markets a standardized warning communication device that can preempt normal cable programs on all cable TV channels with both an audio and video message where a warning needs to be fanned out to citizens. The Cable-Lert II system can include radio stations and other outlets as may be desired by local officials.

"Cable-Lert II", says a company spokesman, "provides for a brief, all-channel preemptive warning activated by civil defense officials within the emergency operations center. Broadcast of detailed emergency warning information over a designated government access channel of the local Channel-TV system follows. Control of the entire system is from a console located within the EOC . . ."

The total cost of the system (around \$13,500 to \$15,000) is eligible for federal matching funds.


In addition to use in emergencies, the company recommends that Cable-Lert II be utilized at all other times to educate and prepare the community on any type of disaster or emergency by pre-scheduling training programs with the Cable Company.

Cable-Lert II is a 1977 development. Among the cities which have already installed Cable-Lert are Decatur, Opelika and Tuscaloosa (all in Alabama); Oxford, Tupelo and Columbus (all in Mississippi); Saginaw, Michigan; and Joplin, Missouri. Other cities now have the system on order.

T. J. Hilbus, Etowah County (Alabama) Civil Defense Director, explains the new capability this way: "Tornadoes have struck localities where the loss of life could have been a fraction of what it actually was had some good way been available to get the warning out in time for protective action. We feel that investing in a TV warning system is another important step in keeping faith with our people and watching out for their safety. The cost is ridiculously low compared to the vital service Cable-Lert gives. No warning system is ever perfect, but with the TV warning method we go a long way toward being really competent in the emergency warning field. It's a matter of conscience."

Such a system, of course, applies to all kinds of disasters. In special cases the visual and audio contact which TV and preemption gives permits special instructions -- an overall flexibility and control.

Cable-Lert can be coordinated very well with other types of warning. Most attractive is the potential for saving lives. With that in its favor it deserves consideration. ☐



# TV TO THE RESCUE

— A Journal Staff Report

Good warning and preparation in disaster means lower casualties. Disaster experience has shown this to be true. It's a form of "pre-disaster rescue".

More and more, disaster situations can be anticipated minutes, hours, sometimes days, before they occur. And more and more, radio and television are being used successfully for warning. Where warning time is brutally short these means are especially effective. Where the public

Cable-Lert II  
Twenty-First Century Systems, Inc.  
P.O. Box 1536  
Decatur, AL 35601 (Phone: 205/350-1121)



# civil defense and politics

"... money spent by the military is politically justifiable only if a well-organized civil defense exists."

*Excerpt from an article by Urs Schöttli of the Basel (Switzerland) Civil Protection Union appearing in the October 1977 issue of Zivilschutz, the Swiss national civil defense publication.*


During a good part of the 20th Century the power of the armed defense of a nation determined its ability to exert its will. The situation has radically changed with the appearance of arms of mass destruction. If a country unsympathetic to Switzerland should try to take over our country through economic and military blackmail our national defense would be forced to evaluate the risks by taking into account on the one hand the possibility of defending ourselves successfully from a military point of view — and on the other hand the protection available for the civilian population.

The independence of the Swiss people must be safeguarded. This goal could not be attained if the army were too weak to push back an enemy attack or if the population could not be sufficiently protected and were exposed to the enemy's weapons of extermination. It follows from this that civil defense broadens greatly the field of action of foreign policy and of national defense. *Any effort to assure an effective defense is in vain if it is impossible to avoid the destruction of that which ought to be saved.* In conflicts and crises on an international level every weak point can damage the Swiss position. In such a case the enemy would not hesitate to profit from evident deficiencies in the protection of the population and vital facilities by resorting to blackmail.

Switzerland is a nation founded on the will of the people.(and so is the United States, Ed. Note).

According to the Swiss Constitution the Swiss citizen enjoys widespread liberties and rights. It is therefore essential that in the case of crisis the majority of the population be persuaded that it is necessary to defend our sovereignty. Political authorities must convince Swiss citizens that it is dangerous to accept peace proposals which imply the loss of national sovereignty. The citizen must understand that peace does not always represent the most favorable alternative, especially if it is based on the abandonment of liberty and democracy and if the country falls under the yoke of a foreign political power.

World War II showed us the kind of propaganda and oppression totalitarian nations use to lead entire populations to certain death. However, in a country which respects the will of its citizens propaganda and police terrorism do not have this effect. When it comes to deciding if the country will cede to pressure or resist it, even at the risk of being led into conflict, then only political and military kinds of arguments count. If it is established that the army can under the worst circumstances successfully resist aggression it is equally important to know that civil defense gives the population the highest chances of survival. It is not an exaggeration to affirm that in today's situation the money spent by the military is politically justifiable only if a well-organized civil defense exists. In a free and democratic country the military makes sense only insofar as it safeguards the liberty of the entire population. It is then essential to assure the survival of this population in the event of catastrophe. □



# OVER THE IRON CURTAIN\*

by RUBY N. THURMER

Solar and Special Studies Section  
Energy Division  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory



## FOOD — FOR THOUGHT AND SURVIVAL

Solar and Special Studies Section etc. take from previous issue

As I began to write, an old saying came to mind — "What people don't know can't hurt them," — immediately followed by "What people in the United States don't know about taking care of themselves in the event of a nuclear war may have already hurt them considerably." It appears that a *lack* of information is the reason behind our country's apathy regarding protection for our citizens. We have been told about the horrors following the use of the A-bomb in Japan, but how many stories have we seen which report that people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who were lucky enough to be in open-tunnel shelters, even one only 100 meters from ground zero, at the time of the bombings escaped completely unscathed? Yet it is true!

For years many Americans have believed and continue to believe that all food supplies and crops would be rendered useless following a nuclear attack. As a result of this belief, there is little wonder that preparations to survive nuclear war seem futile. Why worry about surviving only to die of starvation? In an attempt to correct this area of a "lack of information," we would like to devote this column to passing along some information regarding food supplies after a nuclear attack.

### "WHAT THE SOVIETS TELL THEIR PEOPLE"

Since, ordinarily, our reporting is from "Behind the Iron Curtain," let's take a look at what the Soviets tell their people regarding the use of "Food Products, Fodder, and Water after the Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction." The following is an excerpt from the Soviet civil defense handbook published in Moscow in 1969 and translated, edited, and published as ORNL-tr-2306 in April 1971.<sup>(1)</sup>

"Food products, water, and fodder in a region where weapons of mass destruction have been used are regarded as possibly contaminated. If these products were not stored in tightly covered containers and show signs of contamination, they should not be used without preliminary examination.

"The most valuable and also the most readily decontaminated products are decontaminated first.

... Decontamination ordinarily begins with the container, with subsequent treatment of the food product itself. Decontamination is performed by washing the container surface in running water, or the food product itself if it was not in a container. It is also possible to transfer food from contaminated containers to clean ones (bags, chests, boxes, or barrels).

"Food products in closed, airtight containers (glass or metal) are considered reliably protected from contamination. With such products, the container itself is rubbed down with rags, and then washed in soapy water."


A later edition of the Soviet civil defense handbook<sup>(2)</sup> explains how to protect foodstuffs as well as how to sample supplies that may be contaminated.

"To protect foodstuffs from contamination by radioactive and toxic materials and biological media, they must be kept out of contact with the air. In the home, waterproof and ordinary wrapping is used for this, or the products are wrapped in soft, protective materials. In rural areas, foodstuffs are kept in cellars under the floor, in basements, and storerooms, which should be sealed airtight if possible. Using impermeable containers available in the city as well as the country, assures complete protection of the food and water from contamination by radioactive and toxic materials and biological agents. The impermeable containers include canning jars, glass jars with screw-on lids, bottles with ground glass stoppers, milk containers with airtight lids, metal and wooden kegs, and thermos bottles.

"To protect water, use glass bottles, canisters, cans, barrels, and other containers. Water reserves must be replenished daily. Well shafts in rural areas are closed tightly with an adjustable cover. A shed is built over the frame or, better still, a closed booth. The area around the well in a radius of 1.5 to 2 m is covered with a 20-cm layer of clay and the surface of the clay is covered with a 15-cm layer of sand. To drain rain

water from around the edge of this area, a trench is dug. Under the threat of contamination, the well may also be covered with canvas or water-impermeable material."

It is apparent that the Soviet civil defense people not only assume that there will be survivors following a nuclear war but also assume that these survivors will be assured of a food supply sufficient to sustain them through a recovery period. Of course, the situation is quite different in the Soviet Union than it is here in the United States. Planning for and control of the dispersal of new industrial centers (and thereby population concentration) have resulted in fewer high-density urban areas. Many of their industries already are located in outlying, nontarget sections of the country. Their civil defense is organized around the essential industries; thereby giving the employees of these installations the best opportunity to secure good sheltering facilities along with the knowledge of what should be done prior to and following a nuclear strike. The nonworkers are to be evacuated from the immediate areas near the plants and factories and will, according to civil defense plans, be hosted by rural residents who are to work together with the evacuees to provide protection and survival measures for all. In the event of a planned first strike by the U.S.S.R., stocking of both food and medical supplies could be accomplished well in advance of any mass movement of people. Plans for



the location of new grain storage facilities in nontarget areas have been included in the last two Soviet 5-year plans, and they are being fulfilled accordingly.

#### IN THE U.S.: "ENOUGH USABLE FOOD"

In the absence of any nationwide crisis planning in the United States, the relocation of both people and food supplies would be much more difficult to implement. However, studies indicate that there would indeed be enough usable food (unprocessed grains and soybeans, plus processed foods and surviving crops) to feed the survivors until new crops could be produced. One such study by Haaland *et al.* <sup>(3)</sup> concludes:

"Sufficient grain to feed the entire population of the U.S. for several months to more than a year, depending on the season, exists in storage in the local areas where it is produced. When the quantity of grain in storage is less than a year's supply, there is adequate grain growing in the fields, much of which can be harvested with little radiation hazard to agricultural workers if appropriate precautions are taken."

A General Services Administration (GSA) computer calculation, using a postulated attack on military targets (UNCLEX-MIKE) and another on civilian targets (UNCLEX-CHARLIE), indicates that approximately 50% of the U. S. grain crop would survive. A summary of the GSA calculations is given in Table 1.

This same report states that traditionally (from 1965 through the present time) 30 to 40% of the annual U. S. grain production would be adequate for the annual minimum survival quantity, <sup>(5)</sup> even for the present population.

Given the fact that there would be adequate supplies of grains, which could sustain the nation's surviving population, the transportation of those supplies would certainly require immediate expert attention.

Table 1. Estimated Surviving Yield of U. S. Crops <sup>(4)</sup>

Crop	Total Production (1974) (thousand bushels)	Estimated Surviving Yield UNCLEX-CHARLIE		Estimated Surviving Yield UNCLEX-MIKE	
		(thousand bushels)	(percent)	(thousand bushels)	(percent)
Barley	343,000	134,000	39.0	142,700	41.5
Corn	4,833,300	1,890,000	39.1	1,376,100	28.5
Irish Potatoes	413,100	187,100	45.3	175,700	42.5
Rye	28,500	8,100	28.5	7,800	27.3
Sorghums	909,800	851,400	93.6	749,500	82.4
Soybeans	1,269,800	1,269,800	100.0	1,269,800	100.0
Wheat	1,805,100	883,000	48.9	956,000	53.0
Totals	9,603,200	5,223,600	54.5	4,677,600	48.7

According to Cristy *et al.*<sup>(6)</sup> many field crops would also be usable. Fruits can be decontaminated by washing and peeling, and root vegetables, i. e., beets, radishes, potatoes, carrots, etc., may be harvested and washed well. Of course, all foods should be sampled and checked for contamination before being consumed.

"FAR FROM BEING A HOPELESS SITUATION"

In addition to the salvageable field crops and grains, there would in many cases be varying amounts of processed foods, packaged in impermeable containers, that would be safe for human consumption. Combining wholesale, retail, and home stocks, it is possible that there could be an approximate 30-day supply.

Far from being a hopeless situation, it is apparent that we only need to do some serious work on making sure that the food supplies can be made accessible to those who need them should a crisis situation develop. Our nation needs to accept the fact that nuclear weapons exist and that, one day, we could be faced with either the use or the threatened use of them against us. Once we have acknowledged to ourselves and to the world that we are dedicated to a policy of war survival rather than our present "end of mankind" attitude, we, as a nation would profit in two ways.

First, the block which has kept us from establishing a protective system for our people would be removed, and second, other nations would have less reason to believe that we would be willing to submit to threats in order to prevent the "end of mankind."

A later edition of the Soviet civil defense handbook<sup>(2)</sup> explains how to protect foodstuffs as well as how to sample supplies that may be contaminated. □

<sup>1</sup>SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE, MOSCOW 1969, a translation from Russian, ORNL-tr-2306, J. Gailar and C. H. Kearny, eds. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, April 1971.

<sup>2</sup>CIVIL DEFENSE, MOSCOW 1970 a translation from Russian, ORNL-TR-2793, J. S. Gailar, C. H. Kearny, and C. V. Chester eds., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, December 1973.

<sup>3</sup>Carsten M. Haaland, Conrad B. Chester, Eugene P. Wigner: SURVIVAL OF THE RELOCATED POPULATION OF THE U. S. AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK, ORNL 5041. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, June 1976, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid, pp 117-118.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, p. 110

<sup>6</sup>George A. Cristy, personal communication.

\* Research sponsored by the Department of Energy under contract with the Union Carbide Corporation.



# 5 Years Ago

## In The Journal of Civil Defense

In its January-February 1973 issue the *Journal* reported on a new "report summary" for DCPA by Jiri Nehnevajsa of the University of Pittsburgh. The report, "*Americans and Civil Defense: Some Highlights of the 1972 National Survey*," was based on a public opinion poll which showed that Americans approved of civil defense, wanted civil defense and were even willing to do volunteer work for civil defense. The *Journal* review ended up as follows:

With the national civil defense budget now up to a little over 80 million dollars, the opinion of the sample group was that the civil defense budget was somewhere around 700 million — and furthermore that it ought to be over 1.2 billion dollars, or over twelve times what it actually is!

Nehnevajsa makes this observation:

"In 1972, civil defense remains viable. Its exact missions may not be altogether clear to the public; its

low level of Federal financial support is clearly *not* perceived by the public. But whatever else may be said, it holds without equivocation that the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, as major carrier of the burden of protecting the nation's population against nuclear attack, has a public *mandate* stronger than any legislative mandate would seem to imply, and much stronger than the level of funding makes possible."

It is not then that the public doesn't *know* what it wants. What it doesn't know is that it doesn't *have* what it wants.

In 1973, however, Washington officials felt that the public would not back a strong civil defense effort. Five years later in 1978 many of them, including Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, are of the same opinion. A new element is aroused interest in the problem by Congress, the press, and a growing segment of the public.

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## UPCOMING

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Mar 12-15	USCDC Mid-Year Conference, Wash., D.C.
May 7-11	Region VII USCDC Conference, San Diego
May 18-20	Region IV USCDC Conference, Racine WI
Jun 5-7	Region V USCDC Conference, Okla. City
Jun 12-15	Region II USCDC Conference, Carlisle, PA
Jun 19-21	Region VI USCDC Conference, Livingston, MT
Jun 20-23	Region I USCDC Conference, Windsor, CT
Jul 16-19	Region III USCDC Conference, Atlanta, GA
Jul 21-23	Region VIII USCDC Conference, Portland, OR
Sep 11-15	"Security 78" - International Safety Congress, Essen, West Germany
Oct 8-13	USCDC Annual Conference, Mobile, AL

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### COURSES AT DCPA STAFF COLLEGE, Battle Creek, MI

Feb 6-17	Civil Preparedness Career Development Program - Phase III
Mar 13-17 20-23	Advanced Radiological Defense Officer Industry/Business Emergency Planning

Apr 3-14	Civil Preparedness Career Development Program - Phase III
17-28	Civil Preparedness Career Development Program - Phase II
May 15-26	Civil Preparedness Career Development Program - Phase IV
Jun 5-16	Civil Preparedness Career Development Program - Phase III
Jul 24-27	Industry/Business Emergency Planning
Aug 14-25	Civil Preparedness Career Development Program - Phase III
Sep 18-29	Civil Preparedness Career Development Program - Phase IV

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# NEXT ISSUE



When snow or floods block roads, when time runs out, when speed is crucial in an accident or critical illness MAST steps in with helicopter assistance. MAST is the acronym for Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic.

Bonita M. Ogilvie, Secretary to the MAST Coordinating Committee in upstate New York, dramatizes a MAST mission sent out from Plattsburgh Air Force Base near Lake Champlain. In a little over three years the Plattsburgh MAST unit "has conducted over 300 rescue operations" and has been credited with over 280 "saves."

Ms. Ogilvie's article, "MAST Pay-Off: LIFE!" reveals both the local and the national MAST picture, and the procedure for bringing about a community MAST project.



U. S. Congressman Donald J. Mitchell, no supporter of civil defense until he was confronted with compelling evidence of its need, analyzes the anatomy of indifference and what it will take to cut through it. "What we must do to solve our civil defense problems," he says, "is to secure the support and enthusiastic backing of media leaders. They have the public's confidence. They're the ones who uncovered the Watergate scandal. They're the people who brought to light the shortcomings of so many public officials. They're believable."

Mitchell — naturalist, environmentalist, nutritionist, sportsman — is as much at home in a canoe as in Congress. At 54 he looks to be in his thirties. His media approach to cracking the apathy problem will give *Journal* readers a lot to mull over.

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
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