

June 1978


Volume XI—Number 3

Journal of Civil Defense

**Congressional Focus
On Civil Defense**

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AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE ASSOCIATION




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


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Journal of Civil Defense

American Civil Defense Association

JUNE 1978

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CAPITOL COMMENTARY

by Jerry Strope

Is Reorganization Dead for This Year?

Contrary to information reported in this column in the last issue of the Journal, no recommendation on reorganization of the Government's emergency functions had reached President Jimmy Carter's desk as of the first of May. The report of the President's Reorganization Project is in its fourth version and is still beset with so many problems that Jim McIntyre, the President's confidant and head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), was hesitating to sign off on the fourth version at the end of April. That puts reorganization in jeopardy for this session of Congress.

Any reorganization plan proposed by the President must be promulgated in time to allow Congress 60 days in session to object. Allowing for recesses and the fact that this is an election year, it figures that the deed has to be done in early June, perhaps June 9 at the latest. Else the whole thing will go over to the next Congress.

The difficulty is that there is a good month of hard work needed on the plan itself after the President has made his decisions among the options that are likely to be presented to him. That means that entering May without a decision is big trouble.

Part of the hangup appears to lie right in Mr. McIntyre's Office of Management and Budget, which is traditionally and functionally divided into a management and policy part and a budget-controlling part. The policy side of OMB apparently supports the task force recommendation of one new independent agency built on the merger of FPA, DCPA, and FDAA plus a gaggle of other emergency functions. The budget side seems to favor at least two agencies, perhaps nuclear preparedness (FPA and DCPA) in the Department of Defense and a separate agency for peacetime emergency functions. The grounds are probably that it would be too hard to control the budget of a new single agency whose potential clientele have already been flexing their political muscles on the reorganization issue. So, better divide and conquer, say the budgeteers.

The creation of a new independent agency is prob-

ably another stumbling block. The President may not like that. But the heterogeneous nature of the new agency is also a worry to knowledgeable people like Jim McIntyre. The first version of the reorganization proposal included a proposed organization chart along functional lines—mitigation, planning, response, etc. The implication was that a mission-oriented agency with all of these functions would be dismembered. That approach has folded under attack from a number of quarters.

The firefighters lobby was insistent that the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration preserve its identity as an agency within an agency. After all, this relative newcomer came into being because the firemen were jealous of their fellow police who had the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Right now it is not altogether certain that the NFPCA will be moved out of the Department of Commerce.

Defense Secretary Brown's objection to the reorganization proposal was that defense against nuclear attack was not just another emergency function and had to be considered in the whole national security context. The current accommodation to this problem is a proposed arrangement in which the Department of Defense will furnish policy guidance for civil defense and jointly defend its budget before the Congress. That virtually guarantees that DCPA (or perhaps the combination of DCPA and FPA) will remain an agency within an agency.


So, the whole character of the proposed merger is undergoing a subtle change as compromise and accommodation occur. How far the process has gone is difficult to know. Informed sources say every cabinet officer had some objection to the original version of the reorganization study. It is said that Secretaries Juanita M. Kreps (Commerce) and Patricia R. Harris (Housing and Urban Development) wrote a joint letter of protest to McIntyre. It could be that the "agency within an agency" approach has progressed so far that State and local officials will see little change in the number of different doorbells they have to ring even after reorganization.

About Face!

Last year when DCPA chief Bardyl Tirana was asked in congressional hearings whether he could use additional money in the civil defense program his stock answer was that he wouldn't know what to do with it if he got it. This year, when Congressman Don Mitchell (R-NY) asked if he could put \$137 million to good use rather than the \$96 million in the Carter budget, Tirana agreed that he could. "You mean the extra money wouldn't be wasted?" demanded subcommittee chairman Lucien Nedzi (D-Ohio). "No," said Bardyl. The \$137 million, of course, is the budget figure approved by Secretary Brown for fiscal year 1980 and the figure proposed by Mitchell (and endorsed by the House Armed Services Committee) for fiscal year 1979. □

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


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Is Congress to blame for making hostages of Americans? Are the people? "No!" says Steuart L. Pittman emphatically—"Executive Branch indecision has accounted for the national doldrums on this subject." And this prominent Washington attorney sheds some new light on responsibility in Washington for indecision in remarks which he made at the Federal Preparedness Agency symposium on Civil Emergency Preparedness, National Security and Strategic Deterrence, January 19, 1978. They are reprinted here with FPA permission.

CIVIL DEFENSE AND CONGRESSIONAL

A combination of circumstances brings to the surface at this time the issue of whether the United States should become serious about developing a civil defense capability which would have value in a nuclear crisis or in a nuclear war. Within the next few months the Executive Branch and Congress will attempt to make a decision, and the opinion makers of the media and elsewhere outside of Government will participate as in the past.

There is a key element in this process which is generally overlooked and deserves comment. Since 1961 when President Kennedy briefly stirred the nation on civil defense, policy makers and opinion makers have shared the belief that this difficult issue can be reasonably avoided on the grounds that the Congress, reflecting public attitudes, will not accept any significant civil defense oriented towards nuclear war. A close reading of the evidence suggests the opposite, namely that Executive Branch indecision has accounted for the national doldrums on this subject and that Congress and the public are prepared to follow firm leadership from the Executive Branch if the proposal is moderate and the need is clearly presented.

The evidence of public attitudes has been extensively researched and documented, recently and over the last 15 years. The work of Jiri Nehnevajsa of the University of Pittsburg is especially pointed and is supported by many other studies generally establishing that the public assumes more costly and effective civil defense efforts by the Government than in fact exist and approves of such measures. The experience of public involvement in the surveying and marking of privately-owned buildings and making available storage space in those buildings for shelter supplies is the clearest kind of evidence that there is little if any resistance to Government demands for modest private cooperation with civil defense efforts.

"... impatience . . . a willingness to support . . ."

A House Armed Services Subcommittee last year held hearings at which the Subcommittee evidenced impatience with Executive Branch indecision on civil defense and indicating a willingness to support at least a 40 percent increase in the civil defense budget. All of this reaffirms a state of affairs which should have been clear from a reading of the relevant history of civil defense in the United States. Because those who think professionally about what is good for the public, both in and out of Government, tend to view the history of past policy formulation as only marginally relevant and somewhat boring, it is sometimes worth a brief pause in our search for a better future to consider what can be learned from the past. I believe we can learn that our national failure to complete even the most obvious and noncontroversial civil defense measures has not been, and will not be, due to Congressional or public resistance but rather to Executive Branch indecision.



Steuart L. Pittman was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson from 1961 to 1974, a period during which the priority for civil defense had a volatile history, which provides important insight for the decisions faced by the Carter Administration today.

Steuart L. Pittman

ACCEPTANCE

Nearly half of the last decade has been taken up with high level civil defense studies. They have served mainly to keep program operators in suspense, even in the effective use of the limited resources available to them, and so far have produced no decisions. But let's go back to the last decade to the sharp rise and fall of the civil defense priority in the early 60's, because it illustrates more sharply the thesis that the Executive Branch, not Congress and not the public, is the stumbling block to developing and implementing an adequate civil defense program. The Kennedy Administration, and the President personally, made a significant commitment to an accelerating but moderate civil defense effort two months before the July, 1961, Berlin crisis. It was a rather uncomplicated decision involving, I believe, President Kennedy's personal disposition to seek citizen involvement in achieving national objectives. It was reasonably clear at that time, as now, that practical and moderate measures were available to reduce significantly the damage of nuclear attack, particularly death and sickness from fallout radiation and damage from the blast and heat at the fringes of nuclear bursts. It was discovered that the configuration of existing buildings provided a good start in this direction and clearly reduced the theoretical cost of providing places for the population to take shelter against these lesser weapons effects. This much drew support even from those committed to the hostage theory of peace (the doctrine of Mutual Assured Vulnerability), because of its prudential nature. For them it was possible to disclaim the deterrent potential of civil defense which deeply troubled President Kennedy's key advisors.

"The Kennedy Administration's Schizophrenia . . ."

President Kennedy's strong civil defense speech in May of 1961 emphasized fallout protection and an es-

Question to Steuart L. Pittman based on revelations in "Civil Defense and Congressional Acceptance": The situation you describe appears to be a Gordian knot in that we are faced today with the same insurmountable difficulties which defeated your search for a solution in 1961-4. What can we do about it? What is a *solution*?

Answer by Mr. Pittman: The Gordian knot can be cut—we can overcome our national indecision—if we take practical realistic first steps. If a billion-dollar-a-year program is the issue, and some are convinced it is a minimum necessity, nothing is likely to happen soon. If, however, we work on doubling the present budget for next year we will be recommending something that the Administration can fit into its priorities.

I participated last fall in a study initiated by the Secretary of Defense which addressed this problem in three 2-day sessions. Participants included Leon Gouré, Jiri Nehnevasja, Jerry Strope, Paul Nitze, Eugene P. Wigner, Don Brennan, Bardyl Tirana and other recognized civil defense proponents and opponents. The consensus was that a flexible and relatively effective (albeit imperfect) civil defense program could be had in about five years for about \$200,000,000 a year, which would give the President two options to be employed in a crisis as alternatives or in combination in different geographic areas:

1. Within a few hours, shelter most of the population in the best available protection against fringe blast and heat; and
2. Within several days, relocate those in target areas to moderately protected smaller towns and rural areas.

Those who insist on a billion-dollar a year program today are not going to get it, even though the Soviets are spending that much. If we are not to be still floundering around in a nickel-and-dime operation in 1985, proponents of civil defense should get behind the moderate but relatively effective \$200 million program which is up for decision today.

calating program. This led to a Presidential decision in November of 1961 to provide at least fallout protection, including not only low-cost surveying of shelter in existing buildings but also subsidizing new construction to stimulate the creation of more shelter space, particularly in areas outside the cities, to create enough shelter for the entire daytime and nighttime populations within five years. The program required annual authorization of funds from the Armed Services Committees.



In 1961 Stuart Pittman (left) meets with leading American Architects to begin judging in the National School Fallout Shelter Competition.

The Kennedy Administration's schizophrenia over civil defense was quite evident at the Hyannis Port meeting in November 1961 at which the major decision was taken to shelter the entire population. The recommendation, made in Secretary MacNamara's name, was opposed by Jerome Weisner, the President's Science Advisor, on the grounds that fallout shelters would be obsolete within five years, was opposed by the Attorney General, who appeared in a red shirt, wet from a touch football game in the rain, in the middle of the discussion and advised that the program should wait until the country was organized for civil defense at the grass roots level, was opposed by Ted Sorensen on the grounds of the program's potential for provocation and belligerence, and Secretary MacNamara said that, despite the recommendation, he would prefer to stop at surveying existing shelter space. An excerpt from the President's May civil defense speech promising accelerating civil defense efforts was read to the President, and he settled matters with the remark that he could do no less than the recommended program.

It is not surprising then that the priority started dropping sharply almost immediately after the decision was made. Most of the President's close advisors felt that his prestige had been overexpended and were actively at work, with the cooperation of the Secretary of Defense, to lower the Federal profile on civil defense. My impression was that the President himself was uncertain, at one point expressing the view that civil defense progress must await a crisis atmosphere. He personally raised the issue during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (in the context of evacuating Florida coastal cities), and several days after the crisis was resolved he personally approved a step-up in the shelter program. The declining priority resumed shortly after the Cuban missile crisis and bottomed out in the summer of 1963 with the efforts of peace groups to take Baltimore and Portland out of the national program

and with the announcement of Congressman Hebert that his House Armed Services Subcommittee would hold hearings in a negative atmosphere to dispose finally of the nagging civil defense question.

"Congress . . . demonstrated its willingness . . ."

I come now to the part of this story which is particularly important to my thesis that the Executive Branch and not Congress is the source of Federal uncertainty about civil defense. I refer to the efforts to obtain the several hundred million dollars of the funding authorization for the first year of the announced five-year program to shelter the entire population. Congress had already demonstrated its willingness to accept the high priority for civil defense which the Administration briefly established in late 1961 by passing a supplemental appropriation exceeding \$200 million, about four times the level of annual funding of civil defense in preceding years. But the drop in priority in early 1962 was sensed by Congress as evidenced by two developments. Chairman Carl Vinson decided not to hold hearings on the authorization for the first year of funding the new shelter program on the grounds that the country was not ready. Albert Thomas, then Chairman of the Independent Offices Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, resumed his one-man crusade to stop the civil defense nonsense and was able to cut funds even for the shelter survey, stocking and marking program, started a half a year earlier with the supplemental appropriation.

Against this background, a budget meeting was held at the end of 1962, attended by the President, the Secretary of Defense and the President's Science Advisor, among others. Jerry Weisner came prepared to shoot down the item for several million dollars for the first year of the planned five years of shelter construction (additional to funds for using existing shelter space). Secretary MacNamara quoted Congressman Vinson as assuring him that there would be no hear-

ings on the necessary authorization legislation. The President reportedly remarked that this avoided any need for a budget decision. So the shelter construction item survived in the budget.

Efforts to change Congressman Vinson's mind about hearings were aided by Congressman Hebert's nose for publicity. He developed a relish for holding a hearing to expose the folly of civil defense, which led to his Subcommittee's report announcing the hearings and their negative purpose.

These hearings extended for three months in the summer of 1963 and were an extraordinary experience. The Subcommittee heard over 100 distinguished witnesses on both sides of the issue from in and out of government, including military, scientists, professors, clerics and industry. Attendance and interest by committee members was unusually high throughout. At the end of the three months, the Committee reported out the bill authorizing \$190 million for the program's first year. The report emphasized the reversal of attitude within the Subcommittee and the need for Congress to take the initiative from an uncertain Administration. The full House overwhelmingly voted the authorization at a time when the media was depicting civil defense as heading for the doldrums.

In late 1963 and early 1964 the proposition was presented more concisely and more effectively to Senator Jackson's Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. A majority of the Committee appeared positive, but Senator Jackson said he would defer action (on the grounds that Secretary MacNamara had associated civil defense and ABM decisions) unless he had a clear signal from President Johnson that the Administration wanted the program. I promised that this would happen before the scheduled markup session of his Subcommittee.

No clear signal

I asked Secretary MacNamara to send a short memorandum to the President urging him to sign an attached note to Senator Jackson. The memorandum went to the White House, but I was unable to determine what had happened to it for several crucial days. At the Subcommittee meeting at which Senator Jackson intended to defer the matter, I was allowed 15 minutes to report on the President's position. My

telephone calls to Mac Bundy the night before and outside the hearing room established that there was doubt about whether Secretary MacNamara really meant what he had asked the President to do. In response to my last call from outside the hearing room, Bundy said he would talk to MacNamara and call back. There was no call. I appeared empty-handed and Senator Jackson deferred action as he said he would. On returning to my office, I was given the explanation that the President appreciated the effort but that there was not enough time to resolve the matter. I was back at my law practice two weeks later.

I have gone into detail to make it abundantly clear that the decision reversing the Administration's public commitment to a complete fallout protection shelter system was made by the Executive Branch and not by the Congress and that it was done in the face of an apparent willingness of Congress to join the commitment by funding the first year of a five-year program.

The Carter Administration is now in the process of making another civil defense decision at a high level. The U.S.-Soviet nuclear equation is different and relative vulnerability is different from the 60's. The case for civil defense seems to me to be more compelling on the merits than 15 years ago—because of the new imbalance in vulnerability of the U.S. and USSR, because of the importance of population control in a nuclear crisis and because it is criminally negligent to avoid relatively low-cost measures capable of saving 20 to 40 million lives regardless of how much damage the nation may sustain from a nuclear war.

When the decision reaches the level of those responsible for the political and Congressional implications, it would indeed be tragic if that decision were to be colored by doubts about the willingness of Congress and the public to accept what the Administration decides is necessary and sensible. The myth is very much alive that the experience of the 60's demonstrates that Congress and the public resist civil defense. A little research will show quite the opposite, and it is important that this conclusion be available when the Federal civil defense decision is in the making. □

“... Such concepts as mutual assured destruction have no credibility in Soviet eyes. How can a nation, the Soviets say, conceive of engaging in a war in the belief that it will result in its own destruction?”

“Consequently the Russians plan and prepare to fight and survive a nuclear war should one occur or become necessary. The Soviet Civil Defense system is one of the means by which Moscow hopes to accomplish the survival of the USSR, but it is not the only means, and must be viewed in context if its significance is to be understood properly.

“It would really be inaccurate to say that the USSR possesses a war machine; the USSR is a war machine, and in every ministry, enterprise and institution, the interests of the military take priority . . .”

International Defense Review

Excerpts of a statement given by Eugene V. Rostow of the Committee on the Present Danger to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget (1 March 1978):

PRESENT DANGER?

Nothing could be more useful to the nation now than a serious public discussion about the nature of Soviet policy and the problems it poses for us . . .

We believe that prudent and resolute action by this session of the Congress, substantially increasing the Administration's Defense Budget, could mark one of the finest hours in its long and glorious history . . .

But Secretary Brown seems to suggest that we have to do no more now than keep the situation from getting any worse than it is. We emphatically disagree . . .

There is no harmony between the words and the music of the Administration's budget. The Administration's proposals do not meet the implacable arithmetic of the problem. The budget does not meet the Secretary's stated goal of maintaining the status quo. It therefore fails both as a diplomatic signal and as a security measure. It simply isn't enough to restore our deterrent strength, both strategic and conventional. Moreover, it fails the most important test of a Defense Budget: to give us full confidence in our ability to protect our national interests in peace. The Administration's budget proposals would leave the Soviet Union's military effort still growing more rapidly than ours, thus further increasing their lead in many important categories of military strength . . .

The government is in a strange mood, a mood which reminds me of the 'thirties,' when we and the British hesitated between action and inaction until it was too late to prevent World War II . . .

This time we must not wait for a new Pearl Harbor to arouse us. The risks of such a course are too grave to be contemplated. In this situation of incipient crisis, we should follow one of—Parkinson's most perceptive laws—his observation that the success of a policy is measured by catastrophes which do not happen. The budget proposed by the Administration does not meet Parkinson's standard . . .

If the Secretary of Defense is wrong in his assessment of the present situation, we may well face the prospect that the Committee on the Present Danger identified in its 1976 statement: "Our alliances will weaken; our promising rapprochement with China could be reversed. Then we could find ourselves iso-

lated in a hostile world, facing the unremitting pressures of Soviet policy backed by an overwhelming preponderance of power. Our national survival itself would be in peril, and we should face, one after another, bitter choices between war and acquiescence under pressure." . . .

Four fundamental and adverse developments have taken shape since 1972, when the SALT Agreement was signed. The Soviets have made extremely rapid progress in MIRVing their missiles. Since their missiles have more throw weight than ours, this raises the first problem—how many warheads are they deploying per missile? What is the destructive power of each warhead? And what is the accuracy of these warheads, and what will it be in the future?

The second great change since 1972 is that the Soviets have made some of their ICBMs mobile, despite what the Senate was told on that subject when SALT I was ratified. The President has said that the Soviet Union is already deploying mobile ICBMs. The experts agree that it is in a position to deploy them on a large scale and quickly.

Third, recent reports of Soviet progress in anti-satellite satellites—killer satellites—threaten our chief means of intelligence, communications and control. There is no need to underscore the importance of this development.

Fourth, we must note the significance of the Soviet civil defense programs. Even if imperfect, these programs reduce the effectiveness of our deterrents.

These four developments alone—and there are others—transform the problem of strategic deterrence . . .

No President of the United States should ever be put into the position of having to choose between holocaust and the surrender of vital American interests. □

Eugene V. Rostow, executive committee chairman of the Committee on The Present Danger, is Professor of Law at the Yale University Law School. He was formerly Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

More on the PDH "Disgrace" . . .

Beginning some twenty-five years ago Packaged Disaster Hospitals (PDHs) were placed in strategic spots across the United States in order to be available for disaster situations, in particular war emergencies. Medics and CD pros were shocked as they were allowed to deteriorate and then, last year, at the offer to give them away to foreign nations. Now many of them are gone.

Here Dr. Max Klinghoffer, an avid proponent of improved emergency medical care and author of "PDH: A National Disgrace" in the *Journal's* January-February 1978 issue, cites undue hardship caused directly by the removal of PDH units and asks by what right they have been picked up from locations where they could serve our people in time of peril and summarily donated to other countries.

April 4, 1978

Dr. Peter G. Bourne,
Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20500

Sir:

On Friday, March 24, 1978, Central Illinois suffered an unprecedented ice storm. The downed power lines throughout the area resulted in a true disaster. Thousands were without heat, lights, food refrigeration, and basement sump-pumps. Many communities were affected.

The State of Illinois Office of Civil Defense acted early in this crisis, and most commendably, as they always have. However, there were major delays due to lack of certain supplies—chiefly generators, cots, and bedding.

Some months ago a bulletin addressed to the Civil Defense Directors indicated that you had urged the donation of our Packaged Disaster Hospitals to Latin American countries.

If we consider that Illinois had over seventy such hospitals with two generators per hospital, this means we once had almost one-hundred and fifty standby generators which could have provided power for heating plants. A rough estimate would indicate two-hundred additional generators of these types in contiguous states. This total number of generators could have provided heating for many public buildings, such as schools, armories, nursing homes, and hotels in the area, resulting in warm shelter at least for the aged and for infants and children. A recent government bulletin discussed the dangers of hypothermia in the aged. As a result of this giveaway, very few of these units were still available, and it was necessary for the State of Illinois to acquire emergency generators from distant military posts. One estimate showed fewer than fifteen Packaged Disaster Hospitals still intact in Illinois.

Meanwhile, the citizenry of Central Illinois suffered.

I must ask you by what legal precept or on what moral premise you saw fit to give away to foreign countries that equipment which may be desperately needed by our own citizens? Further: if Central Illinois was virtually paralyzed by an ice storm, how could this nation or any segment of this nation withstand an act of war? I believe we are not in a position to give away our emergency supplies.

I believe, rather, we are in a desperate situation which demands that we quickly acquire more emergency supplies, standby emergency hospitals, and resume training our citizenry in basic emergency medical care.

Sincerely,



Max Klinghoffer, M.D.
Elmhurst, Illinois

SPOTLIGHT

General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in a unique position to assess defense components. Writing on "The Strategic Nuclear Balance" in *Commanders Digest* for March 9th, he says:

"The Soviet Union includes civil defense as an integral part of its overall military strategy. Their rationale asserts that credible civil defense contributes to deterrence, strategic stability, and the ability of the state to survive. Civil defense in the U.S.S.R. is a military controlled nationwide program focused primarily on protection of people (the leadership, essential personnel, and the general population, in that order); continuity of economic activity in wartime; and recovery from the effects of a nuclear attack. While it is not a crash effort, the pace of the program has substantially increased since the late 1960s. The principal achievement has been the construction of blast shelters designed to protect all levels of leadership and essential personnel in a labor force. Industrial protection has concentrated on construction of these blast shelters and implemented selected machinery protection measures at a wide variety of industrial facilities. It is estimated that hardened shelters currently exist for a minimum of 10-20 percent of the general urban population. There is little doubt about the extensive nature of the Soviet civil defense system.

"United States concern for the Soviet program is based on the actual and perceptual role of civil defense in strategic stability and deterrence. Should the Soviets believe their civil defense program makes nuclear war a reasonable option, then the strategic nuclear balance and deterrence could be upset.

"U.S. Policy has tended to rely on mutual vulnerability as the key to deterrence. U.S. civil defense has been accorded a low priority and does not maintain an effective capability. A reassessment of this view is required, along with an examination of what a larger program could and could not accomplish.

"U.S. civil defense programs currently seek to develop the capability to relocate citizens from potential target areas and metropolitan areas to areas of lower risk. Civil defense programs also seek to provide fallout protection for people near places of work or residence.

"In the broadest sense, a strong and effective civil defense program would complement and support a U.S. military effort in nuclear war by enhancing the

survivability of the population and the industrial capacity of the United States, upon which the Nation's defense effort depends."

With a network of over 100 round-the-clock weather radio stations spread across the country the art of severe weather warning has during the past year taken a giant stride forward.

A service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) the "NOAA Weather Radio" also provides continuous routine weather information and is meant to give any other type of warning that may be appropriate, including that of nuclear attack.

Special radio receivers ranging in price from less than \$40 to over \$300 are now on the market. (See Scientific Radio Systems Inc. ad, page 5.)

A total of over 300 transmitters are anticipated for 1979, each with a range of 40 miles. These are planned to serve population centers and environs.

International Defense Review reports that the new Soviet SS-20 has now been deployed in limited numbers (less than 20) "to the east of the Soviet Union, covering China." Deployment is also expected to cover the west and a total force of 300-400 is anticipated.

The "1st International Conference in Israel on Mass Casualty Management" will take place in Safad, Israel September 17-20, 1978. Sponsored by the World Association for Medical Law and put on by The Society for Medicine and Law in Israel, the conference will focus on the saving of lives through "new technologies in transportation and emergency medical care of mass casualties."

The conference is also backed by the Israeli Ministries of Health and Interior plus eight leading Israeli institutions. Members of its International Advisory Board come from seven foreign countries, including three medical doctors from the United States.

The official conference language will be English. (Further information may be obtained from: Secretariat, 1st International Conference in Israel on Mass Casualty Management, P.O. Box 16271, Tel Aviv, Israel.)

From England *The Journal of The Institute of Civil Defense* cites an "international trend" to exploit underground space.

"In fact," it points out in its January-March 1978 issue, "when contemplating a new project, the Swedes approach it with the question—why not put it underground? Thus, it is not surprising to find all-weather rail and highway arteries, power plants, factories, a wide variety of stored items, and countless other items and activities, located underground in Sweden. In Stockholm, four huge Civil Defense shelters which function quite well in normal times as car parks, have been constructed.

"In the Soviet Union, in some towns, storage areas, garages, car parks and all means of communication are found underground.

"In Tokyo, faced with skyrocketing land costs, and also limitations on building heights because of the threat of earthquakes, many enterprises have gone underground. Shopping centers, streets, restaurants, even a hotel have been built underground. One major advantage of controlled environment space is the clean air. New designs and methods in the architecture and lighting set up can also result in very tasteful and comfortable surroundings.

"In Canada, Montreal's huge underground Place Ville-Marie shopping complex underlies several blocks of the city. Here "shirt-sleeves" weather prevails throughout the year. Shops of every variety can be reached with the greatest ease and comfort on a single level in a clean, bright environment, undisturbed by traffic, foul air and noise."

The scale of Soviet satellite experiments points to the likelihood of a "space factory" according to *The Christian Science Monitor*, "Commenting on the new opportunities flowing from the Salyut program," says a London report, "Soviet Academician Boris Petrov describes the smelting of metal held in suspension by a magnetic field as very promising. The same applies to production of foam metals, such as steel, that float in water, and unique alloys that do not mix under normal earth-gravity conditions, such as metal and glass."

With the U.S. Spacelab projected for the early 1980s it appears that the Soviets have a three-year jump on us.

For 24 Central Illinois counties Good Friday and Easter this year were days of anguish. (See Dr. Max Klinghoffer's letter to Carter's health advisor on page 11.)

Throughout the area a vicious, persistent ice storm brought down power lines, paralyzed all activity. With electricity gone localities were supposed to be able to turn to packaged disaster hospitals for generators, cots and blankets. But the hospitals were gone too—given away to other countries by the same government that had provided them for citizen protection. How? Why?

It was like a drowning man being given a rope only to find—the other end attached to nothing.

Klinghoffer has a few pertinent questions.


Soggy matches can be one disaster on top of another. Now FIRESTARTER, a special butane lighter designed to strict GSA specifications, outdates the match and provides a safe, reliable, easy and cheap way to produce a flame. Put out by Lifesaver Products of Los Angeles the lighter is waterproof, leakproof and corrosionproof. Slim and 11 inches long it can be stored for years without deterioration.

The U.S. military has purchased over 400,000 Firestarters. Pressures of up to 165psi can be withstood as well as unprotected travel at altitudes up to 100,000 feet. Firestarter is good for over 5,000 5-second "lights" or 9 hours of continuous burning (1½-inch flame). It is also rechargeable.

In addition to obvious disaster applications, Firestarter safety and convenience features make it suitable for everyday use. Its length, for instance, keeps the flame away from fingers and provides enhanced control.

Firestarter retails at \$9.95 (with substantial discounts for bulk purchases). That's only \$0.00199 a light.

(For information contact Lifesaver Products Inc., 6210 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90048—213/936-8296.)



BLIND

L. T. Patterson, a friend in Cincinnati, has advised us that if the *Journal of Civil Defense* wants to be really effective it is time that it picked itself up off the floor, took its gloves off and indulged in some bare-knuckled reporting of the facts as they are.

His counsel comes well-butressed by his own tactics. Patterson publishes a no-holds-barred financial newsletter which explodes with uninhibited comment and prediction relating to the world's money markets.*

We think Frank Williams took a step in that direction when in his exposure of VIP protection coddling ("Let There Be Truth" in the *Journal's* January-February issue) he challenged President Carter to look over the shoulders of his starched advisers. There he would see his American people doomed to decimation in a nuclear attack situation while their money and labors provided ingenious survival means for him and much of his government-military team.

As if spurred by Williams, a month later the New York Times News Service reported on a series of White House rehearsals to perfect helicopter evacuation procedures for President and Mrs. Carter. The President, the news release stated, is keenly interested in the capability of getting him quickly out of Washington and into his Airborne Command Post—one of two specially equipped Boeing 747 planes at Andrews Air Force Base, a 10-minute helicopter ride from the White House.

Certainly such precautions are justified. So are precautions to keep other government and military operations functioning during emergencies. As Williams points out it's only when we look at what is *not* being done to give the taxpayer a little hope for survival that the smoke thickens. While some 200,000 officials and key technicians throughout the country can hole up in special buildings that will shield them well against a nuclear attack environment over 200,000,000 people have been condemned as nuclear fodder—hostages.

Government believes profoundly in protection for government. Government *does not* seem to believe in protection for the people.


If we appear to be redundant we mean to be.

Put it another way: The average investment in the safety of a protected government official is well over \$1,000. The average investment in exploring measures to protect the citizen—the taxpayer—is less than \$10!

In his article "Civil Defense and Congressional Acceptance" (page 6) former National Director of Civil Defense Steuart L. Pittman says "it is criminally negligent to avoid relatively low-cost measures capable of saving 20 to 40 million lives . . ."

Engineer R. T. Kendall in a letter published in the *Journal's* September-October 1977 issue goes a step further and states than any official "who permits our national defenses and its C. D. to become less than overwhelmingly superior not only breaks his oath but gives aid and comfort to the enemy—and such subversion and betrayal is TREASON."

Is it? Why do we permit officialdom to lavish taxpayer dollars on its own protection and to leave the taxpayer himself out in the cold?



FAITH

"Blind faith" affirms our business manager, Carolyn Hayes, from the back room. Carolyn keeps us honest and in focus. "The public," she says, "has an overriding confidence that government will do the right thing based on its ability to gather and analyze all the facts." And as Pittman points out the public assumes that government is actually doing a great deal to protect the citizen—"blind faith" in high gear.

Officials themselves (many of whom are *not* given special protection) are prone to have a "blind faith" that civil defense is doing well here in the best of all worlds. Congressman Don Mitchell of upstate New York a couple of years ago woke up from his "blind faith" lethargy when civil defense experts briefed a civil defense committee he had tried (unsuccessfully) to avoid serving on. Since then Mitchell has rolled up his sleeves and led the fight for people protection. (See Mitchell's article "Go 'Media'—It's Magic" in the March-April issue of the *Journal*.)

Ten years ago when peaceniks were campaigning against the nuclear antiballistic missile system (the only capability of which is to *protect* people and property) the Russians weren't buying any such argument. Russian Premier Alexei N. Kosygin said:

"I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction? At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is cheaper should be developed. Such so-called-theoreticians argue as to the cost of killing a man—\$500,000 or \$100,000. Maybe an anti-missile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives."

Later, however, when the Soviet Union saw that by agreeing to an ABM ban it could strip the U.S. of defensive weapons and discredit civil defense to boot, it modified its public stand. Why not? Putting U.S.

security at "tilt" is part of the game. Correction: it's the game itself. Give the Russians the credit they are due. They're smart.

We need to be smart too. We need more civil defense experts, more civil defense directors—see "Grass Roots Graffiti," page 20—to convince a much bigger slice of leadership that the interests of the United States and world peace will be served better by protecting the American taxpayer as well as the American VIP.

We need someone like Defense Secretary Harold Brown or National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to say that the taxpayer, who provides the loot to protect them and other VIPs, should himself receive a meaningful investment in his own protection. Maybe 50% of the VIP allocation? Or 40? Or 30?

Let's settle for 10%. Properly handled that would do the job.

How are these for facts, Mr. Patterson? Are we off our knees yet?



*The L. T. Patterson Strategy Letter, P.O. Box 37432, Cincinnati, OH 45237.



"And when the bombs start dropping y'all can rejoice in the knowledge that Rosalynn and I are far away and safe."



Letters TO THE EDITOR

Editor: *Journal of Civil Defense*:

Some comments about the Jan/Feb '78 edition—Five years ago, the magazine was known as the SURVIVAL JOURNAL, not the *Journal of Civil Defense*.

In those years, the *Journal* was for survival of the people; now it tends to lean towards protecting civil defense authorities for the bad job they are doing . . .

Frank Williams' article, "Let There Be Truth . . ." said it like it is. He's about the only good person on the Policy Board, along with Dr. Wigner.

The 'Editorial Committee' seems to have lost its sense of direction and perspective about *survival* of the public. It needed public relations specialists to try and put it on track again . . .

Official Washington and the Pentagon are looking out for themselves—as truthfully stated by Frank Williams. If the people ever get out of their lethargy about CD look out! We believe the time is near at hand when the public will demand 'civil defense *now*' as they demanded civil rights.

. . . What do you think?

Rev. T. A. De Mattis
Lakehurst, N.J.

We like your prophecy.—Ed.

EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTERS— NO MONEY FOR FY 1979

"There is no request for EOC funding in the President's FY 1979 budget estimate for civil defense. We had hearings before the House Appropriations Committee on March 17, and before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 21. Nothing transpired in those hearings which offers any hope for a line for EOC funding.

"Although significant decisions seem to be in the works on civil defense, they appear to be too late for the FY 1979 hearings process. Thus, EOC construction in all likelihood will not reenter DCPA's program before FY 1980 at the earliest."

—from a letter by Bardyl R. Tirana, DCPA
Director to Oran K. Henderson,
Harrisburg, PA Civil Defense Director

Report from ACDA

Edward Teller, H-bomb research and development leader and now Senior Research Fellow with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, will be a featured speaker at the ACDA Seminar in October. Eugene Wigner, Nobel Prize winner and top U.S. civil defense authority, will join Teller as a Seminar speaker. Other participants will be announced later.

The date of the ACDA Seminar has been firmed up for Friday, October 27th—a change of one day from the date previously announced. It will be held in Gainesville, Florida at a location to be selected.

ACDA elections, normally held the latter part of June, have been changed this year to coincide with the ACDA Seminar (October 27th) when a greater number of ACDA members will be on hand.

The *ACDA Alert*, ACDA's newsletter publication, fanned out its first issue in February and followed in April with issue No. 2. Issue No. 3 will be published in June. The *Alert* goes to sponsoring ACDA members or by separate subscription at \$8 a year.

At least two ACDA Technical Reports will be issued during 1978 (probably in August and November).

The Disaster Planning Guide Kit—for community use—has experienced growing pains. Further evaluation and revised input mean that it will be available for distribution no later than July 15th. The kits are offered free of charge to sponsoring ACDA members and for a modest fee to others. Prototype materials and consultation services will also be available.

An expanding ACDA membership promises to give civil defense proponents a stronger voice and to promote more effectively the goal of sharply upgrading the national civil defense effort.

Sponsoring and Regular ACDA memberships are now available at \$56 and \$25 respectively (see ACDA announcement on back cover for details).

Apparent with the present growth of ACDA is the need for staff expansion. This situation is currently being reviewed, analyzed and dealt with. Regular ACDA board meetings, previously held on a monthly basis, have been scheduled weekly since the first of the year.

The interest of other organizations in coordinating with and/or affiliating with ACDA has increased dramatically in the past several weeks. To ACDA this means a promise of additional effectiveness in bringing about a public awakening to the need for much-improved protective measures. ACDA welcomes such interest. □

COUNTDOWN

- by Herb Johnson

Civil defense professionals struggling over the years for greater support for preparedness have never been able to convince the powers that be of the closeness of the danger.

Recent railroad accidents, however, have dramatically focused our attention on just how near we live and work to very hazardous materials being transported through our communities each day. Within seconds a sleepy village with a crystal-clean environment can be converted into an unbelievable disaster scene. Our people and leaders seem to be able to focus their attention on such hazards only after they occur. After all, they reason, these materials have been moving through communities for generations.


Once such an accident occurs, however, everyone is up in arms and makes an all-out effort to see that the tragedy will not be repeated.

The fortunate thing about this type of accident is that something *can* be done to reduce the chances of recurrence. Also, fortunately, there are a few dedicated people (fire, police, civil defense, etc.) who are aware of the hazards and who are trained to take action to reduce the loss of life and property when an accident occurs.

But how many stop to consider how close their community is to the unthinkable hazards of a nuclear war? The time frame of such a probability would be about the same as a railroad accident—that is, the response time for protective action. In the time frame of the average commuter's trip to or from work it could be like this:

If an attack were launched against our country at the same time you left for work (in a target area) you would arrive just in time to become part of the radioactive debris in the mushroom cloud. If you were fortunate enough to be headed home at the time the attack was launched you would probably see a blinding flash over your shoulder as you drove up your driveway. What to do next would then be your problem.

Unlike the railroad accident, there will be in the event of nuclear war no second chance to prepare for or reduce the risk of a recurrence. If we are to act responsibly *we must prepare NOW without the lesson of experience* in a way that we have never prepared before.



Herb Johnson

Dr. Edward Teller estimates it would take four years of all-out national commitment to reduce our overall losses by one half and eight years to reduce them to the optimum level. Since no all-out national commitment is even on the horizon, there is no way of knowing if or when we'll be prepared.

Two things deserve serious consideration. Both involve *time*. The first is that, because of the type of construction needed to protect our people and leaders, a goodly amount of *time* is required to build such facilities. That is where the national commitment over an extended period cited by Dr. Teller is important. The second *time* consideration is that, once constructed, such facilities have an inordinately long life span. That boils down to extremely good economy. A new bomber costing millions of dollars may become obsolete before it can be put into full production. A building constructed to civil defense specifications is economical to operate and maintain and will still save lives 30 or more years from now should it be needed. An extremely good investment.

But how much time do we have? The 30 minutes it takes to drive to work or back—or the 30 years it takes to raise a family?

In any case it's obviously time to act. If we can achieve this goal we will end up with long-term protection, peace of mind, even—with a widely developed and vigorous program—a credible deterrent. □

How should civil defense fit into the overall national defense scheme? Corporation attorney Fred M. Ringel (an Air Force reserve officer) sees a balanced posture only with a strong civil defense arm.

SURVIVAL KEY:

TOTAL DEFENSE *

BY

Lt. Col. Fred M. Ringel
United States
Air Force Reserve



Fred M. Ringel

**This article represents the views of the author contained in a research report submitted to fulfill Air War College requirements and does not necessarily reflect the official views of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. Colonel Ringel is not now on active duty.*

"Peace Through Preparedness," the motto of the American Civil Defense Association, implies that strong military power to provide *adequate protection* for this country and its allies will promote peace. Strong civil defense measures to protect the population of the United States and allied countries in the event of a nuclear attack will help achieve peace by sharply reducing the impact of a possible attack.

The military strength of the United States and its allies has thus far discouraged any frontal attack. Our military power and the accompanying theory of assured mutual destruction have, to this date, fortunately, kept at bay any test of our civil defense capabilities.

Still, we have witnessed country after country leaving the free world, becoming communist and allying itself with the Soviet Union and/or Red China. In order to stop this trend and achieve peace without surrender, we need protection on three fronts—(1) a strong military, (2) a strong civil defense, and (3) a strong political posture.

It is disheartening to look at the spread of communism over the past 60 years. Every few years one or more additional countries have become communist. No country in which communism has become firmly established has ever returned. If the trend continues, it is inevitable that the goal of communism will be realized—we will live in a communist world.

Our democratic governments permit people to choose—even to choose communism—but, the totalitarian governments of communist states do not permit a change from communism to another form of government. The swift, strong military responses of Russia and China, for example, to the revolts in Eastern Europe and the invasion of North Korea, appear to foreclose outside help by this nation to the people of communist countries who might wish to change their form of government. The Helsinki Accord to an extent gives formal recognition to this fact.

Tipping The Balance

Furthermore, this nation cannot singlehandedly police and protect the whole world. Washington has recognized this and has tried to shift more of the responsibility to other nations. However, unless our allies act where we cannot or will not, there is a vacuum with no defense against the spread of communism. A country the size of Cuba can tip the balance to communism in Angola.

Any change in this situation must involve political strategy as well as military strategy and forces. Furthermore, a successful change increases the need for strong Civil Defense. We need to adopt goals and pur-

sue them patiently, realizing that in communism we face a patient opponent willing to wait to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves and to fight to retain ground once won.

Our goals should include the following:

1. The strengthening of the free world by encouraging nations to combine in federations. Larger nations are usually stronger politically, economically and militarily and thus more able to contribute to their defense. Furthermore, something more binding than alliances is needed for long-term defense. NATO, for example, has been remarkably durable, but it is showing signs of division. Communist political gains in one country would not be as threatening if the country were only a unit in a larger government. For example, NATO is now seriously threatened by the possibility of a communist government in Italy. If Italy were part of a unified Europe instead of being a sovereign country in its own right, a communist takeover in Italy would not be so serious a threat to the defense of all of Europe. Furthermore, the economic and political advantages of a united Europe would probably introduce a measure of stability and make a communist takeover anywhere less likely.

"We must all hang together or, assuredly we shall all hang separately."

We have worked for this goal of a unified Europe with our support, for example, of the European Common Market. However, more is needed and the goal of union should be pursued in other parts of the world. Benjamin Franklin once said, "We must all hang together or, assuredly we shall all hang separately." This certainly applies to the nations of the free world. They must unite into larger sovereignties or else the trend we have seen indicates that they will individually become communist.

2. We should encourage a more aggressive pursuit of the protection of freedom by nations which share our goals. We cannot actively assist in local crises with the same ease that once prevailed. Therefore, we should strive to find other nations to be ready in advance to act, and we should back them against retaliation from a communist superpower. A regional military police force, in which we supply no

manpower, might be useful in South America and in other parts of the world.

3. We should support research and development to the fullest. Only our research and technology have given us our military security. But research and technology are needed not only with respect to the military but in other areas essential to our national security such as developing alternate sources of energy.

... Perhaps A Few Years, Perhaps A Few Decades of Peace ...

4. We need a strong civil defense. If we were able to achieve the first three goals a strong civil defense would be even more important than it is today. At the present time there is no need for the communist countries to launch an attack against the United States. They can gobble up the free world a country at a time peacefully. If we continue to let this happen we will purchase perhaps a few years, perhaps a few decades of peace. But eventually there will come a time when communism will be in a position to take the last bite and gobble us up too. If we reverse the trend, the communist countries may accept the reversal or it may lead to more desperate measures on their part. A nuclear attack on the United States may appear to be their only alternative to stop political reversal. Such an attack might come by surprise. Furthermore, the drastically overwhelming consequences of a nuclear attack on this country will be so devastating that we cannot afford to await a reversal of political trends to make preparations. A miscalculation by a foreign nuclear power could trigger such an attack. An adequate civil defense program drastically reduces vulnerability and in addition to effective protection is a powerful deterrent. It is a key to "total defense." It cannot be achieved overnight. Full effort should be directed toward attaining this protection within a realistic time frame.

These goals are not inconsistent with detente. And developments in disarmament agreements might require some readjustments.

Working toward these goals can be expensive. We should, however, also think of the cost of *not* pursuing these goals. □

"The contemplation of a nuclear war is so horrible that most Americans believe it could not happen. No one should imply a nuclear attack would be anything less than an all out disaster. It would assuredly prove catastrophic. But the point is there are ways to survive one. The Soviets realize this. The American public does not." . . .

"Simply put, my goal is to guarantee the survival of a nation, its people, and a way of life sacred to us all. We have no such guarantee today. It is time we did."

—U.S. Representative Donald J. Mitchell

REVIEWS

THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, by Samuel Glasstone and Philip Dolan, United States Department of Defense and United States Department of Energy, Third Edition, Washington, D.C., 1977. Available from: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20401. Price: \$7.00.

Reviewed by Herbert A. Sawyer

The government's classic treatise on that most awesome of man-triggered phenomena, nuclear detonation, has just been updated and expanded in coverage—the first such revision since the 1962 publication of the second edition.

Besides many editorial changes to clarify and tighten both narrative and graphic content, at least three types of important new material on the state-of-the-art have been added. Most important, several previously obscure or neglected, but serious, effects of nuclear detonations are treated. Second, the common-knowledge effects have been discussed in greater depth and for much wider ranges of the various conditions of detonation. Finally, some quantitative and even some theoretical material of the old edition has been significantly adjusted, presumably correctly.

With respect to potential for human casualties, the most important newly considered or emphasized effect is: (a) initial neutron radiation, which for thermo-nuclear blasts is more intense, penetrating, and deadly at close ranges than any other radiation (Chapter 8), and which, incidentally, is the primary effect of the currently newsworthy neutron bomb.

Other "new" effects with human biological impact, in roughly descending order of their seriousness and with chapter references, are: (b) Possible deterioration of the protective stratospheric ozone layer from the nitrogen-oxide produced by nuclear blasts, and also its long-term restitution (Chapter 2). The ultra-violet filtering of this layer is vital to the higher forms of land life. (c) The mass fires or firestorms which may accompany intense burning over large areas (Chapter 7). (d) The "secondary" component of the initial gamma radiation, including rays from isomeric decay (Chapter 8). (e) The hastened fall of fine atmospheric radioactive debris caused by rain, with the consequent increase in initial dosage of fallout radiation (Chapter 9) but over a smaller area. (f) Lastly, the production of tritium (heavy hydrogen) and tritiated water, which prior to any human ingestion is almost always so diluted with normal water as to be harmless (Chapter 9).

The other newly considered effects are important because of their threats to human gadgets and material resources: (a) Electromagnetic pulse, "EMP," the instantaneous surge of current, often of burn-out intensity, induced in wires of electrical power systems, radio stations and telephone systems (Chapter 11, added). (b) Transient-radiation effects on electronic equipment, "TREE," the degrading effect of initial radiations on both conductive and in-

ulating materials of electronic equipment (Chapter 8). (c) Lastly, blastwave induced vibration of equipment causing mechanical damage, including a discussion of shock-absorbing mounts (Chapter 6).

Discussion of the effects of nuclear detonations at the extremes in elevation—over 100,000 feet high and deep underground—have been added, largely based on analyses of high tests (Chapters 2, 7) and performance of subsurface tests (Chapter 6) since 1962. The previous edition's treatment of shallow underground bursts, potentially valuable for quick, large-scale excavation of soil or rock, has been enlarged, refined, and illustrated with photos (Chapter 6).


Discussion of the effects from water-surface and underwater blasts, including damage to ships, has been enlarged, and subsurface shock water pressures and surface wave shapes have been quantified (Chapter 6). However, the new edition's general trend toward more sophisticated analysis has a justified exception in a greatly simplified procedure for evaluating upwind fallout radiation from a ground-surface burst.

The long-term hazard from delayed fallout as evidenced by the prevalence of strontium-90 is re-evaluated with conclusions which are rather reassuring provided the frequency of nuclear bursts remains low (Chapter 9, 12).

A revised quantity of practical importance is the thickness of concrete required to decrease neutron radiation dosage by a factor of 100, changed from 20 inches to 24 inches in the new edition (8.68). However, in adjoining Table 8.72 the neutron dose transmission factor for a concrete blockhouse shelter with 24-inch walls is between 0.1 and 0.2. Presumably differing geometrics of shelter material and rays cause the vast divergence in these quantities, and either these differences should have been defined or the quantities should have been omitted. Admittedly, the new edition was not intended to be a complete guide to practical shelter design—the last chapter of the previous edition, "Principles of Protection," has been omitted completely.

The new edition's last chapter, "Biological Effects," has been extensively updated and is recommended reading. One of its new concepts is the distinction between "acute" and "chronic" exposures to radiation, acute being intense and of short duration and chronic being slow and for a long term. The importance of this concept is that a certain dosage, if acute, will have a more severe biological effect than the same dosage if chronic. In the latter case the body has a chance to repair some of the damage done by radiation.

The authors and the Departments of Defense and Energy are to be commended for this conscientious, substantial revision. But I must admit to a sense of frustration deeper than ever over the difference in the completeness of our knowledge of burst effects and the corresponding protective techniques on the one hand, and the almost total void in our implementation of these techniques on the other hand, even though our lives are at stake.



BLAST TEST OF EXPEDIENT SHELTERS IN THE DICE THROW EVENT, by Cresson H. Kearny and Conrad V. Chester, Solar and Special Studies Section, Energy Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 89 pages.

Reviewed by James W. Dalzell

Basically this is the report of the main event of Defense Nuclear Agency's "Dice Throw"—a series of tests designed to further determine the effectiveness of those shelters that were best designed and survived the 1973 "Mixed Company" tests.

All total, 18 expedient shelters—Russian, Chinese, ORNL versions modifications of same and scaled down versions—were subjected to the equivalent of a 1 KT surface burst. The report gives an excellent analysis of the purpose, construction and test results on the various types of shelters and the conclusions with recommendations on their use. Cautionary warning is given the reader against arriving at conclusions concerning the results of these tests with relation to much larger and more destructive weapons with longer-duration blast.

A point of real interest to this reviewer was the discussion and test results on expedient water storage, a subject seldom discussed.

All in all a good technical report, but too complicated for the man in the street—for whom it was not intended. However, the "man in the street" is the one for whom this information should be prepared and if the taxpayer's dollar is to be spent in this manner then perhaps he should be made aware of these results.

After all, it is doubtful, after reading the report, whether an occupant could survive in the 7-PSI zone (total destruction) using the shelters tested with respect to the type of weapons the U.S. would be subjected to.

This report has a limited distribution; however, it can be purchased from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161. The price is \$9.25 per printed copy or \$3.00 for microfiche.

THE DAY OF THE KILLER TORNADO. 27:13 Min. Color. Produced by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. 1978. Available without cost through Army Audiovisual Centers. Order number: DDCP 20-290.

Those who see "The Day of the Killer Tornado" agree on one thing: it's a superb and awesome portrayal of the destructive forces and the anguish found in winds gone wild.

No one walks out on "The Killer." You are captured from scene one to the final second. One viewer's remark pretty well represents the consensus: "More raw action and drama per film foot than a dozen shoot'em-up Westerns combined."

On April 3-4, 1974 over 140 tornadoes truck in 11 states and Canada killing 315 people and destroying property to the tune of \$540 million. A disaster to remember. To analyze. To take a lesson from.

The film does just that. It shows the weather build-up then quickly comes to grips with the storms themselves. Louisville, Cincinnati. Brandenburg. Huntsville, Xenia. You see the approaches, you see the warnings, you see the contact, you see debris in motion, you see the chilling violence as it happens. And you see the aftermath—the shock, the incomprehension, the tragedy. The director "lets it all hang out."

The lesson: when "The Killer" comes again let's heed it better, respect it more, know its potential, take the life-saving precautions. This DCPA film inspires us to do this. When you compare the unpreparedness of XENIA (33 killed) and Brandenburg (31 killed) with the preparedness of Huntsville (none killed) the lesson is crystal clear.

DCPA deserves a "well done." It couldn't have been better.



PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH OR WAR THROUGH

The American Security Council takes the lead in uniting forces to call for realistic bargaining with the Soviet Union in current and upcoming negotiations.

Kevin Kilpatrick

The Department of Defense *Commander's Digest* for March 26, 1978 ("General Purpose Forces: A Balance Appraisal") reflects and substantiates much of the American Security Council's statistics and pessimism. It's opening:

"This year, as in the past few years, the Soviet Union has steadily improved its general purpose forces.

"The Soviets, with their Warsaw Pact Allies, maintain a quantitative advantage over NATO in combat divisions, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, and combat aircraft, and they are modernizing these forces to close the qualitative gap which, in the past, has favored NATO. Elsewhere, Soviet forces pose a credible challenge to United States military forces and interests . . ."

The *Digest* cites specific USSR advances in categories of (1) Ground Forces, (2) Naval Surface Forces, (3) Submarine Forces, (4) Naval Missiles, (5) Tactical Air Forces and (6) Theater Nuclear Forces. In reference to land-based theater nuclear forces it says:

"The current inventory of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is becoming obsolete and requires modernization. Many weapons now available reflect technology of the 1950s and 1960s . . ."

Where peace has been achieved for the United States it has been achieved because defense muscle was at hand to discourage aggression. Example: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Where peace has failed for the United States and the West it has failed because defense muscle was weak and aggression was encouraged. Example: World War II. Tens of thousands of our soldiers were slaughtered.

The fantastic record of 160 years of peace for the two small countries which have achieved it (Sweden and Switzerland) was made possible only by the continuous development and maintenance of defense muscle. Hemmed in by hungry belligerents there was no other way.

We today can ignore this lesson only at the cost of ignoble defeat—"suicide or surrender." Tens of millions of our people are hostages—their lives on the line.

The prestigious and pragmatic American Security Council (ASC) has long viewed with alarm America's compulsion to strip itself of defenses. And it is now launching a new effort in the face of a threatening SALT II debacle: its "Coalition For Peace Through Strength."

"Information already known about the SALT II Treaty," says John M. Fisher, ASC President, "is such that it is clear that the treaty will make it impossible for the U.S. to recover from a decade of unilateral disarmament.

"There are several national coalitions which are promoting unilateral disarmament. For example, The Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy has 40 cooperating organizations working toward reduction of the U.S. defense budget and Senate ratification of SALT II.

"Even though these anti-defense coalitions represent only a minority of Americans, they are succeeding because there are no comparable pro-defense coalitions.

"That is why we are working with other organizations to organize a broadly-based Coalition for Peace Through Strength educational program."

In a colorful red, white and blue brochure the American Security Council lays down the facts to substantiate its position and cites our "incredible" civil defense predicament:

"For over a decade, official Washington has been unilaterally disarming the United States.

"In the past twelve years the United States has deliberately cut back its Air Force from 935 strategic bombers to 415, its Navy from 300 major combat surface ships to 169, has frozen its strategic missile strength at the 1967 level, and scrapped all its missile defenses against both bombers and ICBMs.

"Official Washington took this risk with the hope that the Soviets would follow the U.S. example of restraint and would then enter into verifiable arms limitation agreements.

"The Soviets saw the American withdrawal from the arms race as an opportunity to gain military superiority. So, they have been feverishly building their military strength faster than Nazi Germany did just before World War II.

WEAKNESS

"Although they are now ahead, the Soviets are still outspending the United States 3 to 1 on strategic weapons.

"Yet the United States is still disarming . . .

"Incredibly, official Washington decided not to defend you against missile or bomber attack. Without asking you, it adopted a policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and dismantled our missile defenses against bombers and ICBMs. It no longer has any real civil defense.

"The idea of MAD is that if the American and Russian people are undefended, they serve as hostages against nuclear war because if one side strikes first, the other will retaliate against the attacker's population.

"However, the Soviets don't believe in MAD and have built the world's most extensive anti-aircraft, anti-missile, and civil defense systems.

"U.S. strategic inferiority, combined with the disarmament of our own defenses, means that the U.S. can no longer credibly deter a Soviet first strike. The reason is that if the U.S. were to respond to a Soviet first strike against its strategic forces by attacking Soviet cities, the Soviet retaliation against U.S. cities could wipe out 60% of all Americans. On the other hand, the Soviets would lose no more than 6% of their population because of their defenses."

The American Security Council has over the years led the battle for "Peace Through Strength." Its seminars, publications, polls, testimony and films ("The Price of Peace and Freedom" was the last one—a dramatic and factual documentary that served to alert millions to the fact that peace and freedom did have a price.)

With the birthing "Coalition for Peace Through Strength" movement ASC will feature as prominent parts of its educational programming full-page newspaper ads, seminars and a new TV film documentary.

The ASC brochure lists nine basic principles for the national strategy of Peace Through Strength. The second principle deserves special mention here. It reads:

"Build such a strong combination of antibal-
listic missile defense, bomber defense and civil
defense that at least 94% of the American peo-
ple would survive any nuclear conflict." □

CURRENT BALANCE—Military Statistics, Coalition For Peace Through Strength (Sources: Official U.S. Government Documents)

	US	USSR
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile	1,054	1,450
Sub-Launched Ballistic Missiles	656	1,006
Strategic Heavy and Medium Bombers	415	830
Mobile ICBMs	0	300
Sub-Launched Cruise Missiles	0	324
Air Defense Radars	57	6,500
Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Missile Missiles on Launchers	0	12,064
Fighter Interceptors	324	2,600
Ground Force Divisions	28	170
Tanks	10,000	45-50,000
Armored Personnel Carriers & Fighting Vehicles	22,000	45-55,000
Artillery	5,000	20,000
Heavy Mortars	3,000	7,000
Helicopters	9,000	3,500
Major Surface Combatant Ships	169	233
Submarines	120*	351**

* Includes 41 Ballistic Missile subs

** Includes 91 Ballistic Missile subs but excludes small combatants

There has been much confusion about IBM statistics. "Doves" often make issue of the U.S. MIRV development by pointing out that our missiles now carry several times the numbers of nuclear warheads than those of the Soviets. This is true today. But it also should be pointed out that the U.S. consequently has more *kiloton*-size weapons while the Soviets have more *megaton*-size weapons. The explosive power carried by the Soviet missiles and the area covered by lethal fallout are 4 1/2 times greater than that of U.S. missiles. Soviet missiles cover an impact area double that of U.S. missiles.

For full information on the "Coalition For Peace Through Strength" educational campaign contact:

COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH
Suite 1000
1101 17th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Civil Defense is in bad shape and will continue to be in bad shape because the Director's and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's planning calls for no major improvements in civil defense until at least fiscal year 1980. The Director's and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's actions continue to amaze me. In spite of overwhelming evidence, Congressional requests and public support for a good civil defense program, they continue to study the situations and (quote) "In the meantime, we continue to maintain a modest civil defense program as a prudent hedge against an unlikely, but disastrous event—the failure of deterrence followed by a nuclear war". This is like buying \$2,000 fire insurance on a \$200,000 house in a wooded fire prone area with an arsonist loose.

On April 5th I wrote the following letter to DCPA Director Bardyl Tirana:

GRASS ROOTS GRAFFITI

George T. Glacken

Dear Mr. Tirana:


Everyone is saying what our civil defense needs are and these needs in no way match what you are advocating. Reference to your statement to House Appropriations Committee (March 17, 1978). Everyone, in essence, is saying that your civil defense program is sadly lacking in planning, leadership and guidance. Greg Schneiders of the President's staff in a handout in San Francisco stated, "A more credible civil defense program is needed and we must enhance recognition of emergency preparedness and responsibility as a national priority". The February "Reader's Digest" article, "The Soviet Civil Defense" recommends a program of about one-billion dollars and states, "we have no choice but to get into a civil defense program." Others have called our civil defense a joke. Your fiscal 1979 request of 96.4 million dollars is only about 10 times short of the "Reader's Digest" estimate for building an adequate civil defense program. Your fiscal 1979 request does not even meet the cost of inflation so the downward trend for civil defense continues. But most important, it means there will be no improvement in civil defense before fiscal year 1980.

You keep stating you are waiting for reorganization before doing anything. It is going to be hard for you to advocate any improvements after reorganization. You have not shown the cost of an adequate civil defense program unless you and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown think the present program with-

out provisions for E.O.C.'s, blast shelters, shelter stocking, emergency communication equipment, etc. is adequate. You have given no indication that your present request is other than adequate and in the past even vetoed an offer of a Congressional increase. To get out between this rock and hard spot, again, I recommend you draw up a civil defense program comparable to the Soviets showing the cost and lead time required. Then fulfill your pledge and responsibility by actively working for this civil defense program.

What good is a strong military defense to us if we lose what we are attempting to defend? In case of a nuclear attack and a minimum civil defense program, this could easily be our situation with an estimated loss of one-hundred sixty million American lives or more. When you have made provisions to protect these lives, you will have an adequate civil defense program and be meeting your responsibility as Director of DCPA. Presently, this is not the case.

Respectfully yours,



George T. Glacken
Director, Las Cruces NM Office of
Civil Defense

"Grass Roots Graffiti" will appear each issue as a forum for readers to express their views.

TOO GOOD TO FILE

No matter what our enemies may say and whatever slanderous lies the imperialists may resort to, dredging up the worn-out bugaboo of the "Soviet threat," we are proceeding with a firm tread along the road of further relaxation in international relations, toward the establishment of long-term peace and security for mankind.

Civil Defense of the USSR, pursuing a purely humane goal—the organization of protection for our Soviet people and the national economy against modern weapons—despite the hostile voices of international reaction and as long as aggressive military blocs of imperialism exist, will be strengthened even further in the name of this noble goal.

—General-Colonel Aleksandr T. Altunin,
Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR
(From *Emergency Planning Digest*—Canada)

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has told President Carter that the deployment of a Soviet bomber "has changed the character of the possible threat" from the Soviet Union and that stronger air defenses are needed in the United States . . .

Mr. Brown also urged the President to support an increase in the nation's "small and static civil-defense program." He urged an annual increase of \$50 million a year, at least until 1984, for the civil-defense budget, which now runs at about \$100 million a year.

"As you know," Mr. Brown said, "the Soviets have shown great interest and considerable activity in this field. While I do not believe that the effort significantly enhances the prospects for Soviet society as a whole following any full-scale nuclear exchange, it has obviously had an effect on international perceptions, particularly in contrast to our small and static civil defense program. For that reason alone, I believe at least modest efforts on our part could have a high payoff."

Dispatch by Bernard Weinraub (NYT) in the April 8-9 edition of the *International Herald Tribune* (Paris)

The environmental problems with coal appear to grow with time and increased understanding. The comparatively large amounts of disturbed land, the chemically and biologically active complex molecules present in coal and produced by the burning of it, and the ubiquitous nature of these effects create difficulties at local and national levels. On a global scale potentially the most serious long-range environmental impacts resulting from the large scale burning of coal (or indeed of any fossil fuel) may arise from the effects of the increased concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere . . .

Irresolution about nuclear power, increasingly apparent difficulty with coal, a partial ban against oil and a half-hearted attitude toward energy conservation make an impossible combination; something has to give . . .

. . . If governments and people are so concerned with the risks of future proliferation, how much more should they worry about the huge numbers of nuclear weapons already deployed. One who lives on the edge of an abyss should not squander his effort avoiding small ditches. The real threat of nuclear weapons is seen once again, more clearly than before, in the illuminating perspective provided by the juxtaposition of thousands of existing megatons on the one hand and a few hypothetical kilotons on the other.

—from "Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons and International Stability," by David J. Rose and Richard K. Lester in the April issue of the *Scientific American*

Communist theoreticians have long argued that as the democracies fall further and further behind the communist bloc in military and economic power, they will reach a hopeless point where recovery is impossible. At that moment, the theoreticians prophesy, the democracies will "lash out in their death throes." It is this possibility that Soviet military strategists use to justify the massive advantage in military strength that they are now accumulating—to deter that desperate attack by a foredoomed enemy . . .

The policymakers of this Administration seem determined to fulfill communist prophecy.

Sometime after the end of World War II, Sir Winston Churchill declared: "And so the great democracies triumphed. And so were able to resume the follies that had nearly cost them their lives."

—Philip S. Cox in the March issue of the *Washington Report*

With one exception, the high level of media coverage and numerous debates devoted to the nuclear issue in recent years have not significantly altered the public's clearly favorable general attitude about using nuclear energy. The exception: Among residents near a nuclear plant site, favorable attitudes increased as the possibility of such a plant neared reality.

—from the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

... The intensive programs of civil defense and hardening of command and control posts against nuclear attack undertaken in the Soviet Union in recent years suggest that they take seriously the possibility of nuclear war and believe that, were it to occur, they will be more likely to survive and to recover more rapidly than we ...

To ignore declared Soviet intentions and demonstrated Soviet capabilities in an erroneous conviction that we have "enough" to defend ourselves and that there is always "time" to strengthen ourselves could prove to be fatal shortsightedness. In the nuclear age "enough" may not be enough, and "time" may run out unless our efforts keep pace ...

Weakness invites aggression, strength deters it. Thus, American strength holds the key to our quest for peace and to our survival as a free society in a world friendly to our hopes and ideals ...

We must demonstrate that we are firmly committed to a course of action designed to safeguard our strategic interests ...

The Soviet view is that the best deterrent is the capability to fight and win a nuclear war—and to survive in the process. It is our task to deny them that capability ...

If we face up to the disturbing state of our strategic forces, make use of the potential of our technology and productive capacity, and demonstrate our determination to maintain an adequate deterrent force, the Soviets should, in time, respond positively to our hopes for peace and stability in the world.

—Summaries of Policy Statements, 1976-1977
Committee on The Present Danger

UPCOMING . . .


- Jun 12-15 Region II USCDC Conf., Carlisle, PA
- Jun 18-23 ANS Annual Meeting, San Diego
- Jun 19-21 Region VI USCDC Conf., Livingstone, MT
- Jun 20-23 Region I USCDC Conf., Windsor, CT
- Jul 16-19 Region III USCDC Conf., Atlanta
- Jul 21-23 Region VIII USCDC Conf., Portland, OR
- Sep 11-15 "Security 78"—International Safety Congress, Essen, W. Ger.
- Sep 17-20 1st International Conference in Israel on Mass Casualty Management, Safad, Israel
- Oct 8-13 USCDC Annual Conf., Mobile, AL
- Oct 16-19 Internation Meeting on Nuclear Power Reactor Safety, Brussels
- Oct 27 American Civil Defense Assn. Seminar, Gainesville, FL
- Oct 28 *Journal of Civil Defense* annual Conf., Gainesville, FL
- Nov 12-17 ANS Winter Meeting, Washington, D.C.

NEXT ISSUE —AUGUST 1978

Dr. Edward Teller, now Senior Research Fellow with the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, led the research on the H-bomb almost 30 years ago. Throughout the years Dr. Teller has insisted that a strong civil defense program should be a taproot of American national defense.

"Now, I would like to turn," says Teller in his article, "to the most controversial point which I want to make. In the defense of Europe, shall we be prepared to use atomic weapons? Opinions are strongly divided. In fact, there is almost a unanimous opinion that nuclear weapons should not be used. The question is only *how* not to use them. The Europeans are not particularly anxious to be defended by being destroyed. They are more anxious to respond to an attack on Europe with an all-out attack on Russia, which of course will bring an all-out attack on the United States. Not surprisingly, people in the United States are less than anxious to do that, particularly so because in nuclear weapons, and unfortunately also in civil defense, we are clearly inferior to the Russians."

Dr. Teller proceeds to outline a pragmatic course leading out of the dilemma and the adoption of an arms policy based on the unique qualities of American technology that will best augur for Soviet containment and peace.



We have already granted strategic nuclear superiority to the Soviet Union and SALT II will codify it. Therefore, we no longer have the strategic deterrent to defend NATO . . .

The neutron bomb would have given the Allies and the United States one last hope of being able to deter a Soviet invasion. President Carter has removed that hope.

—Admiral Elmo Zumwalt

MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION

American Civil Defense Association

The primary objective of ACDA is to increase awareness of the potentially disastrous situation that exists on the homefront. The three-pronged awareness effort relies on education, involvement and intensified research activities. Founded almost two decades ago on a "grass roots" policy, the Association is offering a substantial list of benefits in addition to its stated objectives.

ACDA's program of organized support generates in two directions: national and local. A strong program of education and public relations is needed to influence the decision makers and those affected by the decisions.

To carry the message and assist you in your area of activity, ACDA's two-pronged membership offer lines up as follows:

ACDA Annual Membership . . . \$25

Includes:

Journal of Civil Defense
Conference and seminar invitations
Membership Card
Voting privileges
Consulting services

ACDA Annual Sponsoring Membership \$56

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All above plus—
ACDA Newsletter *Alert*
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Technical Bulletins
Disaster Handbook Kit
Speakers Bureau Service

It is only through the involvement of thousands that millions can be reached. Join ACDA and help support organized protective measures for the people of our country. Be proud to say "**COUNT ON ME!**"

For further information or to join the American Civil Defense Association, fill out the application and send it to:

American Civil Defense Association
405 S.E. Eighth Street
Gainesville, Florida 32601

YES! You can count on me!

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
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