


February 1979

Volume XII—No. 1

Journal of Civil Defense

Missouri Initiative
Potomac Fever





Journal of Civil Defense

American Civil Defense Association

Presenting the Views of Industry, Technology,
Emergency Government and Concerned Citizenry

FEBRUARY 1979

VOLUME XII—NUMBER 1

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


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The *Journal of Civil Defense* presents authentic information relating to civil defense—to the survival of free government, the United States and peace in the nuclear age. Its aim is public education in this field and service as a forum.

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
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


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CAPITAL COMMENTARY

by Jerry Strobe



A Disappointing CD Budget

Despite the well-publicized policy decision last September by President Carter to place increased emphasis on civil defense, the Administration's new budget fails to provide the funds to make a start on the minimal program that was recommended to the President by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Rather than the \$140 million programmed by the Defense Department as the initial funding of a seven-year effort built around evacuation of cities during a crisis, the President's budget message proposes about \$110 million. The budget decision represents a victory for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and a defeat for the National Security Council staff and, to some extent, Harold Brown.

The winners, OMB and ACDA, joined forces for quite different motives. The Office of Management and Budget was mainly out to cut the federal budget anywhere it could. In view of the President's policy decision, OMB could hardly recommend a substantial budget cut, so its initial recommendation was \$102 million, which would have just covered the effects of inflation on DCPA's 1979 program level. Thus, if OMB had its way, fiscal year 1980 would have joined 1979 as the lowest civil defense budget in constant dollars since the Federal Civil Defense Act was passed in 1950. In recommending a budget that allowed for no real growth, OMB argued that the Defense Department's funding proposals were grossly inflated; that people could evacuate cities easily in a crisis without all the expense of operational plans and other preparatory measures.

ACDA, on the other hand, would have been perfectly happy to see the civil defense program abandoned completely as a threat to their cherished concept of mutual assured destruction. Not being able to accept the President's policy decision making CD an important element in national security and deterrence, ACDA argued that the money would be wasted because crisis relocation of urban populations wouldn't work even with all that planning and preparing. So, ACDA argued that evacuation couldn't work and OMB argued it could be made to work without really trying. The ensuing internal debate naturally generated a great deal of heat and very little light.

In retrospect, the NSC staff and the Pentagon did themselves and DCPA no good by leaking the story of the Carter policy decision on civil defense to columnists Evans and Novak with the inference that

the decision committed the Administration to a \$2 billion civil defense effort. At a news conference on November 30th last, Jimmy Carter disclaimed any knowledge of the source of the \$2 billion rumor. He added, rather testily, that he hadn't been asked to make any budget decision as yet. As a trial balloon, the leak only generated negative editorials and cartoons in the nation's big-city newspapers and caused the anti-defense community to mobilize. A week after the President's news conference, Admiral Gene La Rocque's Center for Defense Information and Richard Barnett's Institute for Policy Studies sponsored a "Nuclear War Conference" at the Kennedy Center. Representative Les Aspin (D-Wisc) hurried into print an "analysis" of Soviet civil defense that concluded it was a fraud and a hoax and unworthy of any response on the part of the United States. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency spread around advance copies of the summary of their "analysis" of civil defense and Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisc) arranged for hearings as a forum for the views of Paul Warnke, recently-retired ACDA head, Spurgeon Keeny, assistant ACDA director, and Dr. Sidney Drell of Stanford University on January 8th. There was some positive comment and the anti-defense campaign was not without its problems: Bardyl Tirana acquitted himself well at the Nuclear War Conference, with the aid of some ex-military panelists, the Les Aspin "study" got several rebuttals from the intelligence community, and the brief Proxmire hearing was more balanced than intended.

When put in the context of the President's announced intention to hold the anticipated federal deficit to under \$30 billion, a decision to allow a 7 percent real growth in civil defense outlays next year might be considered an encouraging development. But, at most, it shields Jimmy Carter from being accused of renegeing completely on his recent policy decision while delaying for yet another year any real attempt to change the current low level of civil defense preparedness. DCPA's program managers face a cruel dilemma. The increase, after allowance for inflation, will be half eaten up by the satellite communication system recently announced by Tirana and the remainder is not enough to allow the agency to argue its merits before the Congress. In the Senate, the budget request will be heard by Senator John Culver (D-Iowa), the star of the anti-CD Nuclear War Conference. Not altogether a promising outlook. □

Congressman Ike Skelton's district (Missouri's Fourth) with its 150 ICBMs is a prime nuclear target area. The "Skelton Amendment" to the Defense Authorization Bill—now law—provides for a nationwide study of the special defense needs of 10 million people in all prime risk areas in the USA. Skelton doesn't stop here, however. As his article clearly emphasizes, his home preparedness interest extends to all Americans. He says: "Our entire population is virtually defenseless." People are not opposed to civil defense, he contends. They are opposed, however, to a civil defense program that does not work.

UNDER THE NUCLEAR GUN

—Congressman Ike Skelton

President Carter recently announced that, congress agreeing, he would like to increase our nation's Civil Defense's budget. It is an important step to a Civil Defense Program that I believe will require even more attention—a good deal more attention—before it will be truly effective. On the other hand, it bothers me when some commentators say this upgraded Civil Defense plan is being used to help win Senate approval for the SALT agreements. Civil Defense is not a pawn. Civil Defense is the way to save lives in our nuclear age.

Since the President announced his plans to upgrade Civil Defense, I've read with interest the many newspaper editorials written in response to the President's action. Some are opposed to Civil Defense. Although it is good to offer constructive criticism to Civil Defense, I believe much of the negativism is off target.

In light of the questions raised, let's look at the realities:

REALITY ONE: The major powers on earth have nuclear weapons . . . enough weapons to destroy the lives of millions upon millions of people. It would be a different situation entirely if these governments didn't have these terribly awesome powers . . . but they do. People around the world are literally under the gun 24 hours a day because of nuclear weapons. Also, people who live in high risk areas, such as my

District, Missouri's Fourth Congressional District, with its 150 ICBM missiles, are not only constantly under the gun, they are also living on a potential powder keg.

REALITY TWO: In case of an attack against the United States, now and in the near future, our entire population is virtually defenseless. Also, there are ten million Americans living within or near potential prime target or high risk areas. There are very few effective plans for such areas in case of a nuclear attack against the United States.

When you add these two realities, I believe you reach one solution . . . that is take steps to protect ourselves in case the unthinkable happens. That means upgrade civil defense.

For years some circles in our government have subscribed to the mutually assured destruction or M-A-D theory. Briefly, that is the idea that one nuclear power will not attack the other because both are vulnerable and if an attack occurred . . . both would lose too much. That theory is, I believe, open to question because the Soviet Union has a stronger civil defense than we do. According to a recent newspaper editorial in the SCRIPPS-HOWARD Newspapers: "Soviet Policy seems to be to avoid a nuclear war if possible, but to be prepared to win one if necessary."

The CIA says the Russians have been spending over one *billion* dollars a year on civil defense, with 100,000 people working full time in that field. Right now, we are spending less than 100 *million* dollars a year on civil defense. The effectiveness of the Soviet Civil Defense is debatable, but the fact remains that the Soviets are much more active in this area than is our government.

Contrary to popular opinion, it is not impossible to survive a nuclear attack. Despite the wailings of many commentators, the world will be livable if the unthinkable happens . . . if we start planning now.

"It is not impossible to survive a nuclear attack."

Our government is guilty of what I like to call "analytical impotence." We've done little more than discuss the pros and cons of civil defense. We've analyzed ourselves into a position where our civil defense is impotent. We need action and we need it now!!!

I believe it is time to admit that our civil defense is weaker than it should be. We should begin an all-out effort to convince the public, and then convince those in government, that civil defense is extremely critical and must be upgraded in this nuclear age in which we live. I have taken a first step to upgrade our national civil defense by introducing the "Skelton Amendment," which has been signed into law by President Carter.

The purpose of this amendment, which is part of the 1978 Defense Authorization Bill, is to provide for a study of the special civil defense needs of areas in the United States which contain significant

elements of the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Retaliatory Forces.

For instance, Missouri's Fourth Congressional District contains 150 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's). These missiles are situated throughout the district. In some cases, the missiles are actually located in people's backyards, as was pointed out in a 1972 NBC television report.

Fifty areas of the United States collectively contain about ten million people who live in or near potential high risk or prime target areas. These areas include Strategic Air Command Centers, Nuclear Submarine Bases and ICBM sites. It is my opinion that these high-risk areas will be the first to receive a nuclear strike in the event of an attack against the United States. This opinion is shared by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA). As of now, these ten million people are virtually defenseless. It is my understanding that the immediate future holds little hope for truly effective protection in these fifty areas.

This study should be completed in order to—

FIRST: Provide new facts and information about potential prime target areas that are not now available.

SECOND: Learn what information is already available that can be made applicable to the special needs of these ten million people. Available information should be funneled to a program or programs that are concerned with high-risk areas.

"I know for a fact . . ."

The DCPA informs me that much defense preparedness information is already available. However, this does not solve the problem. Information must be gathered with the foreknowledge that it may be used for the special needs of these ten million people. The information must be localized to these special areas. For example, in response to my question about warning systems, the DCPA sent me an answer which looked at the national warning system. One sentence went thusly:

"The local warning points activate outdoor warning sirens and/or contact radio and television sta-



Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO.) meeting with constituents in the Washington Office.

tions to alert the public of an attack or natural disaster."

I know for a fact that several communities in my district do not have warning sirens. I also know for a fact that during the 1972 false alert when all radio and TV stations were given orders to go off the air because a nuclear attack was imminent—none in my district, to my knowledge, went off the air. My point is that DCPA information that is now available deals with general proposals rather than specific, local needs.

Under the Skelton Amendment, no additional fiscal authorization for the study is required. The study is funded from money the Armed Services Committee has authorized DCPA for research and development.

The elements of the amendment are:

1) A determination of what civil defense evacuation and shelter plans and warning systems are now available or are proposed to be available to these areas.

2) An evaluation of the effectiveness of these existing evacuation and shelter plans and warning systems.

3) A determination of the feasibility of establishing more effective evacuation and shelter plans and warning systems for these areas, and a determination of the potential costs and methods of financing.

4) A detailed analysis of the specific effects of a nuclear attack on each of these areas.

5) A determination of the need for educating and the most effective methods of educating the public in these areas on civil defense matters.

Let us look at the human side. The United States recently allocated \$124 million to harden the ICBM silos at the Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

I do not disagree with the need to harden these silos. However, I must raise the following question: If my country can spend more than a tenth of a billion dollars on this project—why cannot it invest more money into protecting the lives of its people? These people did not ask to be subjected to high risk. Their lives and property are in a very special danger. I believe we should study the possibility of providing them with the protection they need.


"Expanding civil defense preparedness . . . our biggest challenge."

I believe the fifty areas of the nation which contain the ten million people do deserve this special study. But a general study of the ways to reduce the dangers to all our people should also be undertaken.

Remember, the Skelton Amendment is not the final solution, but it is a first step. As far as my involvement is concerned, it is only the first of many steps. My next step will come in April after I review the results of my amendment.

Expanding civil defense preparedness in this country is facing an up-hill battle. It currently lacks the necessary public awareness. I believe this is our biggest challenge.

Today Americans are concerned about inflation. They have every right to be concerned about their pocketbooks. However, I don't think people are saying let's do away with government and government services. I think they are saying . . . let's make government more efficient. Let's get rid of the waste. □



Congressman Ike Skelton meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance upon return from the congressional trip to Vietnam and Laos. The delegation, named by House Speaker Tip O'Neill, brought home fifteen American remains from the southeast Asia conflict.

SPOTLIGHT

HOST FOR 1979 ACDA SEMINAR: KANSAS CITY

Unique Underground Complex a Drawing Card

Kansas City will host the 1979 American Civil Defense Association (ACDA) seminar-conference September 28-29. So announced ACDA President R. F. Blodgett on January 10th.


Kansas City is the big Midwestern town that didn't know it couldn't cut through rock and build another metropolis deep underneath its city streets. Not only did it do it. It made it pay off. Its 20,000,000 subterranean square feet house business and industry for less than half the price of surface space. In addition to that there are advantages of climate control, humidity control, quiet, stability (no vibrations), insurance savings, health, safety and shelter from surface disaster.

"We have had the warm assurance of full cooperation from Kansas City Mayor Charles Wheeler, Kansas City Civil Defense Director Major General Frank Spink, Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank Emergency Preparedness Coordinator John Nolan and other Kansas City officials," said Blodgett. "Because of the extensive commercial underground development of Kansas City and its huge shelter potential Kansas City sets a civil defense example for the rest of the country. It's timely and important that ACDA exploit this example. I am now in touch with General Spink and Mr. Nolan in arranging conference details."

Seminar speakers for 1979 will be of the same calibre as those for 1978 (which included Dr. Leon Goure, General John Kirk Singlaub, Dr. Edward Teller and Dr. Eugene P. Wigner).

"We are open to suggestions at this point," said Blodgett. "One recommendation we are following came from several participants at the U.S. Civil Defense Council meeting at Mobile early last October. They wanted the ACDA conference to immediately precede or immediately follow their own. This is being done. The September 28-29 dates come just before the USCDC meeting."

In inviting ACDA to Kansas City Mayor Wheeler said: "On behalf of the citizens of Kansas City, I want to assure you that your meeting will be well received.... We look forward to a favorable decision."



Access road into Kansas City 'subterropolis.' Note office space at right.

GOOD SAMARITAN BILL (FOR SKYWAYS) PENDING

Medical emergencies can happen at the most awkward times and in the most awkward places. One of the unhandiest places is aboard an airliner removed from the emergency medical care that is available to populated areas below.

In such cases the medically-trained passenger is often the key to the emergency. Sometimes, however, the trained passenger refuses or neglects to identify himself because of a fear of a law suit.

"The answer to this situation," says Dick Ferris, president of United Air Lines, "is a Good Samaritan bill that is in the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. The bill would relieve from liability any physician, registered nurse or airline employee who in good faith renders medical emergency care to an injured or ill person aboard an aircraft flying within the United States."

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH NEWSLETTER:

Volume 1, Number 1 of *Insider*, the new Coalition for Peace Through Strength newsletter, appeared in December. It announced that bipartisan Congressional membership in the Coalition had increased to 162. Organizations now members of the Coalition including the American Civil Defense Association—total 82. Membership goals are set at 200 Congressmen and 500 leading American organizations.

GOING TOUGH FOR SOVIET NEWSMEN

Restrictions imposed on American journalists in the Soviet Union are cause for great annoyance. That's a well-known fact. Less well known are the restrictions placed on Soviet journalists in the United States. Around 23 percent of the U.S. is "off limits" to them. Even to travel in "open" areas he needs a State Department permit for which he fills out a questionnaire giving details of his intended trip. On top of that he's not allowed to rent a car.

"The People be Damned"

—Frank Williams

In reporting the birth of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in an August 1978 editorial "Step One, Step Two" the *Journal of Civil Defense* warned that:

"waiting in the wings are teams of spoilers who time and again in the past have arranged for civil defense to fall on its face. If we are not alert to the danger, if we don't take every possible measure to see that clever, resourceful, convincing, determined—even sincere—people do not succeed in campaigns of ridicule, myth, phony logic and public hypnosis civil defense can find itself on the canvas again—for the full count."

Well, for the past few weeks—even months—that sabotage effort has been much in evidence. Based on the quality of the rhetoric, based on the prestige of the outlets, and based on the timing and

alignment of the propaganda salvos it is evident that strategically placed somewhere there is a super-quarterback calling the signals.

Based on logic and fact, however, these clever propagandists strike out.


Example: *The Washington Post* editorial of December 16-17, "No to Civil Defense." It employs the old trick of asking a number of questions in quick succession and giving no answers:

"Where is it exactly that all those Soviet citizens are meant to be trudging to for the several days it is expected to take them to evacuate their cities? What exactly is it that they are going to build to shelter themselves in when they get there? And with what materials? Who will be carrying the food and water and from where—and over what kind of terrain and clogged (with people and vehicles) roads?"

Well done, but deceiving. What *The Washington Post* neatly fails to convey to the reader—should we assume on purpose?—is that there are simple, perfectly good answers to all these questions. Although an admission like that would spoil the ridicule it would be honest. It continues a little later:

"... diggin in ... will always project the image of an enemy preparing to fight a war. Thus, it is likely to alarm and provoke an opponent; and it may also generate a false and dangerous sense of confidence, bordering on arrogance, on the part of those who construct some kind of civil-defense capability."

In other words providing for public safety is a dangerous venture that will lead to belligerence—except, of course, that no such theory must be applied



to VIPs who must be provided with sophisticated shelter regardless of cost.

In Switzerland Milan Bodi, replying to this same editorial—published also in the *International Herald Tribune* (Paris)—says:

"The editorial . . . makes us Europeans wonder just how far the masochism of Americans has gone . . ."

That's about the size of it. Of course, the editorial lets its readers know that civil defense is, in addition to being provocative, also prohibitively expensive and impossible anyway.

(Our cities can empty every day at 5 o'clock, but it is "impossible" to evacuate them in three days.)

What *is* impossible is survival for a nation which refuses to defend itself, which restricts its emphasis to hedonistic and effete pursuits. It's something like an overindulgent fat man headed for a heart attack. He'd rather wallow in gluttony and rationalize his overwhelming risk. He doesn't want to be reminded of his "unthinkable" fate.

So it is today with the USA. The pleasures of prosperity are fabulously heady. The good life and supersophistication on all sides. Materialism has hypnotized us into measuring life by the quality of our booze, bankrolls and bedrooms.

We are fed bite-sized problems to palliate our collective conscience: prayer in school yes or no, rehabilitation of hardened criminals, the rights of minorities (who is *not* a minority member?), human rights, literacy, drugs,—you name it.

But survival? Too big a problem. Call it "unthinkable." Make it a joke.


Not so long ago—it was 1969 as a matter of fact—Ohio Senator Stephen Young led the tirade against civil defense. He claimed that Soviet civil defense (described in detail in the *Journal of Civil Defense* and elsewhere) was nonexistent, a figment of the imagination. And he predicted that by 1975 the civil defense program would be as obsolete as:

"Civil War cannonballs, ladies' bustles, flintlock muskets, and mustache cups."

Since that time Senator Young's heirs have had to bow to the incontrovertible fact that there is indeed a Soviet civil defense (like the proponents of a flat world, there comes a time when the evidence to the contrary overwhelms them).

The current high priest of the "unthinkable" is Congressman Les Aspin. His timely and most impressive December 1978 35-page report (4½ pages of it are listed references) on the evils of civil defense is another rallying point of opposition to it. Unlike *The Washington Post* editorial, Aspin does not accent the *provocative* "danger" of civil defense. Instead (although there is some waffling) he emphasizes the other side of the coin—it's *uselessness*.

At one point (page 11) Aspin assumes a U.S. attack against well-bunkered Soviet leadership. He says: "Even if the leaders were buried so deeply that the crater effects of an explosion would leave them unscathed, the lid to the shelter



Reprinted from *Journal of Civil Defense*; June 1978

would be destroyed or blown off, thereby exposing them to highly intense fallout, prompt radiation from the warhead destroying the lid, or blast effects from possible follow-on weapons."

What we have from these two sources are two complementary and contradicting attacks on civil defense, one claiming that it is provocative and the other that it is useless. It would appear that discerning Administration officials might see that the opposing fantasies demolish each other.

The point missed by both attacks is that a well-developed civil defense does much more than make survival practical: it makes *war* improbable. The better the overall home defense the more this improbability becomes true.

Some media reaction has strongly supported President Carter's civil defense planning. Some of it has been revealing.

Columnist Art Buchwald, whose satire frequently takes the wraps off well-concealed skeletons, put his finger on the problem of the Washington bug-out procedures in case of nuclear crisis and the pecking order of officials depending on helicopter airlift to underground bunkers outside Washington:

"The Carter Administration is giving more and more thought to civil defense," he opens. "One of the things the U.S. government is doing quietly is assigning priority numbers to those people who will have to keep the wheels of government spinning during an emergency. They are to be evacuated out of the capital to mountain hideaways in Maryland."

In other words civil defense *for VIPs* is a matter of great concern. And he asks at the end of his column:

"Does everyone in Washington have an evacuation number to get safely out of town?"

"Of course not," replies his informant. "There's only room in the underground mountain tunnels for a limited number of people such as the Supreme Court, members of congressional committees, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president and vice president, and anyone who buys a table for the next Democratic fundraiser at the Washington Hilton for \$10,000."

Which is a humorous version of what a *Journal* editorial—"Blind Faith"—said last June:

"We need someone like Defense Secretary Harold Brown or National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to say that the taxpayer, who provides the loot to protect them and other VIPs, should himself receive a meaningful investment in his own protection. Maybe 50% of the VIP allocation? Or 40? Or 30? 'Let's settle for 10%. Properly handled that would do the job.'"

Often grass roots America has an uncanny sense for smoking out the trouble in our marble halls. Milt Fischer, South Dakota Association of County Commissioners President framed his concern in a talk entitled "Apathy is a Disaster." He said:

"The last few years we have fallen into serious apathy as far as Emergency and Disaster Service is concerned. The responsibility of correcting this situation is up to all of us."

Penn Gardiner, writing in the *Manchester Union Leader* (New Hampshire) reasoned this way:

"Lenin was certainly right when he predicted that the capitalists in all non-Communist countries would, eagerly and without hesitation, go all out to sell the Soviet Union the very ropes by which these 'useful idiots' would, eventually be hung! But with the proviso that those who today avidly 'cooperate' with the Kremlin will, have their elimination temporarily deferred although their ultimate fate is absolutely certain. . . . [Mr. Aspin, take a bow.]

"When this 'buildup' reaches a point of overwhelming superiority, which it is currently fast approaching, ask yourself, what can our country do other than throw in the towel, particularly as the ground has already been well prepared by the subversion of its politico-intellectual elite?"

Or is there a Jonestown syndrome to what civil defense saboteurs are attempting to achieve? In an editorial "Roots of Jonestown" the *Christian Science Monitor* on December 4th observed:

"We see this malady in part as a trend toward passivity, toward unwitting public acceptance of intensified mental manipulation of individual thought and of society's cultural environment. From many quarters today the individual is bombarded by often unseen influences seeking to shape his attitudes, habits,

emotions, desires. Unaware of the force of such communication, the individual often succumbs to herd instincts and follows these influences with scarcely an effort to resist them."

Are we indeed victims of the "herd instinct?" In shielding us from the "unthinkable" are the peddlers of opiates for the "unthinkable" not nudging us ever closer to a mammoth Jonestown or (which is worse?) a police state?

Is that what America wants? Is Henry Kissinger right when he says (according to Admiral Elmo Zumwalt):

"When . . . both sides know that the United States is inferior, we must have gotten the best deal we can. Americans at that time will not be very happy that I have settled for second, but it will be too late."

And then there's the "Anti-Defense Lobby" complex that the American Security Council reports on in its December *Washington Report*:

"At a time when 79 percent of the American people favors military superiority over the Soviets and 71 percent is in favor of increasing defense spending if necessary to regain military superiority, this anti-defense coalition has been remarkably successful in influencing government policy and actions. . . .

"Some of the groups involved, such as the Communist Party (which does not publicly join these coalitions but is active through its front organizations), are essentially anti-American and pro-communist. These groups may properly be characterized not as doves but as hawks of the other side. . . ."

Those who hold these views want, of course, no protection against modern warfare for the people of the United States. No civil defense. No shelter for the taxpayer, whose money provides shelter for the VIP.

"The people be damned."

Underneath the scab of hedonism Americans don't really want to be fooled. They want basically to be realists. They want no part of any Jonestown philosophy. They want no duplicity in their leadership.

We hope that President Carter realizes we want our president safe and able to function in an attack situation. That's vital. We want other key defense personnel to be in deep bunkers where they can operate in safety for the good of the country.

And we hope Mr. Carter also realizes that these millions of taxpayers who make safety possible for him and 200,000 more VIPs are also deserving of consideration. "The people be damned" doesn't fit the Carter image. His plan to upgrade civil defense must not be scuttled by coverup artists.

That must not happen. That cannot happen. The Federal Emergency Management Agency concept must function as intended for the good of the people and be given the tools that will permit it.

If we ever needed leadership we need it now. It must not falter. □

OVER THE IRON CURTAIN

— Ruby N. Thurmer,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

(Research sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy under contract W-7504-eng-26 with the Union Carbide Corporation.)

A continuing review of the Soviet news media reveals very interesting variances, depending on the audience to which the particular item is directed. Let's look at the attitude taken in regard to civil defense for the Soviets and then at what Radio Moscow says about the same preparations for Chinese and Americans:

FOR INTERNAL PUBLICATION

Moscow *Voyennyye Znaniya* in Russian, No. 5, May 1978, p. 33.¹

"It is appropriate to say that we still meet people who have an incorrect idea about defense possibilities. The significant increase in the devastating force of nuclear weapons compared with conventional means of attack makes some people feel that death is inevitable for all who are in the strike area. However, there is not and can never be a weapon from which there is no defense. With knowledge and the skillful use of contemporary procedures, each person can not only preserve his own life but can also actively work at his enterprise or institution. The only person who suffers is the one who neglects his civil defense studies."

Another subject that is treated very differently is the necessity for maintaining a strong (overall) defense:

FOR INTERNAL PUBLICATION

V. F. Petroskiy, "The Evolution of the 'National Security' Doctrine."⁴

"The United States' loss of its nuclear monopoly and, subsequently, of its superiority in the sphere of strategic arms . . . were important milestones in the process of the 'agonizing reappraisal of values' during which the U.S. political leadership recognized the impracticality of . . . imposing on the world its hegemonic schemes from a position of superior strength. . . . The decisive influence on this process was the change in the balance of forces in the world in favor of socialism and, in particular, the steady growth of the Soviet state's economic, scientific, technical, and military strength."

FOR EXTERNAL PUBLICATION

Radio Moscow in Mandarin to China, Nov. 3, 1978.²

"However, the fact is that China's digging deep tunnels can never protect the Chinese masses from nuclear bombing or even protect them from conventional heavy bombs."

Radio Moscow World Service in English, Nov. 16, 1978.³

"The U.S. Administration is going to launch a 5-year program of civil defense.—The only real safety for the Americans is strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union, not bomb shelters."

FOR EXTERNAL PUBLICATION

Radio Moscow in English to North America, Nov. 27, 1978.⁵

"Several political leaders in Washington claim the American people have no other choice but to increase military spending and to continue creating new weapons. They say that only in this way can Americans guarantee security in face of a so-called growing Soviet menace. However, the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty do not present a threat to the United States or any other country, and what is more they are doing everything they can to reach agreement by equal and joint efforts to avert the real threat to humanity."

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Gilbert J. Leonard, prominent through the past two decades on the American civil defense scene, has often acted as the "conscience of government." Here Leonard, past president of the United States Civil Defense Council, looks at reorganization with an informed, critical, challenging and hopeful eye.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND REORGANIZATION



Gilbert J. Leonard

PROLOGUE

In 1961 President Kennedy split the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) into two parts and thus ended any semblance of a unified federal disaster management apparatus. Sixteen years later more than one hundred emergency management activities were scattered amongst more than a score of federal agencies.

During these years it became obvious that no one person or agency in the federal family was authorized to control the total response of the nation to a widespread emergency or to focalize the entire strength of the federal government upon any single disaster. No emergency preparedness or disaster response agency was located in the Executive Offices of the President nor was the head of any disaster oriented agency directly responsible to him. By 1977 it was painfully clear that a reordering of the federal disaster control apparatus was sorely needed. Local government was keenly aware of that need.

Through their civil defense organizations, State and local governments began a nationwide dialogue with the Congress. Late in 1977, due in part to the increased pressure from local government, the Congress began to turn its attention more fully to the problem. Not only did the Congress agree with local government's request for a reorganization of the federal disaster missions, but congressional champions began to surface. Gradually, many Senators and Representatives became willing to publicly call for corrective action.

President Carter was already aware of local government's objective from many contacts with his staff. A number of persons in high places joined the effort to get a decision from the administration. With actually only a minimum of delay, President Carter

formed the White House Reorganization Project to pull the system together and finally, on June 19, 1978, he sent Reorganization Plan #3 to the Congress. Sixty legislative days later, on September 16, 1978, reorganization began to take shape with the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). All that remains for the reorganization of the federal disaster control apparatus to be complete, at least for a few years, is the appointment of a leadership staff and the transfer, by Executive Order, of all the other missions dedicated to FEMA.

EPILOGUE

Now that the reorganization goal has apparently been reached, is our work ended? Shall local government sit by and trust that the new agency will organize itself into a workable institution which will auto-

"... local government must have a foot in the federal door..."

matically consider local government's needs? I think not, for that is the path to probable disappointment. While the federal agencies bear local government no particular ill will, the federal personnel, if left alone, will always make decisions within the framework of their own experience and their own constraints. The results are usually much more comfortable for the federal employee than they are useful and helpful to local government. If local government really wants its needs and wishes to be favorably considered, then local government must have a foot in the federal door at all times whether it is welcome or not.

It is recognized that the federal government's role in emergency management is to provide leader-

ship, technical assistance and monetary support. It follows that the State's role is to administer the federal programs and funds and to furnish whatever logistical support it can to local government when required. There is no question that local government is the only management force now available which can bring the nation's survival systems into being. Therefore, local government ought to present to the new leadership of FEMA a thoughtful set of policies and programs which are needed to carry out a truly effective disaster protection process and then firmly request that it be adopted or, at least, seriously considered.

Although President Carter apparently approved the concept of a new \$1.1 billion program for Civil Defense for the next five years on September 29th, all of government, federal, state and local, must face the unhappy fact that, contrary to Presidential Executive orders, natural disaster preparedness has been left mainly to the communities. Compounding that federal administrative failure, national leadership in attack preparedness for the nation has deteriorated annually for almost twenty years. There is a lack of federal will toward industry and warehousing dispersal, damage mitigation for equipment and on-site protection for the labor force . . . crisis relocation planning languishes . . . fallout shelter protection for the people has been almost completely abandoned . . . training and education is at a low ebb . . . public information has come to a halt . . . the national warning system is inadequate . . . the national communications system is outmoded . . . the electro-magnetic-pulse threat is a hazard beyond the

“ . . . survival systems to protect the people . . . put aside . . . for many years . . . ”

normal protective capacity of most local governments . . . the federal policy on emergency operating centers is out of touch with the real world and ought to be brought into proper alignment with today's attack planning. In short, serious federal thought of preparing survival systems to protect the people from nature and the bomb has been put aside by the national administrations for many years. Instead, they have favored the discredited theory of Mutual Assured Destruction and deluded themselves with the tooth fairy conviction that the world actually was as they thought the world ought to be. Our federal tendency to think like we dream ought to be put aside.

One must repeat that State and local governments have always seen civil defense from a different perspective than the federal government. Most State and local governments have usually believed in a unified emergency management philosophy. To build on this long established policy, legislation should be requested from the Congress and the States which would recognize the existing emergency preparedness offices in State and local government as extensions of FEMA. In any case,

the federal agency ought to pass on to local government the full authority to manage, or at least coordinate, all FEMA activities now being performed by any of its parts in the communities.

Advisory Councils should be appointed by the headquarters and regional offices of FEMA as soon as is possible. The Councils should be comprised of knowledgeable local emergency management personnel who should be brought in periodically for consultation. They should be listened to very carefully. In this way, local government would never feel left out of the decision making process nor would unworkable or even just unpopular federal decisions be foisted upon local government without it having at least some foreknowledge of it. At the very least, future FEMA decisions would be leavened somewhat by the pragmatic views of local government.

Federal legislation should be prepared immediately to correct the certainty that the advantage local government now has in being a part of the Department of Defense, such as the Contributions and Loan Program (Excess Property), will not be lost. Legislation should also be prepared to broaden the mission of civil defense to include an All-Risk concept in emergency preparedness rather than depend upon the uncertain goodwill of future administrations permitting local government to continue as it always has and as it must.

The federal financial support system needs to be studied from an entirely different perspective using new and more practical guidelines. For instance, it is often forgotten that local government pays 100% of all response costs for the disasters which never receive Presidential approval. These are the disaster events which occur by the thousands throughout the nation every year. Although each one may not kill, and individually might not merit national attention, if added together the cost is staggering. Yet these costs, often far beyond the capability of the community to absorb, have not so far



been included in the general scheme of federal financial support. It is appropriate to repeat again, for the federal ears, that the attack defense of the country is a constitutional requirement on the federal government alone. Thus, attack planning, systems and hardware is properly a 100% federal expense. It is time they started paying for all of it or at least sharing the cost a bit more reasonably by adopting a 75% federal, 25% local financial support mix.

“President Carter has asked . . . ‘Why Not The Best?’”

President Carter has asked the question, “Why Not The Best?”. It is an excellent question. The people of this country have asked that same question many times about disaster preparedness and survival systems because they have always rightfully thought they were entitled to the best. Most of our citizenry believe we should pay whatever is necessary in preparedness funds and effort to make them safe instead of using the yardstick of how little

can we commit and get away with. The taxpayers do not want their money wasted but they are convinced there is enough available to do what is needed if it is managed correctly.

It seems that President Carter has now listened to the message of our intelligence services and has approved a limited program designed to create a partial plan for the relocation of the citizenry from a risk area to a host area. This is very good if it is translated into annual budgets of sufficient size to support the concept. But then local government has heard the siren song before and has worked hard on evacuation and public fallout shelters as national programs only to have succeeding administrations defer and then abandon them. When the federal government is really serious about civil defense, it will eliminate the permissive participation of State and local governments and make the defense of the nation a fully paid for federal responsibility.

Yes, the struggle to accomplish reorganization may have ended but it is not a time to rest or to be satisfied. Local government has a watch dog responsibility to see that reorganization and civil defense work for the American people. □

NUCLEAR PLANT RADIATION— HOW BAD?

To get a feel for millirems, consider the doses absorbed by the human body in everyday life. Cosmic radiation (at sea level) delivers about 29 mrem/year; external terrestrial sources, such as the ground, rocks and building materials made from them, deliver an average of 26 mrem/year; and the radionuclides in the body (particularly potassium 40 in the blood) deliver about 24 mrem/year. The total that the average US citizen receives from all natural sources is about 80 mrem/year.

To this must be added the doses received from man-made sources. By far the biggest contributor is medical equipment, in particular X-ray equipment (X-rays are much like gamma rays, only with a longer wavelength). They give the average citizen a dose of 50 to 100 mrem/year; in fact, a single chest X-ray will give the patient some 50 mrem just in the few seconds during which it is taken. Next on the list are building materials, particularly granite and other rocks rich in radionuclides; houses can give as much as 100 mrem/year. Then there is fallout from nuclear test explosions from 1951 through 1978. . . . The fallout from these tests amounts to some 7 mrems/year.

Only then come nuclear plants? Not yet; luminous watches give their users a few mrem/year if the digits are painted with radium; if they are made of a tritium compound, they deliver 0.5 mrem/year.

Airplane travel exposes passengers to increased radiation due to high-altitude flying of jets, where there is a less dense atmosphere to screen off the cosmic radiation coming in from outer space; they receive about 0.3 mrem/hour (not per year!), so that in the roughly 10 hours of a trip from New York to Los Angeles and back, the passengers receive 3 mrem.

The sum total of all consumer products (including smoke detectors and color television sets) give the US citizen an average dose of 1 mrem/year.

And what happened to nuclear plants? They are not even on the list, because their routine emissions are quite negligible in comparison: The US citizen gets an average of 0.01 mrem/year from them, though 5 mrem/year is allowed (but rarely reached) on the property line of such a plant. Beyond 50 miles from it its effect is for all practical purposes nonexistent in the far stronger natural background. In a single flight from New York to Denver (3.5 hours), a passenger gets as big a dose as the average citizen gets from a nuclear plant in more than 100 years.

Most people are also unaware of the fact that coal-fired power plants release more radioactivity to the environment than nuclear ones. . . .

— from *Access to Energy*, 1 Jan. 1979
(Published by Dr. Petr Beckmann)

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UPCOMING

- Feb. 16-19 SAR Winter Survival Symposium, Ellensburg, WA
- Mar. 11-14 USCDC Mid-Year Conf., Washington DC
- Mar. 12-16 Tunelling '79, London
- Mar. 19-22 DCPA Staff College Industry/Business Emergency Planning, Battle Creek, MI
- Apr. 2-6 International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, Paris
- Apr. 6-9 3rd International Conf. on Disaster Medicine, Monaco
- June 3-6 20th US Symposium on Rock Mechanics, Austin TX
- June 3-8 American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting, Atlanta
- June 15-17 5th Annual Meeting, International Tunelling Assn., Atlanta

- June 18-21 4th Rapid Excavation and Tunnelling Conf., Atlanta
- July 9-13 DCPA Staff College Career Graduate Seminar, Battle Creek, MI
- July 16-19 DCPA Staff College Industry/Business Emergency Planning, Battle Creek, MI
- Sep. 28 American Civil Defense Association Seminar, Kansas City
- Sep. 29 13th Annual *Journal of Civil Defense* Conference, Kansas City
- Sep. 29 18th Annual American Civil Defense Association Business Meeting, Kansas City
- Sep. 30-Oct. 5 USCDC Annual Conference, New York City
- Nov. 11-16 American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, San Francisco

If you can keep an INADEQUATE civil defense program from blooming in Washington there's certainly very little danger of one sneaking in that will serve the country's home defense requirements in an ADEQUATE manner. That appears to be the current strategy of the "noisy and determined" anti-civil defense coterie. Bob Levetown mourns the dark prospects—as well as the questionable concept—of crisis relocation planning.



THE SLOW DEATH OF D-PRIME

The evacuation plan that can't seem to find its way out of the Pentagon

—Robert A. Levetown
Washington Bureau Chief
Journal of Civil Defense

In November of this year, the *New York Times* stated that the President had approved a civil defense evacuation program, sometimes referred to as "D-Prime" by its DCPA sponsors, that could cost as much as a total of \$2 billion by the mid-1980's. The *Times* wrote that the President's decision was "characterized by White House aides as a significant turnabout in American strategic policy." Barely a month later, all bets seemed to be off again. The President, it was reported, had decided against asking Congress this coming year for the funds necessary to implement the plan as scheduled. Civil defense planners are now saying that the plan may still be properly funded, but that it will have to await next year's budget.

The slow death of D-Prime presents a classic case history of what is wrong with our civil defense planning and raises serious doubts whether future initiatives will fare any better.

The plan itself is a timid compromise with what is perceived to be "political reality." From this point of view, the primary virtue of the plan is that it is relatively cheap. Its sponsors can also claim that, under the necessary favorable circumstances, it can save approximately 60 million American lives.

The plan has drawbacks, however, obvious to the most untutored observer. Even if properly funded in fiscal year 1979, it was not officially expected to be "in place" for seven more years. Unofficially, Bardyl Tirana, director of DCPA, was quoted as acknowledging that the plan would be "more viable for use ten to fifteen years from now." At the end of this long planning interval, the D-Prime program would

proximately 10 million evacuated "key-workers" would voluntarily continue to commute to their work locations in high risk areas and yet no provision is to be made for blast shelters for these persons. Finally, within these extended time frames, many experts agree that the Soviets will have constructed blast shelters for the vast majority of their population and an American evacuation option will be completely obsolete.

Aside from the inherent deficiencies of this unambitious program, D-Prime appears to be dying on the vine because it lacks a substantial base of official support in Washington. Its ostensible sponsor is Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. As long ago as February, 1978, Secretary Brown had written approvingly of an evacuation plan in his Annual Report. He stated:

The key to achieving our primary objective (saving lives in the event of a nuclear attack) is to develop the capability for relocating our people from potential target areas and metropolitan areas to areas of lower risk.

The level of Secretary Brown's commitment to the evacuation concept may have been suggested by the fact that his entire discussion of civil defense occu-

"... this program was intended to benefit the center city residents and the disadvantaged."

"... An American evacuation option will be completely obsolete."

still not provide emergency food stockpiles to support the evacuated populations and it would not have involved the general citizenry in any practice exercises. Further, the plan contemplates that ap-

pied only one page of his 375-page report on the Nation's defenses. More recently, he has been said to be "ambivalent" about an evacuation strategy. On the other hand, D-Prime's bureaucratic adversaries at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and at the State Department have been zealous in their opposition to the program.

The evacuation plan also lacks significant political support. The D-Prime proposal publicly surfaced at a time when the traditional Democratic constituencies were engaged in a bitter "guns v. butter"

dispute with the President over the budget. The \$2 billion reportedly earmarked for the seven-year program became a bone in the throat for those pressing for continually increasing social expenditures. Nobody bothered to point out that, in its own way, this program was intended to benefit the center city residents and the disadvantaged: in a nuclear crisis, they, not the affluent suburbanites, would be most likely to be trapped in high risk areas without transportation; they would be least likely to have second homes to hole up in until the crisis was past; and they would probably not have sufficient ready cash or food supplies on hand to tide them over an extended period without planned government assistance. A study prepared for DCPA had pointed out that any "spontaneous evacuation is more likely to characterize the more well-to-do segments of our society" but this insight, and its implications for the politics of poverty, never became part of the public debate.

Finally, D-Prime has been the victim of an intemperate, know-nothing media campaign against civil defense in general and the evacuation plan in particular. The *New York Times* led the chorus with an editorial entitled "Mr. Carter's Fallout Biscuits." The *Washington Post* chimed in with an editorial of its own captioned "No To Civil Defense." Critics claimed the President was being "bamboozled." The plan itself was characterized as an impractical "doomsday plan." Time and again the newspapers attributed to anonymous government officials the thought that D-Prime was intended only as a sop to be thrown to "conservatives" in the Senate to induce

them to approve the SALT II treaty. In the end, Administration aides admitted that the "strong press reaction" might have had a role in influencing the President's final decision to cut the proposed level of funding.

"How can we obtain the protection of shelters without building shelters?"

The President, now said to be consumed with "doubt about which path, if any, to take to protect the population against nuclear attack," will ask Congress for only enough money basically to continue the present modest level of paper planning and to "analyze" the problem further. The problem to be sure is very difficult: how can we provide our population with roughly the same protection the Russians provide their citizens against a nuclear attack when they spend \$2 billion a year on this effort and we are unwilling to spend the same amount over seven years? How can we obtain the protection of shelters without building shelters? And, most perplexing of all, how can a media-sensitive Administration, which has been irresolute on many occasions when confronted with strong opposition, ever supply the leadership necessary to face down the noisy and determined anti-civil defense lobby? Perhaps the studies the President will ask Congress to finance will answer these questions. However, the odds are that they will not. □

General Haig to "Retire"

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., on January 5th announced his resignation from military service as of June 30th.

Speculation is that the highly respected Haig may run for President in 1980. (Haig was President Nixon's Chief of Staff during the last months of the Nixon presidency.)

Haig's stand on defense is "strong." Writing in the August 1978 issue of the *NATO Review* (Brussels) he observed:

"Many factors will test NATO's ability to assure the security of the West into the next century, but one will dwarf all others in its implications—modern Soviet military power. Developed out of all proportion to other sectors of the Soviet economy, Soviet military power today poses the fundamental challenge to the security of the West. . . .

"Moreover, if the quantitative improvements are unambiguous, so too are the implications for

Western security. The West can no longer assume that its qualitatively superior equipment compensates for increasing quantitative disparities between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Continuing investments have so matured the Soviet military industrial base that the new third and fourth generation Soviet systems now appearing are generally comparable, and in some respects superior, to Western equipment. . . .

"It would be comforting to report that the growing Soviet military challenge evoked instant recognition at the highest political levels of our Alliance. Unfortunately, it did not. Instead, recognition of the Soviet military challenge began with the NATO military authorities. Alerted by the warnings of senior military officials, some Congressional leaders within the United States, especially Senators Nunn and Bartlett, provided legislative backing for military needs while a broader political consensus was developing. . . ."

Packaged Disaster Hospitals—should we continue to donate them to Pan American countries or should we maintain them for disaster-response use within the United States? PDH proponent Dr. Max Klinghoffer says: "We need ALL the PDH's we have, and much more . . ." Michael Walton, Program Director for the Pan American Development Foundation disagrees, and here he rebuts Dr. Klinghoffer.



PDH coils in advanced state of deterioration.

PDH's – OUR DISGRACE OR OUR PRIDE?

—Michael M. Walton

"A valuable resource" some call them. "Isn't something better than nothing?" others ask. Such seems to be the attitude of Dr. Max Klinghoffer in his article "PDH—a national disgrace" (*Journal of Civil Defense*, Jan.-Feb. 1978), in which he cites the Pan American Development Foundation and the DCPA circular no. 77-8 (October 14, 1977).

With most of what he says in his article the Foundation, and probably the DCPA, would have no argument. Their collaboration is based on a point he slides over early in his article which they prefer to emphasize: "these combined programs [Packaged Disaster Hospitals, Hospital Reserve Disaster Inventories, and Medical Self-Help] needed constant updating and further training." It is for this reason, and apparently for this reason alone, that the federal government relinquished control of the DPH's to the states and they, in eighty cases so far, to the Foundation.

In 1972 Congress hesitated to appropriate the seven to nine million dollars necessary to refurbish the PDH's, most of which were assembled in the 1950's. A team of investigators sent to inspect the PDH's reported:

Of the 2,116 prepositioned disaster hospitals, approximately 1,380 had been allowed to deteriorate to the point of uselessness as hospitals . . . Rubber goods had completely deteriorated, medical instruments such as surgical knives, hypodermic needles and other medical equipment were rusted beyond use . . .

Congress confronted this, a replacement cost for

the PDH's between \$60 million (HEW estimate) and \$200 million (AID estimate), and a list of "ifs":

- If these medical stockpiles are kept up to date,
- if they escape nuclear blast and firestorm damage,
- if transportation facilities remain intact,
- if the roads remain open,
- if manpower is available to distribute the supplies in an organized manner...

Congress made no authorization. (For more information, see Richard L. Rashke in the *National Catholic Reporter* of May 9, 1975 and Leonard B. Greentree, M.D. in *The New England Journal of Medicine* of May 6, 1971.)

Since that time the burden of updating and training has fallen upon the states, and now nearly half of them have passed it on to the localities. Why are the PDH's repeatedly passed off? What is the extent of their burden?

If a PDH custodian remembers that most hospitals as well as the U.S. Army change their equipment at least every five years, he or she might get some idea. If a custodian visited the warehouse of the Pan American Development Foundation, he or she could open the donated PDH boxes which conceal broken hoses and gauges on various apparatuses, leaks in water pumps, and electrical wires and bulbs in need of replacement. He or she may even find another completely sealed crate which is totally empty, like the one discovered recently. Some crates contain outdated pharmaceuticals, never to be replaced. (Substantive pain-killers were never stocked.) Yet what hospital exists without pharmaceuticals? Older units often lack the gasoline and the batteries for the generator, extension cords, light bulbs, and prying tools. (In the later models the prying tools are stored inside the very same cases they are meant to open.) No units offer any protection against chemical or biological warfare. These are indeed Dr. Klinghoffer's "vestiges of the PDH's" being offered to the Foundation today. Unusually fortunate is the custodian whose PDH unit does not need some attention.

Yet the preparedness of PDH equipment is only as valuable as the preparedness of PDH personnel. At present this is even more questionable. In a letter to *The New England Journal of Medicine* (July 8, 1971) about experience with a PDH, Peter Mustell writes: "Even with urgent improvements in existing PDH units it may be impossible to supply any of the needs of today's medical specialists who are suddenly confronted with large-scale civilian disasters." In an editorial comment on Dr. Greentree's article cited above, F. J. Ingelfinger, M.D. asks, "How many physicians are well enough acquainted with Packaged Disaster Hospitals to call Greentree right or wrong?" How many PDH custodians can answer him, at least in their area? How many can account for the staff of 263 people (and their relief shifts) which a completely operational PDH requires? (See the *Canadian Nurse* of May, 1977.) These cannot include the personnel which might be needed in an emergency at clinics and major hospi-

tals (of which there were 300 more in 1976 than in 1950 when the PDH program was being formulated). Are these people well acquainted with the kinds and amounts of materials and equipment contained in a PDH? Are they trained in its assembly and use so that it can be operational in the 120 man hours considered sufficient? Have they engaged in a simulated disaster exercise? (See *Hospital Topics* of February, 1970, also Henry C. Huntley, M.D. in the *AORN Journal* of February, 1969 for some practical considerations.)

Even with these precautions, Dr. Greentree may still be right:

It is doubtful whether the emergency "Packaged Disaster Hospitals" (PDH's) that have been put together by the United States Public Health Service at a great expense will ever function and care for the overwhelming number of casualties caused by a nuclear explosion. The surviving members of the local health-mobilization teams needed to unpack the 660 crates and boxes of the packaged hospital, and to assemble them into a functioning 200-bed emergency hospital, might be stranded in shelters elsewhere for a period of weeks because of continued radioactivity. The destruction of transportation, communication and electricity, destruction and pollution of public water facilities, destruction of housing and fuel, as well as the disruption of the various sanitary facilities, could seriously hamper the proper activation of these emergency packaged hospitals. Under these circumstances, putting together a complicated x-ray unit, a power generator or a surgical table, by the light of a flashlight, would become "the impossible dream."

Many states and many localities have now concluded, as the federal government did in 1972, that they cannot realistically support the costs of such updating and training. For many in these times of

(Continued on pg. 26)



DeWitt S. Snell looks at American unpreparedness and inertia and zeroes in on "the question of whether any nation which consciously practices self-deception is worthy of survival." Is there a way out? What is it?

The Nature of Our Enemy

—DeWitt S. Snell

The ancient Chinese proverb "*Know yourself and know your enemy, and in 100 battles you will have 100 victories*" was often quoted by Mao Tse-tung as the key to the Communists' triumph over the Nationalists. For the latter's weaknesses—from their internal divisions and lack of support from the countryside—were fully exploited by the Communists. Despite inferior equipment and manpower the Communists had the support of a peasantry disillusioned by governmental corruption and the oppression of China's landlords. Consequently, with a battle strategy superior to the Nationalists and a higher morale, the Communists could drive the Nationalists from the mainland and establish a government that is now recognized by practically the whole world.

The free world today is locked in a life-and-death struggle with a Soviet Union now recognized by responsible and objective military authorities as being militarily superior. And this tragic situation is directly attributable to the free world's many weaknesses, which have been fully exploited by the Soviets. With the stakes so high—not only the free world's existence, but that of Western Civilization—I submit there is no more urgent task before us than to soberly assess both the strengths of our adversary and the free world's weaknesses, which have precipitated this crisis. For to blindly continue the practices that have compromised us can not only nullify our military and civil defense efforts, but it can raise the question of whether any nation which consciously practices self-deception is worthy of survival.

A major free-world weakness, I feel, has been its unwillingness (or inability) to recognize the East-West struggle as fundamentally an *ideological* one. An illustration of this self-deception was furnished by a recent address at Union College in Schenectady, N.Y. by the celebrated science-fiction writer, Professor Isaac Asimov. Sponsored by the General Electric Company in celebration of its 100th anniversary. Asimov said: "What could very well sink humanity into another dark age or even total destruction, is the continued struggle of countries fighting each other under the obsolete 19th Century concept of nationalism." And historian Henry S. Commager, in a 1974 TV interview, declared that the many Communist revolutions now taking place could be compared with our own American revolution, with the oppressed colonials "only throwing off their fetters."

The dire consequences of a failure to recognize and meet the Communist ideological challenge were stated by Yugoslavia's often-jailed dissident Mihajlo Mihajlov: "Until the time when the idea of totalitarian internationalism is resisted by the idea of anti-totalitarian internationalism, and the Communist pseudoreligion by a true religion—until then the presently prevailing totalitarianism is *invincible*, and no national movements will subvert its foundations, but only alter its form."¹

It can be seriously questioned, I feel, whether the West is capable, or has the will, to meet this challenge.

A second Western weakness, I think, is the West's refusal to believe that Russia, having with us

a common technology and common cultural, sports and educational interests (and even having many social and educational programs being studied by American sociologists and educators for possible application in America), could possibly intend to destroy world Capitalism as its leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev have told us. Thus we naively believed that if we only reduced our military capabilities Russia would do the same, since we reasoned in a nuclear war neither side could win. Thus our strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (characterized by Phyllis Schlafly and Admiral Chester Ward as the "Nitze-McNamara Surrender Plan"),² by which we ceased building missiles, reduced our navy, and abandoned civil defense efforts.


Unfortunately, Russia never "bought" the MAD strategy—but radically increased both its military potential and its civil defenses, until it today believes itself capable of fighting a nuclear war and winning it, with acceptable damage to itself.

This suicidal weakness of the free world in refusing to accept Russia as its enemy, and supplying (for profit) an estimated 95% of the technology and industrial plant through which Russia has achieved its present military supremacy,³ is due, I believe, to our public's refusal to acknowledge that every nation must operate by two different behavior codes. These two codes are similar to those of the Natural World as described by Robert Ardrey in his book *The Territorial Imperative*: "Amity Within the Tribe or Group, Enmity Without."

"The Communist nations . . . are realists."

Since, in an affluent and permissive society such as ours, all unpleasant matters are habitually excluded from thought war and its appurtenances are regarded with disdain—as "necessary evils." Any suggestion that our nation might have to be involved in a major war, particularly a nuclear one, is considered "*unthinkable*." This attitude is reinforced by innumerable estimates of self-styled "experts" to show our military capabilities superior to those of Russia. All evidence of the falsity of these estimates by responsible military leaders is dismissed as propaganda for the armament makers or argument in the self-interest of the military establishment.

The Communist nations, on the other hand—and a few Western nations also, such as Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, which have effective civil-defense establishments—are realists. They live domestically by codes regarded by many responsible Western leaders as superior to our own. For example, Cornell's Professor Urie Bronfenbrenner's 1962 article "Soviet Methods in Character Education" indicates a concern for the moral education of Soviet children and youth far superior to our own.⁴ Yet in their relations with Capitalist nations, whom they regard as their enemies, the Soviets are out-



DeWitt S. Snell

wardly affable and conciliatory, while inwardly ever conscious of a deep hostility that would permit even the unleashing of nuclear war if that were required to destroy Capitalism.

The morale of the Soviet fighting forces is acknowledged by many Western observers as superior to our own. Two articles in the August 1978 *Soviet Military Review*, "Soviet Military Ethics" and "Moral Staunchness," indicate the high value placed by the Soviets on military morals and morale. The first article states: "The armed forces of the socialist countries possess a spiritual superiority over the armies of the imperialist states. Even bourgeois military theorists are forced to admit this. In his book *Soldiers of the Eastern Bloc* the West German writer F. Winter says that 'owing to his way of thinking the behavior of the Soviet soldier is determined by his feeling of collectivism, discipline and devotion to Communist ideals.' There are quite a few statements made by other bourgeois specialists in which they give a high appraisal of the spiritual qualities of the Soviet fighting man."

Finally, I would compare the motivation of the Soviets in their contest with the West with that of the West in its defensive role. Our CIA has continually insisted that the Soviet's driving force in building up a military capability with which either to blackmail the West into submission or to fight and win a nuclear war, is to ensure that Russia will never again be faced with destruction, as it was in World War II.⁵

Convinced that world Capitalism has been the main cause of past major wars (and, considering the finiteness of the earth's resources, and that human acquisitiveness is the mainspring of Capitalism, I feel that the burden of proof that this claim is untrue is on the Capitalists) the Soviets feel that in fighting Capitalism they fight for their own national existence. Despite persecution of its dissidents and harassment of the church, I think the vast

majority of Russians are in agreement with Communist ideals and that in any war the Russian people will support their government.

What is our own motivation in resisting Soviet attempts to destroy the Capitalist system? Are we willing to have the labor of centuries destroyed and 100 million American lives sacrificed to preserve Capitalism? To answer this, I quote from three responsible and intelligent spokesmen for America:

Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and SALT negotiator: "More and more people in the world recognize the nature of Soviet intentions. Most do not want to be dominated from the Kremlin. (How badly do they not want this? Badly enough to sacrifice American lives?) Although many are afraid and some favor accommodation, the general political atmosphere seems to be shifting against the USSR despite its growing military power and the intensity of its political and propaganda campaigns."⁶

William F. Buckley, Jr., Editor of the *National Review*: "President Carter says: 'Our ultimate goal is the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth.' But you see, that isn't our ultimate goal. Our ultimate goal is to keep Gulag a half-world removed from America."⁷ (Please explain, Mr. Buckley, how—in the light of negligible civil defense and a military machine vastly inferior to Russia's—are we to do this, with a Soviet first strike leaving half our population dead and our nation damaged beyond hope of recovery?)

Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies: "What is the long-term goal of our policy toward the Soviet Union? . . . (Should not) our purpose be to encourage the peaceful transformation of the USSR toward a more tolerable internal order and a more responsible external conduct? Surely our long-term goal must be to achieve a gradual Europeanization of the Russians, through the spread of legality, the widening of individual freedoms and the democratization of party and state."⁸

While Mr. Luttwak's goal is an admirable one, it is impossible of attainment, I am sure, as long as Capitalism is considered Russia's No. 1 enemy. In this connection, I suggest a consideration of Yugoslavia's Mihajlov (made in connection with his above-quoted statement): "Russian philosopher Vladimir Soloviev wrote almost a century ago, 'In order to conquer the lie of Communism, one must first admit its truth.' And the truth of Communism is not only in its demands for socio-economic justice, but also in its internationalism."

For myself, considering the deterioration of U.S. defenses in the last 15 years, resulting from our wholly unrealistic strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction and our abandonment of civil defense, I feel that the continuation of an arms race can only be counterproductive and can only intensify ultimate disaster. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, referring to our contemplation of deserting the South Vietnamese said: "It has been said that the judgment of Nature upon error is death. In the life of nations that judgment has been disaster."⁹

"... a continuance of . . . self deceit can be fatal . . ."

Consider that it was our nation's obstinate refusal in the 1930's to admit our own weaknesses and our enemies' strengths that caused denial of aid to the Allies, which aid conceivably could have prevented World War II (with its scores of millions dead, Auschwitz, nations devastated, loss of the Free World's colonies, and the terrifying advance of World Communism). Is it not apparent that in our present nuclear age a continuance of this same self-deceit can be fatal both to the Free World and to Western civilization? With the stakes so transcendently high, is there any sacrifice too great—even to the admission of our mistakes in underestimating our enemies and overestimating ourselves—if thereby the disasters that our follies must inevitably bring upon us might be mitigated?

While a "change of heart" on the part of both the Soviet Union and ourselves is unquestionably the only final solution to our present crisis (someone has said: "The only way to truly destroy your enemy is to make him your friend") there are I think practical steps on the way to the ultimate goal such as:

- (1) A massive effort to achieve nuclear disarmament on a multinational basis; and
- (2) The development of an effective civil defense.

The second step is entirely practical. It works to water down—to dissipate—nuclear targets. In this way it acts to defuse the aggressor's nuclear weapons. It is a threat to no one. It is humane. It is attainable. The Soviets realize this. China, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and other countries realize it.

We too must proceed quickly to realize it and to act accordingly. □

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TOO GOOD TO FILE

Relative to the Soviet civil defense program, our own program lapses in recent years appear to be of startling magnitude. I will mention a number of the more significant points:

First. All former education and training contracts have been eliminated with our universities;

Second. All contracts with State public instruction departments, which coordinated public school activities, have been terminated;

Third. All funding for emergency operating center building starts has been eliminated, at least for fiscal year 1979;

Fourth. The public information program was stopped some years back and only now is being restarted on a very small scale;

Fifth. There is no truly operational radiological defense program.

Sixth. The fallout shelter system is in very poor condition. The facilities still exist and are maintained in the private sector, but Government stocks such as food, water, medical supplies, and instructional materials are in a disarray or have been abandoned. Further, no Federal or local plans have ever been adopted for the resupply of the lifesaving supplies in the shelter systems;

Seventh. The rural civil defense was ended years ago. The Agriculture Department currently has a fine collection of informational brochures, but people in rural communities do not know of them;

Eighth. The medical self-help program, our only first aid training program, is long gone;

Ninth. Training courses at the Civil Defense Staff College have been severely reduced;

Tenth. The public information program and the emergency broadcast system are only now beginning to institute badly needed programs for revitalization. . . .

I am encouraged by the recent movements within our administration to consolidate the American civil defense effort and restore to this important element of our national security the status it necessarily deserves.

—from "Soviet and American Civil Defense", by Senator Dewey F. Bartlett in the *Emergency Preparedness News*

In assessing the impact of this buildup [Soviet], there is room for healthy debate over rates, GNP percentages and even intentions. But there is no escaping the fact that the Soviets have for years continued to out-man, out-gun, out-develop, out-build, and out-deploy us in most meaningful military categories, all the while shortening our qualitative lead in many important areas. . . .

—General David C. Jones
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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(Continued from pg. 21)

tight money the costs of storage and security, let alone maintenance and transportation, are prohibitive. Some might echo Dr. Christopher Kenner, an HEW Emergency Medical Services officer in 1975:

Over the years the program began to suffer. Some years there were no funds. Services and quality control were cut. Supplies began to deteriorate. Administration didn't feel we needed it as a defense posture anymore. It was a wise thing in its day but it was time to let go. There was no choice. It was like paying rent on a leaky house.


(*National Catholic Reporter*, May 9, 1975)

For these people, the Health Services Program of the Pan American Development Foundation offers an opportunity. It is an opportunity to consolidate their PDH equipment within their updating and train-

ing capacity, without wasting any of this "valuable resource." Most donors have chosen to maintain their cots, blankets, bandages, and perhaps a few other items needed repeatedly in disaster situations. But most of the heavy equipment they have contributed toward the establishment of nationwide health care systems in the Americas. Thus even their excess supports American peace and security by reducing one of the underlying causes for tension and conflict and by providing needy people with the strength to fight despotism.

To call such action "a giveaway" is erroneous. Rather, it is an intelligent effort to convert "national disgrace" into national pride.

(Mr. Walton invites further discussion of this issue. He would appreciate any information which supports or rebuts his position. Please call him collect at (202) 381-8651 or write him at the Pan American Development Foundation, 1625 Eye Street, N.W. —Suite 622, Washington, D.C. 20006.) □



BOOK REVIEW

Instrumentation Requirements For Radiological Defense Of The U.S. Population In Community Shelters

By: Carsten M. Haaland and Kathy S. Grant, Energy Division, Solar and Special Studies Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, operated by Union Carbide Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830.

Printed by: National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161, \$8.00, 137 pages.

Reviewed by R. F. Blodgett

The answer to the question suggested by the title of this report: a calculated requirement exists for some 1.4 million new rate meters and between 3.4 and 18.1 million new dosimeters. Obviously, a proportionate number of chargers would be necessary to support the additional dosimeters. These items are needed over and above the current and existing RADEF inventory. The wide variance in numbers is brought about by the level of sophistication desired in exposure control management.

The study appears to have been built upon criteria which in some cases could have questionable validity. For instance, the current NSS (National Shelter Survey) file of December 1976 is inaccurate and out of date in many cases; probably by a relatively large factor. The unproven validity of other than personal use of home basement shelters, as well as other questionable input tends therefore, to put the study conclusions somewhat under a cloud of doubt. Since, however, these data are all we have; the process appears to have been handled as reasonably as possible under the existing circumstances. (Let it be said: the authors have done a very good job with a very sticky subject.)

The costs to provide the shortfall of radiological equipment is estimated at from \$75 to \$228 million. This expenditure, exceeding twice our national preparedness budget, appears necessary to "bring up to speed" only one single component of the overall Civil Defense problem.

Frustrating, isn't it.

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
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Editorial

PERSPECTIVE '79

Perspectives play a big role in this February issue of the *Journal of Civil Defense*.

For instance, Petr Beckmann (on page 16) puts the hobgoblin of nuclear power plant radiation in its proper place. In one chest X-ray you get more radiation than you (and a long string of direct heirs) would get in well over a thousand years from a nuclear plant in your area.

That's perspective.

When Congressman Ike Skelton (page 6) becomes concerned over the wartime safety of constituents who live near ICBM launch pads in Missouri and asks for funds to study the problem *nationwide*—that's also perspective.

When Gil Leonard (page 14) plugs for local input for Pentagon CD planning that's an effort to inject realistic perspective into the decision-making process.

There's something wrong about saying that we will protect our people only if another country protects its people. In America we should protect our people whether anyone else does or not. But the wrong is compounded if we learn—as we now have—that an adversary nation has given its people well-organized effective protection *and we continue to sit on our hands!* And, on top of this, when the nation's leadership uses taxpayer money to give itself hard-core protection and blithely assigns the exposed taxpayer a "hostage" role, certainly this is a wrong that defies understanding in a free society. Frank Williams looks at these problems (page 10).

That's perspective too.

So is Bob Levettown's critical look at crisis relocation planning (page 18)—its snail's pace—its questionable value—the foul up and the foot dragging.

And Ruby Thurmer's shocking Soviet press expose betrays a master propaganda machine—for those who dare embrace this disturbing perspective. Like a sun too bright.

On page 23 scholar-philosopher DeWitt Snell depicts the nation's moral depravity, calls for disarmament (the "noble goal" says Edward Teller) and civil defense.

True perspective in analyzing our civil defense leads us—not to where we want to be—but to where we are. Which is "in trouble" as Congressman Don Mitchell has repeatedly warned us.

Senator William Proxmire, who believes fondly in shielding himself from the evils of lethargy, pollution, poisons and junk food, therewith sets a fine example for *personal* protective measures.

However, Senator Proxmire has apparently never viewed civil defense in the light of protective measures for his nation. (Is he influenced by his former aide, Congressman Les Aspin, whose quixotic railing against civil defense has fanned the flames of CD opposition?)

Whatever, Senator Proxmire on January 8th held a civil defense hearing. How many more will be held? Can he be presumed to be a reasonable man? Could he—with well-organized, pertinent, authoritative, convincing evidence—widen his preparedness perspective from a concept of personal well-being to a concept of national well-being?

Why not? It's time we injected teamwork into our efforts to convince reasonable people of reasonable solutions to survival problems.

Letters from the grass roots to Congress can help enormously. Telegrams, phone calls, visits. Fact and example—you can't beat them.

The quicksand that now threatens the civil defense program could be turned into a launching pad for a vastly improved posture. The harder we try, the better the odds. At stake: the USA.

That too is perspective.



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