

FEBRUARY 1980


VOLUME XIII — NUMBER 1

Journal of Civil Defense

REAL WORLD
CHALLENGE

Accident Analysis

The American Civil Defense Association



The American Civil Defense Association

Journal of Civil Defense

Presenting the Views of Industry, Technology,
Emergency Government and Concerned Citizenry

FEBRUARY 1980

VOLUME XIII — NUMBER I

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
Back Cover: CIVIL DEFENSE
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
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SIGNAL DIVISION
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America's race in the 1970's to strip itself of its capability to protect and succor its citizens is no better illustrated than in the shameful abandonment of the Packaged Disaster Hospital (PDH) by government and the offer of PDH units to foreign nations.

While support of the "Third World" should continue to be vigorous and meaningful, the emergency support of America and Americans should above all else be cultivated —or our foreign aid will fade to nothing or worse.

SALVAGING OUR PDHs

—Max Klinghoffer
—Anthony Damiani
—Nancy Borngraber

Military medical history reveals that the salvage rate of the sick or wounded is dependent upon several factors, including the age of the patient, his general physical condition, advances in medical and surgical management, etc. But one of the most important factors in recent wars has been the rapidity with which emergency care could be brought to the wounded.

From the forward aid station and field hospital of World War II there evolved the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital of the Korean War, and for the first time the wounded received skilled medical help sometimes within minutes of the time of injury.

HISTORY OF THE PACKAGED DISASTER HOSPITAL

It became apparent, during the Korean War, that the "MASH" unit, with some modifications, might be the answer to medical problems in case of all-out war, or in case of disasters of widespread magnitude. In 1953 the 60-bed "MASH" unit became the first "200 bed Civil Defense Emergency Hospital" (CDEH). Elmhurst, Illinois was one of the first communities to receive one of these units, and the job of classification, storage, and training was taken over by Memorial Hospital staff, assisted by citizens of the community. As the CDEH became more sophisticated and updated it finally became known as the "Packaged Disaster Hospital—1962—10,000

series" (PDH). One such hospital was stored at Elmhurst's Memorial Hospital, almost directly under the Medical Education Center. "Memorial" has since then become a center for PDH training, with visitors and trainees coming from other states and other countries.

At the peak of this government PDH program there were approximately 2,600 such units stored throughout the United States. For the most part they had been stored in areas outside "key target areas," thus giving reasonable assurance that these hospitals would survive war, widespread insurrection, and regional major disasters. Although designated as "200-bed units," each PDH is capable of expansion to at least 600 beds utilizing the same facilities of Central Supply, Operating, X-Ray, etc.

The total number of hospital beds in the United States, in permanent hospitals, is approximately 1,600,000. Since most of these "permanent" beds are in metropolitan (which is to say, key target areas) locations, it is possible that, in case of national disaster, the largest number of hospital beds surviving might be those of the PDH system.

DELETION OF PDH FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAM

Approximately five years ago, for reasons not yet clearly understood,

the Federal Government decided to drop sponsorship of the entire PDH program. In most instances the Government offered these hospitals to the medical or governmental agency which then had custodianship of the PDH. The price was nominal—exactly \$15—and Memorial Hospital purchased the local unit. The original cost to the Federal Government (at "surplus" rates) was about \$50,000, and it would probably be safe to say that in view of inflation the value has more than doubled.

But the real value of the PDH is not in the dollars it represents. The true value of this austere but highly flexible facility is in the potential for saving lives. The PDH is as self-sufficient as any hospital could be. It includes sections for triage, wards, shock wards, operating, X-Ray, pharmacy, laboratory, central supply and engineering.*

In case of major disaster in the Chicago area it might well represent more beds than we now have at Memorial Hospital.

The acquisition of the PDH by Memorial Hospital placed a great responsibility on us. This responsibility is made more complex by the problem of urgent need for space for other departments, and the shelf-life of certain items.

**At Memorial Hospital we added a radiation detection and decontamination section.*

MODIFICATION OF THE PDH

Various possibilities were considered as alternatives for the PDH—ranging from keeping the PDH intact as it is, to removing it from Memorial and placing it in storage. But to place such a hospital unit in storage defeats the primary purpose of an emergency unit. Unless emergency medical supplies are available IMMEDIATELY upon notification of a disaster, they are of little use. Further, unless there is an ongoing training program, with provision of a highly capable cadre, no emergency facility can function efficiently.

Recently a meeting was held at Memorial Hospital for discussion of this problem. Represented were the hospital administration, the medical staff executive committee, and the disaster committee. A compromise was reached with the PDH being condensed as much as possible and still remaining compatible with a functional facility.

The rearrangement of the PDH, the categorization of the components (with some items being discarded), and the repackaging of other items was a major project, but it is undoubtedly worthwhile.

The rearrangement of the PDH may also be used to advantage in that we can at the same time establish a more elaborate "mobile triage" system such as that already in effect at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport.

Suggestions for disposition of PDH items are made according to the fol-

lowing major division (detailed information in Appendix II—see special notice for availability):

1. Discard completely (usually because of shelf life);
2. Discard, but destroy (possibly dangerous items such as barbituates);
3. Retain intact (with possible exception of providing better crates);
4. Divide contents of mixed crates (with some of the contents to be retained, some discarded).

When the PDH is modified there should be approximately 40% deleted, which will provide some additional space for other purposes. We would strongly urge against trimming these components to a greater extent, since there is often an interrelationship between items in different categories. For example, the suction apparatus (note we have at least three methods of providing suction) will not function unless we have tubing, and adapters. The water supply apparatus is of no use in an emergency unless we have a source of chlorine and a method of testing for residual chlorine. Accompanying photographs demonstrate the storage of the modified PDH by rows and columns. The alphabetical cross index will expedite the unpacking and utilization of PDH components (detailed information contained in Appendix I—see special note for availability).

TRIAGE AT DISASTER SITE

Locally-packed triage bags are vital to us whenever we are called to give

"I must ask you by what legal precept or on what moral premise you saw fit to give away to foreign countries that equipment which may be desperately needed by our own citizens? . . . I believe we are not in a position to give away our emergency supplies."

Max Klinghoffer in a 1978 letter to Dr. Peter G. Bourne, Health Advisor to the President.

"Of the 2,116 prepositioned disaster hospitals, approximately 1,380 had been allowed to deteriorate to the point of uselessness as hospitals . . ."

Report cited by

—Michael M. Walton, Program Director, Pan-American Development Foundation.

"If the equipment in the PDHs is indeed outdated, rusted, damaged and deteriorated to the point of uselessness—then why is Mr. Walton so anxious to give it to his friends in the Pan American Foundation?"

—Max Klinghoffer in answer to Michael M. Walton

Switzerland has more emergency hospital spaces (underground, fully protected, complete with operating facilities, kitchens, quarters, etc.) per capita than America has vulnerable everyday hospital spaces.



Max Klinghoffer, M.D., Chairman, Elmhurst Memorial Hospital Disaster Medical Care Committee and Medical Adviser, O'Hare International Airport.



Anthony Damiani, Elmhurst Memorial Hospital Associate Executive Director.



Nancy Borngraber, R.N., Elmhurst Memorial Hospital Assistant Nursing Director.

on-the-spot aid in a major disaster." There are no better arguments for this than the experiences in three recent disasters in the Chicago area; (a) the air crash near Midway Airport, (b) the commuter railroad crash in Chicago, and (c) the two-plane accident at O'Hare International Airport. (The DC-10 crash in May 1979 unfortunately resulted in instant death to all aboard the plane, so emergency response was in this case not applicable). Considering the fact that victims can be trapped in wreckage for hours, and considering the variations in weather in this area, it is obvious that our responsibilities do not necessarily end with the establishment of an efficient disaster program at the hospital. In a major disaster within our service area we may be called upon to give extended primary care at the scene of disaster.

These mobile triage bags have been found to be of great value when medical teams are required at the scene of a disaster. Most of the components of these bags are found in the PDH, and this inventory may be completed by nominal expenditure plus utilizing some items found in regular hospital

- 3 Airways
- 4 Vaseline gauze 6 x 36
- 20 amps caffeine Sod. Benzoate
- 1 Clipboard
- 6 Pencils
- 25 ID tags with bands or strings (3)
 - 1 Sheet of plastic with pegs, 6' x 6' (to provide a dry clean area for unpacking the bag)
- 1 Resuscitube
- 2 Cervical collars, adult and child, Velcro closure
- 1 Flashlight with batteries (batteries should be stored in sealed plastic bags and replaced periodically)
- 1 Set pneumatic splints
- 1 Hope resuscitation unit with
- 2 masks
- 1 Sterile scissors

In addition, the use of triage tables should be considered (detailed information contained in Appendices III & IV—see special notice for availability). At O'Hare International Airport there are eight such tables, each measuring 3 x 6 ft. (Memorial Hospital will have a supply of them shortly). They are marked off in five categories: Records and Identification, Resuscitation,

SPECIAL NOTICE:

Due to space limitations the four appendices to "Salvaging our PDHs" could not be printed here. The contents of these appendices are as follows:

Appendix I—Schematic Inventory of Packaged Disaster Hospital at Memorial Hospital

Appendix II—Suggested disposition of cases in Packaged Disaster Hospital

Appendix III—Triage Table Arrangement

Appendix IV—Inventory of one box for one triage table

Inventory reprints are available from:

Memorial Hospital of DuPage Co.
Elmhurst, Illinois 60126

TRUE VALUE (OF PDH)... THE POTENTIAL FOR SAVING LIVES.

inventory. In a sense, this system provides four echelons of disaster care: the first is the emergency room which can usually handle up to ten casualties; second, the hospital disaster program, which utilizes existing space and supplies; third, the modified PDH which can expand the regular facilities of the hospital; and fourth, the mobile triage bags to be taken to the scene of the disaster. The inventory of each of the triage bags (there are 15 stored at Memorial Hospital) follows:

- 7 Hemostats—packages of 3 and 4
- 2 Field dressings
- 10 ABD's
- 20 4 x 4's—pkg. of 2
- 2 Tourniquets
- 1 Abelson cricothyrotomy cannulae
- 1 Bulb syringe with 2 catheters
- 20 Disposable syringes with needles
- 20 Alcohol sponges
- 12 Ace bandages, assorted sizes
- 4 Roller gauze
- 2 Rolls of adhesive
- 20 Band-aids
- 2 Bandage scissors

**Memorial Hospital favors the use of METTAG as a field tag at the disaster site. Upon admission to the hospital the in-hospital disaster tag is used.*

Dressings, Fracture Supplies, and Intravenous Supplies. Accompanying each table is a carton containing the items designated on the table. This system expedites the rapid establishment of a triage area, and assures us that hospital personnel working at any one table will then find the identical equipment in the same arrangement at any other table. The tables used are the aluminum folding type.

CONCLUSION

This is an outline of the system devised by Elmhurst Memorial Hospital to contend with disaster situations by utilizing its PDH. The plan is by no means finalized. Such a system must be flexible and adaptive and improved upon as disasters and exercises indicate errors, new requirements, and the revamping of old procedures.

The experience of Elmhurst Memorial Hospital is that the PDH—even when it has been virtually abandoned by a government which previously had been keenly cognizant of its high value to survival is too valuable, from the standpoint of the salvage of human life, to be discarded or given away in misguided charity. □



Elmhurst Memorial Hospital nurses check stored PDH supplies.

SPOTLIGHT

THREE-MILE ISLAND LESSON

In the Dresser Industries ad in *The Wall Street Journal* Edward Teller was asked: "What have we learned from the accident at Three-Mile Island?"

Teller replied: "Two things. First, that nuclear reactors are even safer than we thought. Despite many human errors and a few mechanical failures at Three-Mile Island, the damage was contained. No one was killed, or even injured. We have also learned that a lot can be done by better educated, better paid and more responsible reactor operators, and by a more efficient display of the state of the reactor by modern instrument panels.

"Three-Mile Island has cost \$500-million, but not a single life. We must pay for safety and, even after we have paid for it, nuclear energy is the cheapest source of electrical power. It is most remarkable that in the case of nuclear energy we are paying for our lessons in dollars, not in lives."

PREDICTED "UNDERWHELMING FLOP" TURNS INTO SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION

"A little bit north of South Carolina" the Carolina Power and Light Company's Brunswick Nuclear Power

Plant provides electricity for a generous slice of North Carolina. On the week end of December 8-9 state and local officials and agencies staged America's first practice evacuation from a mock nuclear accident to comply with new regulations growing out of the President's Kemeny Report.

Predicted by Dan Fesperman of *The Charlotte News* as an "underwhelming flop" the exercise surprised observers by turning into a gung-ho operation participated in by federal, state, county and municipal agencies and inspired volunteer organizations and individuals.

North Carolina's Governor Jim Hunt called the experience a whopping success. "A good job has been done," said Hunt, "and I'm proud of it."

Opposition by anti-nuke demonstrators was insignificant, but it was curiously supported by four commissioners-elect of the island town of Long Beach. One editorial called their actions "both inconsiderate and foolish."

Another paper remarked:

"Our own appraisal is that this was a landmark event for this section of the state, a clear demonstration that prior planning will be helpful in the event a disaster ever should occur. We suspect that other sections of North Carolina, in fact some other states, may have gone to school on us Saturday. If they did, they should have been impressed with what they learned."

PETERSON LAYS KEEL FOR 1980 TACDA CONFERENCE — SCESA & RDOA CO-SPONSOR

Evar Peterson — former USCDC president, long-time vigorous campaigner for an upgraded U.S. civil defense, and promoter of the fabulous Queen Mary CD meeting in 1977 — has been designated to plan and produce the TACDA 1980 Seminar-Conference in Southern California.

Peterson has selected the "Inn At The Park" hotel in Anaheim as the conference site. Dates are October 23-25.

Anaheim, home of the Los Angeles Rams and the California Angels, genial host to Disney World pilgrims, and a travelers' mecca for a number of other good reasons, according to the Peterson analysis has the ideal facilities for the TACDA conference.

"Support for the 1980 TACDA meeting is already substantial and growing," says Peterson. "We can look forward to top speakers, productive discussions and accelerated progress toward CD goals.

"I am especially happy to announce that the Radiological Defense Officers Association (RDOA) and the Southern California Emergency Services Association (SCESA) will co-sponsor the Conference. The participation of these two organizations will be a tremendous boost to providing a truly inspiring program. That we sorely need at this late date in the preparedness game."

UPCOMING

- | | |
|------------|---|
| Feb 10-14 | Executive Council on Emergency Preparedness (American Nuclear Society) — San Antonio |
| Feb 24-27 | USCDC Mid-Year Conference — Washington, D.C. |
| Mar 10-14 | Arizona State U. Aircraft Management Course (International Center for Safety Education) — Tempe, AZ |
| May 24-27 | Industry/Business Emergency Planning, FEMA Staff College — Battle Creek |
| Jun 8-13 | American Nuclear Society Annual Conf. — Las Vegas |
| June 23-27 | Rockstore '80 (Subsurface space for Env. Protection, Low Cost Storage & Energy Savings). Off. language: English — Stockholm |
| Jul 21-25 | Career Grad. Seminar, FEMA Staff College — Battle Creek |
| Oct 6-9 | Annual USCDC Conf. — Milwaukee |
| Oct 23-25 | The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA) Annual Seminar-Conf. — Anaheim, CA |
| Nov 5-9 | Career Grad. Seminar, FEMA Staff College — Battle Creek |
| Nov 16-21 | American Nuclear Society Winter Conf. — Washington, D.C. |


"The Kansas City Proclamation" (Resolution 79-1) was unanimously adopted at the annual meeting of The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA).

It read in part:

- WHEREAS The constitution of the United States requires that the Congress "provide for the common defense";
- WHEREAS The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 declares that "it is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a system of civil defense for the protection of life and property";
- WHEREAS The 1978 White House attempt to remedy the lack of such a system has to date been totally ineffective; . . .
- WHEREAS The provision of sophisticated nuclear attack protective measures for American *leadership* elements clearly demonstrates that the danger of nuclear attack is recognized by the American government;
- WHEREAS The American people have repeatedly demonstrated in opinion polls that they overwhelmingly want, expect and would readily finance a credible civil defense; and
- WHEREAS A credible American civil defense would discourage nuclear attack by creating unrewarding targets, would thereby act as a major war deterrent, would stimulate disarmament planning, and would consequently promote realistic world peace —

Now therefore be it resolved that The American Civil Defense Association urges and charges the President of the United States and the United States Congress to take action to implement their constitutional duty to provide for the common defense and population survival by:

1. Accepting fully and constructively their constitutional responsibility to defend the homeland and all of its people, and their obligation to take appropriate actions to that end; . . .
6. Through building codes, government construction policies and requirements, and through tax incentives and other practical means, encouraging and requiring the inclusion of protective measures in new construction that will shield effectively against anticipated nuclear attack environments;
7. Providing an economic framework for protective measures financing through adequate budget allocations, transfers of funds from less essential projects, cost-sharing, etc.;
8. Planning for proper emergency medical facilities, practical emergency food storage, adequate communications and warning, rescue and emergency relocation operations, long-term restoration and other measures designed to support survival and recovery from nuclear attack;
9. Modifying our national civil defense program so that it will become an integral part of national defense, and tying it in further with other effective means of homeland defense such as antiballistic missile defense and other defense weapons technology;
10. Promoting vigorously in every practical way a credible United States civil defense program along simple, practical lines that will assure foolproof protection measures geared to the chances of survival and recovery irrespective of attack scenario — and in doing so discouraging itself; and
11. Taking such other measures as will promote the security and safety of the United States and honorable peace.



1978-79 TACDA President R. F. Blodgett forwarded copies of "The Kansas City Proclamation" to the President of the United States and to other key government officials and media representatives. The proclamation received wide recognition and applause. (The International Civil Defense Organization in Geneva, for instance, gave it dissemination in four languages throughout the world.)

NOVEMBER 8, 1979

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director John W. Macy Jr. replied as follows (excerpts):

On behalf of President Carter, I am replying to your letter of October 10, 1979, enclosing the resolution adopted at Kansas City by your organization, on September 29... I agree with a number of the premises set forth in the resolution, for example, that the Federal Government is responsible to provide for the common defense, and that the Federal Civil Defense Act states the policy and intent of Congress that a "system of civil defense" be provided for the protection of life and property in the United States, in case of enemy attack.

It is also true that in case of a failure of deterrence, resulting in a large-scale nuclear exchange involving both military and urban/industrial targets, there would be a substantial asymmetry of fatalities, as between the U.S. and the USSR. I would also stress, however, that the likelihood of a failure of deterrence is low... I can assure you that I propose to take all actions which are feasible to develop a civil defense program and capabilities which would give practical effect to the President's PD 41 policies.

I believe that if an enhanced civil defense program is undertaken, both its acceptability and its effectiveness will be improved by the fact that FEMA's programs are to develop readiness for the full spectrum of risks facing our States, communities and citizens now and in the future. These range from chemical accidents to natural disasters, to possible terrorist threats, to international crises and possible limited or large-scale nuclear attacks. This multiple-uses approach is in line with the President's policies for the U.S. civil defense program, that it improve attack preparedness but also "... be adaptable to help deal with natural disasters and other peacetime emergencies."

The multiple-uses approach does not mean that efforts to develop attack readiness will be diluted or eroded by diversion to preparedness for peacetime disasters. Rather, the commonalities between preparedness for enemy attack and for peacetime disasters are so extensive that improving systems and capabilities for attack emergencies cannot help but improve readiness for peacetime emergencies as well. The relatively minor additional effort needed to develop plans for specific peacetime contingencies (e.g., evacuation plans for hurricanes, or a nuclear reactor accident) is in our judgment well justified both on the merits and in terms of the enhanced acceptance of an all-hazards program at all levels of government, and resulting improvements in effectiveness.



FEBRUARY 11, 1980

The following questions (among others) remain;

- ? Has not deterrence — at best in precarious balance — now largely failed with reaction to Mid-East complications (since the Macy letter)?
- ? What actions are "feasible"? Could actions similar to those taken to protect key leadership (but of a lesser degree) be considered "feasible"?
- ? What does Mr. Macy mean when he says "If an enhanced civil defense program is undertaken"? (italics added.) Is there doubt that this defined responsibility will be at last faced and acted upon?
- ? Can the assurances of John Macy — both in his letter and elsewhere — overcome the bureaucratic inertia that has stymied other attempts to provide population protection?
- ? What specifically will be done now to discharge the cited responsibility for providing a "system of civil defense" for the American people?

REVIEWS



WINTER STORMS—film, 27:30 minutes, 16mm, color. Released by FEMA. Available on loan from Army Audiovisual Centers. May be purchased (\$156.50) from National Audiovisual Center, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, D.C. 20409 (order No. AO 2255).

Reviewed by Kevin Kilpatrick

Winter Storms is proof again that a timely and pertinent subject, an adequate budget and a thoroughly professional production can result in a prize-eligible documentary. Such was the unanimous verdict of a handful of CD staffers invited to preview the film.

Winter Storms zeroes in on the worst winter in American history—1978. It shows, with convincing drama, the utter paralysis that snow, wind, mud, flood, ice and cold can bring to cities, countrysides, entire states. Ships that sink in a raging sea, houses collapsing along the shore, traffic brought to a graveyard halt, passengers dead in their snow-banked cars, trains snowlocked, Chicago bombed by dislodged ice from its skyscrapers—and through it all the threat of a heart-rending medical emergency.

The lesson is clear. Preparedness for inevitable winter disaster will go far toward mitigating disaster effects—is worth the high cost and the trouble many times over. And the lesson extends with crescendo

to other types of disaster. Especially the biggie. The problem: doing it.

If FEMA's first film is a sample of things to come we can look forward to real help in promoting long-range disaster control.

By all means get the incredible *Winter Storms*. The public will love it. It can pay handsome dividends.

SELF SUFFICIENCY EDUCATION SERIES—Three courses (volumes) published by Survival Homes, Inc., P.O. Box 163, Provo, Utah 84601. 626 pages (manuscript format). \$40.

Reviewed by Betty Nice.

For the ultimate in-depth approach to long-term survival it must be said that the three-volume SELF SUFFICIENCY EDUCATION SERIES is an invaluable reference and planning document. For the serious planner only. One who is motivated by the weakening of the economy and of our social order.

In crises we would quickly discover that we are too dependent on specialized services that would break down under stress. Those who are genuinely interested in survival need to develop self-sufficiency to the highest practical degree. This can be done as a beginning project for short periods. Physical fitness is a vital part of such a program.

So is energy conservation. We need to know firsthand the characteristics of our environment and how to cope with it and exploit it—something like our forefathers did. We need to anticipate shortages of all kinds in crisis and to stock food and basic implements that will allow for extended survival in harsh surroundings. Not easy. But necessary in a world of uncertainty. Not an overnight project either, but one for long-term planning and acquisition.

This (and much more) is dealt with in Course One. Course Two focuses on the remodeling of a home to serve in a crisis capacity. Secreted storage space—but not a "fortress." Friends and neighbors should be let in on the project—with the idea that the interest might spread. Even community survival planning can—where preparedness enlightenment is contagious—be pursued. And the careful sharing of emergency facilities can also be planned on a selective basis if desired—although beatific "love thy neighbor" attitudes are not exactly what planning should be built around. It is important to realize that a typical American home "as is" is not at all geared to crisis living. Remodeling plans are given for four types of homes. One basic caution: "Don't get bore-sighted on one type of self-sufficiency." For instance, it won't do you much good to be warm if you are starving—or vice versa.

Course Three is for those who plan to build new homes. This volume should be of interest to anyone contemplating the construction of a new house—even if only the security or energy-saving features are exploited. Underground construction is also covered.

A year or two ago something like the SELF SUFFICIENCY EDUCATION SERIES would certainly have produced little more than yawns in our hedonistic society. Today, with the energy crunch a reality and crises actually expected it should be considered an investment in survival as real as building a frontier fort was in the 1700s.

Verdict: For those realists who want to face up to crisis and are willing to do something meaningful about it in terms of effort and cost the series is a darned good buy.

THE SALT SYNDROME—film released by the Coalition For Peace Through Strength. In 16mm, VHS Videocassette, or Betamax Videocassette. Cost: \$275. One-day rental fee: \$25. Available to TV stations free of charge (Write: American Security Council Education Foundation, Boston, VA 22713—or call 703/825-1776).

Reviewed by Walter Murphey

The *Journal of Civil Defense* (i.e. this reviewer) goofed by not reviewing "The SALT Syndrome" in an earlier issue.

However, President Carter's new position that the Senate delay action on SALT II (TV reporter Maryin Kalb of CBS observes that in the coming days "it's going to be difficult to distinguish Carter from Connally") gives us grace and makes the film even more timely in February and March than in November and December.

The hard-hitting all-star cast is what we have come to expect from "The Coalition." It includes Admiral Thomas Moorer, Senator Howard Baker, Texas Governor William Clements (former Deputy Secretary of Defense), General Daniel Graham, General Alexander Haig, General George Keegan, former Secretary of the Navy William Middendorf, and General John Singlaub.

Emphasis is placed on America's civil defense predicament. Reports *The Coalition Insider*:

"A major point that 'The SALT Syndrome' emphasizes is the total lack of protection of the American people against Russia's nuclear weapons. Thanks to the SALT process we have no defenses against nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Russia has built the world's largest air defense and civil defense systems."

"The SALT Syndrome" is an ideal tonic for TV and civic club audiences. An A-1 'weapon for defense.'"

Also available from same source: a special 35mm SALT slide presentation—\$25.

NUCLEAR WAR SURVIVAL—by Duncan Long, Published by SURVIVAL, P.O. Box 163, Wamego,

Kansas 66547. 1979. 47 Pages, (ms format). \$5.98.

Reviewed by John P. King

Duncan Long has provided us with hope for survival from nuclear warfare. Such a war, which would be destructive to much of our environment, seems unlikely to a rational civilized population. The imminence of such a war, however, grows as the struggle for power increases among divergent ideologies.

NUCLEAR WAR SURVIVAL is easy to read, well organized, non-technical, and directly to the point, particularly on the subject of what to expect on earth should one survive an atomic war. After following his instructions carefully, and using common-sense in the application of post explosion procedures; i.e., adhering to the monitored time period until radiation diminishes to safe level, among others, we would be free to begin life again.

Factually, the conditions of such a life will be very primitive. Very few of the luxuries of today, if any, will exist. We will be called upon to exercise ingenuity in a struggle for life difficult to imagine. Life will be an existence primarily agrarian; but for most survivors it will be a jungle of predators, ill-equipped to cope without modern conveniences, and taking the necessities of life, by force from whomever has them. Self-protection from such predators is heavily emphasized in the book and rightfully so. Long's "Instructions on Radiation Fallout" protection are very good. The lack of easy access to dosimeters for the use of the general public does pose a problem to the process of monitoring radiation on an individual basis. Some kind of radiation measuring device is absolutely a requirement for survival. His advice on the stockpiling of supplies and materials for the period of isolation is burdensome by the numbers, but it is better to have something and not need it than to need it and not have it.

Most of all, the philosophical advice he offers (having faith in God, enjoying each day of life while protecting one's family, etc.) is the key to survival and happiness in a new and different world described in his book *Nuclear War Survival*.

The information and instructions contained in the book should be made available to every household.

ISSUES OF CIVIL DEFENSE: VINTAGE 1978. By Jiri Nehnevajsa. Published for Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Contact: DCPA01-C-0218 Work Unit: 4815B, available through civil defense channels. 123 Pages.

Reviewed by Jon Thompson

This report deals with the results of a 1978 survey of a probability sample of 1620 Americans on issues central to the problems of Civil Defense. Each interview lasted approximately 77 minutes.

This survey assessed respondents in the areas of Perceptions of a Threat, Survival, Opinions Regarding Warning, In-Place Protection, Crisis Relocation, Civil Defense Costs, Training and Education, Volunteerism, Information, Soviet and American Military Might, Arms Control and Disarmament and a "no Civil Defense" situation.

Many of the questions used were ones taken from previous surveys. Results were compared to previous studies and to a survey taken by Congressman Ike Skelton of Missouri. His sample was confined to a 14 county area of Missouri. Conclusions show that people believe there exists a real threat of nuclear war. A strong majority feel there would not be time to evacuate our own population. Almost 70 percent of the people believe they live in a high risk area. Over 70 percent feel they would obey the President's request to evacuate. People overestimate what we are spending on Civil Defense.

The final question might be: What would the reaction of our people be if an acute international situation revealed that little or close to nothing had been done to make it possible for as many Americans to survive as modern techniques permitted us to do?

This study is a comprehensive examination of Civil Defense questions and reveals many areas that are not adequately answered or covered by our current Civil Defense programs. Unfortunately, not many people will read it.

At Arizona State University higher education since 1971 has focussed collegiate expertise on the problem of dealing with emergencies and disasters. The university's "International Center for Safety Education" studies and analyzes the anatomy of disasters in the making, their occurrences and their aftermaths. Objective: reducing aircraft accidents, improving air-crash survivability, lowering still further an already low fatality rate, extending benefits to other types of disaster.

DISASTER PLANNING GOES TO COLLEGE

—Gil Haas

Fire and smoke trailed the stricken airliner as it plunged toward a crowded suburb. For San Diego Emergency Services this was not a community disaster drill.

It was the real thing.*

First-hand observers to the mid-air collision were members of the San Diego Fire Department—Engine Company 14—just completing their in-service physical fitness training at a city park. Responding with others on a dead run to the company's fire apparatus parked nearby, the driver notified the communications center on his handi-talkie radio, and seconds later Engine 14 was on the road. Emergency radio frequencies suddenly came alive,

**September 25, 1977 air collision of Boeing 727 and Cessna 172—144 killed.*

dispatching manpower and equipment. San Diego's disaster response system came into full operation as Engine 14 sped toward the mushrooming smoke.

The tension and stress of the situation were clearly apparent to those who sometime later listened to the transmissions from a tape recorder in a classroom of the International Center for Safety Education at Arizona State University. Captain Gary Easton, company officer of Engine 14 on the fateful morning of the crash, was making a presentation to the students of the Aircraft Crash Management course. With unedited TV news tapes and photographs, he described the wide spectrum of problems handled by the responding teams.

The audience was made up of civil

defense directors, law enforcement and fire officers, and airport management personnel who had come from throughout the United States and the Caribbean to Tempe, Arizona for the one-week course.

Captain Easton's presentation was a part of the section on air crash analysis which is designed to let the student analyze and critique recent air disasters. Other major crashes studied during the course included the Eastern L-1011 in the Everglades near Miami, the Continental DC-10 at Los Angeles International Airport, and the Southern DC-9 at New Hope, Georgia.

Lectures were also given on individual subjects such as communications, victim care and transportation, security, and public information. Students were also exposed to highly specialized tasks required in crash situations such as photography, investigation, and body identification.

Great emphasis is placed on developing and implementing a community disaster plan. Each student is directed to start an outline of a disaster plan. Classes show how to develop it and conduct disaster drills to test it. This material then assists him in developing a realistic plan for his own organization.

At the end of five days the student's disaster plan becomes his final exam. He is accorded individual aid by the staff instructors, and when it is completed he leaves the course with sufficient material to initiate or revise the plan of his own community. The course is also designed to break down the polarization between agencies that generally occurs in large scale operations. This allows each individual to get



Author Gil Haas (right) demonstrates extrication techniques at scene of fatal crash.
(photo by Chuck Vogelsong)

THE REAL WORLD

As the captivity of U.S. embassy personnel in Iran dragged on and Soviet troops were poised to invade Afghanistan, a West Coast visitor riding an elevator in the Premier building on Washington's I Street asked his two fellow passengers if they worked for the new Federal Emergency Management Agency. "Yes," they answered. "Ex-DCPA?" "Oh, no. We live in the real world."



Congress returned in late January from the Christmas recess to face a real world that differed considerably from that of six weeks earlier. It was, according to President Jimmy Carter, the most serious international crisis since World War II. But the situation had none of the scary qualities of earlier crises — Berlin, Cuba, Hungary, Czechoslovakia — in which one was conscious of the brink of a precipice. In FEMA land, crisis relocation planners paid by funds appropriated under the Civil Defense Act of 1950 (itself a reminder of an earlier, scary crisis) were busily engaged in reviewing nuclear reactor emergency response plans at the President's direction. FEMA's in the Premier building were busily engaged in bickering over internal territorial rights. Director Macy was discovering that his so-called operating center didn't have the home phone numbers of his chief subordinates. He would have to wait until normal business hours to discuss with them what to do about the recently-appointed regional director who has legal trouble in one of the States within his jurisdiction.

What kind of crisis was this? Actually, the worst kind. Within the decade of the 1970s the strategic balance of power had shifted so drastically that the bureaucracy knew very well there was no chance that the United States would move toward the brink. The Russians could do as they pleased, whether it amounted to a combat brigade in Cuba or the seizure of Afghanistan. Only a direct and unambiguous threat against this country was likely to alert SAC and galvanize the remaining shreds of civil preparedness. And, if deterrence failed, it no longer seemed to matter whether the Republic survived.

A measure of the situation was the nature of the search within the Carter Administration for ways to punish or threaten the Soviet Union for the occupation of Afghanistan in the hopes that they might cease and desist or be deterred from continuing to gobble up the lands of the Persian Gulf. The search was as frustrating as the one having to do with extricating our diplomatic people from the hands of a mob in Tehran. The options were either too weak or too strong; too meaningless or too meaningful. Altogether, choices had to be made on the side of prudence. Close a few consulates. Recall the ambassador for consultations. Embargo grain sales. Debate

in the United Nations. Allude to possible aid to Afghan guerrillas. Review the current embargo on aid to Pakistan. Check for possible bases in the Middle East. Advertise the possible future existence of a "Quick Reaction Force." Shelve the SALT II treaty for the time being.

Congress is unlikely to be as tentative. And a covey of Presidential candidates are at last starting to talk about the options and the need to revise the strategic policy. The media, especially newspapers, have already taken the lead. The President, said liberal columnist Joseph Kraft, needs to stop taking "moral lunges" at miscreants and devise a strategic policy that will get this country through the 1980s in one piece. Washington observers look for Congress to expand the defense budget irrespective of the apparent demise of SALT II. Moves to reinstitute the draft will gain advocates. The energy program or lack of it will be debated in a new context in which dependence on Mid East oil will cause greater concern than in the past. But, also look for the politics of a presidential election year to get in the way of progress.

Recent real-world events have forced the President, he says, to change his views of the Soviet Union and its leadership more than anything in the previous three years. But this is unlikely to loose the grip on defense policy that continues to be exerted by liberal defeatists in the State Department and the Office of Management and Budget. Their concepts of the real world are so firmly embedded in the bureaucratic structure that abnormalities such as the MX missile system readily find their way into the defense budget. The MX, it will be recalled, is a new strategic weapon system designed to assure that at least two hundred of our land-based missiles would survive an onslaught by the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces through the device of shuffling 200 missiles among 4600 silos in a gigantic and ludicrously expensive shell game. It is now widely acknowledged that our Minuteman missile force is soon to become vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. But few recognize that the MX solution is the ugly offspring of the ABM Treaty of 1972 in which the United States agreed to limit (and later abandoned) active defenses designed to assure survival of an equivalent part of the Minuteman force.

If the Carter Administration really wanted to gain the attention of the Soviets and to chastise them for the rape of Afghanistan without injuring ourselves in the process, it might consider asking the Congress for funds to bring the ABM complex in North Dakota into operational condition, announce our intention to abrogate the ABM Treaty of 1972, and budget for FEMA all the civil defense funds it could handle. In the space of a thousand days, this country could protect its missiles and cover its nuclear nakedness to a sufficient extent that Soviet expansionism could once more be restrained. But don't hold your breath until this happens. If it were being considered, the burial of civil defense in the FEMA morass would not be proceeding apace.



Is Soviet civil defense to be copied instead of condemned? Frank Williams, new president of The American Civil Defense Association, looks into the 1980s, mixes CD gloom with CD hope, and comes up with a prescription for action that, if implemented, could remove Americans as nuclear hostages to the ballistic missile threat.

CIVIL DEFENSE: PERSPECTIVE AND CHALLENGE FOR THE 1980s

—Frank Williams

A few days ago Mutual Broadcasting Company commentator R. K. Scott reported that the Soviet Union had successfully tested a particle beam weapon—a weapon capable of destroying incoming nuclear missiles before impact.

What is ominous is not that the Soviets are succeeding in developing another means of defending their country—a humane undertaking that they have every right to pursue—but that the United States is again failing in its duty to do the same. And what is more ominous is that American technology is capable, if properly motivated, properly organized and properly funded, to do a much better job of protecting the United States and its people than any other country—but is not being used to do it.

What is most ominous is that our failure to take deliberate steps to bring this about invites blackmail, war and defeat. In this way we play directly into the hands of our potential adversaries.

It is true that it is now very late in the game to hope for a change in policy and procedure that will halt and reverse our plunge to defense impotency. But it is also true that, with a total awakening to the danger and prompt and sustained and synchronized attention to dealing with the problem by competent analysts and

leaders, corrective action over a period of months is possible. It could save our hides. But we would have to do a lot more than talk about it, put out high-sounding directives and take comfort in palliatives.

We can afford to wait only if we are reconciled to throwing in the towel and taking the consequences of inaction.

DIAGNOSIS . . .

To reach for a cure to our national strategy illness we first have to diagnose it, and the following points are meant to outline such a diagnosis:

“... charity stressed to the point . . . of substituting it for national preparedness . . .”

1. The United States is in the grip of overall lethargy. Has been since the days of McNamara. Our common attitude is that we can be as self-indulgent as we please and that the gods will protect us because we are the “good guys.” In our hedonistic bashes we blindly cultivate nonproductive leisure, intoxicants, gadgets and other frivolities. We have put our young in the hands of derelict “educators” and wonder at the deplorable outcome. We open our doors to deviates. We pamper criminal elements. We “understand”

those whose avowed interest is our destruction. In false pursuit of peace we disarm ourselves and allow our government to expose our women and children to annihilation. In sum, we ourselves are peculiarly bent on putting the “American dream” to its early death.

2. With this backdrop we see charity stressed to the point of making it the principle aim of government, to the point of substituting it for national preparedness, national defense. There is today a \$200 billion budget for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) alone, far outstripping our defense budget and exceeding the total U.S. budget of two decades ago. In this way we have naively weakened our country to the verge of moribundity. Congressman Davy Crockett (of Alamo fame) had this to say to his fellow legislators 150 years ago:

We have the right, as individuals, to give away as much of our own money as we please in charity; but as members of Congress we have no right so to appropriate a dollar of the public money.*

With a return to that philosophy preparedness funding would be no trick at all.

3. We suffer from a number of con-

*See “A Message For Congress from Davy Crockett” (*The Review of the News*, 14 Nov. 79).

I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction? At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to the cost of killing a man—\$500,000 or \$100,000. Maybe an anti-missile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives.

This theory is also embraced by a number of other countries, even by China where, according to prevailing myth human lives are held to be highly expendable. It is really in the United States—where we like to believe that human life is valued above all else—that our civil defense unpreparedness means well over half our people will perish in a full-scale nuclear attack. It is here, not in China or elsewhere, that we have written off human life as cheap and expendable—like it or not.

REMEDY...

As to the prescription for a remedy to the situation, this must be accepted as a priority job for national leadership. Leaders who see clearly the necessity for protection for leadership must also see clearly the necessity for protection for the people. Steps to be taken in implementing a remedy must be taken on an accelerated basis because the time is painfully late. We have already lost almost two decades of time that have elsewhere been used for constructing shelter and making other deliberate preparations. Therefore, our approach in this hour of international imbalance needs to be tailored to a greatly restricted time frame. These points should be programmed in reacting to the need for people protection:

1. An interim plan is required. Evacuation—or “crisis relocation planning”—is a concept that we are forced to consider for the time being because of the lack of shelter. It should be *only* an interim measure, however, because within a very few years evacuation will be obsolete due to Soviet home defense advances. (This involves a Soviet capability to provide urban shelter and to discard the necessity for an extended 3 or 4 day evacuation period that would give notice of prepara-

tion for war.) It can be modified to greatly ease some of the problems

“... we have written off human life as cheap and expendable ...”

that now beset the concept. Instead of entire cities or counties being evacuated to distant reception areas the construction of expedient blast shelter in peripheral areas can reduce the number of evacuees by more than half, even more than three-quarters in many cases. Many of these evacuees can arrange to share shelter in peripheral areas. Others can find space in areas fairly close to evacuated zones. The problem can in this way be greatly eased and planning made more effective. However, plans should be made promptly *through local initiative* and not strung out to the late 1980s at a time when they will be outdated anyway.

2. A workable comprehensive shelter plan should also be devised promptly. It would have many facets. With less than one-fifth the money per year now expended for HEW and over a period of five years a complete U.S. shelter complex could be achieved. Improvements and innovations would be made beyond the five-year period. It would take a well-organized effort. But the expertise exists. Public approval exists. Without such a program the government would continue to be derelict in its duty to the U.S. populace.

3. The antiballistic missile (ABM) program should be revived. Capable only of *DEFENDING* target areas it would serve as a valuable deterrent. The neutron “bomb”—a frightening threat against the *ATTACKER*—should be perfected and deployed. Laser and particle-beam weapons (also *DEFENSE* weapons) development must be greatly accelerated. These should be tied in with space programs. As Edward Teller has pointed out, American technology is its ace card. In his August 1978 *Journal of Civil Defense* article “Technology—America’s Miracle?” Teller says:

Fortunately, there is one important technical field in which we are much better than the Russians. This is electronics...

This technology has been used primarily for peaceful purposes; but in the Vietnam conflict we

started to use related technologies in smart bombs, bombs which were not merely fired in the general direction of the enemy, but which knew where they were going. There are many ways to instruct a person and also many ways to instruct and communicate with a piece of apparatus. But this is merely a first step.

I claim that airplanes, ships and tanks may become things of the past...

With a full exploitation of American technology the defeatist downhill trend of the 60s and 70s can even at this late hour be reversed. With such an exploitation new possibilities will open up.

4. American resolve must never be allowed to flag again. “We all know the dimensions of the problem,” said Congressman Donald J. Mitchell in his Kansas City banquet address, and his outline of methods of obtaining an effective civil defense needs to be studied, taken seriously and applied.

PEACE AND FREEDOM...

No longer can America afford to be swayed by pantywaist politicians and moralists bent on substituting effete “rights” for our traditional pioneer brand of patriotic duty. A public awakening is now in progress that must be fully pushed to national-interest conclusions. One manifestation of this beginning renaissance is

“American resolve must never be allowed to flag again.”

a heady return to flag waving on U.S. college campuses. The Iranian experience has inspired Americans to turn back to unabashed love of country.

This happy turn of events can be construed as a first step in answer to the challenge made by Congressman Ike Skelton in the February 1979 issue of the *Journal*. Said Skelton:

Our government is guilty of what I like to call ‘analytical impotence.’ We’ve done little more than discuss the pros and cons of civil defense. We’ve analyzed ourselves into a position where our civil defense is impotent. We need action and we need it now!!!

If that’s what we are now doing, and if we keep it up, then we are being true to our heritage, and all will be well. Peace and freedom depend upon it. Amen. □

venient, well-nurtured delusions. One of these is that civil defense is provocative. And its sister *contradictory* delusion is that civil defense is useless. Even though they cancel each other out critics of civil defense are prone to use them side by side. In the shadow of this kind of argument our leadership feels justified in spending well over \$1,000 a head for sophisticated protected space for 200,000 government and military personnel—but practically nothing for 220,000,000 taxpayers and dependents who foot the bill for the former. One reply to this inequity is that with improved weaponry VIP protection needs to be much better—and therefore it is quite all right that the public is left unprotected.

With this kind of logic it is no wonder that Leon Goure can say: "If we want to jump off the bridge that is our affair, and Moscow will only applaud..."

CD delusions blandly ignore the conclusions reached by numerous studies commissioned by government. "Civil Defense Needs of High Risk Areas," a March 1979 study commissioned by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency said:

The performance of the current CD program would be inadequate under conditions of nuclear attack, particularly so in case of a full-scale attack.

Given that the population is highly vulnerable in its normal state, CD programs must seek to do two things:

—Provide shelter protection

—Move people to adequate shelter by the time of attack

If one assumes that the warning time will be limited to 15 to 30 minutes, only the dedicated [professionally constructed] blast shelter program is effective.

4. Criticism of the pathetic U.S. civil defense situation has come from respected sources, including the American Security Council, Members of Congress, the Committee For the Present Danger, the United States Civil Defense Council, The American Civil Defense Association, and others. But answers have been few and hardly satisfactory. One answer is FEMA Director John Macy's reply to the "Kansas City Proclamation." While some of Macy's statements can be construed as being encouraging, we are reminded that President Carter's PD-41 is also encouraging. We can't live on encouraging statements. We need action. In the eyes of many of our serious civil defense people the only real result of PD-41 so far appears to be another decrease in the civil defense budget. Mr. Macy's statement (he quotes Secretary of Defense Harold



Frank Williams

Brown) that "the probability of nuclear attack upon the U.S. or its allies '... is very low at the present time'" sounds more like programmed wishful thinking

The Soviets ... deserve commendation

than realistic planning. Developments in the Iranian situation should show that this type of pronouncement is at least very fuzzy and very dangerous to American security.

5. Government has smugly looked to the people for indications of what needs to be done in the field of civil defense. But the people are no more qualified to set forth their needs in civil defense than they are to do so in the building of battleships, missiles or space ships. **The people have repeatedly indicated very clearly in polls that they want an effective civil defense and are willing to pay the price.** Beyond that it is a question of leadership accepting its responsibility. There is a leadership cop-out here. Leadership appears to be more interested in passing out sops to pave the way for reelection than in really protecting its citizens in today's complex world. The faith that the people have in leadership's attention to their safety has unfortunately been badly misplaced.

6. A crumbling economy complicates this picture. A shift from government attention to charity (a vote-saving gesture) over to government attention to survival (a lifesaving gesture) is required. It has not been in the cards. Is not now.

7. Civil defense organizations suffers from all this. While the Soviet Union appoints active-duty generals to its impressive civil defense hierarchy the United States appears to rely heavily on political appointments. The deplorably weak civil defense structure which results from the latter is felt also in the field where civil defense posts are filled by workers whose qualifications seem to rest mainly on their ability to stomach bureaucratic balderdash and starvation wages. While a community may often luck out by getting a CD director who is capable, conscientious and not dependent on a meager salary, more often than not it must be content with a local leadership bargain that only helps to sabotage the program.

IN RUSSIA: A "HUMANITARIAN CONCEPT"...

So much for a quick diagnosis. Perhaps part of it should be the fact that criticism is often levelled at the Soviet Union for the emphasis it places on civil defense and the money and effort expended on a program that effectively protects its people, its leaders and its industry. The Soviets, however, deserve commendation rather than criticism. Protection for any people anywhere is a humanitarian concept, and it is a vital part of overall Soviet defense machinery. It never has been a secret, and the thought advanced by some American planners that both the Soviets and the Americans would expose their populations to annihilation is only another "made in America" delusion. Years ago Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin said:

a better understanding of how his unit will fit into the overall picture. He also leaves with a general recognition of the responsibilities and operations of all agencies that will be working together. This concept gives the graduate the working knowledge to coordinate a major air disaster.

The course draws its instructors from leading authorities in their fields. Most of the staff of ten are brought in from active safety-related organizations throughout the United States and are retained for their specialized backgrounds and teaching abilities. Captain John X. Stefanki, who is Chairman of the Air Line Pilots Association's Fire and Rescue Committee, teaches sessions on community disaster planning and the conduct of

Gil Haas has spent thirty years in the field of public safety, specializing in all facets of aircraft crash management. He is technical advisor and lecturer for Arizona State University's Aircraft Crash Management course, and has been director of Lee County, Florida's Division of Protective Services since 1974.

disaster drills. Dr. James Turnbow is a professor at Arizona State University's School of Engineering, and he coordinated early FAA crash tests on airliners. His classes help the students comprehend the dynamics and forces exerted in a crash. And, as the sole survivor of a major crash, George Burk speaks with authority on crash survivability.

After receiving certificates from Arizona State University's School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, the students are given the opportunity to comment on the course. Typical reactions are:

"Presentations well prepared."


"Photos graphic and informative."

"All material pertinent."


"Provided me with a good basis for planning."

Present planning calls for the incorporation of a crash simulator into the existing program and the possibility of the designation of an advanced crash management class. The innovation could lead to the development of an entire new series of courses.

The International Center for Safety Education has extensive background in aircraft and vehicle safety and crash investigation fields. Its diversified curriculum has for many years been of great benefit to investigators and safety specialists from the military,



Increased air travel along with large-size aircraft dictate a need for air disaster planning in every community. (Photo by Chuck Vogelsong)



Field photography is taught as a method of documenting and recording events as they occur. Photos, films and TV tapes provide valuable records. (Photo by Wayne Lunsford)

federal transportation agencies, and industry.

There is a growing need to create other specialized courses that will aid the public safety sector as well. Since air disasters pose a threat to every community, a course of this type would

provide a forum for development and dissemination of valuable information.

And if a community or individual agency can plan effective mobilization for a major air disaster, then it should be able to readily adapt to other types of disaster. □

COURSES NOW OFFERED BY ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY'S INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SAFETY EDUCATION:

Aircraft Crash Management
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For further information contact:
International Center for Safety Education
P.O. Box 968
Tempe, AZ 85281

AIRCRAFT CRASH MANAGEMENT

Course Content:

Crash Dynamics
Crash Site Problems
Disaster Planning
Equipment
Aircraft Structures
Victim Care
Transportation
Photography
Victim Identification
Accident Investigation
Aerial Applicators
Crash Survivability
Extinguishing Agents
Egress and Extraction

TOO GOOD TO FILE

President Carter advised Frank Reynolds that during the past week he has learned more about "the Russians" (it would have been diplomatic to have said "the Soviet government") "than even the previous two and a half years before that." Perhaps President Carter will request an invitation from Notre Dame to go back there this spring and recant the speech in 1977 in which he spoke so scornfully about our "inordinate fear of communism."

— Columnist William F. Buckley Jr.

In the recent period the NATO countries have been raising a hullabaloo about the "Soviet military threat." The imperialists resort to all sorts of means, including slander, lies, hypocrisy, blackmail, falsification, wooing, cowering and deliberate rudeness in order to deceive the masses and to urge them to believe that the non-existent "Soviet threat" exists.

In the USA this bogey rallied a motley crowd which declared itself a coalition for peace from position of strength.

— Soviet Military Review

Explaining why he now proposes defense increases that he adamantly opposed three months ago, Carter said that Iran is a "reminder" that America must be strong and must take "the world as it is."

I do not know what is more disturbing, the evidence that a national leader needs to be reminded of such things, or the suggestion that, suddenly, somehow, times have changed.

— Columnist George Will

In mining the coal needed to produce 1 billion kwh of electricity, no less than 1,060 coal miners lose their lives — 1,000 by black lung disease, the rest by accidents. In mining the uranium to produce the same amount of power in presently used nuclear plants, 20 miners lose their lives, and if the power were produced by breeders (which use far less uranium), that number would be further reduced to 0.07 — an unparalleled opportunity of increasing safety and saving human lives.

— Petr Beckmann

What Khomeini has done, without intending to do so, is to make the American people pay attention to the facts.

— Columnist James Reston

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

REQUIRED RELEASE OF 220 MILLION AMERICAN HOSTAGES

Editor, *Journal of Civil Defense*

We need your immediate assistance in bringing before the public and the Congress the uses which can be made of surplus grain (8 million tons of excess). As you are fully aware there is no food or water in the majority of civil defense shelters — I would say about 95% of the shelters are without food or water. With the excess grain we have a wonderful opportunity to begin a stocking program of placing freeze-dried and dehydrated foods in the shelters and in emergency storage. We must be like Joseph in the Bible — stock for the years ahead.

One of the waste products of the gasohol process is gluten, a very important food item. The U.S. should push the gasohol program and it would result in plenty of gluten for processed foods. The excess grains can be used to provide food for the civil defense shelters and we have plenty of room to store the wheat, corn and other grains which are in excess of even that in the underground facilities which surround the K.C. area. Food could also be stored in the salt mines in the State of Kansas. We must quit kidding ourselves. We are in a life and death struggle with Communism and only an all-out effort can save the U.S. The military forces have to be rebuilt, new weapons systems developed and we have to get the 220 million hostages released from the Russians. Without a civil defense program, they hold all of our citizens as hostages due to their weapons systems and *their* civil defense program.

Please work to get our Senators and Congressmen behind a food stocking program so we can fully utilize the excess grains which will result from the embargo. Don Meserve and I have already contacted Senators Dole, Kassenbaum, Eagleton, and Danforth about the proposed use of the grain. We also have Congressmen Skelton, Bolling, and Winn being told the same thing.

— John J. Nolan, Kansas City

10 YEARS AGO IN THE JOURNAL OF CIVIL DEFENSE (February 1970)

THE SILENT MAJORITY

— by Don F. Guier

When our leadership is silent, the majority remains silent; when our leadership speaks up, the majority responds. Civil defense is one of the national issues on which there is an impressive majority which is unfortunately silent.

About 85% of Americans report that they are favorable to civil defense. They also believe that Democrats, Republicans, the Congress, military leaders, scientists, the local mayor, the local editor and local clergymen are favorable, too.

About 85% of Americans believe it would be desirable to have fallout shelter throughout the nation, plus shelters against blast, heat and chemical and biological agents in large cities; and 75% consider it desirable to be able to evacuate people near military bases and in some large cities.

On the other hand, our pro-civil defense majority is silent as far as Washington is concerned. The fact that there is very little mail on civil defense leads Washington to assume that there is very little interest or support. This assumption has caused federal civil defense appropriations to decline to the point that they can no longer match the appropriations from scarce local funds by state and local governments. Less than a dime of each hundred dollars the federal government budgets for defense is spent on civil defense.

It is apparent that federal support for civil defense will languish until the majority of Americans make known to Washington their desire for better preparedness. It is equally apparent that the majority will remain silent until our leadership raises the issue, takes a position, and calls for support.

EDITORIAL

STORY OF FAILURE*

—Robert J. Horrigan

My associates and particularly myself have long been concerned that a creditable nuclear attack warning system for the public does not exist. You may be aware that the President issued Executive Order 10952 on July 20, 1961, directing the Secretary of Defense to assume responsibility for warning the public. For a long period of time, a combination of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), the National Warning System (NAWAS) and Civil Defense Sirens seemed to fulfill that requirement.

In February 1971, through personnel error, an attack warning was actually initiated within the EBS. The system failed in total; no warning broadcasts were made; the NAWAS carried no warning and no sirens were sounded. Instead of reacting with deep concern, the failure was rationalized and the EBS was removed as an instrument of Warning at the direction of Mr. Whitehead of the White House Office of Telecommunications. Civil Defense sirens have gradually disappeared over the years except in the midwest and Gulf Coast area where they serve the peacetime requirement to warn of tornados and hurricanes.

Through a series of actions, the federal agencies have inferred that warning the public is really a responsibility of local governments and that the NAWAS is intended to alert only local governments. This in spite of the fact that NAWAS does not reach a high percentage of local governments, which in actuality means that all of these people are completely without warning of any kind.

We have just experienced another total failure. Through faulty maintenance, operations and training procedures, false indications of an attack on the United States were introduced into the military system. Apparently for several minutes, it had to be assumed that an attack on the United States was underway. However, the NAWAS was strangely silent and local governments received no alert, which means actual missiles would have arrived without warning.

Warning time for Soviet missiles launched from land bases is fifteen minutes to southern United States and eleven minutes to northern U.S. Seaborne missiles would arrive with even less warning. Apparently, we do not have a decision-making process which would use the limited system we do have within the evident time frame.

In 1971 there was some public indignation when the system failed. In 1979, although news of the false alert reached the media, the public was not made aware that the only remaining public warning systems again failed to respond. Nor is the public generally aware that it has been directed that the EBS will not be used for warning. One would have to conclude that the federal departments have failed to act responsibly on directions given by the President. Now that Civil Preparedness has been transferred from the Defense Department, even less attention to this vital obligation can be expected.

If there is a national policy to warn the public in the event of nuclear attack, there appears no resolve at the federal level to carry it out. After establishing very expensive surveillance systems, we seem content to operate on a wait-and-see principle. The next indication of an attack may be the real one. Protests of local government representatives within the system have drawn defensive rather than constructive response. For that reason, a recommendation for a Congressional Investigation seems appropriate.


*"Story of Failure" is the text of a letter from Southern California Emergency Services Association President Robert J. Horrigan to U.S. Congressman Donald J. Mitchell of New York.

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MASSIVE DEFENSE vs. "MASSIVE CRISIS"



Civil defense has long been considered an integral part of Soviet defense capability. Since Lenin's time, it has been recognized that protection of the workers must be given very special attention; otherwise, winning a war and the subsequent survival and reconstruction would not be possible.¹ The USSR Civil Defense organization is evidence of Russian dedication to this idea. The training exercises conducted by all industrial installations, state farms, collective farms, educational institutions, etc., have been continually upgraded in order to involve the workers (and nearby residents) in realistic crisis situations. These people carry out complex CD tasks in specially equipped "training areas" which are constructed so that it is possible to simulate fire; smoke; debris; nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological contamination; downed utility lines; damaged water, sewer, and gas lines; etc. This type of training is taken very seriously,

and the CPSU (Communist Party Soviet Union) backs the activity wholeheartedly. It was decided several years ago that it was necessary to form a well-trained cadre who could perform leadership duties and direct the action necessary in emergency situations. Below is an excerpt from a report² of a typical training exercise.

Residents of Chernigov . . . were greatly surprised by an unusual picture. Bulldozers, excavators, truck cranes, lift trucks, mobile generators and compressors, vehicles with people wearing special clothing, trucks with some kind of machinery, and even an ambulance were moving along the streets in strict order.

"What is this? Where are so many vehicles going?" Those knowledgeable answered: "A civil defense exercise." This formation had to perform rescue and emergency reconstruction work at an installation of the city economy in a "center of mass destruction."

The column halted after arriving at Ulitsa Shchorsa . . . Precise, uninterrupted work got into full swing. The ruins of the old two-story mill ceased to exist. The enormous obstruction was eliminated, "the people in trouble were saved," and approach routes to the "important installation" were cleared. And all this was done by one civil defense detachment in a few hours.

Such reports are no longer infrequent, isolated occurrences. Soviet

civil defense is being improved constantly and is viewed as a very *important* part of the over-all defense strategies of the USSR.³ It is recognized that the problems of preparing an effective program of protection are many and varied. There is no end to the complex array of dangers that must be met and coped with. One that seems to cause the Soviets a considerable amount of concern is the possibility of chemical and bacteriological warfare.⁴ [Note: In the late 1960's President Nixon unilaterally renounced biological warfare, and ordered the dismantling or destruction of all US munition stocks and production capability.]

As shown by the events of recent years, the plans for preparing a new world war nurtured by the most shameless circles of the imperialists envisage the extensive use of chemical, radioactive, and bacteriological means for destroying agricultural crops in order to cause hunger and undermine the economy and morale of the population.

It stands to reason that it is practically impossible to completely protect plants directly in the field. But by opportunely carrying out a complex of organizational, agrotechnical, and agrochemical measures it is possible to reduce harvest losses significantly. . . .

Production of vegetables in covered soil (hothouses) is increasing annually in our country. That means, in case the enemy employs mass destruction weapons, their harvest will prac-

tically not be contaminated with RV (radioactive substances) or herbicides in dangerous doses.

This article goes on to advise various methods of protecting agricultural products in a contaminated environment—and gives evidence that postwar planning is not being ignored by Soviet civil defense people.

Although the Soviet civil defense program far exceeds the U.S. one⁵ in scope, funding, and activity, perhaps the following quotes will serve as an indication that the atmosphere is changing in regard to a rethinking of our needs in the area of defense of our own people.

At an international conference on the future of NATO in Brussels on September 1, 1979, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the following statements.⁶

I have said in the United States that if present trends continue, the 80s will be a period of massive crisis for all of us. Never in history has it happened that

a nation achieved superiority in all significant weapons' categories without seeking to translate it at some point into some foreign policy benefit. . . . To conduct business as usual is to entrust one's destiny to the will of others. . . .

Since the middle 1960s the growth of the Soviet strategic force has been massive. . . . And the amazing phenomenon about which historians will ponder is that all of this has happened without the United States attempting to make a significant effort to rectify that state of affairs. One reason was that it was not easy to rectify. But another reason was the growth of a school of thought [Author's Note: This will be a familiar one to civil defenders—it has been used often.] to which I, myself, contributed, and many around this conference table also contributed, which considered that strategic stability was a military asset and in which the amazing

theory developed, i.e., historically amazing, that vulnerability contributed to peace and invulnerability contributed to the risks of war.

. . . Now we have reached that situation so devoutly worked for by the arms control community: we are indeed vulnerable.

. . . It (MAD) was a general theory that suffered two drawbacks. One was that the Soviets did not believe it, and the other is that we have not yet bred a race of supermen that can implement it.

. . . Against all evidence we were told that ABM would ruin the chances of arms control. [Author's Note: Just as civil defense proponents are told that a reasonable U.S. CD program would upset detente.] The fact was the Kosygin in 1967 told President Johnson that *the idea of not engaging in defense was one of most ridiculous propositions that he had ever heard* (emphasis added). □

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¹V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 359: "The primary productive factor of all humanity is the laboring man, the worker. If he survives we can save everything and restore everything . . . but we shall perish if we are not able to save him."

²Col. K. Ogloblin, "In the Name of the Entire City. . . .," Moscow, *Voyennyye Znaniya* in Russian, No. 7, July 1979, as reported in JPRS-74420 *USSR Report*, pp. 31-35, Oct. 22, 1979.

³Colonel General A. Altunin, "Move Forward, Onward," *Voyennyye Znaniya*, No. 10, Oct. 1974: "The security of the country is insured by the Soviet Armed Forces, our country's reliable shield. But as was noted by Mar SU A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense, in his just-published book, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, the nature of modern warfare makes it necessary to organize reliable defense not only of particular installations, as was done during the last war, but also to have a carefully thought-out and organized system of measures to insure stable operation of the entire national economy and reliable defense of the population over the entire territory of the country. Civil Defense, which today is a factor of strategic importance in insuring the vital activity of the state, plays a special part in fulfilling this mission."

⁴V. Il'in, Doctor of Biological Sciences, "Protection of Plants," Moscow *Voyennyye Znaniya* in Russian, No. 7, July 1979, as reported in JPRS-74420, *USSR Report*, pp. 35-38, Oct. 22, 1979.


⁵Director of Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Civil Defense*, July 1978, pp. 2-3: "Leadership: The Soviets probably have sufficient blast-shelter space in hardened command posts for virtually all the leadership elements at all levels (about 110,000 people). *Essential Work Force*: Shelters at key economic installations would accommodate about 12 to 24 percent of the total work forces. However, Soviet plans do not call for sheltering the entire work force. In a crisis, nonessential and off-duty workers would be evacuated. *Population*: A minimum of 10 to 20 percent of the total population in urban areas (including essential workers) could be accommodated at present in blast-resistant shelters. By 1985, the percentage of urban population that could be sheltered would rise to 15 to 30 percent, assuming no change in the present rate of shelter construction. *Cost*: While total civil defense costs are unknown, cost estimates have been made of three major elements of the Soviet program, pay for full-time civil defense personnel, operation of specialized civil defense military units, and shelter construction. The costs of these elements in 1976 amounted to about

400 million rubles, less than 1 percent of the estimated Soviet defense budget. If these three elements of the Soviet program were to be duplicated in the United States, they would have cost about \$2 billion in 1976 with about three-fourths of this representing manpower costs. (These estimates should be considered rough approximations. They are affected by uncertainties both in the quantitative data on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)"

Bardyl R. Tirana, former director Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, *Civil Defense: The Unthinkable and the Non-doable*, August 1, 1979, p. 7, "At the present time, the United States has for all practical purposes no genuine defense against the threat of nuclear attack."

⁶Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO: The Next Thirty Years," as documented in *Survival*, "NATO Defense and the Soviet Threat," Nov.-Dec. 1979, pp. 264-268.

⁷Sidney D. Drell, "A Debate," *Physics Today*, Vol. 29, No. 4, April 1976, page 55, "Implementation of an extensive civil-defense system through massive training will affect the priorities of our own society and will require heightened concern about nuclear war, which would counter the progress that has been made toward reduced international tensions."



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GERMAN LEGISLATORS CALL FOR CIVIL DEFENSE UPGRADING

*From ZS-MAGAZIN, official
West German Civil Defense
publication.*

In a two-hour debate over the proposition [of total defense] in a planning session of the [West] German Bundestag on June 27, 1979 representatives of all three political parties and the Ministry of the Interior took fully-developed positions on the related subjects of total defense and civil defense. During the frequently spirited discussion a far reaching overall agreement as the general objective was apparent: civil defense must be strengthened.

*[Following is ZS-Magazin's
verbatim transcript of por-
tions of one of the legis-
lator's address]*

Dr. Dregger: . . . Total defense, civil defense, civil protection, shelter construction: in all these questions we are talking about the matter of the existence and the security of our people. For years we've been marking time. Critiques and suggestions from the opposition were neither disapproved nor taken into consideration, small improvements were hailed as great successes. Members of the government expressed their opinions in committee. In open session during this legislative period they have up until today kept carefully quiet. One has the impression that the government as well as the opposition would rather forget the subject . . .

The national government in the

former debate [1977] gave no answer—it said nothing. Why? Out of indifference? Out of shame for its neglect? Out of respect for Moscow? Or perhaps out of respect for the left wing of the government parties? . . .

First, the development of civil protection is an indispensable ingredient of war-prevention strategy, for the German military—which is based on conscription—could not do battle if the soldiers' dependents

four main points of total defense: first, an institutionalized cooperation between civil and military defense. Second, the strengthening of the civil protection organization. Third, the building of shelter. And Fourth, the guarantee of public services during crises and periods of tension . . .

An attack against the Republic of Germany would not be made against the Army alone, but directed against everyone—men and women, old

**First, the development of civil protection is
an indispensable ingredient of war-prevention
strategy . . .**

were unprotected and exposed to annihilation. But if the military can't fight then neither can it be respected or make its expected contribution toward the securing of peace.

Second, if our war-prevention strategy fails then civil protection means everything for our people. It is more necessary for our people than for any other, because with the offensive strategy of the East as well as the defensive strategy of the West our territory in case of war would be the main theater of combat.

In the June 22 debate I mentioned

people and children, city and countryside, the government and the economy. It was so in both world wars; and it will be the same in any future war. War's totality would only be augmented, and the attacker's Fifth Columns would be active in all quarters. Such an attack would be a combination of misinformation, subversion, propaganda, intimidation, terrorism of every kind and military action . . .

Most important is my conviction on the introduction of a shelter requirement, particularly for all new public and private construction. . . ☐

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