


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
VOLUME XVII — NUMBER 1

# Journal of Civil Defense



NUCLEAR WINTER  
MESSAGE TO FEMA  
SHELTER — AND CRP

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# The American Civil Defense Association

# Journal of Civil Defense

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Emergency Government and Concerned Citizenry

VOLUME XVII — NUMBER 1

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
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
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
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
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## ANOTHER YEAR OF STRUGGLE

When Ronald Reagan took office three years ago, it seemed that the fortunes of civil defense should take a turn for the better. For one thing, the preceding decade had seen an intense strategic debate that had led to an apparent consensus that a policy of mutual assured destruction (the MAD policy) was not a valid strategic policy. Vain attempts to achieve some measure of assured destruction, however defined, merely fueled the arms race. Mutual assured destruction was not essential to deterrence. Despite the high levels of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Iron Curtain, a nuclear war would be survivable by much of the population in any event and by most if some attention and resources were devoted to strategic defenses and, in particular, civil defense. This seemed certain to be the Soviet view in light of their heavy investment in air defense and civil defense.

### MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION . . . NOT ESSENTIAL TO DETERRENCE.

Candidate Reagan also had a group of defense advisors who, although primarily concerned about the tilt of the offensive balance toward the Soviet Union, also recognized the need to reduce the vulnerability of the American people to nuclear attack. The candidate himself spoke out on the subject and made a new commitment to civil defense an integral part of his national defense program. Moreover, the candidate and his advisors perceived a "window of vulnerability" in the mid to late 1980s when the U.S. would be susceptible to a disarming first strike unless something was done about the situation quickly. With respect to protection of the population, a major shelter-building effort was argued to be the best long-term solution but not deployable to meet the more immediate threat of the 1980s. Fortunately, the Carter administration had become concerned enough about the Soviet civil defense program to undertake policy studies and to propose in principle a crisis relocation posture similar to one well advanced in the USSR. Support seemed assured in the House Armed Services Committee and elsewhere on Capitol Hill when a move to reflect the Carter civil defense program in a new Title V of the Civil Defense Act of 1950 succeeded.

When President Reagan took office, he made many significant changes in the budget proposal he inherited from the Carter administration, especially with respect to increased military expenditures, but he let the Carter budget for civil defense alone while a newly announced policy review was undertaken. Civil defense advocates in the Congress were outraged. They thought the new administration should move ahead with the program that had gained agreement in the form of a presidential directive and a modification to the civil defense act. The House Armed Services Committee pushed through an authorization far in excess of the President's request but the appropriations committees took advantage of the temporizing on the part of the new administration to maintain the status quo. In retrospect, the Spring of 1981 was the golden opportunity that never reappeared once it was passed by. The nuclear freeze movement was getting organized in response to the Reagan defense buildup and the NATO decision to counterbalance the Soviet deployment of SS20 missiles. By the time the administration had done its civil defense study and had installed a new leadership in the Federal Emergency Management Agency, key Congressional supporters had decided to retire and the momentum of past years had dissolved in the face of renewed controversy.

For two successive years, the Reagan administration has approached the Congress to obtain funds for the first year of a stretched-out deployment of much the same program as the

Carter administration proposed. Requesting about \$250 million as the down payment on a \$4 billion effort, FEMA has had to be content with a modest increase over the current funding (\$169 million last year). As the freeze movement succeeded in converting the slogan that a nuclear war is unwinnable into the myth that a nuclear war is not survivable, FEMA management ducked the issue and attempted unsuccessfully to hide the civil defense effort, which accounts for about 40 percent of

### THE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM HAS ACTED AS A LIGHTNING ROD.

FEMA's operating budget and nearly all of its assistance to State and local governments, in a dual-use program device called the Integrated Emergency Management System. Faced with marching up Capitol Hill again in an election year, FEMA Director Giuffrida last June initiated a reassessment of a multi-year civil defense program the administration and the previous administration had been proposing. The reassessment took into consideration the IEMS approach, the refusal of the Congress to appropriate funds sufficient to meet the President's civil defense policy objectives, and the need to sound out the State and local apparatus as to the merits of the program. A task group carried out the reassessment, interviewing many officials at the national, regional, State, and local levels, and presenting their draft report and recommendations in early August. A "highlights" document now available indicates that, although many participants took the opportunity to air their favorite gripes, both the civil defense program elements and the IEMS approach stood up very well. In particular, there was little tendency at State and local level to back away from nuclear attack preparedness and many suggestions to hew to the term, "civil defense." The consensus was that more money was needed if progress were to be made and the task group recommended a budget of \$290 million for the upcoming fiscal year.

Meanwhile, the nuclear freeze movement has stepped up its attacks on the Reagan defense policy. The civil defense program has acted as a lightning rod for such groups, who perceive it as a vulnerable part of the defense buildup. ABC aired "The Day After", which attempted to depict the aftermath of a nuclear attack. The Physicians for Social Responsibility, already on record with "The Last Epidemic" are now publishing a new attack on the crisis relocation program called the "Counterfeit Ark". But the big shakeup has been the publicizing of the "nuclear winter" theory by Carl Sagan and associates. Briefly, it is argued that a nuclear exchange could inject enough smoke and dust into the atmosphere to result in below-freezing temperatures for "up to several months" with an impact on plant and animal life that "could be enough to destroy the current civilization in at least the Northern Hemisphere." If these predictions were proved valid, there would be profound implications for the strategic policies and programs of both the US and USSR. The issue almost certainly will be raised in congressional hearings on FEMA's new budget request, which begin before Congressman Ron Dellum's subcommittee in February or March. Before then, a study group of the National Academy of Sciences is likely to report on the "nuclear winter" theory. There are many uncertainties in the models and methodologies underlying this prediction and the National Academy may convene a meeting in March to examine and assess the assumptions. It is also possible that the National Climate Program Policy Board established under the National Climate Act will be asked to investigate. Thus, the new year, 1984, appears to be another that will see a struggle to attain some measure of nuclear protection for the people of the United States.

*Carsten M. Haaland's address on "Facts and Weapons Effects" at the 1983 TACDA seminar was received with unbridled enthusiasm. Haaland is recognized by scientific colleagues and the public alike as a top authority in the nuclear weapons field. Here he proves that point again.*

# NUCLEAR WINTER AND NATIONAL SECURITY

— Carsten M. Haaland

I began having nuclear nightmares fifteen years ago, long before it became generally fashionable to have them. Few people in America thought about nuclear weapons during those years of detente under Brezhnev's guidance, during which the Soviet Union was quietly building up its military capability. But during these last four years following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas, 1979, there has been a gradual crescendo of fear of nuclear weapons in the United States, culminating in the last two months of 1983 in the pronouncement of Nuclear Winter by Sagan and Ehrlich, and in the showing of the movie "The Day After."

A large majority of Americans are currently asking a lot of questions. Their main question is this: how can we prevent nuclear war? It is apparent to me that Americans have been kept dreadfully ignorant on what to do to protect themselves in case deterrence fails and on defensive measures in general.

## AMERICANS HAVE BEEN KEPT DREADFULLY IGNORANT . . .

Speakers for the nuclear freeze groups and their publications dwell on the horrors of nuclear weapons effects, but never discuss how persons might protect themselves. Some of them go further and attack defense, stating that shelters or ballistic missile defense systems are sheer folly. Because I have spent twenty years of my life studying ways to defend against nuclear weapons, and I know there are effective defenses, it catches my attention when these people scrupulously avoid taking into account any kind of defense, or when others try so

hard to denounce the effectiveness of defense. And now we have a new horror introduced into the picture. If these anti-defenders are backed into a corner by someone who knows the facts about shelters, they can say, "Oh well, there won't be much use for shelters if there's going to be a Nuclear Winter." I was on the same TV panel show with Paul Ehrlich in Kansas City immediately following the showing of "The Day After" when he said those very words!

One of the principal arguments against shelters by speakers for the Physicians for Social Responsibility is that shelters will become crematoria for those inside. What good are shelters, they say, that protect you from being broiled and blasted if you're going to be burned alive in them, or perhaps die from lack of oxygen or poisonous gases? Do they really not know, or do they prefer to ignore the fact that in the most ferocious firestorm in world history, the one in Hamburg in 1943, out of 280,000 people trapped within the firestorm area, 85% survived primarily because of shelters?

A nationwide blast shelter program to provide 100 million blast shelters for those in likely target areas would cost this nation a total of about 100 billion dollars, less than half the Department of Defense budget for one year (\$256 billion for 1984). Of course we couldn't get this program started instantly. We would have to spend the 100 billion dollars over a period of several years. This program would not only educate the people on defense against nuclear weapons, a most urgent and important step, but would also provide stockpiles of food, water, medical supplies, and radiological instruments, in addition to providing the shelters. These steps were started

over 15 years ago by the Soviet Union.

In the book titled *Nuclear Freeze!*, allegedly written by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, there are 26 pages devoted to a table listing American cities and their populations. It is stated that these cities and their populations would be totally destroyed by nuclear air bursts. In order for these populations within these cities to be destroyed, it is obviously assumed that the people are totally uneducated on defense against nuclear weapons, totally unwarned, and totally without blast shelters. That is the way it was at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Unfortunately, that would be the actual state of the situation for most people in American cities today, and that's the way it appeared to be in Kansas City in the movie "The Day After."

What I find to be reprehensible about the Kennedy and Hatfield book is that nowhere is it stated or suggested that people in blast shelters would survive even if they were located directly beneath the particular air bursts that were assumed. The overpressure on the ground directly below these airbursts would not exceed about fifty pounds per square inch. The shelters in the nationwide blast shelter program that I mentioned before would provide protection for overpressures up to 100 pounds per square inch.

The book by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield makes a special effort to devote a whole chapter, Chapter 5, titled "The Illusion of Civil Defense," to attempt to prove that shelters are useless. The results of several government-funded research studies by independent contractors have shown time and again that the blast shelter system I mentioned above could result in an expected 180-200 million surviving

Americans after a 5000-7000 megaton attack instead of just 80-100 million survivors. One hundred million lives saved in the event of the failure of deterrence, for a price of one-half of one year's cost of maintaining the deterrence! Yet it would be much better if it didn't happen at all. And it would be less likely to happen if the attacker knew that our wills to survive were strong enough to prepare for survival in the event of a nuclear attack.

In the late 60s and early 70s, many officials in the Department of Defense were saying that shelters were unnecessary because the policy of MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction, would deter any attacks. These officials seemed to think that this policy would be effective forever, and that no country would make any mis-

ing increasingly concerned about the international situation is this: our old policies of deterrence may become obsolete and they might not protect us in the coming years.

The anti-defenders always assume that deterrence has already failed and we are being covered with nuclear explosions. They have argued that no defense is possible. But now, just in case a defense might be possible, they have brought up the idea of a Nuclear Winter.

The creators of the scenario for a Nuclear Winter say that there will be so much smoke from fires and dust from bomb craters after a major nuclear war that the sun will be blocked out and temperatures will fall. The doom ecologists led by Paul Ehrlich then run with this scenario and predict the end of life.

### THE DOOM ECOLOGISTS . . . PREDICT THE END OF LIFE.

takes. It appears to many that deterrence can take credit for producing the longest stretch of peace at any time in European history. But there is always the unpredictable international situation, and this predictable one: back in 1973, Brezhnev said at a meeting of the Communist Party in Prague, "... a decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that, come 1985, we will be able to extend our will wherever we need to." He was referring to their achievements under detente, getting our technology, our grain, and building the most massive war machine the world has ever known.

At the present time, even Robert McNamara is beginning to have doubts about the effectiveness of MAD, as indicated by his article in the last issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Will a President dare to use his nuclear forces of retaliation, his weapons of alleged assured destruction, when the American people are bare naked in defense against nuclear weapons? Not only are we Americans undefended, but we are for the most part ignorant about the possibility of such defense, while the Soviet people have not only been trained during and after their school years about civil defense but also have been provided with fallout shelters, blast shelters, and stores of grain and water. I believe that one of the main reasons Americans are becom-

The originators of this scenario were Paul Crutzen of the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Mainz, West Germany, and John W. Birks of the University of Colorado. Their paper appeared in a special issue of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences publication called *AMBIO* in 1982. Now a group of American scientists has picked up the idea and has published a paper in *SCIENCE* with the title "Global Atmospheric Consequences of Nuclear War." The authors are Turco, Toon, Ackermann, Pollack, and Sagan, forming the acronym TTAPS, which they have used for emotional effectiveness.


Some of my colleagues and I have reviewed the TTAPS paper. We find a number of highly questionable assumptions and some omissions in their theoretical model that, if modified, could entirely wipe out the Nuclear Winter syndrome. Without going into technical detail, I will only mention two questionable aspects of their model.

First, the amount of soot they assume to be put into the air by fires appears to be unreasonably high, for several reasons. For example, American cities are assumed to burn like the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where most of the houses were constructed of bamboo and rice paper, nearly every house had a hibachi with glowing

coals in it, and the population density (about 50,000 per square mile) was ten to forty times higher than in most American cities. Of course, if there were as much soot in the air as they assume, and if the particles remained there for weeks, as they assume, there would be a climatic effect.

The second questionable aspect of the TAPPS paper is that it appears that effects of natural scavenging processes, such as rain and other weather phenomena, have not been adequately investigated. Can you imagine a stagnant air system over the United States after the violent energy inputs of thousands of nuclear detonations through the country? I personally suspect that if their assumptions and their model were applied to the Great Chicago Fire of 1871, the results would show that our climate today would still be affected by soot in the air from that fire. I believe many scientists will come to realize that this work is not well-founded and needs much more investigation. Yet we have already been treated to a nationwide spread in *PARADE* magazine, on Sunday, October 30, as if the postulations of a Nuclear Winter were indeed a fact!

One reason why this country doesn't have shelters may be that the big picture of this country after a large nuclear attack, even with civil defense, is still too depressing to contemplate. Our cities would be destroyed. Much of the nation would be covered with radioactive fallout, and large areas would still be dan-



Carsten M. Haaland

gerous after a year. But, even after a devastating attack of 5000-7000 megatons, I believe from my studies, despite claims of the Nuclear Winter proponents, that crops could be planted in over 80% of the agricultural areas within a few months to a

### ... CIVIL DEFENSE ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH ...

year after the attack. However, even with a good civil defense program, the superpower status of this nation would no longer exist. The nation would be relegated to the bleak prospect of mere survival and picking up the pieces.

From this picture it is apparent that civil defense alone is not enough to protect our American way of life. An active defense is essential. President Reagan's initiative in his speech of last March 23rd raises a new hope. New technology can be

used to build a defense in space against missiles, whether it be High Frontier or the use of directed-energy weapons. This forward-layer defense must be backed up by mid-course defense to destroy those missiles that penetrate the forward-layer defense, and a final active defense must be placed around those special places, such as cities and certain military targets, to protect them against the missiles that penetrate the first two layers. Finally, and this is most important, there must be a civil defense system including blast shelters to protect people from those weapons that penetrate all three layers of the active defenses in the event that deterrence fails.

The anti-defenders will counter these defense ideas first by saying they aren't feasible. When it becomes evident that these defenses are feasible, they will say that the Soviets will simply build more offensive weapons to overcome our

defenses. There are two responses to this argument. First, we have the economic and technological capability to stay ahead of them if we have

### ... DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT CANNOT HURT THE ENEMY ...

the will to do it. And after the initial cost of the radar and computer systems have been paid for, our cost for many non-nuclear *defensive* missiles will be much less than their cost for one nuclear *offensive* missile. The second response may be more important to peaceloving Americans: It is more humane and moral, more in line with all of our teachings, our ethics and our deepest instincts, to keep ourselves strong by building defensive systems that cannot hurt the enemy than to make more offensive weapons designed to kill and destroy the enemy. □



FEMA Director General Louis O. Giuffrida (right) accepts portrait of Dr. Eugene P. Wigner for FEMA from TACDA President Frank Williams. TACDA Vice President Charles L. Badley looks on at left. The portrait now hangs in Giuffrida's outer office. Plans are being made for a formal unveiling during the NCCEM mid-winter conference in Washington, D.C. February 26-29.

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# TOO GOOD TO FILE

I am referring to one simple, frightening fact: *The United States has literally no defense system to guard against a Soviet nuclear attack!*

... As any military man can tell you, a nation that is unwilling or unable to defend itself from foreign attacks will eventually perish, no matter how strong its offense.

— General Daniel O. Graham  
High Frontier

It remains true that the best way to survive a nuclear war is, through the judicious application of a combination of military force and diplomacy, to avoid one. And that is the policy of the Reagan administration.

Nevertheless, any government that does not work to increase the chances of survival of the largest possible portion of its civilian population in the awful event of such an attack is failing in its duty.

What the Reagan administration is doing in this respect — or proposing to do — is adequate, but just barely so. The White House is asking for \$4.3 billion over a seven-year period ending in 1989, most of it devoted to plans to evacuate two-thirds of the country's population from 400 high-risk areas to more than 3,000 sites in rural America.

— Smith Hempstone  
*The Washington Times*

We have heard a lot lately about freedom of the press but, except for Reed Irvine, not much about accuracy. Years ago, Walter Lippman wrote, "... the right to freedom of speech is no license to deceive, and willful misrepresentation is a violation of its principles. . . There is no more right to deceive than there is a right to swindle, to cheat or to pick pockets." To pretend knowledge you don't have or to misuse knowledge you do is to deceive. This is precisely what the peace movement does, and the media help. Almost anything the peace people say about nuclear war will get into print or on the air. But, except for the *Washington Times* and a few other papers, professionally-competent articles get short shrift . . .

Nuclear war is a deadly serious matter. Rational people understand that the world would be better and safer without nuclear weapons. But the weapons are here and the question is not whether they should go but how. This should be discussed calmly without the irrationality produced by fear. . .

— John F. Devaney, Sr.  
Washington, D.C.

... I know these people who decided to finance Yuri Andropov's campaign against NATO with \$7 million of their own. They are the kind of people who made the movie "Missing," which is full of anti-American lies about our policies in Chile. They are the kind of people who made "The China Syndrome," which is both a scare-attack on nuclear power and an indictment of corporate greed.

You see these people in expensive restaurants in mid-Manhattan wearing Italian suits and \$200 shoes. Lunch ordinarily costs \$50 on their gold cards . . .

This crowd is strong on "conscience" and "idealism," and backing Andropov's campaign against the Pershing II fits in with that. But they are also clawing corporate competitors, climbers of the greasy pole — and, naturally, "idealism" always has a practical side. . .

So isn't it simply mahrvellous, dahrling, to make some big ratings and some big bucks . . . by backing Andropov. You get the payoff, and you get the "idealism" at the same time.

You get the suits and the Guccis and the cocaine, and on top of it all you get the chance to despise Reagan, and Thatcher, and the West Germans. . .

This crowd that you see at the posh places in Manhattan and Beverly Hills is one of the most corrupt social groups in human history — they bring to mind Pompeii, Sodom — and one of the major components of their corruption is their stupid belief that they are idealists. . .

— Jeffrey Hart  
*The Washington Times*

London — After days of promotion and some political controversy, "The Day After," the American-made television film about nuclear devastation, was aired in Britain . . . yet few people were really stirred. Reflecting the condescension that often attends anything American, the movie was broadly panned on its merits.

"The hype and tripe flowed abundantly," *The Guardian* said in an editorial . . . *The Daily Telegraph* said Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had told some lunch guests at her weekend residence at Chequers . . . that she was "unimpressed" by the film . . .


Despite the generally heightened sensitivities in Europe on Nuclear issues in the aftermath of the deployment of new U.S. medium-range missiles, the reaction to "The Day After" appears to be as muted elsewhere as it has been here [in Great Britain]. The film has opened in movie theaters in West Germany and Denmark, where it is said to be doing good but not spectacular business.

— Peter Osnos  
*The Washington Post*

It is the United States which has been a hotbed of terrorism for a long time. Bloody terror, violence and robbery were the favorite weapons of those who conquered and settled the territory which became the United States. America with its capital in Washington arose and grew big and fat on the bones and the blood of the indigenous inhabitants who were almost entirely exterminated.

U.S. terrorism assumed especially large dimensions during the age of imperialism when black thoughts of world supremacy began to beset the incumbents of the White House. Proceeding toward their ambitious goals they literally walked over the corpses of people who had been murdered, tortured to death, or torn to pieces in the Philippines, China, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and other countries. A horrific act of eliminating peoples was the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki . . .

— A. Leontyev,  
*Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow)



## THE AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE ASSOCIATION

November 23, 1983

General Louis O. Giuffrida  
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Dear General:

I and my associates in The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA) certainly sympathize with the many difficulties you must contend with, especially trying to operate a preparedness program on a shoe-string budget. It often appears that popular decisions are impossible and that you are criticized from all sides.

Our sympathy, understanding and our sincere appreciation of your constructive attitude toward TACDA, however, do not obscure the fact that civil defense has over the past 20 years deteriorated from a barely mediocre program that at least held out some promise of improvement to a tragically inadequate program that seems to hold only a promise of further deterioration.

It is distasteful and painful for me to have to admit this and further to have to admit that I have been involuntarily involved in the deterioration process.

Some of the points which relate to this situation and which should be analyzed for subsequent corrective action are:

1. The abandonment of stocks of food and water and medical, sanitation and radiation detection supplies and equipment in designated shelters.
2. The dumping of the Packaged Disaster Hospital program which provided over 2,000 emergency hospitals for use in disaster (most of these are now either given away to other countries or in a state of cannibalization.)
3. The retreat from informing and training the public in emergency measures (for example, the Medical Self-Help course).
4. The fading of a warning system that can reach the public reliably and in good time in the event of attack.
5. The failure to develop for the public through coordinated efforts a shelter system that would bring enhanced nuclear attack survival and serve to discourage such an attack. (As you know, across the country leadership elements are provided with protection while, by and large, the population they serve are not. What can this breed but obvious inequity, confusion and revolt?)
6. The indifference to the plethora of names for "civil defense." This was generated by name changes at the federal level. Now civil defense is called by so many names at state and local levels that the "emergency management" structure is a veritable "Tower of Babel" that defies attempts at real teamwork.
7. The resultant disarray is compounded by the failure of leadership to face the problem and to discharge its responsibility to provide public safety measures to contend with the nuclear threat that is now intensifying from day to day.

It is not our desire to "make waves." However, it is the basic responsibility, the very "raison d'être" of TACDA to address this problem frontally and in depth and to attempt with all the resources at our command to seek to help bring about a solution that will prevent nuclear blackmail, prevent nuclear war, and guarantee national survival if these efforts should fail.

Pronouncements made by President Reagan and by you over the past months have repeatedly indicated that civil defense (i.e. hard-core wartime defense) is taken seriously, but action has not followed the statements, has not given credence to them. A "full-spectrum" civil defense — represented by your Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) — is in our studied estimation only a pale euphemism for the homeland defense that is needed: the type of civil defense that incongruously has been assiduously developed by countries we criticize as being reckless with human lives.

In view of our failure to develop protective measures for our citizens we are the country most indifferent to protecting the lives of our people.

We feel that Congress must be educated — principally by your office — to where it understands the problem. Now, it does not understand it. We feel that the problem (of national survival) must be faced squarely by the Administration and by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). We feel that even with this failure of Congress to provide substantially higher civil defense budgets it is the role of FEMA to make known to one and all the immediate need for citizen protection measures similar to those provided leadership.

We feel that *top leadership* must take up the challenge to alert the country to its peril, to publish information, to conduct briefings and seminars, to republish basic studies (a mass distribution/low-cost sale of a new edition of *Nuclear War Survival Skills* by Cresson Kearny, plus other pertinent information publications, is needed without delay.) Above all we feel that the entire nation must be alerted to its peril so that reactions similar to government safety measures can be programmed for the *people*. This should include several addresses to the nation on the subject by President Reagan.

That's asking a lot, but it is a minimum requirement if we are to take seriously government's commitment to public safety. The reawakening to the requirement for protective measures occasioned by the American Broadcasting Film "The Day After" provides a new cooperative setting for homeland defense efforts.

I realize that we in TACDA are much freer to speak out frankly and independently than are those within government. We feel this is in reality a service to government. I hope you will consider us available to examine these questions from a positive, constructive and forthright position. We want to be of help.

Warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Frank Williams  
President

# ← MESSAGE TO GIUFFRIDA ... AND REPLY →



## Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

December 16, 1983

Mr. Frank Williams, President  
The American Civil Defense Association

Dear Frank:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of November 23, 1983, regarding our country's need for improved civil defense.

We value your expression of sympathy and understanding and, in particular, your assurance that The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA) wants to be of help. You have been of great help; and I know you will continue to be, together with your companion organization, Doctors for Disaster Preparedness (DDP).

We are well aware of the symptoms of decline in civil defense enumerated in your letter; for example, the loss of the Packaged Disaster Hospital program 10 years ago, the removal in the 1970's of many of the shelter stocks procured 20 years ago, and the lack of adequate training for the public. These and other deficiencies result from the fact that the program today is funded at a level less than one-third, in constant dollars, of the 1962-1966 average when most of the programs you listed were begun.

The problem, as you point out, is to persuade the Congress that it should support the Administration's program to improve protection for our people. We achieved a measure of success with our FY 1984 request in that the appropriation provided for about 10 percent real growth in the program. We had excellent support from the Department of Defense and other elements of the Executive Branch, and representatives of TACDA and DDP stated their views strongly, as did a number of other persons from outside the Government. However, 10 percent real growth was much less than we had recommended and is clearly not sufficient to develop the kind of protection our people need and deserve.

We intend to redouble our efforts with our FY 1985 request. I am certain we shall have strong support from the Administration and from those who agree that the basic purpose of government is to protect the lives of its citizens — and that the citizens have a right to demand from their government a predictable, effective, and coordinated response to any danger, irrespective of its cause or magnitude.

We intend also to increase our emphasis on the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS), now being initially deployed. About 100 Federal, State, and local personnel who participated in last summer's reassessment of the Civil Defense Program strongly endorsed intensified emphasis on IEMS. They also felt that the current program elements were appropriate and valid but that funding was inadequate. (I have enclosed a copy of the "Highlights of the Civil Defense Program Reassessment.") Initial indications are that IEMS is enjoying good acceptance by State and local governments, and we hope it will find favor with the Congress as well.

We shall be facing a difficult task nonetheless, as we did with the requests for FY's 1983 and 1984. However, I trust that Congress will agree that a basic lesson of the recent ABC-TV film, "The Day After," is that government owes its people reasonable measures to improve their odds for survival should a nuclear cataclysm ever occur. The horrors depicted in the film are powerful arguments against nuclear war — but are at the same time powerful arguments for civil defense.

We have received from the printer the leaflet, "What You Should Know About Nuclear Preparedness," which you saw in mockup form at the November 14 meeting here, and I have enclosed a copy. We intend to develop additional information materials for the public, as you urge in your letter.

Again, we greatly appreciate your expressions of support. I pledge my best efforts, and those of FEMA's staff, to making a breakthrough with our FY 1985 request. Improved protection for our people is dictated alike by simple prudence, humanitarian concern for human life, and the laws and the Constitution of the United States. Should these efforts meet with success in FY 1985 and thereafter, we shall be in a position to begin implementing programs including elements outlined in your letter and in the TACDA and DDP resolutions you enclosed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Fred", is written over the typed name.

Fred J. Vilella  
Executive Deputy Director

# REALISTIC OR IDEALISTIC?

## A Practical Analysis of the Nuclear Freeze Issue

— John D. Crandall, Director  
Iowa Office of Disaster Services

Civil Defense is but one page in the volume on the nuclear weapons issue, and further, in the collected works of war and national security. All of us who speak for a sound civil defense program have argued that the concept of reducing the threat of nuclear war through the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is a great idea. Civil Defense should be an interim measure in recognition of the current threat that deals with it in a passive sense while people and governments work toward the long range goal of eliminating the threat.

A fundamental question is, can the threat be eliminated? The answer is, probably not. Nuclear weapons may be rendered useless through future technology, they will never be eliminated through peace movements and negotiation. This article provides an analysis to support that answer.

In the Preamble, and in Section 8, Article I of the Constitution, the federal government is mandated '... to provide for the common defense ...'. How does the federal government best fulfill this mandate? The best solution would be to eliminate conflict between or among nations, or at least eliminate war as the means to resolve international conflict. This is not an original idea, the League of Nations and the United Nations were founded with this goal in mind. The success of these ventures has been nil. The League failed because the U.S. wouldn't back it. (Woodrow Wilson literally died from this failure.) The U.N. has survived, but has been ineffective in preventing war. It seems, then, that in spite of the noble efforts of truly great statesmen (and women), humankind is destined to resort to war as a final means of resolving conflict.

Accept for a moment that the U.S. has no aggressive tendencies, or at least no desire to conquer and dominate the people of another nation. Accept also that we as a nation do have the will, resolve, and moral obligation to protect our people from being conquered and

dominated by another nation. How do we do that? The Constitution provides for the establishment of an Army and a Navy, and gives Congress the authority to declare war and to make laws that allow for these activities. Few people, though there are some, have any quarrel with this provision in the Constitution. Having established the rationale and the legal base for a military force, how do we arm them? What weaponry? How much weaponry? What are the conditions for the use of the weaponry? The answers to these questions lie in the nature of the *perceived* threat. Generally speaking, it is prudent to arm our military forces with weaponry of equal or greater potency than that of our potential adversaries. The logic behind that is obvious. Likewise, we must arm our military with enough weaponry to insure as a minimum, parity in the relative strength of ourselves and our potential adversaries. Again, the logic behind that is obvious. Finally, we must be prepared to use our weaponry to that degree sufficient to insure the successful defense of our nation from a small conventional skirmish on up. All of this can be done only within the resources available to us. Every nation with a non-aggressive, self-preserving set of national objectives will approach the problem this way. The degree to which they follow the logic stated above depends on their resources. Aggressive nations, or those nations that do seek to conquer or dominate the people of another land, on the other hand, must always strive for superiority in potency and relative strength, and must always be willing to exert all of their force to achieve their national goals. Therein lies the paradox of the arms race and nuclear proliferation. The non-aggressive, self-preserving nation, within its resources, must be in an arms race or succumb. Incidentally, when I discuss the defense of a nation, I am not *de facto* discussing the nature of the weaponry. A military force today cannot be successful in de-

fending its territory without the ability to take offensive action, both tactically and strategically; hence our force structure as you know it.

This discussion leads to the nuclear freeze/reduction movement. There are a sizeable number of national and international organizations that are involved in this movement. To my knowledge, all such organizations exist in the non-communist world. Like any organ-

### SEVERAL QUESTIONS DO ARISE

ization, each of these has a goal which establishes its 'raison d'être'. If one were to ask each organization what its goal is, the answers, though similar would undoubtedly all be different. I think, however, that a common goal might be stated as follows:

'To eliminate the threat of nuclear war throughout the world: Common objectives might be:

1. To achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
2. To achieve a mutual and verifiable reduction in the number of weapons and delivery systems.
3. To eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all nations.'

I know of no individual in our government or in the military who would quarrel with that goal or those objectives. Several questions do arise, however:

1. Why limit it to nuclear weapons? Chemical and biological weapons can be just as devastating to animal and plant life (more so, I submit) as nuclear weapons, and can be strategically delivered just as nuclear weapons.
2. What are the freeze and reduction goals? How do we convince the nations with fewer weapons or no weapons at all to freeze their arsenals, reduce them from current levels, or not produce them when other nations with more weapons are perceived as a threat?
3. How will the USSR reconcile its freeze agreement with the U.S.



if France (for example) decides to become an equal nuclear power? How would the U.S. react if China made the same decision?

4. If success is ever achieved in eliminating the weapons, what guarantees are there that they won't be built again. The technology will not be eliminated.
5. What about future systems, not even conceived of, that may prove to be more devastating than any we know of today. How do we freeze technology?

There is ample evidence to suggest that most Communist nations are aggressive and constitute a threat to our freedom and the freedom of other nations whose continued existence as free nations is in

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### HOW DO WE FREEZE TECHNOLOGY?

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our best interest. Hungary, East Berlin, Afghanistan, and Poland stand as examples of overt military action employed by the Soviet Union to carry out its aggressive policies. Korea, Viet Nam, Cuba, Africa and

others stand as similar examples involving the USSR, China, and other Communist nations. How do we reconcile our desires for elimination of nuclear weapons with this perceived threat and our mandate for national security? How do we convince other nations, both Communist and non-Communist to reconcile those issues and actively move toward the goal of eliminating the threat of nuclear war?

I am sure that some of the strongest advocates of the arms reduction movement are cognizant of these concerns. Bob Fiedler, a former local civil defense director from Muscatine, Iowa, who resigned his position to join the freeze movement, stated during a debate that nuclear weapons will always be with us. Dr. Peter Whitis, a psychiatrist from Dubuque County, Iowa, and an active member of PSR stated during a debate that it would be at least three generations before a freeze could be effectively implemented. This suggests that even the strongest advocates doubt that they will be successful.

War is a dumb way to settle international differences, and a goal for humanity as a whole should be the

elimination of war. In a pragmatic sense, though, I cannot see that it will ever happen. Humankind is too self-centered and near-sighted to recognize the self-destruction inherent in war.

These thoughts, while pessimistic, are realistic, and perhaps as we continue our debate on civil defense, we would do well to be honest about the practicality of a successful freeze/reduction/elimination of nuclear weapons. Civil defense is being treated like another weapon in our nuclear arsenal by the freeze/reduction movement. It obviously has strategic value, but only in a deterrent sense. A realist will recognize that an arms freeze/reduction/elimination is a goal well worth working for, but probably not attainable, given the need for national security, unless the weapons are rendered obsolete or ineffective. . . . "High Frontier" concept may render nuclear weapons obsolete. Civil defense is a tool to reduce the effectiveness of nuclear weapons. These approaches to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war are far more realistic than all of the inane and blatantly false rhetoric of the anti-nuclear groups. □

## WILL THE REAL SCIENTISTS PLEASE STAND UP!

The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is known best for its unbridled opposition to nuclear energy. However, according to the November issue of *Discover* it does not have quite the simon-pure scientific pedigree its name implies. Its influence on public opinion has been powerful. "But what the public, and apparently most of the press, does not know," points out *Discover*, "is that the UCS represents neither science nor most scientists."

Efforts by interested parties to categorize its 100,000 members have not been successful. USC doesn't know, doesn't seem to want to know, how many scientists are members.

Political scientists Stanley Rothman of Smith College and Robert Lichter of George Washington University, who were not permitted to poll the UCS membership, took other means to determine the real nuclear energy views of scientists. *Discover* continues:

"They [Rothman and Lichter] reported in the September 8 issue of *Nature* that, of 741 scientists they picked at random (from names listed in *American Men and Women of Science*) and queried, 53 per cent believed that the country should proceed rapidly with nuclear energy. Thirty-six per cent urged moving ahead, but slowly. Among energy experts (which included 163 from the random sample and 195 chosen specifically from fields related to energy) the respective percentages were 70 and 25. In addition, 68 per cent of the scientists and 85 per cent of the energy experts considered the risks of nuclear energy acceptable."

Nobel Laureate Hans Bethe, who serves as a UCS advisor, disagrees with its anti-nuclear energy stand (although he supports the UCS anti-nuclear weapons policy).

"The fact remains," concludes the *Discover* article, "that fear of nuclear energy is widespread among Americans. That is a tribute to the public relations skills of the UCS and the gullibility of reporters who accept its views as scientific gospel." □

## “THE DAY AFTER” IN MOSCOW

Answering a question about an advance showing of “The Day After” in the USSR, *The Review of the News* reported on December 14th:

“Two nights before it was shown nationwide in the United States, Robert Zelnick, Moscow bureau chief of ABC News, held a private showing of the film at his home in the U.S.S.R. At least six Soviet officials viewed the movie. The screening had been requested by the Reds.”

## COMPOUNDED FOLLY

TACDA Board member Richard Sincere has recently debated Helen Caldicott, Jack Geiger and other prominent anti-defense spokesmen. His articles, his letters, his TV and radio appearances, and his lectures have given him a highly deserved reputation as a strategic defense authority of the first water.

One of Sincere's successful techniques is to cite quotations from prominent defense proponents.

In a recent address before the Citizens' Congress on National Security in St. Louis he said:

“... Nobel laureate Eugene Wigner told the International Seminar on the World-Wide Implications of Nuclear War: ‘A world in which neither of two opponents can destroy each other is much, much more stable than one in which each can destroy the other.’

“... My position is simple and plain: Civil defense against nuclear attack is a *moral imperative*, a *political obligation*, and a *strategic necessity*.

“The distinguished Catholic philosopher and historian Frederick Copleston, J.J., has reduced the moral principle to its essence: ‘It clearly is not a government's job to render defenseless those whom it is committed to defend.’ Theologian John Courtney Murray ... pointed out ‘It is folly not to foresee that the United States may be laid in ruins by a nuclear attack; the folly is compounded by a decision not to spend any money on planning what to do after that not impossible event.’

“... However, the U.S. government has failed to come to grips with the horrifying prospect of what to do if deterrence fails.”

## “PROPAGANDA BLITZKRIEG”

Perhaps the most insidious, the most deceptive and the most damaging of the attacks on American values mounted by leftist sympathizers and “useful idiots” is that aimed at children.

The December issue of *Washington Report* (American Security Council) zeroes in on this repugnant campaign, which it calls a “propaganda blitzkrieg.” It quotes Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah from the Congressional Record:

“Our local schools have always been proudly patriotic and, at the same time, religiously free of political bias. But there is growing evidence that the sanctity of neutrality, which we have taken for granted in the learning environment, is being invaded and eroded.

“I have just learned that the President of the United States receives over 100 letters a day on the subject of nuclear war. That is more than he receives on any other subject. Those letters are not from mature, well-informed citizens. They are from frightened, ill-informed schoolchildren, who, in writing to the President, are fulfilling classroom assignments.”

Thomas B. Smith, the American Security Council's Director of Research, lists six “programs” which aid in promoting defeatist views and their publishers.

“Our classrooms,” says Smith, “must not be used as propaganda organs controlled by anti-defense lobbyists. Our free society will not be able to survive if each new class of young adults enters the policy-influencing arena of life unconvinced of the value of our institutions and the need for a strong defense of them.”

Coincidentally, Dave Emerick in his *Press Reports on Soviet Affairs* (distributed free of charge by the Advanced International Studies Institute) cites an article on Soviet concern about children and nuclear attack. The article, which appears in the Soviet civil defense *Military Knowledge*, states that the protection of the young is the obligation of all adults “under conditions of nuclear, biological and chemical warfare.” It goes on to describe cer-

tain specific protective equipment for the young.

“The protection of children from weapons of mass destruction,” it asserts, “is the most humane, crucial and noble task.”

## VILLELLA GETS NEW POST

National Emergency Training Center Director Fred J. Villella has been appointed to the additional post of Executive Deputy Director and Executive Secretary of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board. The new policy role will make for closer coordination between the training center and agencies relating to FEMA. It will also permit better exploitation of training center courses and services.

(See Villella letter on page 11.)

## GIUFFRIDA NAMED MAJOR GENERAL IN CALIFORNIA RESERVE

FEMA Director Louis O. Giuffrida in December was promoted to the rank of Major General in the California State Military Reserve.

Giuffrida also is chief U.S. delegate to the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and the NATO Civil Defense Committee, and he serves as a presidentially appointed governor of the American Red Cross.

## NCCEM MID-YEAR CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON FEB. 26-29

The Capitol Holiday Inn in Washington, D.C. will be the site of the 1984 Mid-Year Conference for the National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management (NCCEM). Dates are February 26-29. Doctors for Disaster Preparedness has been scheduled for a one-hour program on Monday morning, February 27th.

For information call NCCEM headquarters at 803-765-9286.

## PUBLIC: “MORE DEFENSE!”

From the traditionally Democratic constituency of Congressman Don Fuqua (D-FL) comes a plea for preparedness. This from a questionnaire returned by 16,000 voters.

"Many, many of those responding," said Fuqua, "commented on the need for a strong national defense."

How to reduce the budget deficit? 21.2% said cut the defense budget. But 34.8% said cut social programs.

58.2% said the draft should be reinstated, and 91.6% said that if it were, registration should be required. 52.8% thought that the all-volunteer military service was working.

Greater emphasis on technological development pulled in a 90.3% positive vote. Overall these dyed-in-the-wool Democrats turned in an overwhelming Conservative mandate.

### ANATOMY OF A FAILURE

The *Bulletin of the International Civil Defence Organisation* publishes an article by 1983 NCCEM (USCDC) president Thomas E. Blosser. Originally published in *Hazard Monthly* the article reads in part:

"President John F. Kennedy stated during his administration . . . 'We have a sober responsibility. To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do or where they should go if the bombs begin to fall, would be a failure of responsibility.' When you equate President Kennedy's statement with our posture today, in regard to our responsibility to the citizens of this country, those of us involved in federal, state and local governments have failed. . .

Blosser lists the following as "Discontinued Disaster Preparedness Programs":

Shelters — all stocking programs and most identification and marking programs.

Purchase and distribution of Radiological Monitoring instrumentation. Rural civil defense education programs.

School programs — civil defense education. "Your Chance to Live," and adult education.

Medical self-help educational program.

Stockpiling of packaged Disaster Hospitals.

Stockpiling of emergency water supply equipment.

Stockpiling of medical supplies (Hospital Reserve Disaster Inventory), engineering equipment, etc.

## EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE COURSES (NETC)

16825 South Seton Av., Emmitsburg, MD 21727

(The following schedule of EMI courses is taken from the *Emergency Management Institute 1983-84 Catalog of Courses* — National Emergency Training Center.)

Key: TBA — To Be Announced

T-T-T — Training-the-Trainer

EMC — Emergency Management Course

PDS — Professional Development Series

Courses for:

F — Federal Student Applicants

S — State Student Applicants

L — Local Student Applicants

— Includes Non-Governmental

COURSE	DATES	COURSES FOR		
EMC Recovery — Pilot	Feb 6-10			L
Fallout Shelter Analysis	Feb 6-17	F	S	L
Graduate Seminar on Contemporary Issues	Feb 13-17	F	S	L
EMC — Response	Feb 13-17			L
REP Ex. Evaluators Wksp.	Feb 21-24	F		
Introduction to Emergency Management T-T-T (PDS)	Feb 27-Mar 2		S	
Individual and Family Grant Wksp.	Feb 28-Mar 2	F	S	
EMC Response	Mar 5-9			L
Radiological Accident Assessment	Mar 5-9	F	S	L
Basic Skills in Emergency Management T-T-T (PDS)	Mar 5-16		S	
EMC Mitigation — Pilot	Mar 19-23			L
Basic Radiological Health Course — Pilot	Mar 19-23		S	
Continuity of Government Wksp.	Mar 19-23	F	S	
Exercise Design Course T-T-T	Mar 26-30	F	S	L
Federal Radiological Preparedness Committee	Mar 29	F		
Flood Insurance Study/Project Monitor Wksp.	Apr 2-6	F		
EMC Response	Apr 2-6			L
Protection Construction Course	Apr 2-13	F	S	
Ex. Evaluation and Simulation Facility	Apr 9-13, 30-May 4	F	S	
Formulating Public Policy T-T-T	Apr 9-10		S	L
EMC Nuclear Accident — Pilot	Apr 16-20	F	S	L
National Security Seminar	Apr 16-20	F	S	L
Temporary Housing Policy Wksp.	Apr 16-20	F	S	
Flood Property Purchase and Relocation	Apr 30-May 4	F	S	
Ex. Evaluation and Simulation Facility	Apr 30-May 4	F	S	
IEMS Conf.	Apr 30-May 4	F	S	
Training Managers Wksp.	May 7-11	F	S	
Public Assistance Course T-T-T	May 7-11	F		
EMC Response	May 7-11			L
EMC National Security — Pilot	May 14-18	F	S	L
Graduate Seminar on Contemporary Issues	May 14-18	F	S	L
Inspectors Training/Construction Cost Est. T-T-T	May 14-18	F		
Fallout Shelter Analysis	May 14-25	F	S	L
Radiological Monitor/Instructor T-T-T	May 21-25	F	S	L
Radiological Accident Assessment	May 21-25	F	S	L
Crisis Counseling Seminar	May 29-Jun 1	F	S	L
Radiological Defense Officer/Instructor T-T-T	May 29-Jun 1	F	S	L
Intergovernmental Relations Seminar	Jun 4-8			L
Temporary Housing/Project Monitor Wksp.	Jun 4-8	F		
Industrial Protection Course	Jun 4-8	F	S	
EMC Response	Jun 11-15			L
EMC Response T-T-T	Jun 11-22		S	
Hazard Mitigation Planning (Sec. 406)	Jun 18-22	F	S	
Federal Coordinating Officer Wksp.	Jun 25-29	F		
EMC — Nuclear Accident — Pilot	Jul 9-13	F	S	L
Multiprotection Design Summer Institute	Jul 16-27		S	L
Radiological Monitor/Instructor T-T-T	Jul 23-27	F	S	L
Radiological Defense Officer/Instructor T-T-T	Jul 30-Aug 3	F	S	L
EMC Recovery — Pilot	Jul 30-Aug 3			L
Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team	Aug 6-10	F	S	
EMC Response	Aug 6-10, 20-24			L
Continuity of Government Wksp.	Aug 6-10	F	S	
Graduate Seminar on Contemporary Issues	Aug 13-17	F	S	L
Economic Stabilization Wksp.	Aug 13-17	F	S	
Local Flood Plain Management	Aug 20-24	F	S	L
Intergovernmental Relations Seminar	Aug 27-31			L
DAC Management and Operations T-T-T	Aug 27-31	F		
NDER/Economic Stabilization Administration	Sep 10-14	F		L
EMC — National Security — Pilot	Sep 17-21	F	S	L
State RADEF Officer Management Course	Sep 17-21	F	S	
Industrial Protection Course	Sep 24-28	F	S	



## EVERY FAMILY SH

In the course of the recent [British] Parliamentary and media debate on the Government's New Civil Defence Regulations, our Minister for CD — The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, CBE., MP, stated that: . . . "Given the limited resources available and the remote risk of war, vast expenditure — for example on a nationwide series of shelters at a cost of many billions — cannot be considered."

Meanwhile, some way down the road from Westminster (in distance rather than political proximity), the peace protests continue at Greenham Common and at other Cruise Missile bases. And the long arguments involving the military strategy and technological reliability of these weapons remains unabated. Moreover, the Soviets appear to have gained some respectability from this debate, claiming that they will remove some of their SS20 missiles from Eastern-Europe in exchange for a cancellation of cruise deployment. On the face of it, this might be seen as a gesture of willingness to lower the nuclear temperature presently sweeping America and her NATO Allies. But . . . we learn that the Kremlin has yet another missile system ready for deployment — one which counters the potential of cruise! Thus it is not the West only which might be accused of escalating the missile race, the Soviets also indulge in the process of development; their weapons research programme not only mimics the progress of NATO forces — it frequently anticipates!

Readers of this journal know that the nations least protected against the effects of heavy conventional, biochemical, or nuclear attack are Britain, America and many of their European Allies. Clearly, there is a large window of opportunity available to any aggressor who possesses a superior civil defence and anti-missile defence screen

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### **. . . WHILST PROTESTS ABOUT CRUISE DEPLOYMENT RAGE, THE SOVIETS ARE CONFIDENTLY BUILDING CIVIL DEFENCE AND ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEMS.**

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within and around his own territory. Thus, whilst protests about Cruise deployment rage, the Soviets are confidently building civil defence and anti-missile systems. These will not be blunted by the cancellation of SS20's.

When (not if!) war comes, it will not be like the NAZI War of 1939-45. There will be little warning of enemy intent. He will choose the best day possible. Christmas Eve — around midnight or some other 'inconvenient' time. There will be no time to mobilise the public information services. Stockpiles of food, fuel, and other essentials will be negligible (in regard to the entire population). There will be no time then to pour concrete to shelter citizens. Panic and fear will sweep the nation. Our own Police and Army may have to use force to control this understandable (yet avoidable) situation. Leaders of government, at national or local authority level, will be swamped by public appeals for aid and protection.

In the midst of this extraordinary train of events, enemies from within the State and their aggressive masters will seek to exploit this turmoil to full advantage. Remember, even patriotic Britons, Europeans, or Americans will not find it palatable to be told that many more of their Soviet counterparts will survive the retaliatory strike because of a superior civil defence programme supported by a high anti-missile (ABM) kill rate!

# WOULD HAVE ONE!

Surely, if the people of the Western Alliances are expected to fight and resist the attentions of an invader, their protective shield must be equal (or better) than the enemy's.

**SURELY, IF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCES ARE EXPECTED TO FIGHT AND RESIST THE ATTENTIONS OF AN INVADER, THEIR PROTECTIVE SHIELD MUST BE EQUAL (OR BETTER) THAN THE ENEMY'S.**

Mr. Hurd's response to the request for shelters is not new. The British Home Office has long briefed Ministers on the 'political' and 'financial' ramifications of mounting a major shelter building programme.

The Home Office estimate it would cost the British £80 Billions for a national shelter effort. We believe this figure to be based on absurd arithmetic. We believe that somebody took the average cost of a private bunker (say £10,000) and multiplied it by 8,000,000 (the number of shelters required in the United Kingdom — using a 57,000,000 population /6 persons per shelter).

Since the British draw heavily upon American research (see Home Office booklet 'Domestic Nuclear Shelters', expedient shelters), it is surprising that 'abstraction' did not reveal a U.S. Study\* to build buried metal shelters (rated at 50 psi overpressure.) at around \$115 per American.

Allowing for inflation since this U.S. study was undertaken, it would cost the British around £153.33 per space, or a total of £8.739 Billions! A tenth of current Home Office thinking . . .

We are forever being informed that . . . 'it is the duty of every democratic government to protect the lives and freedoms of its citizens.' And, for the last 39 years we've managed to honour that commitment. But the power of deterrence is being undermined by new technologies and survival programmes. It would be utter folly to trust that fear of retaliation will continue to have the same implications for an aggressor dedicated to another dictum . . . 'Protect the worker, and the State survives.'

BRUCE SIBLEY

\*U.S. Study: Blast Shelter Concept II Revised 1978.  
for U.S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

Scientist-writer Bruce Sibley is the intrepid publisher-editor of the United Kingdom's remarkable *Practical Civil Defence*. As editor of the former *Protect & Survive Monthly*, Sibley established himself as Britain's No. 1 civil defense authority. When this publication ran into management trouble and folded Sibley picked up the pieces almost single-handedly and with them produced the new *Practical Civil Defence* early in 1983. (Address: Maidenwell House, Maidenwell Lane, Navenby, Lincolnshire LNS OED, England — bimonthly — 25 British pounds per year foreign, or \$38 U.S.)



# REVIEWS

**THE COUNTERFEIT ARK: CRISIS RELOCATION FOR NUCLEAR WAR.** Edited by Jennifer Leaning and Langley Keyes. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company (A Physicians for Social Responsibility Book). Cloth, \$29.95; Paper, \$11.95. 300 pages. Publication date; January 20, 1984.

— Reviewed by Richard Sincere

While there is still some controversy in the civil defense community about the efficacy of crisis relocation planning, none of us reject CRP outright. We point out its flaws, argue for more CRP funding, and offer alternatives. Physicians for Social Responsibility, on the other hand, in its never-ending battle to maintain America's vulnerability to enemy attack, has made CRP's flaws a platform for attacking the concept of civil defense.

In *Counterfeit Ark*, edited by Jennifer Leaning and Langley Keyes, the vast gulf separating PSR and groups like TACDA becomes more apparent than ever. For example, in Jerome Weisner's foreword, he says CRP (and by implication, all forms of civil defense) "is morally wrong; it is strategically wrong; and it is operationally wrong." Contrast this with TACDA's testimony before Congress last April: "Civil defense against nuclear attack is a *moral imperative, a political obligation, and a strategic necessity.*"

Some of the specific criticisms levelled against CRP by the various authors in this book deserve further examination. There are, indeed, valid points made which draw attention to some faulty assumptions made by FEMA planners and others. However, these criticisms should be taken into account not in the way Leaning and Keyes would like — that is, to give up the idea of crisis relocation entirely — but rather as a starting point for solving the very real problems which we must recognize can exist.

The basic deficiency in this book is that it examines civil defense in a political and social vacuum. Incredibly, it discusses civil defense and nuclear war without acknowledging our chief adversary, the Soviet Union. The authors make their arguments as though the threat which we face comes either from nuclear wea-

pons alone or perhaps from the Oval Office — but never the Kremlin. It is amazing to read 300 pages of text about nuclear war and to find no recognition that Soviet military doctrine stresses not only that thermonuclear world war can be fought and survived, but that it can be won. (Several writers do imply, however, that this is the belief of the Reagan administration; but this flies directly in the face of the facts and renders questionable any legitimate critical faculties on the part of Leaning, Keyes, *1et al.*)

Strangely enough, the contributors to this volume suffer from the same deficiencies they attribute to crisis relocation planners. A common theme in the book is that the scholars and writers and engineers who have investigated the feasibility of crisis relocation are "too analytical": they break things down too much and simplify in order to get predetermined results; they neglect the "big picture." Yet in attacking these studies, the authors — particularly Donald Schon — commit the same sins: they analyze, nitpick, point out particular flaws, and generally come out sounding like the man at the scene of a car wreck. When the driver comes out unhurt and weeps for joy at his good fortune, the bystander says, "Yes, but it didn't cure your rheumatism, did it?" Under the pretense of scientific objectivity, Physicians for Social Responsibility masks its own biases.

Some particulars worth noting: Ex-admiral Noel Gayler, in the only mention of Soviet civil defense, makes no substantive argument against it but uses an argument from ridicule. Unfortunately for us and for Gayler, laughing at it will not make it go away. He further makes the ludicrous assertion that should we evacuate our cities, the Soviets will "retarget" evacuated populations — an idea inconsistent with Soviet military doctrine.

Philip Herr refers to the spontaneous evacuation of Three Mile Island, but fails to make the obvious conclusion that crisis relocation *planning* therefore becomes all the more necessary to prevent such chaotic events in a future crisis. He also assumes the only clue Americans will have that a crisis is imminent are statements from the White

House — as if American citizens would be oblivious to news reports on TV about Soviet troops marching into West Berlin, etc.

Herr further makes the assertion, often heard from PSR, that civil defense "could reduce the political urgency of achieving *real* means of avoiding rather than ameliorating the consequences of nuclear conflict" and that if we had effective and credible civil defense, our leaders' "reluctance to risk nuclear escalation might be reduced." Once again, as always, these statements are made without proof. Nowhere has Herr (or Caldicott, Geiger, or Leaning) drawn analogies from history, evidence from military strategy, or examples from current conflicts that protecting innocent civilians makes war more likely. They must be reminded that there is no contradiction between a commitment to civil defense and a commitment to conflict resolution. Defense, deterrence, disarmament, and diplomacy are all tools in the same arsenal to preserve international peace and stability while enhancing liberty and justice in this land and abroad.

On the level of absurdity, in a touching essay on the potential harms to children during evacuation or during war, Irwin Redlener argues that gangs of children "might band together and" contribute to "massive social disintegration." Again this ridiculous argument deserves attention only to the degree it (and the rest of Redlener's minutiae) spurs us to make more thorough and effective civil defense plans.

*The Counterfeit Ark* is a shallow book that raises many questions but offers no answers or suggestions; in this it is more destructive than constructive, and may indeed lead us closer to nuclear war than any of us — TACDA or PSR — wish. In the words of another contributor to the volume, linguist John Haj Ross: "I could go on, but I think that if my point has not been made already, further analyses of [this book] or of similar ones, will be superfluous." (See ad, page 3.)

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**NUCLEAR ARMS: A DEFENSE**, pamphlet by Peter Schwartz. 8 pp. (8½ x 11"), 1983. Published by *The Intellectual Activist* — a newsletter

dedicated to the defense of individual rights. Single copies are \$1.95 each, 2-25 copies; \$1.75 each, 26-50 copies; \$1.50 each; 51 and more copies are \$1.25 each. Order from The Intellectual Activist, 131 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10003.

— Reviewed by Hank Phillips.

Pamphlets in general tend to oversimplify, dodge important issues and demolish "straw men" rather than take on the opposition's best arguments. This one is not only an exception, it is "outstandingly reasoned" according to Dr. Petr Beckmann of *Access to Energy*. I must concur.

Where else are you going to find a pamphlet couched in easy-to-understand question & answer form which: explodes the MAD fallacy of retaliation without defense; explores the limits of nuclear weapons capabilities; traces the political premises which underlie the arguments for Peace Through Strength as well as those designed to support a "Freeze"; analyzes the *strongest* arguments published in scientific journals by weapons Freeze proponents, refutes them using brilliant logic and then goes on to show that they contradict *each other*?

Peter Schwartz is not an arms specialist and so does not overwhelm the reader with statistical arguments which Freeze advocates will dismiss as "mere number crunching." By relying instead on a few well-researched examples, this pamphlet clears away the imagery of a lifeless, war-torn planet and establishes an objective framework for conceptual analysis of the very thorny problem of national defense. The central question which this pamphlet identifies and then tackles is: how to define the purpose of America's defense structure.

This leads into the area of political philosophy, which happens to be the author's specialty. The political premises which lead to the conclusions embraced by both Peace Through Strength and nuclear "Freeze" advocates are traced and presented fairly and with no caricaturing. This is important for two reasons. Freeze advocates love being misquoted and misrepresented because that sort of thing serves to prop up their contention that advocates of a strong defense are all involved in some sort of conspiracy designed to enrich "the military-

industrial complex." It also eliminates an "easy out" for those who empathize emotionally with the "Freeze" movement, but still possess the intellectual honesty required to at least pick up and examine arguments which are contrary to those they are predisposed to believe. After all, the purpose of a pamphlet is to convince skeptics, not to reinforce conclusions already drawn.

The best and most unusual aspect of this pamphlet is its novel approach to the problems of verification and its assessment of arms-limitation treaties in general. Again, the fundamental question is brought clearly to the fore: Can an agreement between a defender and a destroyer of human liberty defining the terms of battle be in the interests of the United States?

In sum, this pamphlet is one of the first attempts to discuss the issue of nuclear arms on *intellectual* grounds. If we defeat the anti-defense 'intellectuals' on their own turf, we can expect to be spared the grief and effort of defeating their ideological allies on the battlefield.

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*THE SOVIET CRISIS RELOCATION PROGRAM — FINAL REPORT*, by Dr. Leon Goure. Prepared for FEMA by Science Applications, Inc., Center for Soviet Studies, 1710 Goodridge Drive, McLean VA 22102. In manuscript format, 247 pp (with detachable 9-page summary), 1983.

— Reviewed by Betty Nice.

This publication is just what it purports to be — a thorough report on Soviet CRP. It is an in-depth study of a concept familiar to career civil defense personnel and to others who take their civil defense and survival preparations seriously.

For the doubters, who don't believe the Soviets would consider or could survive a nuclear exchange, it should be required reading. At least the 9-page summary of it should be. A comprehensive report to FEMA, however, does not necessarily mean a comprehensive report to the American people. The report states that the USSR allots one hour per year to crisis relocation training. Total civil defense training in America could be measured in minutes.

Key statements in the report concern damage limitation and reduction of population losses as essen-

tial if a country is to avoid defeat at the start of a nuclear war. An important Soviet doctrine is that "successful implementation of crisis relocation will depend on the psychological preparation of the population — including understanding of principles, sense of discipline and faith in effectiveness."

Panic can be avoided if people are acquainted beforehand with evacuation procedures and living conditions in hosting areas. It is in this respect that the Soviets have the advantage — participation in civil defense planning is compulsory.

The gist of the report is that if a country can convince its people that a war is winnable, *if* the country and the people are prepared, it probably is — and an enemy would certainly hesitate to launch a first strike against such a country.

The report covers every facet of Soviet plans for crisis relocation — even the Table of Contents is impressive and it is regrettable it can't be included in this review.

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*WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT NUCLEAR PREPAREDNESS* — a 14-page pamphlet (L-138) published by FEMA, November 1983. Available from local and state CD and from FEMA, Box 8181, Washington, D.C. 20024.

— Reviewed by Kevin Kilpatrick.

L-138 is an informational pamphlet in capsule form for the citizen who wants an outline for options relating to nuclear attack preparedness. It's an easy-to-read introduction to protective measures that includes basic guidance on warning, crisis relocation and shelter. It's a refreshing turn toward the more urgent and more difficult aspects of emergency management.

One constructive comment could be that steps need to be taken to see that the siren warning system — or some other type of system — described on page 4 is credible. The recent experience in Pennsylvania where a false alert produced confusion and anger provides a lesson that a number of local directors have underlined for the past several years.

That doesn't obscure the fact that L-138 is a welcome turn to *nuclear* preparedness. If it indicates a new FEMA direction toward the "real CD," it's worth its weight in diamonds.

# FAMILY FORUM

Veteran space engineer, CD writer and survivalist Dick Oster contributes his wide expertise to "Family Forum" (for both the February and April issues) and gives us ideas and tips on last-minute emergency measures.

## DO-IT-YOURSELF SHELTER

(Part I — Fallout Shelters)

— Richard E. Oster, Sr.

If the U.S. should be subjected to nuclear attack in the near future your SURVIVAL would basically depend on YOU. Getting a properly-equipped shelter will be your responsibility. And if you can't make it to a public shelter, then it will all depend upon you.

When an attack occurs you will be in one of three general geographical locations. The first (and the worst)

### Area codes used by Oster

RED ZONE —  
Direct Effects Area  
YELLOW ZONE —  
Fallout Area  
GREEN ZONE —  
Unaffected Area (except possible EMP)

is what we will call the RED zone. This is the area around ground zero (GZ) where the heavy initial effects of a nuclear detonation (NUDET) take place. It is also called the blast area, but blast is not the only initial effect. The area involved in the red zone depends upon the size of the bomb, its mode of detonation, etc.

The second geographical area is what we call the YELLOW zone. It is also hazardous, but the hazard here is from fallout radiation rather than from blast effects. Most of the initial effects are not present, but electromagnetic pulse (EMP) can be present in both the RED and YELLOW zones. Fallout patterns are somewhat predictable if current data are available (NUDET location, size, wind, etc.), but even then the fallout track is not certain. Fallout can cover

wide areas (hundreds of miles).

Finally there is the geographical GREEN zone where there is neither blast nor fallout (but possibly EMP). This zone is not totally safe and can have problems related to the NUDET (not the least of which is the stream of refugees coming from the RED and YELLOW zones). Because NUDET locations are not exact and fallout tracking is not certain, it is necessary that you plan for either RED or YELLOW zone protection.

There are four ways to reduce your exposure to radiation: (1) move away from the source, (2) limit the time of your exposure, (3) place shielding between you and the source, (4) allow the radiation to decay in strength before you venture outside your protective shelter. Numbers 1 and 2 are the most difficult to achieve. The fallout shelter is based on numbers 3 and 4. The measure of how well a shelter protects you from radiation is called the fallout protection factor (FPF). It is a measurement and refers to the reduction of radiation inside the shelter as compared with that on the outside. As an example, a shelter that has an FPF of 50 is one that reduces the radiation on the inside, so it is 1/50th of that on the outside.

Here is what your fallout shelter must provide: (1) sufficient FPF to prevent your death and, preferably, any radiation sickness, (2) enough fresh air (at the correct temperature) to provide oxygen for breathing, removal of your exhaled carbon dioxide and a temperature-humidity index conducive to good health for those in the shelter (varies with health of shelterees), (3) enough

room to lie down, sit up (many designs do not permit standing up although that is desirable), and to use waste-disposal facilities and store supplies (public shelters provide a minimum of 10 square feet per person), (4) light, and (5) a reasonably sanitary environment. There are a number of other desirable features, but we haven't the space to review them here (heating-

### HOW MUCH PROTECTION DO YOU NEED?

cooling systems, cooking provisions, bathing, food, water, medicine, portable radio, radiation detectors, EMP protection, post-shelter skills/materials for emergence into a post-attack world, etc.).


How much protection do you need? It depends on how high the radiation levels are outside. We know that 100-200 roentgens (a radiation measurement) will make the average person ill and that 200 to 450 roentgens will cause death to less than 50% of those exposed (if received in a short time — a week or less). The radiation level outside the shelter is determined by the NUDET

Type Material	Thickness (Inches)
Iron	3.3
Concrete	11.0
Earth	16.0
Water	24.0
Wood	40.0

Fig 1 — Radiation reduction of normal gamma rays

size, whether it is an air burst or a surface burst, its location with respect to your shelter, winds, hot spots from rain/snow, etc. The public shelter specification provides a minimum FPF of 40. I personally do not consider this to be enough and would suggest an FPF of at least 100, even much more if practical.


Different shielding materials of different thicknesses will reduce radiation exposure by different amounts. At this point, we will not consider the neutrons and nitrogen capture gammas near GZ. Figure 1 gives some typical materials and the thickness needed to reduce the "normal" gamma rays entering your shelter. The thicknesses shown will reduce the radiation to 1/10th of what it is outside the shelter. If you add another layer of the material the radiation will be reduced to one-tenth of one-tenth (which is 1/100th).



**Fig 2 — Basement workbench shelter**

If you are the average U.S. citizen you probably won't do much about a shelter until you get the warning (can be 10 minutes to 7 days before attack). So, you will have to improvise a shelter if there is no way to get to a public shelter. One way to do this is to build a "quickie" shelter in the corner of a basement (pick a corner away from basement windows). Figure 2 shows how to do this by stacking material (the denser the better) on and around a workbench (good materials would be bricks, sand or dirt in drawers, iron, etc.).

If you have no basement you can build a shelter on the first floor of your house. Pick a spot that has the densest material between it and the outside. You can use furniture as building blocks (dressers, chests, washing machine, etc. filled with




**Fig 3 — Furniture module shelter**


sand, water, books or other available materials, etc.) and house doors for overhead supports. Figure 3 shows this approach.

Another scheme is to use the slab foundation of a house as the roof of the shelter, gaining the concrete's ability to reduce radiation. Figure 4 shows this approach. Note that dirt is also added over the concrete. Note also that the slab is *supported*. Slabs are not usually reinforced. They can crack, crumble and cave in under stress.

Maybe you have no house at all (caught out in the woods, etc.).



**Fig 4 — Slab roof shelter**



**Fig 5 — Hole-in-the-ground shelter (dirt goes over boards)**

Here you will have to resort to a hole-in-the-ground. Figure 5 illustrates this method. Note that the ditch you dig has a right angle in it. This is important! Radiation generally travels in straight lines, and when it enters the entryway it will enter the back wall of the ditch and not turn the corner to where you are sitting.

By now you should be saying, "What a hard way to make a shelter," and you are right! It would be much better to do something ahead of time, and it need not cost a fortune to construct a fallout shelter! One solution is to build an "expedient" shelter. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory has designed and tested many of these (testing is very important because it tells you what the shelter will actually do as opposed to what it is supposed to do). One of my favorites is the small-pole shelter (designed and tested by Cresson Kearny of ORNL). You can find complete plans for this in Reference 1 (plus plans for 5 more expedient shelters and other valuable data). If you are interested in the fallout shelter story there is plenty of literature available as indicated in the following partial listing:

1. *Nuclear War Survival Skills* (Cresson H. Kearny), Available from: Citizens Preparedness Group of Greater Kansas City, P.O. Box 23209, Kansas City, MO 64141 (see advertisement elsewhere in this issue.)
2. H-14 (March 1968), *In Time of Emergency*. A citizens handbook on nuclear attack and natural disaster. (Available through civil defense channels — 1968 edition is preferable to 1983 edition.)
3. H-20 (February 1977) *Protection in the Nuclear Age*. (Available through civil defense channels.)
4. *FORESIGHT Newsletter* (12 issues available from: Richard E. Oster, 914 Pinehurst Dr., Arlington, TX 76012.)
5. *Journal of Civil Defense*, P.O. Box 910, Starke, FL 32091.
6. FEMA Fallout Shelter Series, H-12-A, B, C, D, E and F and H-12-3 (above-ground shelter). (Available through civil defense channels.)
7. *Protect & Survive Monthly* (British magazine and its successor *Practical Civil Defence*, both by C. Bruce Sibley at Maidenwell House, Maidenwell Lane, Navenby, Lincolnshire LN5 0ED, United Kingdom.
8. *Life After Doomsday*, by Bruce D. Clayton, Published by Paladin Press, P.O. Box 1307, Boulder, CO 80306.
9. *Surviving Doomsday*, by E. Bruce Sibley. Published by Loxley Bros. Ltd. Available from Delta Press, P.O. Box 777, Mt. Ida, AR 71957.

# GRASSROOTS GRAFFITI

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*Ever wonder why civil defense never got off the ground in the USA? Why after 33 years of shadow boxing with the program through 8 presidential administrations — all of which vowed devotion to the welfare and safety of the American people — do the people remain designated hostages ready to be sacrificed? Because it costs money and effort to protect them?*

*Veteran CD professional Joe Vanderloo (18 years as director of Minnehaha County, South Dakota) has a few ideas on the subject, and here they are.*

## HELP NEEDED: LEADERSHIP

— Joseph Vanderloo

"Emergency readiness" means that a community is prepared to react promptly to save lives and property if it is threatened or hit by a disaster or major emergency of any type. This requires that planning and preparatory action be taken *before* there is an emergency.

Disasters or major emergencies can strike any location within the United States.

system is relegated to appointed local Director/Coordinators. Programs and tasks are frequently passed from federal to state to local through technical channels without the knowledge of the elected officials.

Federal Emergency Management, state and local jurisdictions are doing a good job, even though there is a lack of support by most elected

lack of it — demonstrated by the elected leaders. The support of elected officials determines the level of priority to be placed on improving our emergency preparedness and response programs.

Since the system is so interdependent, if the elected officials fail to show an active interest or demonstrate the quality of leadership required, it is unlikely that others will be encouraged to place any emphasis on their own emergency service programs. Local leaders, the private sector and the federal government must be convinced that they should dedicate sufficient time, resources and personnel towards the program. If a clearly-defined and well-supported program does not come from our leaders, it is difficult to expect local civil defense units to do so by themselves.

One of the reasons that the federal government has a problem is that the program changes with every new President. By the time a new program gets started, we get a new President and a new program.

To have a successful, long-lasting program, FEMA personnel should be staffed by permanent top executives with task assignments from the President and Congress.

In this way they would achieve the continuity found usually at the local level.

Add to this an acceptance of home defense responsibilities by top leadership, and we would create an environment where a realistic and effective strategic defense for our people would become possible.

We needed that yesterday. □

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### LACK OF LEADERSHIP, LACK OF SUPPORT, LACK OF CONCERN, LACK OF MONEY AND LACK OF PLANNING.

---

As I see it, we have a few serious problems in the emergency preparedness system: lack of leadership, lack of support, lack of concern, lack of money and lack of planning. However, all these problems could be solved by a strong attitude of all of our elected officials at all levels of government.

Between the state and local jurisdictions we have 28 different names that we call ourselves; therefore, we lose our credibility.

Further, most communities appoint a Director/Coordinator only because the law requires them to do so. And very little emphasis is given to the importance of the job.

It is very difficult for a part-time or volunteer Director/Coordinator to get his community support. Saving lives deserves the emphasis of a full-time position.

The single greatest shortfall or deficiency which I see in the system is a *lack of leadership*, a lack of stated emphasis and the support of most of our elected officials.

The responsibility for making the

officials.

If all elected officials at federal, state and local levels of government would play a role in the leadership of the program, the local volunteer or part-time Director/Coordinator could accomplish his/her responsibility.

Polls do indicate that the American people think we are prepared, and we are *not*.

If the elected official shows no interest or very little interest, it is going to reflect on the local program and no active program is going to take place. To support this statement one only has to look across the U.S., and he will find that 75% of the positions are either part-time or volunteer.

A strong involvement of all elected officials at all levels of government in the formulation of emergency preparedness policies is essential in developing an on-going, consistent emergency services program. The efforts of our state and local civil defense jurisdictions and the private sector reflect the leadership — or



## WISCONSIN RHUBARB

The depth and fire of defeatist propaganda in the U.S. can be breathtaking. In the wake of ABC-TV's "The Day After" the *Milwaukee Journal* on November 21 reported on unpreparedness in the area. And it quoted Anthony Testolin of Wisconsin's Division of Emergency Government as saying: "In an all-out nuclear war, I don't think there is a defense."

The remark left veteran CD campaigner Ernest Terrien at Wisconsin's Zone "C" a bit unsettled. Wrote Terrien to Division of Emergency Government Administrator Carol Z. Hemersbach:

"What in the heck is going on? Why is the State Office now professing no need for civil defense? Why am I busting my butt producing plans, papers, warning systems, speaking to groups, issuing news releases, appearing on television, professing and promoting what was heretofore been expressed as Federal policy as put forth by FEMA and taught by the National Emergency Training Center? In one media release as indicated, mine and every other local Director's credibility has been dashed and crushed. As one newspaper said — 'Ernie, how can you say what you say when your own State Office officially has said per the quote: There is no defense?'"

### "STATE'S POSITION . . . ANTI-AMERICAN"

"Needless to say, I am disgusted and ashamed to say that I have anything to do with the State Office. The State's position, as quoted, in my opinion is anti-American."

Apparently you don't say them words without stirring up the ire of the good Ms. Hemersbach who replied two weeks later (in part):

"Mr. Testolin's quote was appropriate for him to make. It was his opinion, which he is entitled to express, and it paraphrased my statement contained in Information and Guidance Memo 11-2-83 sent to all County, Zone, and Municipal Emergency Government Directors in which I state, 'Indications are that there is no defense against all out nuclear war;' he did not say there is no need for emergency preparedness/civil defense for natural (floods, tornadoes, windstorms) and technological and hazardous material disasters, and for the possibility of a limited third world or terrorist nuclear attack or incident . . .

"Your paragraph on the State office

and your comment on the State position as anti-American is unacceptable and insulting . . .

"I now wish to clarify our roles. I am the Administrator of the Division of Emergency Government, appointed by Governor Earl, confirmed by the State Senate, and responsible under the law to the Governor and charged with advising the Governor and carrying out state and federal policy. You are the Emergency Government Director of Zone C in Milwaukee County. The Zone governments you represent are required under Chapter 166 to administer a program consistent with the State Plan of Emergency Government.

"I consider your letter of November 23 a crude attempt to intimidate my-

self and my staff members . . ."

Which proves perhaps that Mr. Terrien of the zone office, unlike Mr. Testoline of the state office is *not* entitled to express *his* opinion.

Those elements of the State of Wisconsin which are serious about preparedness, survival and peace might want to look into indicated Division of Emergency Government disinterest in the matter.

They might even want to recommend that *What You Should Know About Nuclear Preparedness* and *The Soviet Crisis Relocation Program*, both reviewed on page 19 of this issue of the *Journal*, be studied and analyzed by the Division staff. □



# 22 YEARS NEW

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*An improvised hospital has to be much more than a good idea. First, responsibility for it must be clearly defined in detail, seriously accepted at all echelons, and conscientiously implemented with planning, training and all-around readiness. The indifference, neglect and dismay which has accompanied the sacking of the PDH program from the top down in the last ten years or so programs the total chaos and collapse of medical efforts in disaster which the faint-hearted now embrace and which our adversaries cleverly encourage. It's an important part of "disinformation." A reversion to the foresight of the leadership of the 50s and 60s in practical disaster medical response measures would turn this induced chaos and failure syndrome — a disaster within a disaster — into an orderly, functional, rewarding reaction to emergency which would program a wholesale lifesaving operation. This is Dr. Klinghoffer's message. Do we want it?*

# TRIAGE — EMERGENCY CARE

## XVII — IMPROVISED HOSPITALS — PART I

*(17th of 19 installments)*

— Max Klinghoffer, M.D.

In the event of major disaster, it may become necessary to improvise hospital facilities. This may be done by activating an existing stored hospital, or by mobilizing trained personnel, requisitioning supplies, and establishing an austere hospital in a previously selected building.

Such improvised hospitals may be

used in a number of situations: to replace an existing hospital, damaged beyond salvage; to augment an existing hospital which has been damaged, but portions of which are still usable; to handle a portion of the patient load where existing hospitals are overwhelmed with casualties; to be set up in an area hit by disaster where no hospital exists; and to establish specialized units, such as burn wards or wards for those exposed to ionizing radiation.

The providing of additional hospital facilities is a complex problem, and should be planned in advance of any disaster. It is not impossible to organize such a hospital after disaster occurs, but it becomes vastly more difficult to do so.

The prototype of an improvised disaster hospital is the "200 Bed CDEM Improved Hospital" which later evolved to the "200 Bed Packaged Disaster Hospital." These units were established by the Federal Government and, at one time, represented our strongest medical defense in the hospital category, in the event of any major disaster. There were at the height of the program over two thousand of these units; there are now less than four hundred. Due to inaction and unwise action on the part of Congress, most PDHs have been cannibalized, or have been donated to other countries. Much information on improvised hospitals may still be found in manuals describing establishment, utilization, and maintenance of PDHs\*.

Although many buildings may be available in most communities, the selection of a building for an improvised hospital is a critical matter, and it is essential this factor be considered well in advance. There must be a firm commitment from those who own the building, and this must be in writing. There is no time for legal niceties after a disaster has occurred. Those in charge of such a building must know exactly what will be needed and how the building will be used. The time must be an "open-end" decision, since no one can predict in advance how long the building will be needed for care of patients. Further, since the transfer of supplies becomes much more difficult in a disaster situation, it is highly desirable that storage space for basic supplies be designated within the building. Such supplies would include chiefly those items to be used in Triage, Admitting, and Radiation Detection-Decontamination. Very little, if any, material should be stored which has a short shelf-life. If, on the other hand, the building and the supplies are closely supervised, it may be possible to store some materials of short shelf life provided arrangements can be made to rotate these items (usually with a nearby hospital).

In the storage of supplies, a master inventory should be prepared, in both alphabetical and schematic form. Several copies of this inventory should be immediately available in the storage area,



*Nurses check PDH supplies at a Midwestern location in the early 1970s when the U.S. PDH program was operational.*

in order that anyone may locate any item with a minimum of delay. Similarly, it is advisable to determine in advance where each functional section of the hospital will be located, thus determining where the stored items will be used.

The building selected for use as an emergency hospital should have a safe source of water. This must be tested periodically for safety as drinking water, and it must be available even if central water supplies should break down. This usually means a well, and it also means there must be an independent power supply to operate the pump. In fact, there are some circumstances in which an individual well may be safer than a central water supply. Simple methods may be used to be certain enteric bacteria are destroyed.

As nearly as possible, there should be certain access to the building, even considering traffic problems following a disaster. Insofar as entrance to the building is concerned, it is ideal if there is a "maze" entrance, to reduce the amount of radioactive dust which might enter the building. But it is unlikely such buildings will be so constructed, unless those in control are very disaster-conscious. If a maze entrance is to be devised after the disaster occurs, then it must be remembered that the entrance must accommodate large pieces of equipment, and it must permit passage of litters. This may be accomplished in two ways: first, by making the maze portion wide enough to accommodate large pieces of equipment; or, second, to enlarge one end of the maze to permit a turn-around. For this reason, planners should determine the size of equipment to be moved into the building.\*

Transportation considerations must include: personnel; medical equipment; engineering and repair equipment; food; and possibly water. For this purpose, a motor pool must be listed, and it must be kept current. It is advisable to revise such a list at least every six months.

Waste disposal may be a problem post-disaster. The sewers may be damaged and, in any case, there will probably not be enough water for flushing receptacles. Large garbage cans will serve during the first few hours, but after that time, it will be necessary to have wastes hauled away, or buried. In the event of heavy radioactivity, it will be impossible to haul or to bury wastes for perhaps several days. Therefore, a large quantity of garbage cans will be needed. Such containers may be sanitized and deodorized by use of Chlorinated Lime, such as is used to treat swimming pools.

After a major disaster, it is likely electric power will be unavailable, at least for some time. If there is radioactivity, it may be weeks before power lines can be repaired. Therefore, it is urgent that such buildings have their own independent power supply, and there must be stored, adjacent to the premises, enough fuel to supply the generators for weeks. It is also advisable to make prior arrangements with suppliers of fuel to agree upon priority for such fuel for emergency medical establishments.

While standby generators are vital to the functioning of a disaster hospital, other sources of power should be considered. Various types of batteries, especially storage batteries, will serve to supply emergency lighting until central sources of power are restored. All facets of electric power supply must

be considered, and advance preparations made. This must also include planning to provide power without danger of electric shock, or fires due to short circuits or overloading.

### ... PROVISION FOR HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION.


Depending upon the climate and the time of year, it is almost always necessary to make some provision for heating, cooling, and ventilation. The presence of many people in the hospital will provide some heat; but this will pose a problem on hot, humid days.

Improvised hospitals will undoubtedly have security problems, just as do permanent hospitals; but the security problem will be more acute following disaster. It will be necessary to retain the integrity of the hospital as a hospital at such a time; but it must be remembered that such an installation will also be looked upon as a source of general shelter, a depot of food and other supplies, and a source of controlled drugs. Advance plans must be made to, as nearly as possible, identify those authorized to be in the hospital. And strict security measures must be established to prevent access by any who are not authorized. Certainly the regular law enforcement agencies will not be able to handle this problem at such a time. It is necessary to train auxiliary security personnel in advance, and to provide identification and authorization for their functions at time of emergency.

A survey of existing buildings in the area should be made and recorded, and should be updated at frequent intervals. Some such buildings may seem adequate at the time of inspection, but may become inadequate or unavailable due to damage, or remodeling. In surveying these buildings, consideration must be given not only to location, but also to access, and to the potential of the building as shelter for both protection from the elements, and shielding against ionizing radiation. Legal factors should also be considered. For example, written permission from the owners for alternate use of the building is necessary; but there may be a change in ownership, and renegotiation for use of the building is then required.

For purposes of indoctrination it is advisable that any buildings planned as improvised hospitals be so designated in advance, with easily visible signs both inside and outside the buildings. (In negotiating for the use of structures as emergency hospitals, the owners should be made aware that in offering these buildings as "dual purpose", there is a distinct community service, and a very positive public relations factor.)

Permission to use the building as a hospital must be widely publicized, and all key personnel in disaster work should



*The Swiss have gone underground in the last 20 years. Here a surgical team follows the Swiss practice of utilizing extensive underground hospital facilities during peacetime.*

be aware of this. Similarly, they should have a good overview of the structure and its capabilities, and a detailed knowledge of what is stored in the building for medical purposes.

For actual use, these buildings will

superhighways be built in such a manner that the area beneath the roads would be shelter. This would have provided a network of public shelters throughout the nation, accessible for residents of almost all areas. The idea

as much flexibility as possible.

In establishing shelter spaces for medical uses, there must be extensive pre-planning with regard to personnel. Yet this planning also must be kept flexible, since designated individuals may not be available at the time they are needed. It is a mistake, in any disaster program, to say with finality: "John Smith is in charge of administration." There must be alternates for every key position in such a plan, and it is advantageous if some of the disaster personnel are versatile enough to be in charge of more than one position.

It is certain the medical plan in civil defense cannot function unless there is a close coordination between the medical plan per se and the capabilities of the community. This requires considerable pre-planning. The community may furnish additional doctors and nurses (some of whom may be retired or semi-retired); medical supplies; security personnel; engineers; dieticians; maintenance personnel; and many others.

### **A SHELTER WHICH IS ADEQUATE FOR USE IN CASE OF MILITARY ACTION WILL ALSO BE SUITABLE IN CASE THERE IS NEED IN NON-MILITARY DISASTERS.**

almost surely require some modifications in structure. This must be undertaken by the owner; but those responsible for its use must be aware that there may be some limitations on such emergency remodeling. It is preferable that agreements be made in advance to provide payment for use of the building (if such is required by the owner) and for the cost of returning the building to its previous state. Many owners who may be reluctant to relinquish a building for other purposes, may be more willing to do so once such guarantees are made.

When the time comes in which the government accepts its responsibility for the protection of the American people, and when we then have a tangible civil defense program, it is likely we will again see packaged disaster hospitals reinstated, and we will see special areas built for and dedicated to these units. In the hospital where the writer worked during the 1950s, a special basement storage area was built to house a PDH, since this hospital was located in a suburb about twenty miles from a metropolitan city, and therefore would have likely been a major support area. As our civil defense preparedness advances (hopefully) we may see buildings erected which are dual purpose: that is, which are used for other purposes under ordinary circumstances, but which may be readily adapted to emergency hospital use when the need arises.

Should the Federal Government re-establish a realistic civil defense program, such as we had in the 1950s and 1960s, it is likely that special structures will be built as dual purpose buildings. One of the objections to such a program has been the cost of such a project, and the idea that these buildings would serve a single purpose: shelter in the event of war. Such is not necessarily the case. A shelter which is adequate for use in case of military action will also be suitable in case there is need in non-military disasters. Further, these structures may serve other and non-related purposes. For example, they may be used, under ordinary circumstances, as storage areas, postal sub-stations, governmental offices, etc. If such a program is inaugurated the shelters should protect against both blast and radiation. Several years ago, the writer published a paper in the *Illinois Medical Journal* recommending that all elevated

was described as "good, but too expensive." Even today, if we really place a value on the lives of our citizens, it would be possible to convert existing highways to shelters.


In addition, the government should again distribute booklets describing simple means of building a home shelter, or converting basement and other areas to shelter.

Shelters for the protection of our population, and shelters for emergency medical facilities should both have the

### **... STAFFING FOR TRIAGE SHOULD INCLUDE THOSE WHO HAVE HAD "HANDS-ON" EXPERIENCE ...**

same protective features. While it is advisable to designate the purpose of each shelter area, it is also a good idea to leave this designation rather flexible. It is impossible to determine, in advance, exactly what proportion of shelter space will be needed for protection of the uninjured segment of the population, and what portion will be required for medical purposes. Therefore, each shelter space should be planned with

The triage section of the emergency hospital will include "pre-triage" for the purpose of checking radioactive contamination. Triage will also include administrative personnel in order that an accurate account be kept of those who are seen as patients. The doctors and nurses who function in triage are not necessarily those who are highly skilled in various medical specialties; rather, the staffing for triage should



*Swiss underground hospital wards are ready for instant emergency service. Here one is opened up for routine patients by hospital staff.*

include those who have had "hands-on" experience in rapid but accurate classification and categorization of patients. It MUST be remembered that experience has shown that the triage area is the most likely section to become a "bottle-neck".

Technicians in various categories, who may work in the local hospital, or who may be residents of the community,

nel in advance, in order to supply such personnel at the time the unit is activated. The question of authorization of security personnel and the extent to which they may enforce security measures must be decided by legal counsel, in advance. But it seems likely that, under disaster conditions, extraordinary powers would be given law enforcement agencies, whether regular or auxiliary.

### **... WITHOUT EFFICIENT COMMUNICATIONS, DISASTER CARE WILL FLOUNDER.**

will be a factor in staffing. These will include laboratory technicians; X-ray technicians (who will function not only in diagnostic X-ray work, but also in radiation detection and decontamination); respiratory technicians (who, in disaster, will function primarily in resuscitation measures); technicians experienced in setting up orthopedic equipment; etc.

Administrative personnel will have functions similar to their everyday work; but in addition will be responsible for rapid identification of casualties, tagging, and hospital records to show where each casualty is located at any given time. Administration must also be responsible for control of any media involvement. In this latter area of work, administration must always keep in mind that the availability of information to the news media is SECONDARY to the care of the patient.

The role of maintenance in a disaster is a multi-faceted one. And it is a vital one. Maintenance and engineering personnel must be prepared to supply power on an emergency basis — whether this power comes from electric lines which are still intact, or whether it means the use of emergency generators and emergency wiring. They must be prepared to protect the windows and doors of the structure against the elements and against radiation. Engineering will work closely with dietary and laboratory in establishing and maintaining a safe water supply. In addition to such duties, maintenance will also be responsible for repair of equipment. Another important point: If the engineering and maintenance people are indoctrinated with the goals and purposes of the disaster

### **SECURITY IS ALWAYS A PROBLEM ...**

program, they will produce a gratifying number of improvisations of austere equipment for the purpose.

Security is always a problem in any emergency or disaster. It would be a problem multiplied many times in the event of war. The local law enforcement agencies should train auxiliary person-

nel in advance, in order to supply such personnel at the time the unit is activated. The question of authorization of security personnel and the extent to which they may enforce security measures must be decided by legal counsel, in advance. But it seems likely that, under disaster conditions, extraordinary powers would be given law enforcement agencies, whether regular or auxiliary.

Another problem in communications is the lack of rehearsal. If the communications systems are tested only during actual emergency, it is almost predictable they will not function.

Within the improvised hospital, communications may be readily available if the structure used is a normal office area with internal communications systems. It has also been found that surplus "field phones", such as were used in the military, may provide an excellent means of contact within the hospital structure. ... are easily wired from site to site. But it is essential these units be tested from time to time, and that the appropriate signal system be developed in order to be able to call any location.

Hand-held radios are also of use in improvised hospitals. But it is essential they also be tested frequently, and that the power supply be checked at intervals. Extra batteries must be easily available. When hand-held radios are to be a part of the communication system, it must be remembered that range (in distance) is not the only factor. Often there may be good communications between two radios located at considerable distance apart, but radio failure at some points which are closer. This is due to "shielding", which means the radio signal is interrupted by some of the structural material in the building. Therefore, radios must be tested at ALL areas of the building where they may be used. In some cases, this problem may be lessened by the use of one central radio, usually in the administrator's office. This should be a radio using the full power permissible, and should have an antenna which can be quickly set up when there is notification of need.

The role of dieticians in the improvised hospital is a varied one. The dietician should plan in advance to provide minimum basic meals for hospital workers, and appropriate meals for patients. Special meals, such as those high in protein and carbohydrate, will be needed for some types of injuries — especially burn cases.

It is likely that paper plates and cups will be used in the early hours after disaster, since there may not be personnel or facilities for washing dishes. Some meals will require only a paper or styrofoam cup, with sandwiches being wrapped.

The dietician should have a written agreement with food suppliers in the area, in order that patients and hospital workers have a reasonable priority for food supplies. Because of limited refrigeration facilities, the dietician should plan much of the diets around non-perishable foods.

The dietician shares responsibility for a safe water supply with the laboratory and the engineering sections. Engineering is responsible for the physical factors in the water supply and perhaps in

### **... CHLORINATION OF WATER IS VERY SIMPLE, ...**

the preliminary steps in purification. The appropriate treatment of water, usually with Chlorine, is the responsibility of the dietary department and the laboratory. Fortunately, the matter of chlorination of water is very simple, with the use of household Chlorine bleach as the only chemical needed. (Materials used for chlorination of swimming pools may also be used.) And the determination of the chlorine level in the water is easily tested with the easy-to-use Ortho-toluidine kit. It is urgent however, that all who are responsible for safe water supply realize that the Chlorine must interact with the water for at least thirty minutes before the water is safe to drink. It should also be recognized that, while chemical treatment of the water will destroy the most dangerous bacteria, including the enteric bacteria, such chemical treatment has no effect on the cysts of amoeba; nor does it affect the virus of hepatitis. And chemical treatment does not reduce the dangers of other chemicals which may have been introduced as contaminants, nor does it affect radioactive materials. □

NEXT INSTALLMENT:  
Improved Hospitals — Part II

\*Manuals describing the various sections of the PDH, inventory books of the PDH, and instructional manuals for personnel in the functional sections may still be available where the few remaining PDHs are still to be found. These are informative, but will require updating.



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
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
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From: METTAG, P.O. Box 910, Starke, FL 32091. (Phone: 904/964-5397).

- Feb 21-23 23rd Annual State Emergency Management Conference, at Austin Hilton Inn, Austin, Texas. Contact: Public Information Office, Texas Division of Emergency Management, P.O. Box 4087, Austin, Texas 78773. (512/465-2138).
- Feb 26-29 National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management, Capital Holiday Inn, Washington, DC. Contact: NCEM, 3126 Belt Line Blvd (Suite 101), Columbia, SC 29204. (803/765-9286).
- Mar 23-24 The Alabama Association of Emergency Medical Technicians will sponsor *Back to Basics* Conference. Contact: AAEP Seminar 1984, P.O. Box 11302, Huntsville, AL 35814.
- Apr 2-6 American Nuclear Society, 5th International Conference, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. Contact: James R. Vogt, 214 Research Reactor Facility, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211. (314/882-4211).
- Apr 12-13 18th Annual Governor's Conference on Disaster Preparedness, Concourse Hotel in downtown Madison, WI. Contact: Division at Post Office Box 7865, Madison, WI 53707. (608/266-3232).
- May 10-13 Seventh Annual National Educational Conference of the National Association of EMT's-Dearborn '84. Hyatt Regency Dearborn, Dearborn, MI. Contact: Brenda L. McLean, NAEMT, PO Box 380, Newton Highlands, MA 02161. (617/894-7179).
- May 15-18 1984 Convention, National Association of Freestanding Emergency Centers, Chicago Marriott, Chicago, IL. Contact: Slack Incorporated, 6900 Grove Road, Thorofare, NJ 08086. (609/848-1000).
- Jun 3-8 American Nuclear Society, Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA-Hilton. Contact: Thomas H. Row, ORNL/ND-Union Carbide Bldg., 4500 SN MS/S/178, Oak Ridge, TN 37830. (615/547-5974).
- Oct 2-5 Emergency 84, Second International Congress on Disaster Preparedness and Relief, Palais des Expositions et des Congres of Geneva. Contact: Congress Secretariat, ICDO, 10-12 chemin de Surville, 1213 Petit-Lancy/Geneva, Switzerland.
- Oct 7-12 NCEM Annual Conf., El Paso, TX. Contact: John Parks, El Paso City Hall, No. 2 Civic Ctr. Plaza B-17, El Paso, TX 79999. (915/541-4449).
- Nov 14-16 The American Civil Defense Association 7th Annual Seminar/Conference, Daytona Hilton, Daytona Beach, FL. Contact: TACDA, PO Box 1057, Starke, FL 32091. (904/964-5397).
- Nov 17 Doctors for Disaster Preparedness 2nd Annual Seminar/Conference, Daytona Hilton, Daytona Beach, FL. Contact: DDP, PO Box 1057, Starke, FL 32091. (904/964-5397).

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THE SLURS AND ARROWS directed at strategic defense (civil defense and active defense) these past months point to one certainty: Strong interests want strategic defense discredited in the West, discredited completely and for good. Buried. Whatever the cost.

IDENTIFYING THESE PARTIES is not really all that difficult. The core, of course, is the Soviet Union, and the art it cultivates is the old game of deception and surprise, which its propaganda batteries are superb at playing. It should be obvious, however, even through the pinkish smoke screens, that while every possible trick is employed in torpedoing strategic defense in the West, behind the Iron Curtain the full spectrum of defensive measures development is given heavy and sustained emphasis — top priority. Why not? An ambitious nation in its right mind will never inflict upon itself the same debilitating diet that it fashions for the gullible "useful idiots" it courts among its potential enemies. No conquering country worth its salt can act otherwise.

THE LATEST OF A LONG STRING OF ASSAULTS on strategic defense (not by any means the last coming across the peacenik horizon) is what engineer Petr Beckmann calls the "Sagan Saga" — a curious, allegedly scientific report by astronomer Carl Sagan which questions its own assumptions but paints a horrifying "nuclear winter" as predicted after even a relatively small attack. According to Sagan and his fellow writers it puts an end to the earth as we know it. But such an event has in fact already occurred, says Beckmann in his January Access to Energy newsletter — a volcanic eruption which exceeded 2,4000 "Sagan Thresholds" without producing any unbearable Sagan "horrorama." In this issue of the Journal of Civil Defense (page 6) nuclear scientist Carsten M. Haaland also finds "with some of my colleagues" questionable assumptions and omissions in the nuclear winter concept.

COMPLAINTS THAT 1983 WAS A BAD YEAR FOR CIVIL DEFENSE are certainly valid if we judge by the mounting attacks upon it. In another light, however, it has been many years since civil defense has received real attention. Now, with promising active defense (especially SPACE defense) being debated and thrust into the limelight there is the opportunity, if we will but seize it, to promote a really effective nuclear defense, one that will make attack against the West too heavy a risk for any aggressor. Some things are now going for us. For instance, ABC's "The Day After" failed to frighten the masses in America or Europe into giving up, prompted many to ask: "What can we do?" The answer is simple: "Prepare." Guidance is for the asking.

THE COVER OF THIS ISSUE depicts the basic mechanics of the Red propaganda offensive. It illustrates the "Peace Through Appeasement" effort that has been so contagious with the help of misled "peace" organizations. It has historically produced only war. What we must pursue in 1984 is "Peace Through Preparedness" — a concept that has a long history of success.

WHAT WE NEED IN 1984 is determined, coordinated educational offensives of our own directed to all echelons of government — PARTICULARLY TO CONGRESS — and to the people. We need to get with it. Now.

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**LATE LATELINE:** The National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians (NAEMT) is now accepting applications for 8 annual awards for excellence and leadership in the emergency medical field. Applications must be forwarded no later than March 1. For information and forms contact: NAEMT, P. O. Box 334, Newton Highlands, MA 02161-0334 (Phone: 617-894-7179).

# IN DEFENSE OF CRISIS RELOCATION

— Walmer E. Strobe

Crisis relocation has been getting a bum rap recently from some people who should know better. It is bad enough when the international anti-nuclear movement cries that there is no possibility of evacuating our cities or an otherwise sensible United States Senator insists that the Russians would start World War III if they noticed any unusual traffic over Washington's 14th Street bridge. Things are getting out of hand when civil defense advocates join the disinformation campaign by denigrating crisis relocation in favor of their own preference — usually blast shelters. I'm a longtime advocate of blast shelters myself but I also know all too well the program limitations as they apply today. Others would do well to get back in touch with reality . . .

The brief defense of crisis relocation is that it is the only civil defense measure that could alter in a major way the current vulnerability of the American people to nuclear attack in the near term; say, the next two to ten years. It is true that a nationwide shelter system — blast shelters in the cities and fallout shelter elsewhere — could save as many lives as a well-executed crisis relocation and sheltering operation, perhaps more. And, high quality shelters close by where people are could save great numbers of lives under a wider range of scenarios including that of a surprise attack. Such a civil defense program — a nationwide shelter system — was proposed to President Eisenhower in 1956 by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. It was estimated to cost \$50 billion then and would cost at least three times that much now. Of course, it was planned to be accomplished over a ten-year period . . .

The consensus of military strategists is that the late 1980s will be the most perilous with respect to deterring nuclear war — the "window of vulnerability" that has been spoken of. Preparations for crisis relocation and construction of fallout shelter in the hinterlands could be in place in as little as two year's time and would provide high population survival under most plausible scenarios. It is, in fact, the only basis for improving the survival of our population under nuclear attack during this decade . . .

The second point to be made is that the Russian people are going to do it, too. Remember, the Politburo had to back down in the Cuban crisis and decided that we would never put them in that position again. Along with their military buildup, they put renewed emphasis on civil defense. The Soviets had been incorporating blast shelters into new construction since World War II, but, as we have already noted, a nationwide shelter system is a longterm project and they weren't all that far along. Our Pentagon planners didn't give much credence to crisis relocation until they discovered about 1968 that the Soviets had spent the previous five years making it the center piece of their civil defense effort. The Soviets continue to incorporate shelter in new construction but right now and for many years to come their planned response in a future deep crisis includes the evacuation of their cities. Without a mature and well-planned program of preparedness for crisis relocation, what options would an American President have, once the Soviet Union began to evacuate its cities? . . .

A few final remarks may be in order. The Administration's proposed civil defense program based on crisis relocation is not easy to defend. Priced at about \$4 billion, it has been stretched out to seven years of accomplishment at the urging of the Office of Management and Budget. Thus, the main argument for the program, namely, that it offers the only hope of reducing the vulnerability of the population in the short term, is largely vitiated by the slow pace of the proposed deployment. That program could be accomplished in a period of three years or less if the Administration undertook it seriously. Such a schedule would support arguments that could make more sense to the Congress, which has turned down the stretched-out program the past two years, although not on the basis that it is too little too late.

It also can be argued that the Reagan program would have a more solid basis if it included a long term commitment to the incorporation of shelter into new construction as a routine matter. Then, crisis relocation could be presented as the interim capability until a nationwide shelter system could reach fruition. Shelter and evacuation are the central countermeasures for protection of life and property. But it is misleading and counterproductive to argue for one over the other. The two options are not alternatives. The American people deserve both. And they need crisis relocation right now.

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