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Protecting Our Life

The Journal of Civil Defense Volume 33, Issue 1

The American Civil Defense Association



International Association Emergency Managers break ground for A new National Civil Defense Memorial.



Congressman Roscoe G. Bartlett, 6th District of Maryland, welcomes the crowd.



The Civil Defense monuments staunchest supporter, Frank Williams, Rancho Cucamonga, California, corporate executive presents his check to Hugh Warner, finance campaign chairman at groundbreaking.

THE LONG JOURNEY By Frank Williams

Editor's Note:

In this article, Frank Williams recounts the beginning and near end to establish a Civil Defense Emergency Management Memorial Monument. Colonel John E. Bex was the prime mover in a well-aided effort to memorialize the achievements of thousands of careerists and volunteers in the field of civil defense and emergency management.

"Almost unbelievable this is an actual happening," declared Alex Atzert, Chairman of the Civil Defense Monument Commission. Mr. Atzert was addressing an undertaking of two decades.

Six months shy of twenty years from an idea to a reality, ground was broken in formal ceremony establishing the site for the construction of the Civil Defense Emergency Management Memorial Monument.

These ceremonies were conducted in late March of this year on the campus of the National Emergency Management Training Center, Emmetsburg, Maryland.

The Monument honors professional and volunteer personnel; those who have participated in the planning, training and operations designed to mitigate the effects of catastrophe, threatening life and property.

Endorsement of the idea by the leadership of the Federal Emergency Management Agency was followed by a design by Maryland artist, Donald Begg, the production of a bronze eagle by an Oregon sculptor, Lorenzo Ghiglier, and the selection of a 15-ton block of polished granite from Vermont. The latter forms the centerpiece of the monument. Location on the grounds of the National Emergency Training Center, although approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, was determined to require legislation from the U.S. Congress.

Maryland Congressman Roscoe J. Bartlett, approached in 1998, enthusiastically introduced a bill to enable the required legislation. Languishing in subcommittee for eight months, the Congressman solicited co-sponsorship by nine colleagues to assist in moving the bill to a floor vote. Passing both houses in November 1999 with only token opposition, President Clinton signed PL 106-103. The law, in effect, cleared the way for construction at the National Emergency Training Center and named the Civil Defense Monument Commission as manager.

Funding of the entire project has been made totally through donations and without Federal appropriations. The costs, to include the architectural specification, the purchase of materials, the construction itself and subsequent maintenance of the site, had been estimated at \$100,000.

The non-profit National Civil Defense Commission and an Executive Committee had been organized with Alex Atzert, Olney, Maryland. The purpose was to conduct fund raising and to manage progress toward the overall goal.

Over the years \$80,000 was raised. The effort was assisted by members of the International Association of Emergency Managers, the National Emergency Management Association, their counterparts among state level Emergency Management Directors, the American Civil Defense Association and the American Strategic Defense Association.

Thirty-five of the fifty states have made contributions qualifying for placement of State flags that will encircle the Monument plaza.

The ground breaking ceremony,

attended by those primarily involved in the work of the Monument Commission, and invited guests, were present to celebrate the results of a very long journey, to reaffirm the purpose of the memorial, and to pledge continued support in the final move. There is yet more funding needed. Completion of monument construction is anticipated for spring 2002.

Robert Straw, an active Commission member, acting as master of ceremonies, introduced speakers with appropriate remarks complementing each one's contribution. Those making further remarks were Congressman Roscoe J. Bartlett, David McMillen, Maryland Director of the Emergency Management Association, Patrick Boyle, Council President, Emmetsburg, Maryland, Stephen Sharro, Superintendent of the Emergency Management Institute, Billy Zwerschke, President, International Association of Emergency Managers and Ken Burns, acting administrator, U.S. Fire Administration.

The completed Monument will stand twelve feet in height. The pinnacle of the obelisk is the sculpted bronze eagle. The Vermont granite pyramid, the centerpiece is three-sided, each side representing the team effort of the federal, state and local governments in accomplishing the joint mission. The flags of the States, a polished granite wall and benches encircle a plaza for visitors.

All donations to the Monument Fund will be tax-exempt. The IRS tax-exempt number is 23-2889515. Donations can be made by sending your check to:

The National Civil Defense Memorial Monument ATTN: Mr. Charles F. Sullivan, Treasurer 352 Blacksmith Road Camp Hill, PA 17011-8421 Telephone Number: 717-737-5466

Contributors To The Civil Defense Emergency Management Memorial Monument

Based on current records, we find that 28 states have donated \$1,000 each in order to have their state flag flown at the monument. In addition, two organizations, International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) and The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA), have also donated \$1000 each to fly their organizations' flag as well. Also three additional states have made partial contributions as well, and five more states, along with the District of Columbia, are also in the process of doing so.

As of the time of publishing of this issue, the following states will proudly be represented at the Civil Defense Emergency Management Memorial Monument by having their flags flone:

OREGON, TEXAS, MISSISSIPPI, ILLINOIS, TENNESSEE, KEN-TUCKY, OHIO, PENNSYLVANIA, IOWA, LOUISIANA, UTAH, MASSA-CHUSETTS, NEW JERSEY, MARY-LAND, INDIANA, VERMONT, NORTH DAKOTA, WISCONSIN, KANSAS, NORTH CAROLINA, FLORIDA, ARIZONA, VIRGINIA, NEVADA, WEST VIRGINIA, WASH-INGTON, CALIFORNIA, and MIS-SOURI.

If you, your agency or institution would like to make a contribution to the Civil Defense Emergency Management Memorial Monument, please contact TACDA toll-free at **1-800-425-5397** to learn how you can help support this worthy cause.

DOOMSDAY by Sharon Packer and Paul Seyfried Utah Shelter Systems (spacker@netoriginals.com)

We have had the privilege of learning about national security affairs, weapons effects, and shelter design from face to face consultations with people who have designed, built, and tested nuclear weapons. Some of these people have passed away, some still serve in positions at Livermore National Laboratory, or have retired. They have all convinced us that the world is anything but a safe place, and that shelters are still a good idea.

A physician once asked Dr. Lowel Wood (a current nuclear physicist at Livermore) a question concerning the status of the Russian nuclear arsenal. His reply was immediate and firm: "The Soviet Union assembled the largest collection of weapons of mass destruction on earth and it will remain a potent and lethal threat to the American people long after the people in this room are dead." This hardly sounds reassuring. The American media boldly trumpets the end of the cold war almost on a daily basis, but quietly concedes the fact that U.S nuclear forces rehearse killing thousands of Russian targets every single day....and the Russians rehearse killing us. We figure if the air force prepares as if this could happen at any moment, so should we.

And now a word on so-called "doomsday":

People who typically build shelters do not believe in doomsday...what would be the point of surviving the unsurvivable? It is popular in the United States to deride citizens who just want to protect their families from war. We don't quite understand the origins of this attitude, but we were unable to find people in Europe who shared this uniquely American paradigm. Europe has seen total war waged upon them and around them for thousands of years and they aren't so naive to think that the future will be different.

Switzerland, Norway, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Finland, Russia, both Chinas, both Koreas, Singapore, Malaysia, and some dozen other countries have real shelter programs. Switzerland is the world leader in shelter technology and dominate the world market...most other countries purchase components from them-sometimes in a state of panic. The Saudi Arabians sent six large transport trucks to the Andair AG factory shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait and bought every shelter component off the warehouse shelves. Saudi Arabia is still building shelters today.

According to the U.S Dept. of State, at least 22 countries have active offensive biological warfare programs. Most of these countries hate us. One of these countries (Russia) can still launch around 6,000 nuclear warheads at us in about ten minutes notice (General Eugene Habeger, retired commander of all U.S. nuclear forces, 60 Minutes interview w/ Dan Rather, Feb. 5th, 1999) Russia is still believed to be developing and producing anthrax, smallpox, Marburg, tularemia, V.E.E., several other hemorrhagic fevers, and dozens of other toxins in violation of the BW protocol of '72. The former deputy director of this program, Ken Alibek now living in the U.S., believes this is so. It is now believed by western experts that North Korea and Iraq, both well known for their campaigns on human rights, can produce and weaponize smallpox. We can wring our hands on the possibilities forever, or we can act.

Some people have taken physical action to protect themselves because they no longer believe that their government can (or ever tried to) protect them from this threat. If these terrible weapons are ever loosed upon mankind, we don't believe it would be the end of the world...it would just be the end of the world for a lot of other people.

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MISSILE DEFENSE -A GLOBAL APPROACH By Max M. Kampelman and Frederick Seitz

In response to President Bush's commitment to national missile defense, Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for a limited, Europewide missile defense program. We ought to welcome this Russian proposal and link it to U.S. objectives.

The established "wisdom" is that acting on missile defense would require withdrawal from the ABM Treaty — a very controversial idea in this country. Our allies and friends, observing this domestic debate, contribute their concerns that national missile defense is threatening to Russia and China.

We believe it would be irresponsible for the U.S. government to leave its people defenseless in the face of clear signs that a growing number of countries are developing ballistic missiles capable of reaching this country with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Our government needs to lead us into a creative international approach to missile defense designed to resolve the domestic and international controversy.

One promising approach would be to revisit earlier proposals that have not been pursued — proposals reflecting President Ronald Reagan's early pledge to share the fruits of U.S. strategic defense research with other countries.

Nearly 10 years ago, in October 1991, Vladimir Lukin, vice speaker of the Russian Duma, stated that "we could be talking about a strategic defense system for all mankind." Russian President Boris Yeltsin embraced a global protection system in a United Nations speech the following year. From June through October 1992, the United States and Russia pursued high-level and promising, although unpublicized — talks regarding a cooperative approach to missile defense, one that transcended the ABM Treaty.

President Putin also has called for "new mechanisms" to protect against certain Third World countries, and he has advocated "umbrellas" so that "we could jointly protect all of Europe." It is time to welcome, however belatedly, the initiatives presented by Yeltsin, Putin and others.

The ABM Treaty provides for negotiations between the parties regarding new futuristic missile defense technologies, defined as those based on "other physical principles." In informing the Russians that the United States wishes to discuss their proposals, along with other ideas, we should make it clear that we wish those talks to be expanded at the appropriate time to include NATO, China, Japan, Israel and others.

The U.S. objective should be to create an international consortium dedicated to a missile defense designed to protect everyone. It should also be understood that our efforts to defend ourselves will continue, whether or not the talks proceed constructively.

Should Russia prove not to be serious about its proposals, the United States and its NATO allies should nevertheless form an international missile consortium. Its goal, using both cutting-edge scientific research and farsighted diplomacy, would be to create a global missile defense system within the decade, the fruits of which could be shared by all nations.

This proposal dovetails with the new administration's desire to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear-based deterrence, since an effective global defense would lessen the value of long-range nuclear missiles. It is now almost universally acknowledged that missile defense technology is maturing, but more work is needed to achieve highly reliable, deployable systems. Substantial effort at the conceptual level has gone into spacedeployed global defensive systems that would detect and destroy missiles in their highly vulnerable and slow initial boost phase, well before warheads are deployed. Space-based systems could destroy attacking missiles during boost phase using conventional, not nuclear, explosives.

Although the engineering challenges of developing such systems are complex, the underlying principles involved are scientifically valid. If and when an effective missile defense system is developed, protocols should be established concerning all rocket launches worldwide, whether or not the launching nation is a consortium member. It would be in the best interests of responsible nations to join such a cooperative program, assuming they share the goal of achieving peace and stability while avoiding the threat of nuclear blackmail or attack.

Some say the concept of strategic defense is misguided because individual nuclear bombs could still be used against us by clandestine means. But while such an event would be devastating, the destruction would not be comparable to the paralyzing damage that could be wrought by a half-dozen missiles, each containing multiple nuclear, chemical or biological warheads.

The diplomatic effort to create an international consortium for global missile defense should be a vital national initiative. It would provide us with an opportunity to serve the national interest as well as the objectives of peace and stability.

Protection of our nation is not a principle open to compromise. The time has come to put partisanship aside and, under the leadership of the president, work toward a domestic and international consensus on global missile defense.

Max M. Kampelman was State Department counselor and, from 1985 to 1989, head of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. He is chairman of the Georgetown University Institute for the Study of. Diplomacy. Frederick Seitz, president emeritus of Rockefeller University, is past chairman of the Defense Science Board and past president of the National Academy of Sciences.

Swiss Concrete Shelters vs. Corrugated Steel Shelters by Sharon Packer and Paul Seyfried Utah Shelter Systems (spacker@netoriginals.com)

Switzerland has been building concrete shelters for the protection of their general population for over 50 years. They have reached their y2k goal of sheltering 100+% of their population. Their public shelters are generally hardened to 45-psi. Shelter Cost America, on the other hand, has no public shelters. The economics of large concrete shelters is lost when building units for individual families. We believe it becomes more cost effective, therefore, to use steel as a building medium.

Steel shelter hull sizes include 8', 9', and 10' diameters, and in lengths from 20' to 50'. Entrances can be fabricated through the side of the hull or through the bulkhead. Entryways have both a vertical and horizontal run. The vertical portion can be made to come strait down, or at a 60 degree angle. We greatly prefer the latter for safety and ease of use. Shelters can also be hooked together. This can be a cost savings as they can both use the same air handling system and provide separate quarters for adults and children, or people and storage items.

Steel shelters offer excellent protection against the effects of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The cost per shelter occupant space compares very favorably with large concrete shelters, and installation time at the site takes two to three days instead of four to ten weeks, as does concrete.

Radiation Shielding:

Because it is easy to build small shelter entrances of the correct geometry in steel, the problems of radiation shielding are readily solved. For installations near likely nuclear targets (air force bases, international airports, etc.) we recommend entryways not to exceed 36" in diameter. The total sum of the vertical and horizontal run of this entrance should be approximately 22 feet The 90 degree turn of this type entrance will attenuate (stop) 90% of the gamma radiation. If entrances exceed 36 inches in diameter, they should compensate by adding a longer total entrance length. We highly recommend that two entrances be installed.

The formula for fallout protection is eight times the length squared (in feet), divided by the diameter squared. A 90 degree turn will give another factor of 10. We are looking for a protection factor of over 2,000. Therefore, a 22 ft. angled entrance, of 4 ft. diameter and one 90 degree turn will give a protection factor of 2,420. Compare this to a 6 ft. long, 4 ft. diameter, vertical stove pipe entrance with a protection factor of only 18. Neither of these entrances are adequate alone, against Initial radiation . However, the angled entrance can utilize the horizontal run for the extra shielding required to attenuate the neutrons as explained in the next paragraph.

Steel shelters, when properly installed can withstand overpressures of 150 psi. At these high overpressures, the occupants could be exposed to Initial radiation_. In this event, the horizontal run of the entrance can be quickly

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filled with 50 lb. bags of grain for maximum protection against the prompt neutron and gamma radiations of Initial radiation. We have also utilized our horizontal runs for water barrels which can quickly be pushed into the entrance on a trolly system. Initial radiation is present within 7000 feet of ground zero-particularly in the case of surface burst nuclear explosions. (Grain contains a high proportion of hydrogen atoms which capture the trillions of neutrons streaming into the entry tunnel, effectively shielding the shelter occupants.) It would be very difficult to add 6 ft. of shielding into a vertical stove pipe entrance.

Blast Hardening:

Steel shelters can be blast hardened to twelve atmospheres overpressure (180 psi) without difficulty or significant additional expense...as long as attention is paid to the prompt neutron problem. This means the steel shelter would protect persons from all weapons effects to within 1/2 mile of ground zero of a one megaton surface burst, or directly beneath the same weapon detonating at its optimum burst height (8,000 ft. altitude) in an air burst. One megaton weapons are still used on some aging Russian sub launched ballistic missiles, almost all other weapons in use today are 500 kiloton or smaller. The largest U.S warheads atop the MX and the navy D5 Trident are around 350 kiloton yield. The trend is towards more numerous, accurate, and smaller warheads--stuffing more warheads on a rocket or into the belly of a bomber. The huge (and very heavy) multi- megaton weapons are history. Recently there has been talk in the Pentagon of placing very accurate, small yield nukes on satellites.

Most shelters need not be hardened to the 150 psi degree and thus more spacious and comfortable entry tunnels can be fabricated and still maintain good blast protection to one atmosphere overpressure. One atmosphere (15- psi) correlates to about 1.6 miles from a one megaton surface burst. (a typical frame or brick house turns to matchwood at around one third of an atmosphere overpressure or at approximately 5 miles from a one megaton surface burst.)

Entrances & Doors:

Entrances to Swiss concrete shelters normally come at the end of a staircase or ramp. The 8 in. thick vertical hung concrete door enters into a small antiroom or hall. The anti-room also serves as an airlock against chemical/ biological agents. The door to the main shelter is offset from this anti-room, providing good protection from gamma radiation, but little or no protection from initial radiation . The entrances are large and easily accessed by groups of people coming at the same time. These 45-psi concrete shelters will not withstand the overpressures that accompany most prompt neutron scenarios. It would, therefore, be fruitless to build in the prompt neutron protection for the small percentage of people who would otherwise survive.

A horizontal steel hatch is prefered over the Swiss type door because it presents a low drag target to the shock wave and the accompanying flying debris. Our steel doors have a lift assist, which allows even a small child to open them with ease. Our doors lock from both the inside and the outside. We enter the shelter by ladder through the vertical run, and crawl through the 8-ft. horizontal run.

As a nuclear shock wave travels across the ground, it spreads ground up houses, automobiles, trees, etc. around, sort of like spreading jam on a piece of bread...and it fills in any low spot on the terrain- such as basements, or the outside entry areas of Swiss style shelters. Since Swiss armored doors open outward; they could be difficult to open if debris should block the door. This is one reason why we discourage basement shelter entries in areas that could be exposed to blast effects. Also, a strong ground shock wave could tip a basement wall over on top of, or against the shelter closure. To get around this problem, the Swiss have well designed emergency escape

tunnels covered with grates, which would allow shelter occupants to leave the shelter and unblock the doors. We deal with this problem in our steel shelters by recommending two entryways, and our hatch can utilize a 20-ton hydraulic jack to effect selfrescue.

The primary difference in design philosophy between Swiss shelters (reinforced concrete) and steel shelter is that the Swiss rely on a concrete shell for blast resistance and shielding, and the steel shelter relies on the earth surrounding the shelter for both shielding and structural integrity. It is far cheaper to dig a deeper hole than to pour thicker concrete walls and ceilings. The big advantage the Swiss shelter has is that it is somewhat easier to integrate into a new building, and concrete shelters built in 1970 will be around for potentially hundreds of years (like their 12th century castles). Steel shelters remain viable for 50 to 100 years, depending on soil type, and corrosion inhibiting techniques used. (What will your \$30.000.00 car look like in 75 years?)

Electrical Systems:

In both the concrete and steel shelters, the electrical system incorporates both 110 volt AC and 12 volt DC with generator backup. The 12 volt DC system is geared for normal lighting and very energy efficient lighting for use during attack conditions.

Ventilation & Air Filtration:

We at Utah Shelter Systems use the same Swiss made air handling systems in our steel shelters as the Swiss do in their concrete shelters. They are high quality, rigorously tested by the Swiss government against air shock, ground shock, and the filters are tested against all known chemical and biological agents. They can be operated on 110volt power, or by hand. (electricity just might not be available during your war and batteries can fail...but you still have to breathe.) All air systems in Swiss shelters (and ours) are required to operate by hand-even the large systems servicing 2000 people per unit.

For private shelters of any kind, we recommend the Andair AG, VA-150 air handling unit featuring one bar explosion protection valves as standard equipment. Three bar valves are available as extra cost. It will provide sufficient filtered air for 50 persons. The duration of blower operation will vary, depending on shelter size and number of occupants. Ten persons in a 10' X 50' shelter might require an hour of blower operation every four hours...50 persons in the same shelter would require two hours on, two hours off. Most people would prefer fairly continuous operation to maintain a pleasant air supply in a fully occupied shelter, such as in the 50 person example. Each man would have to turn the blower for 1/2 hour, once a day (some people pay a lot of money to go to the gym to work a lot harder than that)

In September of 1999 we traveled to Andelfingen, Switzerland, to receive factory schooling on large shelter construction. After our schooling was over we toured the country and inspected dozens of shelters in schools, hospitals, public parks, shops, banks, hotels, churches, homes, and factories. About 73% of Swiss homes have shelters. The rest of the population is assigned to public shelters. All shelters are inspected and built to Swiss government specifications. Every canton (county) has its own civil defense training school, where all able adults are required to take a 14 day course in fire fighting, first aid, shelter operations, weapons effects, search and rescue techniques, and radiological monitoring. The Swiss are truly a well educated and prepared people...they are NOT a doomsday cult. If a crisis involving bioterrorism or war should ever occur, they will promptly deal with it in an orderly manner. I might add that the Swiss have preserved their freedom and avoided war for over 400 vears.

If you are prepared, you have no reason to fear.

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PROTECTING OUR LIFEBLOOD By Jane M. Orient, M.D. Doctors For Disaster Preparedness

A key part of civil defense or disaster preparedness is to assure the availability of the necessities of life: water, shelter, food, medical treatment, and so on.

Often forgotten, until it is lacking, is the item necessary for supplying all of these essentials: access to energy.

This means fuel-primarily coal and hydrocarbons-and electricity.

If trucks and trains stopped moving, or if the current stopped flowing, millions would die before very long.

Such a catastrophe could be brought about by a powerful enemy targeting our oil refineries, generating facilities, dams, and pipelines. At the present time, an all-out military attack seems unlikely to bring about this objectivealthough enough missiles and nuclear warheads under foreign control exist to make it theoretically possible.

But there is another way, whether pursued deliberately by an enemy or unconsciously by well-intentioned but misguided people in our own nation: gradually constricting our access to energy. Methods include these: making land off-limits to oil exploration or to gas pipelines; creating a climate of fear such that no sane utility undertakes to develop nuclear generating plants; and driving industry offshore because of unaffordable environmental rules.

At first, an affluent nation experiencing great strides in productivity, thanks to technology, doesn't notice. But as infrastructure decays and cannot be replaced, or as population growth catches up to our previous excess in capacity, the fault lines begin to show.

There is a chance that the nation might wake up before it's too late, and begin to question all the bad science, the rationale for the tyrannical environmental regime that has gradually evolved. That is probably why there is such a sense of urgency about ratifying a global energy rationing scheme, and establishing a bureaucracy with the power to enforce it. This scheme is called the Kyoto Treaty.

For a preview of the effects of this Treaty, consider California. As the Golden State experiences rolling blackouts-with stalled elevators, inoperative traffic lights, crashed computers, and idle produc-tion lines-it is instructive to note that the reduction in electricity is less than 10% of the cutbacks required in just the first phase of Kyoto. Even Science editor Don Kennedy now points out that the real reduction target of Kyoto-usually stated as 7% below 1990 levels-is 30% of the energy that would be required to meet the demands of population growth and increased per capita use (Science 2000;290:1091).

The Kyoto Treaty is not a "sensible insurance policy" to guard against catastrophic climate change. The catastrophic predictions have been as thoroughly debunked as the nuclear winter scare that was promoted in the 1980s-by some of the same people.

Rather, the Kyoto Protocol is a prescription for disaster: the destruction of the United States as a superpower, and the deaths of millions who are already at the margin of survival. Carbon dioxide is not a pollutant, but is the unavoidable byproduct of energy production by the methods on which we must rely in the near term. It is also the basic building block of all plant, and thus animal life. We can only make the requisite drastic cuts in carbon dioxide emissions by impoverishing millions, ultimately depriving them of the means to sustain life.

Doctors for Disaster Preparedness

(DDP) was founded in 1983 as an outgrowth of The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA), to help counter the misinformation that was blocking the development of American civil defense.

The same bad science that has prevented both civil and strategic missile defense is also deployed against the American economy as a whole. When spokesmen for groups such as Physicians for Social Responsibility said that the strength of the American economy is more important than its nuclear arsenal, they were correct.

Destroying America requires the destruction of its freedom and its economy. Whether this occurs through a Soviet missile attack as feared in the 1980s, or through environmental rules enacted by international treaty, the ultimate outcome could be the same.

Defending against an attack disguised as "insurance," or concern for safety, or moral righteousness about the sacred Planet could be even more difficult than building effective defenses against weapons of mass destruction.

Both types of defense are on the agenda of the DDP annual meeting to be held in Las Vegas July 14 and 15, with optional tours of the Nevada Test Site and Nellis Air Force base before and after.

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FUELING THE FIRE TACDA Preparedness Tip By Sharon Packer (spacker@netoriginals.com)

Storing enough fuel for emergencies can become overwhelming, to say the least. However, the scope of this addition is to help provide you with an easy and cost-effective solution to this problem.

One possible source of fuel for emergencies is cooking alcohol. One gallon of cooking alcohol and a small alcohol stove should provide enough fuel to cook two hours per day for one week. One plastic or plastic-lined 55 gallon drum filled with cooking alcohol should provide enough cooking fuel to last for one year.

Because the by-products produced from burning cooking alcohol are Carbon Dioxide (CO2) and water (H2O), you should be sure to always use a well ventilated area when cooking on alcohol stoves, as they will consume valuable Oxygen.

Be sure to store the alcohol outside in a well ventilated area away from your home. Alcohol is not extremely flammable, but in the event of a fire, the alcohol could act as a catalyst or accelerant to the fire.

Below are instructions for building a simple yet effective alcohol cooking stove out of common readily accessible materials around the home.

Materials Needed:

#10 can without lid.
roll of toilet paper with the cardboard center removed.
quart-size paint can (new) with lid.
Cooking alcohol.
punch-type can opener.

Instructions:

1. Punch 6 to 8 holes around the sides of the #10 can, about 1 inch from the bottom of the can and set this can aside. It will later be placed over the alcohol stove.

2. Remove cardboard center from toilet paper roll.

3. Place the full roll of toilet paper into the 1-quart paint can.

4. Fill the 1-quart paint can with cooking alcohol until the top of the roll

of toilet paper is covered.

5. Place the 1-quart paint can stove on a flat, fire proof surface.

6. Strike the match and light the alcohol on fire. (The alcohol must be at least 53 degrees Fahrenheit in order for it to burn).

7. Turn the #10 can upside down over the 1-quart paint-can stove (this forms a flat surface for your pan to sit on). Use EXTREME caution as this surface will become very hot, very quickly.

8. Place your cooking pan on this flat surface.

9. When cooking is complete, carefully remove the #10 can, and place the paint can lid over the 1 quart stove to smother the fire.

10. Allow the remaining alcohol to cool and then press the lid firmly over the top of the stove to protect against the spillage and evaporation of the unused alcohol.

REMEMBER: USE THIS STOVE IN WELL VENTILATED AREAS ONLY. KEEP AWAY FROM CHIL-DREN. USE EXTREME CAUTION WHEN WORKING WITH HOT SURFACES AND MATERIALS.

Disclaimer:

TACDA provides the above information as a service to its members and interested public. The information provided is general in nature. For any specific applications of storing fuel or building a cooking stove, please consult a professional about your particular circumstances to ensure the safety of yourself and others. By applying any of the information provided above, you agree not to attempt to hold The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA), nor any persons affiliated with or part of TACDA, nor any author or publisher of said information responsible for any damages resulting from its application or misapplication.

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CYBER TERRORISM -Should We Be Concerned?

WASHINGTON - A large-scale cyber attack against the "extraordinarily vulnerable" computer systems running the United States' vital infrastructure may be only a matter of time, senior government officials warn in interviews with United Press International.

A concerted cyber assault by a wellorganized terrorist group or hostile nation could be crippling to the country's economy and national security. Key pieces of U.S. infrastructure, such as telecommunications, the seven interlinked power grids, financial transactions, government, air traffic control and emergency services, rely on networked computers.

Potentially hostile governments are developing "offensive" capabilities for use in cyber warfare.

Michael Vatis, director of the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center and the nation's top cyber-cop, warned that a large-scale assault would be fundamentally different from the hundreds of lesser attacks by individual hackers and criminal groups that occur each year.

"We see [lesser attacks] every day," Vatis said. "The only thing we haven't seen is a sophisticated attack by a terrorist group or information warfare" by a hostile government.

But that situation is ripe for change, he said. "I think we clearly need to be prepared for more serious terrorist attacks against United States targets. It is only reasonable and prudent to prepare for a true cyber attack on n s ." information systems by terrorists." The national nightmare that would be caused by such a large-scale cyber assault is also a primary concern at the White House.

The NSC is proposing a \$138.5 million budget for cyber security, but huge chunks of it are stalled in Congress. In the House, committees have so far approved slightly more than \$15 million; in the Senate, about \$40 million.

A senior administration official in the cyber arena, speaking on background, warned, "Very bad things happening to major corporations is a very real scenario for the future."

However, "rather than the electronic Pearl Harbor," the official said he believed "the future is going to be much more one of the cyber Exxon Valdez," with residual damage spreading out from the initial contamination.

The official said a combination attack may be likely, with terrorists exploding a bomb and launching a cyber assault against 911 services and police communications at the same time.

Another fertile area for terrorist groups is manipulation of financial transactions, "a win-win situation for the bad guys," the official said. "If I'm success ful in doing that, I make a lot of money. The official points to the 2,500 hacker for my cause," he added, but if the manipulation is detected, it shakes confidence in the financial market.

The United States infrastructure can be penetrated. "We are extraordinarily vulnerable," the senior official said, because of the dependence on networked systems and the rapid growth of e-commerce and business-tobusiness networks.

"The Internet and most software and operating systems were never created with security in mind," he said. Though the Internet "has a sort of resiliency" because of its decentralized nature, there are "some real points of vulnerability" at domain servers and critical nodes. And the battleground is chang-

ing with the explosive growth of the Internet, the official argued. "What is new is the fact that we are beginning to see some very real and very serious threats out there to the security of our cyber networks."

Some of the threats involve outright warfare.

"There are a number of nation states that are investing resources in offensive cyber capabilities," the senior administration official said. The Chinese have "been very explicit in some of their military papers about cyber attacks on the [U.S.] banking system as part of some future conflict," he said.

The Russian and Indian governments are also developing offensive capabilities - as well as the United States. "We know what they can do because we have some sense of what we can do," the official said.

The new threat presents a unique challenge to national security, he added: No. 1, "government and the traditional security establishment can't address this issue by themselves. It does require cooperation with the private sector." And No. 2, mounting a cyber attack "requires very little resources and intellectual know-how."

Web sites on the Internet, many of them with "user-friendly, Windows-style, bint-and-click intrusion software."

NIPC's Vatis also believes U.S. infrastructure is vulnerable. "I think we've seen the vulnerability demonstrated time and again over the last year" with viruses, denial of service attacks and intrusions aimed at stealing data or money, or intrusions that corrupt a system.

"We have not seen an instance of information warfare by a foreign country," Vatis said, " but we are seeing many countries developing the capability. Some of them have the U.S. as their main target."

The National Infrastructure Protection Center is located inside FBI headquarters in Washington and is mostly staffed by the bureau. But the center also includes representatives of other U.S. departments, all the intelligence agencies and the private sector, and FBI agents across the nation and the world.

"Our role is not to harden the targets" of a potential cyber attack in the public or private sector, Vatis said. "That is really the role of the owners of those targets." That is why the partnership of government "with the private sector is a vital part of our mission. Our role is to provide warning and advisements and assessments so the owners of those systems can secure" their own networks with software firewalls and other measures.

Awareness of the problem among the owners of potential targets "has risen greatly, but it's still not good enough," he said.

If and when the attack is launched, how will it arrive?

Vatis believes such a large-scale cyber assault "could come in a variety of forms. Attackers can disguise their point of origin. They can make it look like it's coming from inside the U.S., or from a foreign country."

The attack could come in as a distributed denial of service, or DDOS, attack. Controllers implant hidden "daemons" or "packets" in innocent third-party computer systems called "zombies," then launch the packets at the target simultaneously from literally hundreds of zombies. "Or it could take the form of a malicious and very destructive virus that spreads in a matter of hours and overloads systems," Vatis said.

Frank Cilluffo is senior policy analyst and director of the task force on information at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The vulnerabilities of the electronic infrastructure "are close to endless," Cilluffo said. "This may be one means of leveling the playing field" for a hostile nation wanting to strike at the U.S. superpower.

The intent to harm the United States exists, as does the capability to do so in the cyber world, he added. "But what we have not seen, fortunately, is the intent married up with the capability."

Cilluffo also warns that situation is changing.

"To me that's a matter of time, unless we take steps now" to improve cyber security and "manage the consequences" of a serious cyber attack, he said. "I think we have some breathing space, but there's a compelling case for doing something now."

He gives some credit to the Clinton administration. "They've recognized a major gap" in the nation's security, "and they've taken some pro-active measures," Cilluffo said. "Still, I think they've been long on nouns, short on verbs; long on talk, short on action. But it's easy to point fingers."

While the government needs to get its own cyber security house in order, he said, "the real answer lies in the private sector that owns over 90 percent of the infrastructure."

The government needs to lead by example and form a true private sector partnership, Cilluffo contended, particularly in the computer science and software world. The policy planning table "needs to be expanded where the wingtip here in Washington meets the sandal out in California That gap must be bridged."

The problem must be approached "holistically" with a true national strategy, Cilluffo insisted, including a presidential assistant in the next administration who would be focused on the issue.

Protecting Americans From Bioterrorism by Barbara Reynolds, Crisis Communication Specialist Center For Disease Control (CDC)

Protection against bioterrorism requires investment in the nation's public health system.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's focus is on being prepared to detect a silent bioterrorist attack and ensure local public health is prepared to respond to such an attack if it were to occur. This task is an integral part of CDC's overall mission to monitor and protect the health of the U.S. population.

A strong and flexible public health infrastructure is the best defense against any disease outbreak naturally or intentionally caused. Unlike an explosion or a tornado, an event involving a biological agent requires a different first response. And, unlike chemical explosions, a bioterrorist attack can be invisible and silent, and difficult to detect at first. Symptoms might not occur among victims for days or weeks, and those initially presenting themselves to physicians and clinics may go un- or misdiagnosed.

There is little experience in the United States with incidents of deliberate release of biological agents to cause mass illness. The initial responders to such a biological attack will include hospital staff; members of the outpatient medical community; local, county, and city health officers; and federal public health professionals. And once detected, the magnitude of the situation could overwhelm traditional local public health systems.

In 1998, CDC issued Preventing

Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century, which describes CDC's plan for combating today's emerging diseases and preventing those of tomorrow. The plan focuses on four goals, each of which has direct relevance to preparedness for bioterrorism: 1) disease surveillance and outbreak response; 2) applied research to develop diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines, and surveillance tools; 3) infrastructure and training; and 4) disease prevention and control.

The effort to upgrade public health capabilities locally and nationally to respond to biological and chemical terrorism is ongoing. CDC, working in collaboration with state and local health departments, many other public health partners, and other Federal agencies, is leading the effort.

An improved public health infrastructure that can detect disease outbreaks early is important not only for issues related to bioterrorism but for all emerging and reemerging infectious diseases. The release of a biological agent may not have an immediate impact because of the delay between exposure and onset of illness, or incubation period. If an attack involved an organism like those causing plague or smallpox that is spread from person to person, there could be a second or third wave of illness, and health care workers treating patients would be at risk of infection. Each wave of illness could be larger than the one before, as more and more people were exposed.

In the best-case scenario, an observant health-care worker or law enforcement agent would recognize that something out of the ordinary has occurred and alert public health authorities. In the worst-case scenario, the first wave of cases may not appear to be connected — or may be mistaken for other diseases — and the outbreak would continue for some time before the diagnosis is made and action is taken to contain it. Only a short window of opportunity — between the time the first cases are identified and a second wave of people become ill — is available to determine that an attack has occurred, to identify the organism, and to prevent further spread.

In its report, "Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical or Biological Terrorist Incidents," the Institute of Medicine recommended the expansion of CDC's emerging infections initiative as a means of improving state and local disease surveillance infrastructure. Skilled epidemiologists, strong public health laboratories, and coordinated communications and disease reporting systems are the best defense against any emerging disease threat and are essential for developing sustainable disease prevention strategies.

First and foremost, local communities must have a coordinated response to a possible bioterrorist attack. These response plans will include law enforcement, medical first responders and public health officials. The FBI has jurisdiction for bioterrorism response. If a bioterrorism attack is suspected, the local emergency response system should be activated. CDC's Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) trains personnel to respond to outbreaks and other disaster situations to aid state and local officials in the identification of potential causes and implement appropriate solutions. It is interesting to note that the EIS was first established 50 years ago, in 1951 during the Cold War, in response to the threat of biological warfare.

In the event of a bioterrorist attack, rapid diagnosis will be critical to the immediate implementation of prevention and treatment measures. Because none of the biological agents considered most likely to be used as bio-weapons is currently a major public health problem in the United States, the nation has had limited capacity to diagnose them. CDC is working with state health department laboratories to increase the capacity to identify these agents.

CDC is working to develop and enhance reference laboratory activity in

key geographic areas and awarded cooperative agreements to health departments to help upgrade state and local disease surveillance capabilities. As part of the implementation of CDC's plan for emerging infections, CDC has established the Epidemiologic and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) program to help state and large local health departments develop the skills and resources to address whatever unforeseen infectious disease challenges may arise in the twenty-first century. One of the specific aims of the ELC program is the development of innovative systems for early detection and investigation of outbreaks. State and large local health departments will receive continued support from the ELC program.

CDC has helped establish sentinel disease detection systems that involve local networks of clinicians and other health-care providers. One such network includes emergency departments in large U.S. cities. Another includes travel medicine clinics in the United States and overseas. A third network includes more than 500 infectious disease specialists throughout the country. CDC is using these and other provider-based networks to alert and inform the medical community so that health workers can help recognize and assess unusual infectious disease threats.

One of the major objectives in CDC's emerging infections plan is to improve CDC's ability to communicate with state and local health departments, U.S. quarantine stations, health care professionals, other public health partners, and the public. In the event of an intentional release of a biological agent, rapid and secure communications will be especially crucial to ensure a prompt and coordinated response. Each hour's delay will increase the probability that another group of people will be exposed, and the outbreak will spread both in number and in geographical range. To ensure rapid communication and access to critical health information, CDC is implementing the national Health Alert Network (HAN), in partnership with the

National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), and other health organizations.

Once the cause of a terrorist-sponsored outbreak has been determined, specific drugs, vaccines, and antitoxins may be needed to treat the victims and to prevent further spread. Depending upon the pathogen that causes the outbreak, appropriate medical supplies may not be readily available since these organisms are uncommon causes of disease in the United States. CDC has developed stockpiles of pharmaceuticals to be able to reach victims of an incident within 12 hours. CDC is involved in the plans for developing an infrastructure for rapid delivery of pharmaceuticals and adequate monitoring and record-keeping systems.

CDC and the public health community at large is not involved in assessing the likelihood of a bioterrorism threat. CDC's responsibility in the overall federal counterterrorism response is to improve the public health community's preparedness to detect illness that may be related to a bioterrorism threat, and develop the appropriate public health contingency plans in the event of a bioterrorism incident.

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Peace Through Preparedness



Winds of Change -Developing an Emergency Management Capability for the 21st Century *By Bill Karl*

"Prospects will grow that more sophisticated weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction-indigenously produced or externally acquired-will get into the hands of state and nonstate belligerents, some hostile to the United States. The likelihood will increase over this period that WMD will be used either against the United States or its forces, facilities, and interests overseas." Quote from the report prepared by the CIA titled Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts The central challenge of emergency management is Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The WMD threat is unique in many respects. First, most likely, it will occur without warning. WMD requires emergency managers to closely coordinate two distinct and dissimilar missions - - the criminal investigation mission and the public safety mission. Life savings operations must be the number one priority. The two operational missions can in some instances be in conflict with one another. The very term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" implies the potential impact. If successful, one single terrorism event could affect a wide area and millions of lives. Local resources will be overwhelmed and the military resources will be needed to support civilian operations. This must be accomplished in such a manner to ensure civil liberties are protected. The medical

community will need to be involved at the regional and national levels. Emergency managers have in the past planned for events based upon analysis of what occurred in the past. Emergency managers know the consequences of tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, HAZMATs, and nuclear power plant accidents. These events have produced a technical base of information. There is information available on time from discovery to impact, protective action decisions, effectiveness of protective actions, emergency information needs of the public, etc. This information base is the departure point for developing emergency plans. WMD can take many different forms and there is not a similar information base available on which emergency planners can base their plans. Changes are occurring at the national level to meet the WMD challenge.

On February 15, 2001, a report was published titled "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change." This report was prepared by a prestigious commission formed by Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. The report outlines the changes that are occurring in the world and provides some insight on how these changes might affect national security. The report makes very specific recommendations that will generate an infrastructure to adapt to the changes. One of the major recommendations of the report is the development of a new National Homeland Security Agency to consolidate and refine the missions of the nearly two dozen disparate departments and agencies that have a role in U.S. homeland security today. The report can be found online at http:// www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf>.

On March 21, 2001, a bill was introduced into the House by Mr. Thornberry to form the Homeland Security Agency. The bill would direct the authorities, functions, personnel and assets of the following organizations to be transferred to the new agency.

(1) The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the ten regional offices of which shall be maintained and strengthened by the Agency. (2) The United States Customs Service, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Agency. (3) The Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Agency. (4) The United States Coast Guard, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Agency. (5) The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office and the Institute of Information Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Commerce. (6) The National Infrastructure Protection Center and the National Domestic Preparedness Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

On March 29, 2001, Mr. SKELTON introduced the Homeland Strategy Security Act in to the House. The following is a direct quote from the act that provides food for thought." (1) The United States needs to enhance activities to improve homeland security for its citizens and territory in providing protection from the threat of terrorist or strategic attacks, including cyber attacks and attacks involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

(2) The two key aspects of homeland security are—

(a) antiterrorism activities, including activities relating to force protection, prevention and detection of attack, law enforcement, public health, reporting, and other activities that precede a domestic attack against the United States; and

(b) consequence management, including activities carried out by government entities that are designed to respond to and mitigate the effects of a domestic attack against the United States.

(3) There is currently no well-publicized, widely understood, comprehensive, government wide strategy concerning the role of the United States Government in homeland security crisis and consequence management. (4) Development and implementation of a homeland security strategy will necessarily involve several executive departments and agencies and will only succeed if the heads of those departments and agencies agree to fully support implementation of the strategy within and across those departments and agencies, including implementation of all aspects of the strategy relating to resourcing and funding of personnel and equipment.

(5) The United States Government does not currently have an adequate strategic sense of the unconventional threats to the United States. Due to the significant conventional military superiority of the United States, future adversaries are unlikely to risk a direct head-to-head military confrontation with the United States, but rather are likely to seek to exploit weaknesses in the domestic preparedness and counterterrorism preparedness of the United States. (6) A United States homeland security strategy should reflect a layered approach to homeland security that provides for activities relating to each of the following: prevention of an attack, protection from an attack, and response to an attack.

(7) The Department of Defense has assets that could be used to provide and enhance homeland security, but those assets should only be used for that purpose in appropriate circumstances."

Given the basis for the Homeland Security Strategy Act and a general consensus that a WMD event will occur on American soil in the next 10 years, the United States is in for the race of our lives. The race is to build a credible emergency management infrastructure that has the capacity to manage a WMD event. Will we win this race?

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TACDA Cosponsors Annual DDP Conference July 14th - 15th, Las Vegas, Nevada

The American Civil Defense Association, in cooperation with Doctors for Disaster Preparedness (DDP) would like to cordially invite you to attend this year's annual seminar entitled *"Back to the Future: Perspectives on Science, Defense, and Freedom"*.

TACDA has joined forces with DDP to better enable us to bring you the most comprehensive list of speakers with expertise in civil defense and disaster preparedness. This is DDP's 19th annual seminar, and TACDA is pleased to be one of the cosponsors for this exciting event.

DATE and LOCATION:

July 14-15, 2001 The Sahara 2535 Las Vegas Blvd South Las Vegas, NV 89109

To make hotel reservations, call the Sahara toll-free at (888) 696-2121. Rooms are limited at the special rate of only \$79 per night (single or double) on Friday and Saturday, and only \$32 per night Wednesday, Thursday, and Sunday.

Call now to make your reservations. The cutoff date is June 11.

REGISTRATION INFORMA-TION:

The registration Fee will be \$150 for the entire seminar. This price includes a welcome reception, a banquet, and two luncheons. Be sure to bring your family along as well. Additional family members will be able to attend with you at a reduced rate of only \$95. The tours are extra.

Make your reservations now!

Volume 33, Issue 1

Registration fees can be mailed directly to Doctors for Disaster Preparedness at: DDP, 1601 N. Tucson Blvd. Suite 9, Tucson, AZ 85716. They can also be reached by phone by calling (520) 325-2680, or via the world-wide-web by visiting <u>www.oism.org/ddp/</u>.

DIRECTIONS:

The Sahara is located at the end of the Strip, near the junction of Highway 95 and Interstate 15. It is best to take a taxi from the airport.

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS:

Friday, July 13, 2001:

6:30pm - 9:30pm- Welcome Reception; see "Special Attractions" for tour of the Nevada Test Site and for Monday, July 16, tour of Nellis Air Force Base

Saturday, July 14, 2001:

7:45 am- Welcome. Jane Orient, M.D., DDP President

8:00 am- The Health Risks of Radioactive Wastes. Bernard Cohen, Ph.D. Dr. Cohen is Prof. of Physics, Univ of Pittsburgh, and author of Before It's Too Late: A Scientist's Case for Nuclear Energy.

9:00 am-Biologic and Epidemiological Foundations of Radiation Hormesis. Myron Pollycove, M.D. Dr. Pollycove, a member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is Prof. Emeritus, Lab Medicine and Radiology, UCSF.

10:15 am- A Climate History of Earth: the Last 1,000 Years. Sallie Baliunas, Ph.D. Dr. Baliunas is a Sr. Scientist at the George C. Marshall Institute and the Harvard-Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory.

11:15 am-Ascertaining Mankind's CO2 Fingerprint: Why Is the Task So Difficult? Willie Soon, Ph.D. Dr. Soon is an astrophysicist in the Solar & Stellar Physicist Division of Harvard-Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory.

12:15 pm- Lunch: The State Established

Religion of Environmentalism. Vin Suprynowicz. Mr. Suprynowicz is assistant editorial page editor for the Las Vegas Review Journal and writes a widely syndicated column.

2:30 pm- U.S. Energy Follies and Opportunities. S.S. Penner, Ph.D. Dr. Penner is Professor of Engineering Physics (Emeritus) at the University of California, San Diego.

3:30 pm- Current Outlook for Defense Against Ballistic Missile Attack. Lowell Wood, Ph.D. Dr. Wood is a staff physicist at Lawrence Livermore Natl Lab and has worked on national defense for 35 years.

4:30 pm-Terrorism. Rear Admiral Tom Steffens. Admiral Steffens, a long-time Navy Seal, is at Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL.

6:30 pm- Reception and Banquet: William R. Graham, Ph.D. Dr. Graham has directed research on strategic system survivability and is former NASA Deputy Administrator.

Sunday, July 15, 2001:

8:00 am- Scientific Truth versus Politically Perceived Truth. Arthur Robinson, Ph.D. Dr. Robinson is President of the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine and editor of Access to Energy.

9:00 am- Can the Kyoto Protocol Be Killed? S. Fred Singer, Ph.D. Author of more than 200 scientific papers, Dr. Singer heads the Science and Environmental Policy Project.

10:15 am- Insects Versus Human Health. J. Gordon Edwards, Ph.D. A medical entomologist at San Jose State University, Dr. Edwards is a world-class expert on DDT.

11:15 am- Prion Disease. To Be Announced

12:15 am-Lunch: Lessons from the Nevada Test Site (and Computer Models v. Testing). Edwin York. Mr. York has participated in many nuclear weapons tests and designed systems for military and industrial protection.

2:30 pm- Civil Defense Worldwide (U.S., Switzerland, Singapore, and Others). Sharon Packer and Paul Seyfried. Mr. Seyfried is President and Mrs. Packer Vice President of Utah Shelter Systems; she is also a Director of TACDA.

3:30 pm- From Organic Waste to Energy: Destructive Distillation. John Toman. Mr. Toman is President of Pan American Resources.

4:30 pm- A New Essential of American Civil Defense. Cresson Kearny; CD Q&A: Panel. Mr. Kearny is America's foremost authority on expedient civil defense. He will discuss the impact of terrorism. Panel includes Mr. Kearny, Mr. York, Mrs. Packer, Mr. Seyfried, and Dr. Robinson.

* Registration fee includes the reception, two luncheons, and a banquet.

SPECIAL ATTRACTIONS:

The Nevada Test Site is celebrating its 50th anniversary. Several of our speakers or attendees, including Ed York and John Toman, have first-hand knowledge of the tests. Bus transportation and box lunches will be provided for our tour on Friday, July 13. We will leave the hotel about 7:30 am and return about 3:30 pm. Little walking is required. The cost for this event is only \$15 per person. Space is limited, so interested individuals should call early to insure a spot! U.S. citizens must supply name, address, birth date, employer, and Social Security number at least 3 weeks in advance. Foreign nationals must submit a special form at least six weeks in advance.

Our tour of the Nellis Air Force Base on Monday morning, July 16, will include the training facility and the Thunderbird Museum. Lunch will be provided at the Officer's Club. Bus transportation to and from the hotel will also be provided. The cost for this event is only \$20 per person. We encourage all to attend. Foreign nationals may require State Department approval 90 days prior to their visit.

Additional cosponsors include Physicians for Civil Defense, Access to Energy, and the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine.

NOTE: If you are not able to attend this year's events, or if you would just like to take part of them home with you, audio cassettes are available of each segment listed above at the rate of \$8 per copy and video reproductions are available at a cost of only \$20 per copy. For more information contact DDP directly at:

Doctors For Disaster Preparedness (DDP) 1601 North Tucson Blvd. Suite 9 Tucson, AZ 85716

PH (520) 325-2680

Press Release: Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway Arlington, VA 22202

Enhanced Hazardous Material Database System Now Available

The Technical Support Working Group, a Federal Interagency group focusing on developing new technology for combating Terrorism has sponsored the upgrade of the commercially available Palmtop Emergency Action for Chemicals (PEAC) system. The PEAC-CW expands the list of toxic chemical and includes 6 chemical warfare agents and 73 precursor chemicals, This capability was designed for use by Federal emergency and law enforcement officers, and all State and Local Fire, Law Enforcement,

The Journal of Civil Defense

HAZMAT, Bomb Squad, and other emergency/public government services organizations who may be involved with responding to terrorists, HAZMAT incidents, or other chemical spill emergencies.

The PEAC-CW system contains information from a number of sources, including NIOSH, NFPA, AIHA, MSDS, and DOT for over 10,000 chemicals and synonyms searchable by its chemical name or UN number including:

• Proprietary dispersion model that develops site specific Protective Action Distances based on input for meteorology, surrounding terrain, container size and orientation, type of release and chemical exposure guideline. Or display DOT ERG2000 values (green pages).

• Chemical and Physical properties such as flash point, boiling point, LEL, UEL, auto ignition temp, melting point, vapor pressure, vapor density, published toxicity levels, etc.

• Specific Chemical Protective Clothing information from manufacturers

• NFPA hazard Identification system (NFPA 704 - Standard System for the Identification of Fire Hazards of Materials)

- NIOSH Guidebook respirator recommendations
- · Synonyms list

• Access to procedures and recommendations for 62 chemical classes from DOT ERG-2000 Guide information (orange pages)

The computer-based system has been tested, certified and is available on seven models of the Windows CE Pocket PC's including:

• Compaq Aero 1550, Compaq, iPAQ H3100, and Compaq iPAQ H360

- HP Jornada 545/547/548
- Casio Cassiopeia E115 and E125
- Symbol PPT 2700

The PEAC-CW system is also available as a Windows 95/98/NT/2000 application for desktop and laptop PC's.

Aristatek, Inc. of Laramie, Wyoming developed the PEAC-CW system. The PEAC-CW system is available directly from Aristatek or its distributors by calling toll-free 1-888-463-6974 or 1-307-721-2211. Software can be purchased separately without a platform or preloaded on a platform (prices vary depending on platform selected) and quantity discounts are available. Detailed information is available online at http://www.aristatek.com.

METTAG PRODUCTS, INC. Medical Emergency Triage Tags For Use By First Responders



In the event of a mass casualty incident (MCI), where multiple victims are injured and require varying degrees of medical attention, it is absolutely imperative that first responders have a quick, easy, and reliable method of assessing victims and assigning them with an appropriate triage or priority status, based on the severity of their injuries. The best way to achieve this goal is through the use of a **Medical Emergency Triage Tag** (METTAG).

To place an order, obtain pricing information, or request tag samples, call **1-800-425-5397** or visit *www.mettag.com*.



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EM Assist is a comprehensive planning and training tool designed to aid emergency managers, first responders, as well as anyone working in the field of emergency response, recovery and mitigation.

EM Assist consists of over 8,400 documents, briefings, and images pertaining to every aspect of emergency management, from receiving funding, to training personnel, to responding to specific disasters. EM Assist is also cross-indexed and crossreferenced to both NFPA 1600 and the Federal Response Plan (FRP).

EM Assist addresses every aspect of needs assessment, design, development, and delivery of curriculum. It also covers all levels of training, from beginner to experienced professional, and includes videos, briefings, forms, and templates for tailoring training to local needs.

EM Assist also offers professional Consulting Services for training, community disaster response planning, EOC management, resource management, group dynamics, leadership, and team building.

If you would like more information about this dynamic innovation in emergency management planning and training, contact Bill Karl at (256) 832 - 0350, or visit http://www.emeocassist.com.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE ASSOCIATION

The *Journal Of Civil Defense (JCD)* is the official publication of The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA). The *JCD* is published quarterly and is designed to aid both the private and professional sectors of American citizens by providing thought-provoking articles that encourage the reader to take appropriate actions and steps toward preparing themselves and their communities for disaster and emergency preparedness, response and mitigation.

TACDA was established in the early 1960's in response to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Since that time, our focus has expanded in order to include current threats and modern deterrence and mitigation solutions.

The American Civil Defense Association is a non-profit, non-political organization dedicated to providing strategic civil defense, disaster preparedness and disaster mitigation resources to all sectors of American society and abroad, and to promoting reasonable disaster preparedness activities and sanctity of life for all.

TACDA's member base is comprised of a diverse group of individuals, organizations, institutions and agencies all sharing the same fundamental goal of preserving life and property through the promotion of proven reasonable civil defense, disaster preparedness and emergency management strategies and techniques.

TACDA strongly encourages reasonable disaster preparedness activities for all sectors of American society and abroad, whether for a single family or for the entire nation, in an effort to help citizens avert danger and save lives.

Interested individuals and/or agencies that would like to become members of The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA) and help themselves and others be better prepared in the event that disaster should strike, are encouraged to contact TACDA at any time. A one-year TACDA membership will entitle you to receive a one-year subscription to the Journal of Civil Defense, periodic association updates via the TACDA Alert newsletter, access to disaster preparedness and emergency management supplies, resources, and product advertisements as well as many more benefits.

The price of a 1-year membership to a single individual or family is only \$25 per year, and the price for a single organization, institution or agency is only \$50 per year.

Please, send a check or money order for the appropriate amount to the address shown below. TACDA also accepts VISA, Mastercard and American Express. If you would like to purchase a TACDA membership online, you may do so by visiting <u>http://www.tacda.org/</u>.

TACDA Contact Information:

The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA) Post Office Box 1057, Starke, Florida 32091 Phone - (800) 425-5397, Fax - (904) 964-9641 <u>http://www.tacda.org/</u>

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